Interesting and emotional discussion over at Abu M over Ricks' new book and its winners and losers.
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?bl...36754182659039
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Interesting and emotional discussion over at Abu M over Ricks' new book and its winners and losers.
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?bl...36754182659039
I'm only a quarter through the book, but it is obviously a social/political history (not a military history). The two stories being told are:
1. How did the change in political direction come to take place? That is, how did Pres. Bush come to oust Rumsfield and give control of the war over to a group of people who would implement a strategy at odds with Army institutional attitudes.
2. How did the US Army transform itself into an (arguably) effective COIN force? "Arguably" only because I don't want to digress into the whole can of worms about how to conduct COIN. The point is, a lot of people recognized we were going in the wrong direction and went to great effort to change direction.
Who moved troops where and when and why and etc. is completely beside the points the book is making.
I'm losing sleep sorting through the book:D
I'm enjoying Ricks' observations and perspective on the strategic and operational level, but he has left out significant tactical narratives. I suppose this history is simply too rich and too new to be told now.
Off the top of my head, five major battles were neglected:
Pre-Surge:
1. Nov 2006: Battle of Turki Village: movement to contact, 5-73 Recon killing 110 enemy.
2. Jan 2007: Battle of Turki Village II: Clearance of AQI training camp, 5-73 Recon and 3/1 CAV, 250 EKIA.
3. Feb 2007: Battle outside Najaf: 3/2 Strykers and SF killed 300 EKIA.
Surge
4. March-July 2007: Battle of Baqubah: 3/1 CAV and 3/2 Strykers
5. March-Aug 2007: Battle of Diyala River Valley, 5-73 Recon and 3/1 CAV
Several KEY BCT and BN Commanders were left out- COL David Sutherland, COL Townsend, and COL Andrew Poppas. Not to mention COL John Charlton's and 3/3 ID efforts following Niel's success in Anbar.
v/r
Mike
you that it's emotional. Also agree with the Anonymous poster who there who said "This thread is evidence of that fact due to the ignorant trolls who showed up with y*****be quality comments."or words to that effect.
Not that Tom Ricks, AM or anyone else cares but put me down for siding solidly with Carl Prine on this one.
I also agree with J. Wolfsberger, it is emphatically a political and social screed, not a military history simply because the author is not a military historian and doesn't claim to be; he's a journalist turned writer which tilts him almost automatically into the social and political trivia and gossip arena. The world is full of such books, most hardly worth the price IMO (YMMV). Haven't read it so cannot comment on its quality but if it echoes the overall quality of Fiasco, I don't expect to either learn much or be impressed by the book.
He does reference Townsend and the SBCT he commanded in his para about the promotion board he chaired, and 1/3 ID gets credit for following 1/1's start and the Battle of Donkey Island is briefly mentioned.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
As I mentioned on AM's comment thread, and Ken says above - he's writing a narrative, not a history. As such, there is already much teeth grinding over 2d squad, 2d Plt, B Company, 69th Infantry's omission from the book. With all of them - you have to evaluate - did the inclusion or exclusion significantly impact the validity or outcome of Ricks' narrative?
I also remind a lot of mil guys - there were very few reporters and a lot of battles. If you haven't written the 1st hand article on an event you were involved in, do so and send it to the appropriate branch pub or military mag. One reason 1/1 and 2-37 AR have been heavily written about is that their commanders took the time to write their experiences for publication.
In another thread I took a 2ACR SGT to task for complaining about his unit's exclusion in Martha Radditz's "The Long Road Home". I then asked if anyone had written their story or told it outside the unit. The answer, of course, was no.
No writing, no publicity/credit/honor for your guys and their efforts.
(Not directed at you Mike, but I hear this a lot)
Niel
From J. Wolfsberger:
Thanks. Now, I understand Ricks intent a bit better. On a positive note, he is at least sharing the story to an uniformed American populace.:)Quote:
I'm only a quarter through the book, but it is obviously a social/political history (not a military history). The two stories being told are:
Spot on. That's why I keep nudging my buddies, peers, and subordinates to write:)Quote:
Originally Posted by Cavguy
I think I figured out the storyline for Ricks follow on book. COL Gentile, historian, writes the comprehensive history of Operation Iraqi Freedom ten years from now when the dust is settled. Gentile's works sparks a massive overhaul of DoD to prepare for Conventional, Hybrid, and IW warfare. Ricks can then do a character transformation with Gentile as he did with Odierno from Fiasco to Gamble. :D
v/r
Mike
In the grand scheme of things, were those battles all that significant?
My unit spent a year unscrewing an insurgent safe haven in 2005, only to have an entire year's worth of work undone in a month because our AOR was handed off not to a US force, but to an undermanned, poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly led IA unit when we rotated home. My fondest, proudest memories in uniform were in 2005, where we got zero support from our disinterested BDE and hapless DIV, but still managed to stomp the crap out of insurgents and terrorists for 12 months. Regardless, I'll be the first to admit that, in the grand scheme of things, it was irrelevant, because every bit of progress that we made was deliberately squandered by handing off responsibility of the AOR to the IA before they were ready for it. I don't say that lightly. We had a lot of KIAs and amputees.
A lot of our guys did some incredible things that went unappreciated outside of our unit. They earned ARCOMs and Bronze Stars for acts that, if performed nearer to BDE headquarters, would have earned Silver Stars. But, if it's not relevant to the grand scheme of things, then I see no reason for its inclusion in this particular book. Maybe some day it will make for good fodder for a documentary, when all of those young guys are wrinkled old men with VFW and AmLeg hats.
Schmedlap, I generally agree with you. I can feel your pain on watching success crumble after RIP/TOAs and soldiers awarded Arcoms and AAMs; however, I have to take issue with the significance comment.Quote:
Originally Posted by Schmedlap
I can only speak for 5-73 as I was not with the Strykers. All of our operations were nested with the BCT, DIV, and CORPs campaign plans.
Significant achievements outside of tactical accomplishments:
1. Defeated two AQI training camps pushing fighters into Baqubah, Baghdad, and Saudi Arabia. (Strategic).
2. Stopped a potential genocide between both Sunni and Sectarian forces. (Strategic).
3. We turned an economy of force shaping mission into a major campaign. (Operational).
I apologize for the rant, but throughout the fighting, our 300 man squadron suffered 23 KIA and 100 WIA. The significance matters to me. LTG Caldwell summed up the squadron's operational effect here. As I stated initially, I usually agree with you, but in this case I think you are being far too pessimistic. Our story simply hasn't been told yet.
v/r
Mike
My original intent of posting those five battles was to inform not to try and spout "look what we did." Actually, I was hoping others would highlight other battles too. I like reading about how different people solve different problems.
It seems like every other day I'm hearing a new story about the heroic actions of a small group of soldiers or units in this Captain's War. It fascinates me.
Hopefully, this eleviates some of the tension in an otherwise emotional thread and topic.
v/r
Mike
Understood. My question posed was not rhetorical.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
But it is the third book to present a journalistic first reading of the history of the turnaround in Iraq. The other two are Bob Woodward's, the War Within (the 4th of his Bush at war series and with The Commanders an excellent longitudinal report of how the NSC sytem functioned or failed) and Linda Robinson's Tell Me How This Ends. So far, I think that Robinson's is the best of the three but they are all worthwhile in that they each hold up different mirrors to the same events. Future historians will be indebted to these journalists as will college profs, like me, who can assign some good reading to their undergraduate students.:wry:
Cheers
JohnT
I'm picking up the book today and several of us are going to be using it in a directed study on Civil-Military affairs out here at the Naval Postgraduate School. (yes there are army folks here way out on the left coast) I'll save comments on it until I'm complete with it.
I look forward to the read, particularly to the 'transformation' of LTG Odierno. I had the distinct displeasure of being counseled by him in late 2003 around Balad while a BN battle captain. Seconds after a mortar attack I received an radar acquisition and directed SWT and platoons to the site (the SWT was only 1 minute out and platoons were in good positions to roll up the egress routes). Clearly I should have cleared and fired counter battery. He rectified my mistake by ordering a 2000LBS JDAM creating a new swimming pool for the farmer. Although I have no proof that act created more enemies I can say without too much trepidation that we made no friends.
Schmedlap said " A lot of our guys did some incredible things that went unappreciated outside of our unit. They earned ARCOMs and Bronze Stars for acts that, if performed nearer to BDE headquarters, would have earned Silver Stars. But, if it's not relevant to the grand scheme of things,"
I agree, looking at my second tour (2006-07) I am most proud of the work my company did on the southeast side of the river in Mosul. Collectively and individually the unit worked with the express purpose of making the IA and IP a more effective and more legitimate force. We made some great strides. (they seemed even bigger to us because we could compare them to what we had seen in the same area in 2004)
However after my BDE was transfered to Baghdad, many of those gains became losses...furthermore my company was involved in a significant fight just north of Najaf on 28 Jan 07. This action, an Ad Hoc affair of ODAs, MiTTs, IA, 2 Stryker Companies, and a liberal application of firepower form Attack Aviation, CAS, and AC-130s, killed over 300 and took over 300 prisoner. It prevented a large scale attack on the religious leaders of Najaf during Ashura which most likely would have had very poor repercussions to both the GOI and US forces.
I'm very proud of what my unit did. It entered an unknown situation, quickly ramped the level of violence up to a very high level. When the enemy surrendered as we assaulted into their trenches the next morning, young Americans treated those that had done their damnedest to kill all night long.
In the end the company earned about 75 valorous decorations for the event.
I'm proud of that too, they were well earned. Other members on this site who have cleared objectives that contain large numbers of men (and women and children) who died in battle perhaps would agree that this phase of an event is perhaps the hardest of all.
As I reflect back on the time I spent in Iraq I realized that I had rewarded my Soldiers for actions they took near Najaf at a much higher rate than I did their actions in Mosul. There are several reasons for this.
1. Najaf was pretty much textbook Big Army sort of stuff, we found, fixed and finished a big mess of bad guys who were dumb enough to stand and fight. Our Award system in the Army is built on WWI and II style conflicts which this action mirrored. As a recommender for an award, the definition for a BSM/V or ARCOM/V clearly fit. I was making no stretch.
2. This clearly was not the case for stuff we did in Mosul. When the IA base was filthy and my Sgts made their men do police call day after day until the IA sgts decided that it was a pretty good idea and oh my it is nicer not living in filth and boy you mean I do have some authority as an NCO. Or when the Jundi, when executing a raid realized that you did not have to trash the house upon entering it. etc etc. but these things are not easily quantifiable and I think to give a reward your stretching it a bit to fit COIN type 'goodness' or 'individual merit' into the current award system.
Looking at how we reward Soldiers:
1. Pay-you are not getting any more being on a MiTT team which in the grand scheme of thing is supposed to help us with our exit. My point being that you may be the COIN God but are going to get the same $ as the guy in the battlespace next to you who is not.
2. Promotion-The army has paid some lip service to how advising will assist in getting you promoted...there are other forums on this site to discuss that, however I would argue that almost everyone is being promoted anyway...the officer doing the best thing for grand scheme will not be rewarded any more rapidly than the officer who in in a BCT and crushes bad guys (when he can find them) The first true 'cut' today and in the near future is the command board after an officer pops to LTC. I'm not as fluent with the enlisted side so I wont comment there
3.Awards-Clearly they favor the guy who crushed the bad guy; or demonstrates some incredible courage after some bad event has occurred to his unit. (I'm not in anyway saying that these things are bad or should not be rewarded)
However it seems to me we have a situation where we want someone to do 'B' yet give them an Award for doing 'A' :((this is borrowed from Steven Kerr)
I'm working on a Thesis here which argues just this point, that the incentives are not aligned and this hinders our ability to successfully conduct COIN. (Clearly there are many reasons why we are not so hot at it, as many of the forums here discuss, I'm just focusing on the Award system)
Thanks for reading my rant, it perhaps belongs somewhere else but I'd appreciate any of your thoughts on it.
MikeF, hope to see you soon bro.
While I've not read "The War Within" or "The Commanders" I have read "Tell Me how this ends" and liked it, even if it does strike me as a love letter to General David Petraeus.Quote:
Originally Posted by John T. Fishel
May I also suggest The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq
by Bing West