Wow…first…let’s define this debate a bit
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Granite_State
But even this characterization is largely false. Much of the slaughter of the Western Front happened for more complex and common sense reasons than a fixation with "attrition warfare" (ex. the Somme, pressure had to be relieved on the French, a British Army largely made up of green conscripts was justifiably confined to simple tactics). Douglas Haig is usually depicted as the stereotypical Western Front "chateau general," but he was a cavalryman who was always looking for a breakthrough, not an attritional victory. He was a "maneuvrist!" And this is probably the purest example of "attrition warfare" that can be found.
Wow…first…let’s define this debate a bit…simply…Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict = Maneuver Warfare…based on the above comments we need a sand box to play in here that is smaller than a universe.
If you are calling Douglas Haig a “maneuverist” meaning a Maneuver Warfare general (= Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict) because as a former calvary officer he was always looking for gaps (at the Somme or anywhere else), I strongly disagree. 600,000 causalities in exchange to relieve pressure on Verdun and movement of the front line by 10 miles = an attritionist in my mind. The technique of surfaces and gaps does not define a maneuver warfare general…but I would say that a maneuverist is someone who is always adapting. Compare Haig to Ludendorff…Haig is severely criticized for lack of adaptability … compare to Ludendorff who changed both Germany’s defensive and offensive doctrine in the middle of a World War.
not the way I remember it...?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Infanteer
Merry Christmas to you as well!
Seriously, the narrative of the military literature on Maneuver Warfare seems to be:
1. Lind and co. create MW; Wrong! As an Obnoxious Buzzer sounds. Yes, Lind coined the term “Maneuver Warfare” but what he was talking about was Boyd’s Patterns in Conflict. I would say it went something like …Boyd and his first acolytes win the E-M Theory war with the production of the F-16/F-15. Boyd retires. Boyd then comes up with Destruction and Creation…”Tada! A snowmobile is born”. Boyd enters his monk phase reading and analyzing war. Destruction and Creation is important because the snowmobile method is what Boyd applies to develop Patterns. “Let us take it all apart; pick the best pieces; and build a snowmobile”.
2. MW catches on and, in a flurry, is incorporated into doctrine; From my observation, I have an issue with the phrase “in a flurry”. In 1978 I was introduced to Patterns of Conflict as a student at Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico. In 1988-1989 my Command and Staff College Class was trying to figure out things like Commander’s Intent, Mission Orders and so were a lot of other folks. That’s ten years and we are just starting to get serious.
3. Critiques of MW appear; They did?? Where? If you got any please send me the references.
4. Critiques are not answered, instead 4GW is created (which isn't ever taken seriously); and I agree here….4GW was a definite MW spinoff and a distraction
5. MW falls into relative disuse, slowly becoming a footnote in doctrine, but leaving some "maneuverist traces". Yep! Can’t argue with that…after Desert Strom the debate, study, rigor and work on Boyd’s theory dropped into a black hole.
If you have copies of MW apologia in the light of all the literature critical of MW and its theoretical foundations, I'd love to see it. In light of literature? Literature? ..sorry you just completely lost me here…references?