Do Nations really surrender?
Fuchs' example of Czechoslovakia made me think of the Polish forces' surrender in 1939. I think Poland as a nation never officially surrendered. In 1940, France, as I remember the case, did not actually surrender either. An armistice was signed by General Huntziger, perhaps on behalf of the French Government, but no peace treaty was ever signed.
So perhaps a first step in the process would be to decide what counts as surrender. I think we have a fairly clear case of what that means when military forces surrender--they lay down arms and agree to stop fighting as an armed force, usually for a specified period of time.
Nations, on the other hand, do not surrender in the same way. I submit the people of the occupied parts of the the nation either acquiesce in the process of being absorbed by their conquerors (or at least being detached from the rule of their former government) or accept their government's agreement not to do whatever it was that caused their opponents to start fighting with them in the first place. I am not sure that this would be surrender in the same sense that an army surrenders though. Just as the "contracts" by which governments are established/receive their legitimacy seem to be somewhat mythical, I think national surrenders as datable events are equally chimerical.
How would [I]I cite The Life of Brian[I]?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
wm
Survival may take precedence over liberty in most cases, but strong religious convictions may trump survival at times. Besides
this scene from
The Life of Brian, two examples come to mind. But, neither fits the original proposition as I understood it. The two examples are the Jewish Revolt against Rome by the Zealots, and others, (66-70 AD) with the famous last stand at Masada, and the subsequent revolt led by Bar Kochba (132-135 AD). Perhaps some of the 7th-12th Century campaigning by the native population against Byzantines, Moslems and Mongols of various varieties that occurred in the historical lands of what is now NE Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan might also count as a refusal to quit regardless of what the central authority did. However, again, this does not really fit the original scenario. The fighting was conducted by monarchies or aristocracies, and, as with the Jewish Revolts, the reasons for fighting tended to be related to religious differences or to oppressive taxation by a conqueror.
Actually, they fit very neatly into the scenario, but religion is an interesting hybrid of identity and something else that I haven't quite figured out yet. In a society built on common identity with loyalty to a single leader (or ideology) then death of combatants and even civilians is easier to tolerate as long as the group and its leader survive. It is not about the individual, it is about the group.
"If I can't have it no one can"
My last post requires some clarification. Since I am lazy I am going to cut and past in a section from something else I am working on in order to make it clear. In this section I am introducing Weber's ideal types of legitimate authority. I only extract the first two sine the third is not relevant to the discussion.
Quote:
"Max Weber – Three types. There are multiple types of political legitimacy. Perhaps the best known is Max Weber’s three pure types of legitimate authority. These are traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic. Traditional is legitimacy built on adherence to accepted principles and personal ownership of the public property. An example of traditional legitimacy is the monarchy. The oldest son of the dead king becomes the new king. That is the way it has always been done. That is all the justification that is needed for the oldest son to take the throne and be accepted by the people as their leader. More precisely, there is no other person with a greater claim on the throne than the oldest son. Anyone else is illegitimate. In addition the new king inherits all the property of the kingdom, which is viewed as privately held by the monarch. Loyalty is owed personally to the king and the king often decides whom his ministers are.
Legal-rational legitimacy is built on more bureaucratic ideals. People create political systems and methods of administration to achieve specific goals. Once these systems are created, and as long as they continue to perform their desired function, they are legitimate. There is also a distinction between who owns government property and who controls it as part of their public duties. The bureaucrat never has personal ownership of the money, land or equipment he may use to accomplish his governmental duties. He cannot bequeath his position to anyone and loyalty is not owed to the person but to the position he holds. There is a clear line between his public duty and his private life."
Loosely speaking, traditional legitimacy is associated with autocratic systems while legal-rational legitimacy is associated with democratic systems. So if the autocratic (or theocratic) leader sees the country as his personal possession he is more likely to fight till the end and, when frustrated, do everything he can to stop his enemy from ending up with the prize. "If I can't have it no one can". A democratic leader has no personal connection with the country (other than loyalty to it). He can cut his losses and run. It is also the nature of a democracy that power transfers on a regular basis. Trying to maintain it till death is not in the nature of the political system.
This could be an explanation for why there would not appear to be a "surrender" in the WWII cases as well as why others will destroy everything rather than lose.
This does not explain why religious zealots appear more willing to give their life for the cause. That is a question that has to be looked at from the individual level. But at the system level, some commonality in the way things play out may be possible.