Not that a study might lead to action...
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USIP, 20 Aug 07: U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations
Complete 12 page report at the link.Quote:
• The first obligation of an international intervention force in a peace or stability operation is to provide security for the civilian population. Inevitably the arrival of foreign military forces is followed by a breakdown of public order.
• Historically U.S. military forces have been unable or unwilling to perform police functions to control large-scale civil unrest. This was true in Iraq, where looters destroyed government buildings, cultural centers, and commercial areas.
• The United States lacks civilian constabulary (gendarmes) or other national police forces specially trained for crowd and riot control. Instead the U.S. relies on civil police provided by commercial contractors that do not perform this function.
• Fortunately the U.S. government is taking steps to address this deficiency. Current State Department plans call for creation of a Civilian Reserve Corps that would have a police component.
• There is no agreement on the ultimate size and character of this police capacity. However, the history of U.S. interventions from Panama to Iraq argues for a robust capability.
• A review of U.S. interventions in post-conflict environments demonstrates that the United States has repeatedly needed highly capable police forces but has lacked the capacity to respond effectively. The case studies in this report provide lessons applicable to future operations.
• The State Department’s current efforts are a useful first step that will give an opportunity to create the basic infrastructure for expansion of U.S. capabilities in peace and stability operations.
Given the subject, I thought I'd throw in this older document; it's quite relevant, and is not referenced elsewhere on SWC:
Conference Report: Assessing the Role of Stability Police Units
Quote:
On April 4-5 2005, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) conducted a two-day assessment of “The Role of Stability Police Units” in peace operations at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.
The objectives for the workshop were to advance the development of common doctrine and operational procedures for all parties involved in the employment of Stability Police Units (SPU) and to assist CoESPU in establishing a network for discussion and harmonization of SPU doctrine. The focus of the discussion was on the international response to the riots in Kosovo on March 17-19, 2004, and the lessons that should be learned from that experience.
This report summarizes the panel discussions, with an emphasis on what doctrine currently specifies and how the response to the Kosovo riots might inform that doctrine. The report concludes by identifying gaps in current doctrine and discrepancies among the international organizations that field SPUs.
JSOU, Feb 09: Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN - The Thick Blue Line
Complete 110-page study at the link.Quote:
....Joe Celeski’s current work on the role of policing in confronting security threats highlights the need to shift resources and emphasis towards policing, law enforcement, and internal security. Law enforcement and internal security are key pillars in a comprehensive national security strategy and are often underemphasized. As the campaign against terrorist networks shifts out of a combat phase, the competition between governments and terrorist groups for the public’s support, a key element in irregular warfare, will occur in noncombat zones. It is in these noncombat zones that the police and other internal security elements of governmental power will be critical in negating terrorist network access to populations. The military’s role in these operational environments will be significantly reduced, but select support will be required and this effort will fall heavily on the Special Operations Forces.
This monograph explores the complexity and challenges a government faces in organizing and training multiple levels of a nation’s various police institutions. Through a thorough and excellent analysis, the author highlights the differences of policing in a counterinsurgency environment versus traditional, peaceful societies. He further amplifies his discussion of counterinsurgency policing through a series of vignettes. The true danger of failure in the current campaign is that a successful irregular warfare campaign in one region may spur additional challenges across the globe, and Joe Celeski argues persuasively that the police are the “thick blue line” in this type of campaign....
RAND, 24 Apr 09: A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities
Quote:
This project investigates the need for a U.S. Stability Police Force, the major capabilities it would need if created, where in the federal government it would best be headquartered, and how it should be staffed. In doing so, it considers options based in the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. The project was conducted for the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute PKSOI). Its purpose was to make recommendations to PKSOI, the Army, and the community of rule-of-law researchers, practitioners, and policymakers on the need for (and characteristics of) a U.S. Stability Police Force.....
Good job by the authors. I think their recommendation is viable but also think they missed a bet by not looking at four totally USAR MP Brigades of a small Headquarters and four Battalions each. The Battalions would be located in four parts of the country and their subordinate Companies could be further distributed. This would require some travel but the result would be worth it. See the USNR Submarine program for a way to do it.
Personnel recruited should be only serving civilian police officers to insure continuity and experience in required skills. Many already serve and they serve in a variety of ArNG and Reserve units -- offer that demographic a Cop-centric option and they'll flock to it. Use the USAR to leave the Guard-joining Police Officers for State missions. My bet is this would be cheaper than the hybrid proposal and would avoid adding to an already unwieldy Federal civilian bureaucracy.
"The people are the police and the police are the people." Robert Peele
The case for the police and the law cannot be overstated in coin, peace-keeping, MOOTW, conflicts, small wars. IMO The US Army MP has to utilize and develop the LE skills and advisor skills necessary to confront the persistent conflict. We have been in this mission for a long time but as many of you commented we reinvent the wheel every time like it is a new idea. IMO Covert/Special Forces are the tool for creating insurgencies and overthrowing government, (i really do not know that). Overt/Advisory forces support the legitimacy of the government and the Host Nation Rule of Law. We are once again capturing these lessons. Any input is appreciated.
Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961(passed in 1974) prohibited the military from training foreign police forces. The training thereafter was provided by exception to the law. Then it was amended for post-conflict stabilization.
A study by Rand lays out a much better case than I. Check it out.http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG819.pdf
Check the LINK.
Here's another that discusses Police training: LINK. Still more: LINK, LINK.
Generally, little new really appears here so it's a good idea to hit the search function -- which works pretty well -- to see if your topic has been previously discussed or cited; then you can just tack on to that thread. When you do that, it automatically will update the thread and move it into the recent posts category. Not a problem, just makes it easier to track things...
Continuation of the above.
1) Barney Fife can not do this mission.
2) Local police became local police to come home every night those that want to travel join the National Guard or Reserves.
3) By the time civilian capacity is developed to handle the missions we will forget why we(congress) need them and cut their funding.
4) LE experts apply Americanized justice to legal systems that are much more similar to Military Court Martials(continental systems) than common law.
5) Police advisors must be prepared and equipped to defend themselves.
6) This is the future (recent past and not to distant past) of war and diplomacy. We will be providing foreign police assistance as long as we fight and win our nation's wars and fix what we break.
You were given a reasonably polite tutorial -- which, of course, you're under no obligation to heed...
Having said thatCould you be more specific? Barney Fife is to my knowledge a fictional character so I presume you have some other point.Er, true. And the point is?Quote:
2) Local police became local police to come home every night those that want to travel join the National Guard or Reserves.
Probably true but you will have to address 22 USC 2420 (as you mentioned) Note that all exceptions to that law thus far are temporary.Quote:
3) By the time civilian capacity is developed to handle the missions we will forget why we(congress) need them and cut their funding.
True but is that a significant problem?Quote:
4) LE experts apply Americanized justice to legal systems that are much more similar to Military Court Martials(continental systems) than common law.
Also true. Most should be and many have.Quote:
5) Police advisors must be prepared and equipped to defend themselves.
Possibly correct and equally possible not correct. That applies to the future. With respect to the past, I'm not familiar with that many we've 'won.' In any event I strongly question whether one can 'win' in an insurgency...Quote:
6) This is the future (recent past and not to distant past) of war and diplomacy. We will be providing foreign police assistance as long as we fight and win our nation's wars and fix what we break.
Nor have I seen any instance of us fixing what we broke. Too early to tell in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The fact is that we Small Wars with a small footprint pretty well. When we commit the GPF in the FID/SFA mode, we do not do well for a variety of reasons -- most notably that Armies are very good at breaking things and atrociously poor at putting Humpty Dumpty back together and one should put considerable thought into committing them to such a mission.
I agree we will be providing police assistance in the future as we have in the past and I presume you have some thoughts on the topic but I'm unsure what, precisely, they are.
You may be hinting that the Active Army MPs should have the training mission. Aside from the cost to train MPs for that mission weighed against the possibility of no employment in that mode and thus stagnation and eventual cessation of the effort due to non-use, you may confronted with strong Congressional resistance to that idea...
I thank you for your advice and counsel. I titled the reply interrupted because my thought was interrupted in real life by my lovely children wanting to play. I did not intend any disrespect. As for the nature of my post I really wanted to see who was watching and replying. I will do my best to be more thoughtful in the future. Again thank you for the lesson.
the CPT and the SGM having met, etc.
The topic of a gendarmerie is near and dear to my heart; but discretion (and the presence of Tom Odom and Ken in prior posts) suggest that I read and understand this thread better - as well as the Rand report and the other like materials I've downloaded on the topic.
I shall return; but now I have to catch up with my wife, who is younger and faster than I (Ken will understand that :))
Mike
Barney Fife was ahead of his time when he said "You Gotta Nip It In The Bud"
Barney Fife-Nip It
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=de_P2aUZJyA
Upon review of the video evidence Barney Fife would be an excellent International Police Advisor.:)
Some people (not me) say that we can develop the advisor advanced skill set by removing the posse comitatus prohibitions. Thoughts? Federalizing the Military Police Corps?
I believe the utilization of the reserve and national guard sworn officers is the closest thing to the right answer.
I still owe you the answers to your questions Ken but rambling is more entertaining.
Or is it I resemble that remark. :D
No problems on the answer, rhetorical in any event...
IMO, Posse Comitatus should be left alone. There are advantages to both the nation and the Army. As you know, National Guard MPs can enforce State Law unless they are in Federal Status. The Reserve MPs have the same restrictions as the active folks.
Though it is noteworthy that Canadian MPs are sworn Federal Law Enforcement Officers with full power of arrest on and off post / base. Many nations have paramilitary police who fulfill the MP function for their Armed Forces and also have a full time civil police role, notably the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri and Netherlands Marechaussee...
was based on valid reasoning in its day, which still exist today. I thought much of the Rand memo was a non-starter because a domestic gendarmerie (whether overt military or under the subtrafuge of a civilian agency) would not fly politically. Actually, Ken knows more about the history of Posse Comitatus than I do - and he has actual experience in domestic pacification (Detroit riots et al). :) So, I hand off to him.
Using a gendarmerie in an insurgency (at the right times and places) seems a good idea to me - if it is an indigenous force. What if they don't have one ? Then, a civilian "FID" effort by the US would be a solution. What, we don't have one - so, who are the trainers ? Form a small unit in the FBI (who want to stick their nose into everything overseas) and send them to countries who have gendarmerie units (e.g., France, Italy and Spain). After their training, they would then be the training base for host nation units.
Very quick thoughts off the tip of my skull.
This thread has a different and related LE theme: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5029
Much of that thread is around the police in Small Wars and a gendarmerie.
davidbfpo
Link:http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htm...inecops23.htmlQuote:
The Marine Corps has created its first law-enforcement battalions — consolidated units of military police officers trained to investigate a variety of crimes. Combat in Iraq and Afghanistan has underscored the relevance of such a force, as Marines have increasingly found themselves playing street cop in addition to combat duties.
For those closer to the US scene this may not be a surprise, although I did wonder why the US Army MP brigades weren't enough.
"..although I did wonder why the US Army MP brigades weren't enough."
David,
It is my understanding, based on an article I wrote and conversations I've had, that the Army is uninterested in re-establishing Constabulary units (which is what these law enforcement BNs sound like) because the Army doesn't think it ought to perform such missions.
Our MP brigades are not designed to perform constabulary/ gendarmerie duties though I think they could transition rather quickly for such duty if needed. But given that the Army seems more interested in returning to a pre-9/11 mindset and training focus (big, conventional wars vs small wars/ stability ops), it's good that the Marines are taking this on as we will quite likely need such a force during the next few years (Syria?). Just my two cents.