A probability if said POI is seen as too
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Originally Posted by
CR6
If it is indeed a sham (and I don't know either way), is it a concept problem or an issue with execution? Any POI, regardless of how brilliant, can become mediocre through indifferent implementation.
far away from the party line. Not necessarily an accusation of malfeasance though that has certainly occurred and will again. It also sometimes happens even if the boss(es) support it but the worker bees, rightly or wrongly, have a gut feel it is wrong or too different from their experience -- or that the product will be too good...
Jealousy is a really stupid vice and emotion but it's out there and take strange forms.
In the early 80s, Benning ran a select Cadre operated IOBC, picked a super CPT and two great SFCs for Cadre who'd be responsible for a large percentage of the training for one OBC Company. In 12 weeks they produced what everyone acknowledged was the best class in memory. Benning tried to expand it and asked for more water walkers -- HRC (then MilPerCen) said forget it; they'd take what the pipeline spewed forth. Benning did, tried to expand the Cadre system with routine fill; quality plummeted and another good idea died at the hands of the Personnel system.
As you say:
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"Any POI, regardless of how brilliant, can become mediocre through indifferent implementation."
You cannot get great results from mediocrity...
I keep getting ideas for a blog topic and you smart guys keep scuffing them...
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Originally Posted by
RTK
...To be honest, I'd like to have another 40 days at BOLC III to focus in on the basics and fundamentals of mounted maneuver with my students. Realistically, that will never happen.
Not in the current environment -- but if we get smart, it will. Shy Meyer tried to get a year long Basic course; HRC (then MilPerCen),TRADOC and the Schools didn't want it because it adversely impacted officer distribution and instructor contact hours --which BTW is a dumb way to staff schools and TCs. We need to fully train new entrants and we do not do it -- that literally kills people as the untrained and partly trained make bad mistakes. Plus the partly trained require considerable watching so that contributes to micromanagement.
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In all fairness, I would say that the benefits of having those young lieutenants in BOLC II probably allows those in other branches the benefit of having a tactically proficient individual to learn from who probably already knows land navigation, basic rifle platoon tactics, and leadership because their success rate for failing to exemplify those traits in combat arms will find them jobless rather quickly.
True; the solution to that used to be to require Officers in other branches to do two years combat arms duty. That provided a lot of LTs as PltLdrs and gave them some great training. The civilian educators hired in the 70s told the Army that was wasteful -- it was not. Hard to do now because the Army is over-officered. Cut back from the current O:EM ratio of 1:6 or thereabouts to a more realistic 1:12 and everyone would be better off. Then we could return to 2 yrs CA duty...
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I think we should also revisit the branching system where performance during BOLC II impacts branch selection more that a board during the senior year of college or the "I picked my branch" method like at USMA. I think BOLC II should have branch representatives that have a draft and select BOLC II students based off their college credentials, ROTC or USMA military education, and performance at BOLC II.
Good idea.
I'm aware of all that but disagree with much of it
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Originally Posted by
Hacksaw
...maybe just maybe you could stock the schoolhouse with enough studs to effectively implement, but then the CTCs would suffer... we were, for very good reasons, a CTC-centric Army pre-2003...
Been there, saw that, scheduled rotations for it. I understand but do not totally agree all the reasons -- or the results -- were good (at least up to my DAC retirement in '95, lost track after that). The CTC like any other training evolution has good and bad points.
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there is a far better arguement to staff studs at IN/AR-BOLC III given the reality that new LTs are as likely as not to be thrown into the meat grinder prior to his first unit rotation through a CTC.
That sounds like an acknowledgment that combat is more important than a CTC rotation... :D
We can agree on that.
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The universal AAR comment from SAMS is "this is what should be taught at ILE" -- problem is you have to have the faculty to actually make it happen...
True but that elides the point of my earlier comment to RTK -- the Personnel system is flawed AND all persons are not equally competent even though that system likes to / is forced to pretend that is the case. Horses for courses and all that...
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Wasn't this thread about impact of professional writing :D
Still is, minor digressions only bother the conformists. ;)
Compel Subordinates to Write!
This was a terrific thread. Some of the comments made me flash back to experiences at OBC, too, which was scary!
A few contributions and responses to comments in here, for what it's worth.
I have never personally seen or experienced someone close to me come under fire for something published in a professional journal. On the flip side, I have never had a commander or superior who encouraged people to write articles, either.
I don't know if that is typical or not, but if it is, it is unfortunate. One of the biggest weaknesses I have observed over the past few years is the military's ability to communicate effectively in writing. At the Battalion and (SF) Group level, I saw poor written communication hamper procurement of critical equipment, impede preparation for deployment, and most critical of all, delay execution of operations. Where I sit now, in the five sided/five rings of hell, a poorly written document could potentially staff until the end of the universe itself, with no action taken.
As a Group XO I directed my entire primary staff to submit a written article based on their respective specialty area. I am now the lowest ranking guy in my office, and luckily I don't have a d*ck boss who is compelling me to write anything :); however, if I am ever in a tactical unit again, I will compel all of my subordinates to submit articles to professional journals once again. As a military, we rely on email and the written word in general to convey critical thoughts; officers need to be adept in this domain, especially as they get older, or they will be at a disadvantage.
Someone wrote about quality control problems at OBCs after the late 1980s; I can attest to that! I went to IOBC 91-92 and it was absolutely terrible. All of the instructors were SFAS failures marking time until they got out of the Army, or people who had gotten in trouble for one thing or the other. I went to IOAC (now the career course) in 96, and we had a Captain in our small group who had trouble READING, and had to redo land nav, the write for life superorder, etc; he was supposed to go to the 25th ID, but they sent him to be an IOBC instructor instead. Awesome! Someone told me that the Infantry School did better with quality control later on, I hope it's true.
Also, someone wrote about the issue with being able to do a SAMS-like POI at CGSC is manpower/human resources; I think that is debatable. It does not take a genius to teach the SAMS POI, and it is more student driven than anything else (readings, driven by discussions); the exercises are student driven as well. The SAMS POI might compel students and instructors to step away from mediocrity, but so be it. The Army would be better served.
SAMS cultivates a mystique about being uber hard, and there are probably leaders who don't think the average field grade could hack it. But come on, how hard is SAMS now, anyway? Back in ought-four, You could do PT in the a.m., attend class, read most of the afternoon in the library, and still have enough go-juice left to drink a few pints of Guinness at that crappy dive bar on 3rd street in the late afternoon. Is it way tougher now or something? It beats working.