Londonstani reports collection
Moderator adds: This thread was called 'Londonistani reports from Pakistan' as he has now moved back to London, via Syria, it has been renamed and some recent posts on another thread have been copied to here. Jon Custis and I like his writing style. I think his views are important on the non-lethal aspects of 'small wars', so he has his own thread, which is rather unusual. (ends).
Londonstani is a correspondent for the CNAS blog "abu muqawwama" and has been sending in some great reports from Pakistan>
His latest is at:
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam....html#comments
My comment on it was: Great Job!
I would only add one more thing: Your psychoanalysis of the "common man's" confusions may be correct, but dont underestimate the layer of confusion ADDED ON by army psyops to whatever was inevitable and expected in ANY human society.
The army has been running the country in one form or the other since 1953, they have a lot of leverage in the media (much of it unrecognizable to the casual observer). They have a particular interest in trying to project foreigners/Indians/CIA/Jews as the cause of all our troubles. And that interest may not even be primarily ideological (meaning it may not be because the army is all jihadi). Some of the motivation may be more pragmatic: The army high command may be willing to change course on the jihadi issue and even kill its own creations but they are NOT willing to sit back and let bloody civilians run the country as they see fit. If they accept responsibility for this mess it wont take long for ordinary people to realize that the "corrupt civilians" have done much less damage to the country than the super-efficient smartly dressed military patriots, which means the bloody civilians may be giving orders to generals one day.....
I know this sounds too conspiratorial (maybe it is, maybe some bloody civilians have been blaming the army so long, they cannot think any other way), but I suspect that the high command is pretty shrewd when it comes to their interests in the power game. Bottom line: if the army wanted, it could actually demonize these talibans and terrorists much more. The problem is, they want them demonized, but not to the point where people start asking questions about "strategic depth"....Of course, they may actually believe their own propaganda. Its very easy to believe what is in the interest of your pocketbook..
Updated report from on the ground
Abu M's correspondent 'Londonistani' has revealed himself now; link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...erant-peaceful
and has written a short commentary 'In search of the real Pakistan', sub-titled
With extremism on the rise, it is more important than ever to support the tolerant, peaceful elements of Pakistani society and link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...erant-peaceful
Engaging Pakistan's moderate majority
A thoughtful comment article, which could fit a number of threads. Hat tip to Abu M and the comment is on Afpak Channel:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...erate_majority
His penultimate paragraph:
Quote:
For decades internal and external actors have been exploiting religious fervor in Pakistan for political gain. That feeling has morphed, evolved, and developed a life of its own. The future of Pakistan will be decided by the outlook adopted by its people. And as of yet, that outlook is still being formed. Right now, despite the best efforts of extremists, the majority of Pakistanis see the core principles of their faith revolving around peaceful coexistence, social justice and community service. If the public sees Barelvis and Deobandi leaders marching their communities to war, the groups will threaten their own legitimacy. On the other hand, if extremists succeed in redefining what is considered "Islamic" and convincing ordinary Pakistanis that differing views of religion are worth fighting and killing over, the consequences will be devastating for Pakistan, and disastrous for the world.
He adds this on what the West can do:
Quote:
A few months ago, I read Hilary Synnott's International Institute for Strategic Studies report Transforming Pakistan. I thought at the time that Sir Hilary's suggestion that the international community basically take it on itself to transform Pakistan was unrealistic and an even bigger disaster waiting to happen. However, I'm beginning to think that a major game change is needed and the only question remains who the real domestic partners should be. The best option, and the most willing potential allies, are the general public. The question is how to approach them and how to tool the options avaiable to the international community so that they actually work effectively.
The above comment comes from the article and there is a poor discussion on:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...-pakistan.html
Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism
A short eleven page USIP paper on strategic communications by Amil Khan, aka 'Londonistani', which examines the messaging used by extremists and their opponents:http://www.usip.org/publications/pak...ives-extremism
From the summary:
Quote:
extremist strategic communications efforts build on Pakistan’s existing narratives to portray events related to Pakistan as proof that there is an ongoing war against Islam....Unlike extremist communications efforts, strategic communications efforts to counter extremism in Pakistan typically do not deploy messages built on Pakistan’s narratives.
Ouch. Now for the future:
Quote:
Any strategy toward counterextremism communications in Pakistan should draw on Pakistan’s existing narratives and its sense of itself. Indeed, these narratives provide significant opportunities for counterextremists to attack the vision and worldview of groups like al- Qaeda. Strategic communications efforts against extremism need to move away from crafting the “right” message from the practitioners’ point of view and move toward focusing on emotionally engaging the audience.
The author's bio:
Quote:
Amil Khan is a director of Breakthrough Communications Ltd. Before working in strategic communications, he was a foreign correspondent for Reuters and later worked for the BBC. He speaks fluent Arabic and Urdu and has lived and worked in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. From 2009 to 2012, Khan was based in Pakistan consulting on strategic communication projects for nongovernmental organizations, governments, and private organizations.
Link to Londonistani thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8870
Londonstani reports from Pakistan..
Londonistani is back, now commenting on the Middle East; analysing al-Baghdadi's "I'm the Caliph" speech at Friday prayers in Mosul:http://www.londonstani.com/blog/2014...the-narratives
Quote:
As opposed to Osama's empty threats and Zawahiri's tirades, Baghdadi casts Muslims as not a downtrodden people but a nation - represented by his caliphate - who are ready to extract their revenge. Unlike his AQ predecessors, he isn't looking for unrealistic concessions from Western powers but demands allegiance and assistance from Muslims across the world - his new constituency.
But it's about more than just messaging. ISIS has learnt how to synchronise its communications, military and political efforts for best effect. It makes sense that the group would use Sunni frustration in Iraq to cobble together an alliance to take territory. But to hold its gains, it seems to need to move quickly from a shaky coalition based on Sunni grievance to something bigger. The announcement of the Caliphate and the bold speech are part of that.
He concludes:
Quote:
Like AQ, ISIS's weak spots are its inflexibility, extreme sectarianism and propensity for bloodshed. And like AQ, it gains support when it can claim to be acting to "save" its core Sunni community. As many commentators have said, in real terms the announcement of Baghdadi's caliphate may mean little, but the Jihadi movement has turned a significant corner and what remains to be seen is what he can use it to do next.
Sharp-eyed observers noticed he was wearing an expensive Rolex watch on his wrist.
Londonistani had had a break from blogging, he has been working to support the media work of the Syrian opposition. His old thread on Pakistan is here:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8870
There is a short commentary on:http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world...to_pledge.html
Public opinion can no longer be ignored
A reflective look at Syria and the wider region, one that is optimistic - not for today, but for the future:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amil-k...b_5617178.html
The challenge for our Western governments (mainly I shoudl add as SWC has members beyond the West) is:
Quote:
For Western policy makers, getting ahead of the curve requires accepting the new reality and working with it to bring about stability and security built on rights and justice instead of repression.
Jihadi Rap so powerful there is little to counteract it
A snappy title for his latest thoughts: 'Al Qaeda’s New Front: Jihadi Rap The suspected killer of James Foley represents a new, dangerous merger of gangsta hip-hop and Islamism'.
Within is this passage:
Quote:
It is clear to me that one of the main reasons that al Qaeda’s ideology is so powerful is that there is little else to counteract it. The majority of the Syrian opposition, activists and sympathisers as well as fighters, are still moderates seeking a state that respects the rule of law, protects the rights of its people and does not differentiate on the basis of ethnicity or beliefs. But these principles have not yet been developed into an ideology that can inspire, motivate and mobilise.
Link:http://www.politico.com/magazine/sto...l#.VARK1qORcdV
Terror in Paris: we lost this propaganda battle
Terrorism is invariably armed propaganda, Londonistani argues that the reaction in the "West" has given the violent Jihadists a victory, as they:
Quote:
...always relied on a sort of geopolitical judo, using its enemies’ strength against them by making them prove its own worldview
The idea, as stated in the jihadi strategy document “Management of Savagery,” is to “transform societies into two opposing groups, igniting a violent battle between them whose end is either victory or martyrdom.” The best way to make sure the intended audience understands the justification for the attack is to make the attack itself self-explanatory, the strategists behind the document say. Clearly, the targeting of Charlie Hebdo, a magazine well known for printing images that many, if not most, Muslims would find offensive, but were seen as part of a cherished European tradition of free expression, fit very comfortably in this strategy.
...the attack is sharpening differences between communities and isolating European Muslims from their countrymen.
How a group sees its place in wider society is a key factor in recruitment to extremist organizations. When a community feels victimized, an opportunity presents itself for champions and saviors.
Link:http://www.politico.com/magazine/sto...l#.VLprByxx8dV
His arguments, are not easy IMHO for us to accept. We are not the primary audience for the violent jihadists, they aim to get more support, especially recruits to their cause.
Rarely does officialdom consider how the opposition is likley to react, let alone preparing messages that do not give our enemies yet more "ammunition".
Thanks to contact with a "lurker" this Sun Tzu passage is very appropriate:
Quote:
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
