Counterinsurgency Strategy: Staying Put
7 June Christian Science Monitor - Counterinsurgency Strategy: Staying Put by Charles Crain.
Quote:
Last fall, US Marines swept through Qaim, a cluster of towns and villages along the Euphrates River, and wrested control from foreign jihadists.
Over the years and throughout Iraq, the Americans have followed up similar successes by returning to large bases miles from the nearest major town.
That distance allowed insurgents to return and regroup.
But in this region of about 80,000 people near the Syrian border, the marines have stayed. Under the command of Lt. Col. Julian Alford, they followed up Operation Steel Curtain by spreading out over a dozen small bases inside towns and along major roads. Lt. Col. Nick Marano and his marines took over in Qaim earlier this year and are using the strategy to push into towns and villages that are seeing an American presence for the first time.
That presence has helped the Americans prevent insurgents from reestablishing a large-scale presence in the area. This spring, marines are building more new bases in the rural areas east of the major towns here...
Staying Put - Smaller / More Numerous FOB's
It amazes me that we are just now deciding to utilize this tactic for building security. I don't know if in the past it was due to lack of troops (most likely excuse) or due to concerns for force protection (most likely in reality) that the U.S. military placed such emphasis on building large bases from which to operate. Looking at successful counterinsurgencies a trend is the need to do two things:
1) Utilize local forces to assist and eventually carry the burden of security
2) Operate based on intelligence - intelligence which can best be gathered by daily interaction with the population
This is not a post to discuss the first trend. Regarding the second trend though I believe from open source reporting that the U.S. is experiencing some success in those areas that we are now employing small bases allowing units to have more regular contact with the local population.
Establishing smaller bases throughout large areas has a number of advantages versus building larger bases consolidating U.S. forces. Building smaller bases increases the opportunities and frequency of contact between U.S. units and local nationals. Smaller bases allow a unit to be located directly in its area of operations, thus helping them to better understand and influence the environment. Smaller bases reduce the "commute" to a units AO and thus can reduce their vulnerability to establishing patterns of transit into an AO. Finally establishing a large number of smaller bases is similar to building multiple police stations in an area - it can generate increased security for the local populace by the near presence of security forces.
Drawbacks to smaller bases include increased force protection bills, an increased number of targets for threat forces, and increased vulnerability for logistics assets which now have to maintain these smaller bases. However, the short term increased risks are offset by the long term improvement in intelligence and security for the local populace. Even more so today when we can employ ever greater numbers of local security forces in addition to U.S. forces.
Agreed, those are the numbers I've seen.
SWJED, those are the numbers I have read as well. It seems that General Frank's original campaign plan called for around 380,000 troops. It also called for a lengthy air campaign prior to the ground offensive, ala Desert Storm. According to Bob Woodward in "Plan of Attack" Rumsfeld sent Franks back to adjust the plan multiple times. Lets face it, Rumsfeld knew what he wanted from the outset. And IMO, he used OIF as a proving ground to validate his vision of how the Army should fight, to show the generals that his way would work. I better stop before I get completely off topic.