F-35 and F-22 are not the same...
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Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
I wasn't aware that we ever LOST air superiority over Vietnam. When exactly did this happen?
That said, I don't have a beef with the F-22 as a tech test bed, but I have yet to be convinced that anyone is going to send it into a SEAD environment where it might get shot down (and I mean a real war environment, not an exercise). Remember the fuss when one F-117 got knocked down? A-10s can manage to a great degree because they can take lots of physical damage. Stealth aircraft simply cannot. And as so much of procurement is political, that explains much of the white noise that emanates from congressional hearings. Congress has always liked airpower because it's sexy and (more to the point) because its most strident advocates always promise that it brings war on the cheap.
I don't think anyone's proposing the M-60A3 analogy, but I do think there is a growing sense that the F-22 might be a "bridge" aircraft between the F-15 and the F-35.
We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.
The F-22 is the only aircraft we'd send into such an environment... The F-117 was old enough that it was not survivable, hence why it got shot down. The F-22 actually has a number of survivability enhancements as well.
The F-22 is not a "bridge" to the F-35... the F-35 is inferior to the F-22 in many ways, especially in air-to-air and DEAD. Not as survivable against SAMs either - the F-35 needs the F-22 to be a viable platform in the face of any adversary with double digit SAMs.
And yes, I know, I should follow Entropy's lead and just accept that I am not changing anyone's mind. Guess I'm just too stubborn to give up. :wry:
V/R,
Cliff
Politics isn't everything...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
Loss rates in Vietnam are interesting things, and had a great deal more to do with politics (both in terms of the Johnson administration and the Air Force's own doctrinal preconceptions) than they did airframes. Ken already ran the numbers side, so I won't rehash that ground. But when you consider that SAC's own way of doing business had a large role in the losses suffered during the first phase of Linebacker II it gives you pause.
I'm well aware that the F-22 and the F-35 are not the same. But I'm also not willing to be convinced in the perfection of the F-22 based on exercise results. So we'll just have to agree to disagree.:)
Sir-
I agree that politics had a lot to do with the less than optimum execution of the air war in Vietnam.
SAC's micro-management of the BUFF tactics definitely had a lot to do with their losses in LBII.
However, I was referring to the pre-1968 bombing halt loss rates.
The SA-2 and the MiG-21 combined had a huge impact on our loss rates until we developed effective SEAD aircraft and jammers, as well as tactics.
We started Vietnam with poorly trained crews flying 15-20 year old tactics, with missiles that didn't work, and jets not designed for the roles they were fulfilling. Not knocking the F-4, but it was originally designed to shoot non-manuevring bombers prior to them attacking the carrier... not for OCA/DCA against fighters and SAMs...
What turned it around? Training was huge... Top Gun, USAF FWS, Red Flag all had a huge impact. Improved F-4s with systems and missiles that worked a lot better made a huge difference as well. EA pods, PGMs, etc were big for the A-G folks.
The new double digit SAMs and Flankers with EA are the equivalent of the SA-2 and MiG-21 of Vietnam. I don't think the F-22 is perfect... but it is the only airplane we have that will be able to go up against advanced SAMs.
There's a reason why the F-15C was 104-0... and it wasn't just training. Training was definitely a huge part of it, but superior airplanes with better training are even better.
It seems like all of this is going to be a moot point anyway... see here.
I sincerely hope that the folks on SWJ are right about the future of war in the next 20-30 years...
V/R,
Cliff
This pertains to the thread.
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Originally Posted by
Cliff
I am absolutely sick of "experts" who have never been up against the threats we're talking about telling the media that the F-22 isn't needed, and the F-35 will be so much better...
So am I. However, I don't think anyone on this thread has said or implied that. The policy discussion you started has essentially been on policy, not the technical merits.
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The Thuds were not bought due to bad purchasing decisions... the Thud was bought to drop nukes on the Soviets... period. Unfortunately we bought aircraft only in preparation for (total) nuclear war... and trained mostly for nuclear war. Training and buying for only one type of conflict.... hmm, sound familiar?
The Thuds were bought for one war and used in another because the wrong war had been used to justify their purchase.
The announced strategy change, eliminating the myth of two war capability, will presumably be reflected in the QDR. If that reality is indeed reflected in the QDR and if what has been dribbling from most in the DoD heirarchy over the last few months is correct, the focus will be on the full spectrum of warfare and not just current fights. Thus I suggest you have been the one emphasizing training and buying for only one type of war, DoD does not appear to be doing that and no one else on this thread appears to be doing so.
That 'Full Spectrum' bit means that everything from dropping nukes to getting in the mud will be required / desired. We differ on what that means apparently. You see it as focusing on only one type of war, the current flavor thus producing a shortfall in a program you support. I see it as reflecting a realistic apportionment of funds among a number of needed programs -- to include curtailing purchase of one aircraft I've strongly supported as has been stated on this board numerous times.
That apportionment includes attempting to accelerate the purchase of an aircraft with less capability in some respects but which can be exported and for which agreements to buy from other nations exist thus lowering it's net cost to the US and enabling more of those aircraft to be purchased. As well as, of course, honoring those agreements, which may require added R&D or Engineering Change Proposal funding and thus impose unwanted but regrettably necessary unanticipated costs. That, as they say, is life...
An economic perspective...
From today's FP by David J. Rothkopf: Great powers aren't what they used to be...
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The United States is certainly at the moment a great power by any definition. We are the only country on earth capable of projecting force anywhere at any time. The U.S. GDP is almost three times that of the next biggest country, Japan and is roughly the equivalent of the next four added up (Japan, China, Germany and France.) To get a different perspective on the size of the U.S. economy relative to that of the world, take a look at this two-year old
map comparing the size of the economies of U.S. states to those of other countries.
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Are these "great" powers nonetheless still greater powers than the others of the world? Certainly. Most of the countries of the world are virtually powerless. Only 25 countries have the ability to field active armed services in excess of 200,000. Of these perhaps 17 would be considered very economically constrained and all but a tiny handful would be useless too far beyond their own borders. Only 25 countries have GDP's larger than the annual sales of the each of the world's 3 largest companies. (Not an apples to apples comparison, I know...but I offer it primarily to underscore the relative smallness of the rest of the world's economies. The 100th largest company in the world in sales, Target, has sales that total more than the GDPs of all but the 60 largest.) Most countries have precious little political influence and that influence tends to be diluted when it is channeled through low-functioning multilateral institutions. It is amplified via effective alliances but precious few of these exist on any global scale.
That said, as striking as the weaknesses of great powers may be, a parallel trend is that which gives the weakest access to powerful technologies (of mass destruction or political persuasion) that enable them to gain previously unavailable global stature and leverage. Twenty five countries are reportedly considering or planning nuclear power programs. Some of these will lead to nuclear weapons programs. Some of these will contribute to proliferation and making new threats available to weak states and non-state actors. And some of those big companies I mentioned earlier are now weighing in, using their global economic clout to influence everything from tax codes to trade regimes to who wins or loses big elections. So the ends are converging on the middle and the terms we are used to, great and small, powerful and weak, are coming to mean something entirely new.
All us metrosexuals use such phaseology...
Of course, in Oklahoma, you may not be aware of the latest trends... ;)
(Actually, too lazy to spell out RAM/MQC and go into training problems. :D)
Yes, indeed, it has been like this for all my lifetime...
See no sign of any change on the horizon, either... :D
That's all political smoke and mirrors though -- there has been little to no notice of the slippage in the mainstream media because they ain't too bright and stories like that won't sell ad space or time. For once the Pendragon spokes-squirrel is correct, that article is all old news and the Cabal -- that's what they are -- of affected Senators is simply trying to get traction because while the Authorization wallahs have spoken and said no more Raptures (bad choice for a fighter name, BTW, AF...), the Appropriation wallahs have not yet done so plus the conference to reconcile both Bills still offers hope. We can persuade 'em, think they. The Fat Lady has not yet warbled. :rolleyes:
The Aviation and specialist press has been full of it for over two years. Aviation Week (I feared poor Bill Sweetman was gonna have a coronary over it...) and Flight as well as the defense pubs have all reported it. My Jane's Defence Weekly and IDR have something on it in almost every issue. So if those idiot Congroids say it was hidden and they didn't know it, they have just proven they pay no attention to reality and focus only on the pork aspects. I don't belong to the AFA and don't check Air Force very often but I'd be amazed if they had not covered the issue copiously. All that, BTW is easily Googled, I'm sure.
One of the comments on your linked article has words to the effect that the F35 program is filled with graft and corruption and lies. Possibly true. As was the F-22 program, the LPD-17 and LCS programs, the EEV, the various MRAP purchases similarly filled. Yet, all those are really pretty good and not so crooked programs. For far worse, see the The A-12, the various CGN Classes of nuke propelled cruisers, the P6M, MBT-70 / M1 debacle (GM had the better tank but Chrysler was going bankrupt after all...). There are more that are even worse. Even something as simple as the M-16 / M-4 has a sordid history. :mad:
This is just business as usual in our nation's capital.
True. Since you mention it, I suppose some aren't familiar with the 'why.'
it's here; 10 USC §118.
It starts:
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(a) Review Required.— The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a “quadrennial defense review”) of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Note the time period to be forecast.
Here's Congresses big issue:
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. . .
(3) to identify
(A) the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and
(B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk; and
(4) to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to section 1105 of title 31. (emphasis added / kw)
The first highlight is their notice that they aren't going to fund everything everyone wants and 'they' are willing to accept some risk (nice of them...). The second highlighted item is their notice they're going to fund what they want...:rolleyes:
The QDR sprang from the post Cold War Dividend mentality in the mind of then SecDef Les Aspin (not as bad as Louis Johnson but bad enough to make Rumsfeld look like a gentle genius) and his Bottom Up Review (BUR) looking for that peace dividend. The BUR was the first appearance of the idea that the US should be able to fight two “nearly simultaneous major theater wars,” a riff on the the two-big-war standard of the Cold War. The bottom line of the idea was to justify major defense spending and force structure cuts. The BUR was seized upon by Congress as a way to get more spending clout than they already had so the QDR was born. It is essentially a waste of money though some good comes of it. Not much, some. I'll also note that as I said before; they never funded DoD to fight two wars (the mid-Reagan years came close).
It's all DC smoke and mirrors...