Now we sound like the cabinet.
It started as a simple exercise in bring more troops to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Now, we have shifted to an AQI focus that is transnational, and only secondary to Taliban in Afghanistan (to the extent they would provide a base for AQI).
Unfortunately, I am now hearing two potentially discrete objectives: (1) pursue AQI including in places that may be attractive refuges; (2) stabilize and improve self-governance in Afghanistan (via a new Army).
Last night, I caught CNN Andersen Cooper: Micheal Were and Peter Bergen argued for a major military increase to fight Taliban in Afghanistan; discussion included buying off warlords as an off-set to more troop deployments. Rory Stewart argued for a downscaled US/NATO mission to just AQI prevention, building a long-term development relationship to improve actual Afghan's lives, and, implicitly, an Afghanization of the internal/external conflicts.
Like Brezinzki's warning that sending more troops will incur more wrath and opposition to the "foreign occupier", and the debate over whether this is a COIN problem which can only be addressed by a COIN solution (based on the COIN staffing model, it all seems pretty complicated---but not in the military realm.
I agree with the opinion that the assessment says, if it is a military problem, here is what we need, but the crying out gap in that report is the political one.
What are we trying to achieve in Afghanistan?
My guess, and it follows some of Rory Stewart's approach, is that if our goal is to assure a permanant, long-term relationship with an adequately powerful governance group capable of limiting AQI influence over time, we may be talking warlords, Talib accommodation, and many other Afghanizations yet to be discussed here in the apppropriate depth.
The above-referenced long-term relationship is precisely what we failed to achieve in Iraq, and why I'll keep my gorillas boxes in the garage for the next round.
How do we establish long-term meaningful relationships with sufficiently powerful leadership capable of sustaining itself after our departure?
There is no grand strategy in shooting bad guys until our hunting license is revoked. The ones who survive become the next crop of bad guys.
Steve
Interesting thread. I have Grenades to throw in the water...
The People of Afghanistan -- the nominal focal point of a COIN campaign -- are not our focal point, they are an ancillary issue. So this, as Slap says, is not really a COIN Campaign.
The US political process has never, does not now and is unlikely to ever support the truly coherent planning that Steve would like or the grand strategy that Marc would like. We tend to wallow about and generally end up doing more good than harm...
MikeF has some good thoughts on AQ strategy and I agree that's what I would do and think that's what they're angling for. He ends with the question "What is our strategy to defeat AQ?" My guess is we have now realized we cannot do that and we will continue to disrupt and deter.
The Marines version of strategy is realistic -- you have an end goal, you have means and from that you craft a way. The Army version is idealistic and incapable of execution at an international level in most cases because you will never have all the means at your disposal; you have to do with what you have. I suspect that the 'policy maker' -- the civilian politicians -- have a variant the reads:"Ends+Ways+MeansMade Avaliable+Escape route=Strategy." I'm unsure that the three versions can be decently merged but I'd opt for the Marine version as being best for everyone...
Marc suggests metrics. The word to me implies relatively provable factual data points to facilitate logical decision making. He suggests:
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1. What metrics are used to track correlations between continuance of the Afghan mission and radicalization in the US /NATO nations and countries that "we" are trying to influence by diplomatic means?
2. What metrics are in use to track the GS reputation of US / NATO military forces vise a vis changes in diplomatic "power" and "prestige"?
3. What metrics are in use to track changes in US / NATO civil rights and freedoms in relation to the stated goal of a "war" on AQ?
4. What metrics are being used to track the effects of various "strategies" vise a vis national political polarization?
Since we are not looking at logical decisions but rather at political decisions, I respectfully suggest that each of those collections of metrics are not amenable to realistic numeration or positive/negative assessments but require rather nuanced and probably quite lengthy summaries -- and all of which will be subject to interpretation and /or spin by various wheels in the policy establishments (plural) as it would appear best for them. The President may have been a community organizer but as Steve said, he thus should be aware of the capabilities and the limitations of political intercourse (word advisedly used...).
Which is where we are. We went to Afghanistan to rid the world of Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, the principal policy makers did not comprehend the fact that it is not going to be destroyed -- it's not even going to be defeated, best we can do is disrupt and deter. That's what we're doing reasonably well and we'll get better at that. After we got there, we blew several attempts to "get Bin Laden" (which we weren't, correctly, all that serious about anyway) and someone or something convinced G.W. Bush to say we would stay and 'fix' Afghanistan regardless.
Thus we're there as a result of a flawed strategy that the Armed Forces / DoD did not particularly want to implement because they knew the potential problems, knew the civilian establishment would accept little or no responsibility for what they had ordered and that establishment would constantly change the rules. They also suspected they would be tasked to do things that were not their job in the process -- all that has come to pass.
Steve cites Rory Stewart who I believe has better insights than most and should be listened to. Steve then asks:
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How do we establish long-term meaningful relationships with sufficiently powerful leadership capable of sustaining itself after our departure?
Haven't been in that area for almost forty years but I suspect the Afghans haven't changed all that much. My guess in answer to his question is that you cannot and it is foolish to try...
What many in the Armed Forces want out of this is a military win. Not going to happen; never was. Most know that but the system demands that they try so they at least get credit for a draw. They will stay and do their best with what they are given but would much rather be elsewhere...
What most Western politicians want is a political win, a semi-viable Afghan state that they can chalk up a at least a tilted draw and which will not be significant problems until they're long out of office -- after that, they don't care. Not an ounce. For now, they'd just rather be elsewhere...
So it is now realized that we are not going to beat AQ, at least not in Afghanistan and thus we merely want to be sort of sure they won't resettle there until our disrupt and deter works better -- and it will. That leaves us with a need to 'fix' Afghanistan to some extent for several valid reasons.
The problem is that sounds nice but if properly done will be a multi-generational effort and neither the US or NATO are going to do that. We just want an acceptable outcome and the people of Afghanistan are not a major consideration. They never were. We will do as well by them as we can in order to achieve for The US and NATO and Pakistan and Afghanistan (in that order) an acceptable outcome. How do we get an acceptable outcome? What is an acceptable outcome?
We haven't figured that out as far as can be publicly ascertained at this time. Add to that there is NO 'right answer' but instead many alternatives of varying complexity and cost with even more potential variance in results. That's why no one can say what we are going to do...
Which, IMO, is to be expected and is better than trying to do something that simply cannot be done within the human, political and financial constraints extant. IOW, the means in the fullest sense are constrained, they always were and failure to consider those factors placed us in an unenviable position.
A source close to McChrystal
Writes
Quote:
This story is not about an argument between two powerful men. It is about an argument between two or more sets of strategic assumptions concerning the mission and desired end state in Afghanistan.
Read the whole thing - I think that quote is key but there's much there of interest.