Michael Mazarr's new article in Washington Quarterly is one of the better arguments that the U.S. military and U.S. strategy has shifted too far toward what he sort of nostalgically calls "asymmetric" threats. I didn't, though, find his suggestion that we revert back to preparing for MTWs very persuasive. I'm left wondering whether we're just searching for an alibi to perserve a very large military rather than deciding that we MUST keep a very large military.
He states, accurately enough: "The United States also ought to be clear about the range of conflicts that it has in mind when thinking about asymmetric warfare, a term that obscures more than it clarifies." then uses the term freely... :wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
Nor did I. In particular, I think this excerpt is ideally correct but practically virtually impossible to implement: "The United States would remain firmly involved in defense alliances around the world. On the nonmilitary side of the ledger, it would substantially increase its profile abroad in foreign aid, expanded diplomatic missions, cultural engagement, and much more. It would seek to address the underlying causes of asymmetric conflict." For six reasons; we do not have a good record in foreign aid and I see no indication of future improvement; our cultural interplay is not wanted in most of the world; Congress; the US system of governance and its lack of continuity; the underlying causes of conflict are deep, varied and too many to properly address; and, lastly, the fact that by definition, the asymmetric attacker will aim for those areas in which we do not possess overwhelming superiority -- it is predicting what those areas will be that presents the debate he addresses.Quote:
I didn't, though, find his suggestion that we revert back to preparing for MTWs very persuasive.
I have no doubt that some are doing so, some would go in the opposite direction but most I think are simply still trying to get an accurate sort on it (and good luck with that ;) ) to determine what to aim for.Quote:
I'm left wondering whether we're just searching for an alibi to perserve a very large military rather than deciding that we MUST keep a very large military.
Given the fact that the object in war should be to always be asymmetric in relation to the opponent, I'm distressed but not terribly surprised that most of the buzz I hear is aimed at reacting (in one way or another) to the other guy (whoever he is) instead of asymmetrically knocking him off balance before he does something we may regret.
That, to me, should be our strategic aim.
Too True, but from looking at the history of those who try to sell said object to decision maker's it seems to be an inordinately tough battle which is often lost to the much easier and emotionally driven reactionary standard.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Am I mistaken or was not one of young Alexander's greatest strengths the fact that he would ask his supergenerals how things should be done and then redteam it to himself. He would then prep battle plans not on what his generals would do but on how to use how the enemy was going to act against the predictable patterns and then find ways to throw his own offsets in the mix.
And all this before breakfast.
To me that is why you old guys carry so much weight in the bigger scheme of things.