A Modest Proposal to Adjust the Principles of War
A Modest Proposal to Adjust the Principles of War by LTC Gian Gentile at SWJ Blog.
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I propose a consideration to adjust the Principles of War as accepted by the American military since J.F.C. Fuller first came out with them in the early 1920s and the American Army’s use of them in the majority of its major doctrinal manuals. I do not propose radically new principles of war like Lieutenant Commander Christopher Van Avery did in a recent summer Armed Forces Journal article. His proposal of very different Principles seemed too “new-ageish” for me and in my mind wrongly assumed that the information revolution of the 1990s produced a concomitant revolution in military affairs (a still debated and contested notion by scholars). Too, with regard to Avery, I do not accept his historical premise of now as the time to radically adjust the Principles of War because of the so called recent RMA; one could easily make the argument that we should have produced new Principles of War shortly after August 1945 and the advent of atomic war and Bernard Brodie’s classic The Absolute Weapon...
From Doctrine to Principles of War
I was originally going to post this to the Dishonest Doctrine thread, but really it's a response to your blog piece.
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Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
I will be involved in it; but not the day-to-day running of it like when you were here. Yeah, that was a great experience; I especially liked the staff ride to Saratoga when we made Simon Frasier's line "Oh Fatal Ambition" as our motto. That was my favorite tee-shirt too until my son absconded with it.
Ah, Saratoga -- Hall was impressive, and it made all of the history of the Northeast just jump out at me, and it's been in big, bold type (so to speak) since then. I owe you guys one. Ref. your son's sticky fingers, that's why I bought a second one for my husband from the get go.
Reminiscing aside, I bring up your reference to Saratoga here because I have always found it ironic to have had that lesson* of the Rev War -- the French won't get involved unless the Continentals can prove they are willing and able to fight the Brits -- brought up in the shadow of OIF. I've been living in the shadow of Rochambeau -- literally, his statue -- the last few years here in Newport, and it's a lesson I think about a lot. (My slightly more strange interaction with Rochambeau was my son, for most of the time he was 3, shouting his name as we'd walk the dog past the statue.) How one intervenes in the domestic affairs of another state/entity matters.
Maybe this ought to be principle Minus 1 for wars of the sort likely to require COIN -- that is, don't even bother with the rest if you can't nail down this part.
And I disagree with the Curmudgeon that COIN is not "war." Perhaps Fuller's Principles of War ought to be renamed Principles of 20th C Conventional War, but the concept that war itself is only encompassed at the most high-explosives, internal combustion engine end of the spectrum is far too limited. The pinnacle of the most perfectly executed war, according to Sun Tzu, is the one which need not be fought because the weaker side realizes the futility of bothering to fight, putting it at the "no intensity" end of the spectrum. I don't cotton with the habit of labelling any significant effort a
"war," but neither do I think it is useful to exclude from the definition legitimate forms.
Cheers,
Jill
* Yes, there's debate as to the actual importance of the outcome of the battle, but even with a tinge of apocrypha the lesson itself has merit. If you look further at how the French intervened -- subordinating their army forces to Washington's command (happily and willingly, it seems, at least from Rochambeau and Chastellux's commentaries, which recount very good impressions of the General and his officers) is a big one in my mind -- I think there's even more that can be gleaned from the case.
Sigh. I was going to send a two word PM;
"Rabble rouser." :D
However, Norfolk beat me to it and publicly. Good job, Norfolk.
At the risk of being unintellectual and exposing my laziness, I see no problem in adapting the Principles to COIN operations as written, all it takes is a little thought.
I suggest COIN is war -- and not as some say the Graduate level -- it's more like 7th Grade; full of angst, raging hormones one knows nothing about and constantly shifting loyalties, likes and dislikes compounded by hatreds one knows not from what cause and frustrated and confusing parental 'guidance.' Plus an aging an imperfect infrastructure. Bad teachers, too...
Those Principles are just that, Principles. They simply give structure to planning and the goal of planning is to conduct successful operations at minimum cost to own forces. Thus the Principles are simply an outline and the plan is the body of work.
I've lived with those principles for a long time, they aren't perfect and not all apply in all situations but basically, they're pretty good and cover most situations I've seen in several levels of war.
I have, however long contended that Mass should be changed to Nathan. As in Nathan Bedford Forrest -- a simple reminder to get "thar fustest with the mostest." Those of a more formal bent may prefer Local superiority or even Schwerpunkt or any other term that connotes skill and agility and downplays Mass -- which should never have been first in the first place.... :wry:
Well, that's semi serious. Seriously, I have an alternative list that I've been packing around in my head for almost 40 years; I contend it is applicable to everything from life to all levels of war:
1. Surprise
2. Local dominance
3. Agility
4. Initiative
5. Simplicity
6. Objective
7. Execution
8. Economy of force
9. Security
Thus it was written in the gospel according to KW. Who by the way also points out that this version or the classic or Gian's should be viewed as readily shiftable in order, situation dependent but that the order shown will cover most situations. Yes, I know but people do tend to look at lists and consider the items in order -- particularly if there's an acronym to go with it. MOOSEMUSS = Mass; the American way of war... :D
Very seriously, excellent piece that deserves thought.
Simplicity is my watchword...
Ron said:
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I really like the simplicity part, somes of uss need things kept rather simple in order for us to keep up.
That would be me. I'm taking an anti-virus med that's supposed to have confusion as a side effect. I can't tell a bit of difference... :D
Gian said:
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I wrote the post because I found the idea of wrestling in one's head what they should be a good way to get at the deeper problem of defining the nature of war as we know it today and in the future.
Always a good idea to look long and hard and question everything (and most everybody ;)). I am convinced that we've gotten out of the habit of asking questions for fear of looking untootered. Since I can't spell it, I've never worried about it and I think we've gone too far with the oriental concept of face. Maybe too many shooters of messengers about. McNamara's 'zero defects' has a lot to answer for...
Good Blog item...
Selil said:
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...As such COIN is part of the conventional military operational capablity. Of course in my uneducated opinion I think amphibious operations are conventioanl military operations, and anti-terrorism is also conventional military operations. Nuclear missiles, drug interdiction, and training support of foreign militaries I think might be unconventional military operations.
I can buy all of that. But you are NOT getting me to climb down another Cargo net from a 'KA to the Mike Boa... Wha... Huh? They don't? When did they quit??? :o
Galusha is of note only due to the fact that he
was the youngest General ever; a 21 year old BG has got to have something aside from a family tree. Sherman was good, quite good. However, I think mayhap you ought to consider Daniel Morgan -- and your Guy Simonds is sadly under rated by many, good Corps Commander...