Its' find, fix, finish. Not find, fix, flee
Quote:
"But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
For those who have expressed concern over the issue of being all to quick to call in airtrikes for everything, we are in 100% agreement. The idea of containment of an enemy may work at times, situation will dictate. We had CAS on mission at times, but the FAMAS works just as well for what the Legion does. Now maybe the intent was to keep every commander from calling in a JDAM strikes and hellfires every time a mortar tube goes off, but if so that should be covered in a seperate CAS ROE.
If you can run away from the fight go ahead and do it? Gentlemen, none of us wish to harm any non-combatants, but the top down order to flee from the fight because there may be civilians in the compound, and they may be hostages of the insurgents is not a good plan. Loitering around waiting for them to come out and surrendur may not be all that bright either, you would risk your men to any rienforcements jihad joe could call up. One thign we must ask ourselves here in regards to civilian casualties is this. Were they really civilians, how do we know? If they were hostages and we cannot engage these compounds how can we reasonbly expect to clear, hold, or build anything? Do we really think that the civillian that got held hostage for three days and was tormented by the Taliban will somehow respect us more because we ran away and left him to the mercy of such men?
ISAF will likely come out of such situations looking like base cowards to the locals in many of these situations. They may see it as westerners making excuses for ISAF forces not to fight the Taliban. Putting myself in the enemy mindset for a moment; I can see already hear the jokes in the villages about Americans putting both SAPI plates in the backs of their IBAs in my mind. I know if I were a Mujahideen Commander I would order video cameras to be present for any long term occupation of civil compounds. That way I could get video of the kuffr running away and turn it into some good propaganda. I could also remind the locals of how when the Mujahideen came, the Americans and ISAF crusaders ran away.
Find, fix and finish is the simple and effective answer here. Not find, fix and flee. Having said that mouthful above I will say that I have a great deal of respect for the General, and I know I am being unfair to him by bieng so critical when I do not have the burdens of command placed on me any longer. I also know that regardless of the outcome, he has the best intentions in mind here.
Little guardian lawyer angels ...
Well, we went pretty quick from a change in the ROEs to prosecuting officers for war crimes - ready, shoot, aim.
Suppose every soldier had a little guardian lawyer angel (let's call him JMM), who will whisper the best legal advice (angel JMM doesn't whisper military advice). Angel JMM might whisper something like this. Niel Smith and Tom Odom, two officers that JMM happens to highly respect, accept the new ROEs; and believe that, if civilians (defined as friendlies) are killed, you my soldier ward could (not necessarily will) be prosecuted for war crimes. So, I'm telling you, scoot & don't shoot. You won't be prosecuted, none of your men will be killed (at least not here), and no civilians will be killed (at least by you).
QED (any lawyer angel who advised otherwise should be given a spaded tail & exiled).
Here is another legal opinion on the same topic. Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (2001; he rose in the world since):
Quote:
(p.5)
As Reisman and Antoniou indicate, the mere perception of LOAC violations can significantly impact operations. The Gulf War provides two examples of situations where LOAC was not violated yet the perception that it may have been had clear military consequences. The first concerned the attack on the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad that was believed by the allies to be a command and control node. Some experts concluded that the post-attack pictures of the bodies of family members of high Iraqi officials (who evidently used the bunker as a bomb shelter) being excavated from the wreckage achieved politically what the Iraqi air defenses could not do militarily: rendering downtown Baghdad immune from attack.[22]
Worried coalition leaders put the city virtually off-limits to avoid a repetition of like scenes reaching their peoples. Similarly, fears about the impact on coalition constituencies of the images of hundreds of burnt out vehicles along the so-called “Highway of Death” following an air attack on retreating Iraqi forces was a significant factor in the early termination of hostilities.[23] That result left the Republican Guard intact to slaughter Kurds and to help keep Saddam Hussein in power to this day.
22 See Michael Gordon and Bernard E, Trainor, The Generals’ War (1995), at 324-326.
23 Id., at 476-477. See also Colin Powell, My American Journey (Random House, 1995), at 520 (“The television coverage… was starting to make it look as if we were engaged in slaughter for slaughter’s sake.”).
This is a short 27 page article, worth reading in full by everyone.
End legal advice by little guardian lawyer angel.
No smiles or other icons - this is a difficult topic (as another officer I respect just posted - hi, jcustis).