Understanding the military that's being advised
It seems that the last few pages of this thread have highlighted an important factor that limits the effectiveness of any advisory effort but that never seems to get the importance it deserves: the internal dynamics of the host nation military. In other words, we can send in as many advisers as we want, but some militaries will not be able to noticeably improve their performance and this is due to internal factors ranging from cultural biases, societal cleavages (whether tribal or class), insufficient education, or interference from other host nation governmental institutions.
In terms of culture, it has been noted quite well in this thread that the failures of many militaries to adapt to the our advice can be traced to certain cultural beliefs or societal structures. Correct me if I'm wrong, but we are advising them on the creation of a western-style military which is characterized by such things as a strong NCO corps. There was an interesting little book published in 1990 called [I]Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914[[I] by David Ralston. In the book, he argued that as certain developing countries (Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, China, and Japan) adopted reforms to improve their armies by making them into a more European-like force, they then had to implement changes to their government, economy and society to ensure the success of the military policies. You can't just force an modern institution onto an underdeveloped country. While globalization has changed many of the conditions that affected the countries in the book, the fact remains that many countries today still harbor internal conditions that aren't that receptive to our style of military.
Nagl's legions of advisers ignores the fact that devoting that many people to the cause may not necessarily ensure a corresponding increase the military capacity of our partner nations. There needs to be an understanding of the needs of the targeted nation as well what can be accomplished with that country (and what it is willing to accept). Success stories seem to be in cases where the country is willing and able (Rwanda as mentioned by Tom Odom) or where we devote money, time and education (Colombia, El Salvador). We can't afford to do the latter in every country so we have to be sensible about the advisory effort. The advising debate seems somewhat similar to the economic development debate of the 1950s and 1960s (I'm not that old, but I do remember reading about it in my graduate poli sci classes. However, this was before the Navy when most of my brain cells saw fit to escape for some fresh air and never bothered to return). We assumed back then that we could help countries develop their economies if we provided them with enough loans, grants, and advice. That didn't seem to work well back then (or even now) because among many other things, some countries weren't ready or capable enough. I think the same thing holds true for building partnership capacity. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't try, but we should seek to target our efforts a little more wisely.
One last thing about Nagl's proposal (I'm going for Rob Thornton-like length with this post:)). We always talk about what we can do for the country being advised, but we rarely talk about what the advisory effort does for us (the US Military). If we want our Soldiers/Marines to be able to function in these new hybrid wars, then what better way for them to learn some cultural understanding than by going out and working with foreign soldiers in their own environment. You can't learn every culture but you can learn how to adapt quickly to other cultures. Additionally, advising provides a warfare education to our people by allowing them to see what other militaries do and what types of conflict/adversaries that they must face. If you want worldly soldiers, then you must send them out into the world and you want to do this before the war starts. This has been the exclusive province of SF and SOF, but this needs to change (or continue to change) so that the conventional military can reap these benefits. I do like the USMC FMTUs in that they're using regular combat MOSs to fill these slots. These guys can take what they learn and bring it back to the fleet.
Sorry, enough rambling for tonight. Hopefully, this made some sense.
Heh. Little fear of that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
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I would also warn against assuming that there is one type of NCO culture. I believe there are two or three successful models, but they are all dependant on how respect is gained in the varying cultures. The UK model would fall flat on it's face in the IDF and the IDF model would be unwelcome and uncomfortable for the British Army.
I go a lot further than two or three; there are a half dozen or so in the US Army alone, not least the three major Infantry type units which differ.
The USMC replicates some of them and has a couple of its own. The British Regiment; Scottish (Lowland and Highland subsets) Regiment and the Para Regiment as well as several others crew give the British Army a pretty diverse set as well. As you say, the IDF is a whole different ball game. There are probably as many types of NCO cultures as there are Armies -- or close to it.