Dinner with Al Qaeda without precondition
On two seperate occasions, I had dinner with Al Qaeda leadership and Sunni tribal leaders that actively supported AQI (mostly for financial gain). Now that the concept of talking to our enemies is in vogue on the tactical and operational levels, I wanted to see if anyone else had similar experiences and how you viewed the outcomes.
Personally, I believe that these talks were significant shaping efforts in our COIN efforts in my AO.
During the first engagement, I entered the meeting with a relative strength advantage in my town.
During the second engagement, I entered the meeting with a relative disadvantage in my town.
The first effort allowed me to understand the competing interests and grievances of the disenfranchised Sunni populace. Furthermore, I was able to identify and distinguish many reconciliables from irreconciliables.
The second effort allowed me to convey the determination of the US military effort during "the Surge." I was able to plainly articulate my ultimatum to AQI- either lay down your arms and negotiate peace or be subject to extermination.
The outcome truly amazed me. Over the course of the next ninety days, after some brutal fighting, the town was cleared and attacks went from six a day to almost zero. The hard-core AQI members not killed or arrested simply fled to other safe-havens. They didn't want to play anymore.
I'd do it again in a heartbeat.
Are their other stories out there of these engagements (not to be limited to AQI and the ME)?
v/r
Mike
I introduced the topic lightly
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
COIN is fundamentally political, and usually negotiations end the insurgency. In principle, I would not be opposed to talking to the enemy - but you also have to understand that when talking to someone you confer legitimacy - they can turn around and use the meeting to show how powerful they are, and sometimes they can use that to revive a dying movement ("look, I brought them to the table"). So proceed with care, but do it where appropriate and understand the second/third order effects.
Well stated Cavguy, and I agree with you that timing, tact, and circumstance are critical factors in determining negotiations, but I think that the concept of "legitimacy" underscores a significant conceptual block that we in the military face on a daily base in a foreign land.
In some ways, the enemy is already legitimate b/c they are native-an attribute we will never have.
Academically, it is refered to as the "meta-game," but my interpretation is that this game is the reality of what happens under the threshold of what we observe and interpret- the "real" environment in which we operate that we continue to attempt to penetrate through reconnaissance, surveillance, sourcing, etc...
True, talking to an enemy provides some legitimacy, but what if the legitimacy is already there outside of our purview. Regardless, any engagement provides the opportunity to gain intelligence and understanding, but I think you're correct in stating that it must be weighed in a cost-benefit analysis.
Just some quick thoughts as I grapple with the subject.
v/r
Mike
How do you train people skills?
Niel/Rob/Schmedlap,
All great posts, and it seems like we've had similar situations with differing outcomes. Rob, I'm in the process of trying to describe the engagements with AQI and other actions taking during "the Surge" that may have been innovative or creative enough to capture as a TTP, lessons learned, or simple case study.
Schmedlep brought another subject up indirectly that I've been considering for some time.
How do you train junior leaders to lead in an environment where they do not have direct authority/responsibility?
SF and FAO's train their leaders to negoitiate, coerce, exploit, etc in order to successfully navigate their way through mission sets. Many of us pick it up intuitively, but I think it must be instituted for greater success.
Now that we have to work with IA soldiers, tribal leaders, NGO's, PRTs, etc, we cannot rely on traditional means of leadership...i.e. I'm in charge so you will do what I say. This approach doesn't work. We have to learn how to teach our junior leaders a different form of leadership that is more collaborative and "people skills" focused.
One of my old first sergeants remarked that his time as a recruiter probably taught him the best lessons on how to persuade.
Just another issue I've been considering.
v/r
Mike