Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame
I've been reading the discussion on our SOFA negotiations with Iraq, and thinking about what the means for Security Force Assistance. I did not start out to write a long post, it just came out that way as I got deeper into the what I htought "sustainable security" meant with regard to Iraq. Anyway, I thought it might be worth discussing so here it is:
Greater stability in Iraq is a supporting policy goal of our desire for greater stability in the Middle East. Iraq has the potential to add to greater ME stability, or to detract from it. Key to greater stability in Iraq is sustainable security of the sort that accounts for its ability to defend itself against all enemies foreign and domestic. To do this a state requires a security sector that has accountability and oversight and is resistant to the abuse of power. It needs to assist the political leadership in considering the threats to its sovereignty and support the development of the ends, ways and means required to realize its domestic and foreign policy objectives. The security sector must fit the political, economic and cultural environment in which it is to operate. It must develop systems and processes which not only meet the requirements of the moment, but help set the course for meeting enduring requirements.
There is much in the news about our future security negotiations with Iraq, and whether our positions are impinging on their sovereignty, or impeding their ability to govern, etc. Maybe we need to discuss where we are in the movie with regard to sustainable security of the type that could facilitate more stability. I think there are several questions that might be useful in considering how our SFA (security force assistance) efforts (from advising to IMET, and from internal to external defense) can best help them achieve sustainable security. These are the same types of questions we go through ourselves when drafting our strategic security documents. Maybe it is worthwhile to try and consider Iraq’s pursuit of its security as if we were faced with their security issues. I am not saying impose our U.S. values on Iraq – I mean just given some of the geo-political issues they face.
1) What are Iraq’s interests & supporting objectives (short and enduring)?
2) Who would oppose those interests and why?
3) Of those who would oppose their objectives, why would they?
4) What do their enemies see at risk with regard to their own interests and objectives? Why?
5) How would they oppose Iraq’s interests? Would they oppose Iraq in a competitive, non violent (meaning everything short of violence), or would they oppose them through war (everything from IW to conventional)?
6) What does Iraq have in terms of resources, access, etc. that potential enemies might see of sufficient value as to go to war to obtain it (resources, security, access or denial of access, etc.)?
7) Who can be counted among Iraq’s allies? Why? What do they bring to the table?
8) Are their potential allies with like interests who remain formally uncommitted? Why?
9) What are the gaps in Iraq’s ends/ways/means equation that prevent Iraq from achieving its own goals of sustainable security while preventing others from achieving those goals which threaten it?
Question 10 is one that might concern us with regard to our own interests, objectives and SFA efforts, and how they match up with Iraq’s.
10) How do our current and future actions and efforts better enable Iraq to achieve its security goals while satisfying our own interests and objectives?
How best do our objectives and those of Iraq reflect something satisfactory for the U.S., Iraq, and the broader regional and international states and actors who have legitimate interests in Iraq’s future,? We need to consider it from multiple perspectives in terms of suitability & feasibility for the most relevant participants to get sustainable security. One of the things that I’ve been thinking about is the difference between securing yourself against four categories of threats: internal domestic; internal but foreign supported; external but domestic supported; and purely external threats. The four categories represent different combinations of threats and require different things from a state’s security sector. It is not meant to be along the specificity of the U.S QDR quad chart – this is meant to be more generic.
For the last few years the immediate threat has arguably come from the first two categories (internal domestic; internal foreign supported), our military efforts in support of Iraq have been geared toward combating those forces directly and in building Iraqi security forces in capabilities and capacities that can take over that effort (our by, with and through efforts). We have also been engaged in the Iraqi security sector in terms of the development and reform of those ministries and supporting institutions which provide accountability and oversight toward sustainable security. We have also assisted Iraq in development & reform of the economic and political sectors (reform should not be seen here as imposition of our values – just the reformation of things with the purpose of congruence in the objective environment as negotiated between Iraq and the United States). These efforts have become part of our FID & COIN operations, and our broader strategy.
But what about as we look down the road? The second category (internal but foreign supported) has been altered to include Iranian support, intimidation and interference, and because the interest have become more contested they have become linked to the third category (external but domestic supported). Linked in terms of how others see Iraq connected to their own interests and objectives. We continue to make progress in assisting Iraq with resisting this category through our development of the security, economic and political sectors – our BPC efforts. Between Iraq, and its allies (the U.S. and broader coalition) and there is evidence that sustainable internal domestic security is achievable. I’m not saying it’s a done deal, in fact I’d argue that it is reversible if we withdrew our support in a manner that did not fully consider the consequences of the action and did not account for the range of effects such an action would have.
One of the issues we must help Iraq consider is how to transition their security sector in a manner and at a time that allows them to address all four categories with assistance that meets their needs while not impairing their sovereignty. What direction and scope should our SFA activities take as we move from a focus on FID to one focused on deterring regional aggression and ultimately to one of fostering security cooperation between partners with like interests? Questions such as how soon can the Iraqis (with our assistance) develop committed, competent, capable, and confident police and other domestic services so that the military and supporting intelligence services can better assume those roles the state requires to defend it from external aggression? With the establishment of events that marks the ability to transition the Iraqi Military, the question arises of what type of SFA activities best support those Iraqi and U.S. policies with regard to not only Iraq, but the region, and how do we implement them with an eye toward sustainability? For our own requirements, what type of demand signal does the send in terms of SFA? And will we have the resident capabilities and capacity to assist Iraq? If we don’t do we develop them, or do we turn to another partner with interests coincide with ours and Iraq’s, and who now at a time where Iraq’s operating environment may be more politically accommodating is willing and capable of providing SFA? Are their other alternatives which meet both Iraq’s interests and ours?
continued..
Toward Sustainable Security in Iraq and the Endgame (Continued)
Secretary Gates has repeatedly mentioned the risk of losing of the endgame. While there is the ongoing discussion about the level and type of continued support to the government of Iraq with regards to the first three categories, what about the fourth category (external)? What are the external threats to Iraq’s sovereignty? As a consequence of those threats how are our own interests at risk? How can our security force assistance plans account for the fourth category and help Iraq reach its own strategic objectives? Our approach to securing the endgame must account for sustainable security in Iraq that looks beyond those security issues that we see most visibly right now, and consider the competitive environment in which Iraq must exist further down the road. As a region we know the Middle East will be competitive from both within and without for reasons that range from human security to regional intolerance and fear, to global energy consumption. These issues are often intertwined and overlayed with one another and/or masked by other out growth issues. The SOFA and SFA (Strategic Framework Agreement) negotiations set not only the tone of military cooperation, but also much of our future political and economic cooperation. A successful negotiation that both Iraq and the United States see as supportive of their interests and policies support both sustainable security and the securing of the endgame.
Our endgame with regard to Iraq is greater stability of the type that by its nature resists extremism and supports regional access and openness. It is underpinned through sustainable security. The development of committed, competent, capable, and confident security forces that are rooted in accountability and oversight are operational objectives. They must be in tune with regard to Iraq’s geo-political environment, and they must be in tune with Iraq’s political, economic and cultural realities. The endgame may not represent the “end” so much as it represents a point where the policy goals we share with Iraq are for most purposes irreversible and require what we might think of as the type of routine SFA interactions we have with other partners and allies for opportunities that strengthen interoperability and open the door for other areas of cooperation via increased familiarity and trust.
Best, Rob
The policy wonk and implementers
sure do forget it. Worse, there are millions out there (many of whom like to comment volubly on both sides of the political weblogs) who have never learned
Quote:
"...the quest for a silver bullet solution to foreign policy problems is very much like the quest for the Holy Grail."
Too much effort is expended in attempting to achieve the impossible...
Those are the understatements of the week...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
... but I think that has more to do with the entrenched power structures in Congress than anything else.
Part of the key may lie in the Department of State, but I'm not sure if their infrastructure is sound enough to carry consistent policy evaluation these days. If current events are any clue, I would say that it is not...:mad:
Me, too... :mad:
Good post and I agree. What you say tracks
with my observations over many years. My concern is that State doesn't get listened to (or adequately funded and manned) by Congress. That and the fact that the DoD geographic commands effectively end up setting foreign policy -- which is not their job and in fairness, most of them and most of DoD know that, it just happens by default no matter how much the GCC try to avoid it.
We could probably stop with the political plum Ambassadors, too...
On Consistent Policy and Speed of Change
The nature of bureaucracy is such that it supports consistency at the price of agility, flexibility,and speed of change. The counterweight to the bureaucracy is the rotating work force reprsented by the politcal appointees. Politcal appointees represent the new blood that brings new ideas; but they demand quick implementations in order to make their mark in the short(er) time they occupy their positions. In order for the system to work well, it needs an equilibrium between these two groups. Sometimes one side or the other seems to acquire more power, which tips the system out of balance. Buy it usually ends up correcting itself. America is currently at a watershed of shorts as baby boomer bureaucrats are exiting government jobs and retire in droves.
By the way, I suspect that military members observing and/or getting involved in the process tend to get rather frustrated because they, due to the rotational nature of their assignments and the "up or out" promotion policies that are carried out through centralized selection boards, need to make their mark in each assignment rather more quickly (sort of like a first-term President elected on a reform platform) than is common in the slow incremental change process that distinguishes the realm of government policy.
America could probably do this a different way. However, if we opted for a speedier process, I fear the US would be much more like certain Latin American countries in terms of the turbulence in its national leadership. Or, the US could end up taking as long as the UN or EU to implement watered down policies that really do nothing for any one.
You pay your money, and you take your choice.
The ways in which we think about security
Steve,
Quote:
Perhaps it is time to change our tactics and use a 'new marketing plan' to advertise this change in emphasis......
My thesis is that successfully isolating the civilian populace of Iraq from the insurgency has a significant economic component that has eclipsed the security component at this point. Though it may be politically painful for the current administration to consider, it is time for an Economic Surge.
Steve,
Great post and I think gets to the real heart of ow what security can mean outside of its physical context.
What really makes a population resistant to radicalization? or put in another way, what keeps violent competing ideologies from being attractive, taking hold and becoming a movement? What keeps terrorism on the margins - attractive only to the most extreme of the population? What keeps criminal activities from defining the norm? What builds faith in the leadership that they will provide the conditions in which the population can meet its needs?
Sustainable security in this sense does not exclude the people I think, it is contingent upon them. They must understand the stakes, but to do so they must perceive they have a stake. What makes a state viable? As we start looking at complex social systems we're starting to understand that progress in one area is often contingent on development or reform in another.
Iraq is starting to develop the monies it will need to develop an economy that could go beyond the hydro-carbon industry. While undoubtedly that will be a chief export (and much of the foundation on which the rest is built), stability probably resides in economic diversity. There is the potential for other mineral industries in the North, agricultural industries, banking, trade, and a history in many cases of a textile industry. Getting physical security to a point where economic development takes hold, and political development to a point where economic development is sustainable and encouraging to more development is the point where Iraq will succeed long term I think.
Key to realizing a development strategy I think is understanding the how systems interact with one another - and insuring that just because an area is not the concern of the moment, it does not get neglected, but is developed more in tandem with other areas so that one system does not grow so fast that is either unsustainable, or its growth crushes, over shadows, or unbalances the whole system. The challenge may be in understanding that although an immediate challenge may require a disproportionate amount of energy in one system, sustainability eventually comes from greater equilibrium - aka stability. This would seem to be the most important thing we should require from any leader - knowing when to take action (set or change course), and when not to act (remain on course) - this comes from understanding what problems are really problems and what are symptoms, and being able to resist the pressures of the moment, and our own biases - the second may be the leader's ability to set and manage expectations - which is in effect demonstrating the strength to lead.
Best, Rob
Public Private Partnerships
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
Key to realizing a development strategy I think is understanding the how systems interact with one another - and insuring that just because an area is not the concern of the moment, it does not get neglected, but is developed more in tandem with other areas so that one system does not grow so fast that is either unsustainable, or its growth crushes, over shadows, or unbalances the whole system. The challenge may be in understanding that although an immediate challenge may require a disproportionate amount of energy in one system, sustainability eventually comes from greater equilibrium - aka stability. This would seem to be the most important thing we should require from any leader - knowing when to take action (set or change course), and when not to act (remain on course) - this comes from understanding what problems are really problems and what are symptoms, and being able to resist the pressures of the moment, and our own biases - the second may be the leader's ability to set and manage expectations - which is in effect demonstrating the strength to lead.
Rob,
I appreciate the opportunity to think about and discuss this important issue with you (looking at this sentence construction makes me realize it sounds a bit stilted but there it is).
Understanding the area of operations culturally and tactically is vital to ensuring that we do not experience a Buddy the Elf tries to hug the Raccoon moment while attempting to share the love.
Business Theory is built upon employing and continually measuring the performance of manageably sized Business Units in order to achieve profitability. This is a good start point for a discussion about ‘how-to’ accomplish sustainability at the local level.
Witold Rybczynski, in Chapter 14 of his book Last Harvest (ISBN 978-07432-3597-6), discusses how community associations in US neighborhoods have taken on municipal responsibilities such as local security, street cleaning, trash removal, park maintenance, and water and sewage treatment. He notes that 30 million Americans currently belong to such associations.
The Congressional Research Service (Claudia Copeland) in their February 21, 2007 Report Water Infrastructure Financing: History of EPA Appropriations note that of the $51.3 billion dollars the EPA has used for water infrastructure programs since 1986 average grant sizes have shrunk from $18.1 million in 1995 to approximately $3 million today and are typically as designated special purpose grants rather than for regional projects.
Since privatization appears to work at the local level it is natural to ask if it works at the national level. Chancelor Adenauer of Germany is remembered for the privatization of Volkswagen, Britain’s Prime Minister Thatcher for the privatization of British Telecom, France’s President Jospin for the privatization of France Telecom, and Japan has (mostly) privatized Nippon Telegraph and Telephone. It is interesting to note that all of these examples come from countries, which enforce a ‘rule of law’.
Chile privatized Telefonos de Chile and Brazil has privatized Telebras, however we currently see a general backlash in much of Latin America against Privatization of State Owned Enterprises. Both Venezuela and Mexico do not support privatization of their Oil Industries (nor does Russia for that matter).
Privatization of State Owned Enterprises failed in Iraq, and I would submit that this was due to a number of reasons to include failing to implement a local network to sustain the populace prior to privatization attempts.
Jeffrey Sachs provides a stunning tour of ‘Why Some Countries Fail to Thrive and On The Ground Solutions’ in his book The End of Poverty (ISBN 0-14-303658-0). The Rand Corporation, in their Monograph # MG 557 The Beginners Guide to Nation Building, throws pearls when it notes, “Establishing workable financial controls without a banking system and in the absence of communications is a tall order. However, simple but robust financial controls can limit corruption. First, every school, clinic, police station, or other operating unit needs a budget.”
My experience in Iraq was that, on the whole, we favored high priced foreign talent and a top down funding process to our detriment. I was fortunate to be able to operate in an AO in which we had access to a significant amount of CERP funds and force ratios with one maneuver unit and later operate within the same AO with decreased CERP funds and decreased force ratios. It was a painful yet positive learning experience.
My AAR is that we that must successfully use the energies and desires of local people to develop local solutions to local problems in order to achieve a sustainable security solution in Iraq. Enabling our BCT’s with consistent local SME teams (trained and organized by Civil Affairs Teams, SF Teams, and MTT’s), expert comptroller teams, significant baseline CERP funding and the capacity to surge CERP funding as deemed necessary by the maneuver commander would go a long way towards developing sustainable security solutions. Long term the local maneuver commander will have to transition to the local power structure be it sheik, mukhtar, or group. We need to ensure this person or group is able to receive, manage, and be held accountable for the accounting stream that is the lifeblood of the AO. This is not a simple task as we all know well.
Regards,
Steve