AQ's M&A Strategy is a franchising network?
An impressive, short commentary by Daniel Byman, in the FP Blog; full title being: Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy Is franchising a successful way to build a global terror network?
Early on:
Quote:
much of al Qaeda's growth in the last decade has been the kind of expansion that any American businessman would recognize: They've systematically tried to absorb regional jihadist start-ups, both venerable and newly created, and convince them that their struggle is a component of al Qaeda's sweeping international agenda -- and vice versa.
Midway:
Quote:
When groups embrace al Qaeda's "far enemy" logic, they are also embracing strategic absurdity. Terrorist groups that succeed politically, like Hezbollah and Hamas, are firmly anchored in local realities and politics, and their success comes in part because their ambitions are limited.
Ends with:
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In all these cases, however, the United States should strive to separate the locals from the al Qaeda core. The organization's merger strategy is a double-edged sword: Al Qaeda has gained from its acquisitions, but it can also be hurt by them.
Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...and_a_strategy
IIRC some of these business strategy terms have appeared before and indirect responses. David Kilcullen in particular comes to mind, having read his first book.
The Five Habits of Highly Effective Terrorist Organizations
A follow-on by the same author, Daniel Byman, looking at AQ after a new lader is chosen:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...tions?page=0,0
Hat-tip to FP Blog.
He ends with:
Quote:
This list, while done with tongue firmly in cheek, does have some value for U.S. counterterrorism officials. As the above lessons suggest, al Qaeda is an organization prone to divisions, and Zawahiri will have his hands full keeping it even semi-unified in this time of crisis. Efforts like the drone campaign in Pakistan are vital because they kill skilled leaders, which are in short supply these days. U.S. information operations must take advantage of al Qaeda's blunders, making the terrorists defend their mistakes rather than gloat about their successes. And if the United States and its allies can decrease the number and scope of terrorist havens, it will be harder for them to form the in-person bonds they need to trust one another.
If there was a 'score card' to our post-9/11 response to the threat (there probably is somewhere) I'd rate information operations our weakest link.