The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars?
He's got his opinion about this, and it won't come as a huge surprise to the usual suspects in here.Quote:
(...) President Obama has described our military as “the strongest military the world has ever known.”
There’s just one problem with this...
That military just lost two wars in a row.(...)
If our military is so great, why have the last fifty years been so disastrous? (...)
(I don't agree completely.)
Winning is achieving your objectives. If the selected objectives are not achievable through armed force, or if mission creep shifts the goalposts to a point not achievable by armed force, no military mission will succeed, no matter what level of training and equipment are employed.
The US military is trained and equipped to defeat an opposing armed force. This it has done in the recent wars. When it was asked to build nations and install self-sustaining governments, success was a lot harder to find. These are not tasks that the US military is trained and equipped to pursue, and they are not tasks appropriate for a military force in the first place. Even the world's best hammer makes a very lousy screwdriver.
Not that the training and equipment are perfect (nothing ever is), but IMO the failure to fully achieve goals (call it "defeat" if you must) in recent wars was less due to military deficiency than to the selection of impractical and unrealistic goals that were not achievable by military force in the first place.
If "...the failure to fully achieve goals (call it "defeat" if you must) in recent wars was less due to military deficiency than to the selection of impractical and unrealistic goals that were not achievable by military force in the first place." then why didn't anybody say so in the first place?
Was it foreseeable that goals were unacheivable?
I recall believing - and writing - before the Iraq war that while defeating Saddam's military forces would be relatively easy, installing a new government and bringing it to a functional level was likely to be a very formidable task for which the US had little effective capacity. I think a fair number of people pointed out that mission creep in Afghanistan and the emergence of "nation-building" roles was handing the military a role that is not trained or equipped to perform.Quote:
Originally Posted by tjmc
Obviously nobody listened, but that doesn't mean we can't learn from those mistakes. To learn from them, though, we have to recognize them, and that means recognizing that the root problem is not lack of capacity in the military but the decision to assign the military a set of tasks that are simply not suited to achievement by a military force. The whole concept of "armed nation building" was fatally flawed from the start. My opinion only, of course.
Dayuhan correctly framed the issue, but to add when it comes to military capability there isn't any other military that comes close. Population centric COIN is a failed approach that the author of the article thinks would work if the military just adapted to it. The fact is the military did adapt to it and results are telling. When it comes to military activities to include engaging with civilians there is no better, but rightly so our core competency is waging and winning battles. In short we do have the world's best military, there is no other military who could have done better in either war (neither of which were lost) given the same policy objectives.
Idiot should check the scoreboard. It's a sure sign of ignorance to place these things in a win loss paradigm. Everyone loses its war. But there is a little less evil in some dark corners due to our efforts. We hear this too much. If you don't know keep your mouth shut.:mad:
Not sure what you mean because of grammar, but the Swiss will want to disagree if my suspicion about what you mean is correct.Quote:
Originally Posted by OfTheTroops
@Bill;
he's easily a top tier military affairs analyst if "highly naive" is the worst that can be said about his articles. There's not much shining competition...
I personally don't agree with his idea to about the direction to go (pop-centric COIN) and would if at all rather treat this as a political fight (=deal with those who have influence, don't try to influence millions of people directly).
I do believe he's more right about the "losing" thing, and consider your and dayuhan's position as rather reflexive partisan - especially in the case of Iraq, where the troubles were started more by occupation mistakes than in Afghanistan.
Furthermore I wouldn't place so much trust in the core competence of winning battles. The American way of warfare works well against near-defenceless opposition (at least superficially) and it works well with overwhelming resources. Competence is yet to be demonstrated in battle, and especially so in crisis. The 101st in Bastogne was probably the only U.S. Army ground forces formation that prevailed in a crisis with inferior resources - ever!
That's not much to show for. Too many Kasserines to contrast this with.
The current doctrine and near-total radio comm dependency of the entire army still needs to be proved to be an effective system in a conflict against a great power. I've got my doubts about the viability of the entire concept in such a scenario.
Agree there's little competition but believe that naivete is dangerous. Being intelligent, articulate and passionate does not bestow competence.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Agreed.Quote:
I personally don't agree with his idea to about the direction to go (pop-centric COIN) and would if at all rather treat this as a political fight (=deal with those who have influence, don't try to influence millions of people directly).
Also agree. We are victims of our own propaganda and are not nearly as good as we could be or should be.Quote:
I do believe he's more right about the "losing" thing, and consider your and dayuhan's position as rather reflexive partisan - especially in the case of Iraq, where the troubles were started more by occupation mistakes than in Afghanistan.
It should be noted though that we are as competent as most want us to be -- and allow us to be. Fortunately, that's generally been adequate and competitors have all had their own problems -- political and military... :wry:That's not totally correct. Just in the past century from WW I's 'Lost Battalion' and Belleau Wood to the failed defense of Bataan and numerous smaller actions in WW II -- the 101st may be the most notable in the Ardennes but there were other units that did well at the time against the odds. Add the 1st Marine Division at the Reservoir in Korea to dozens of smaller battles in both Korea and Viet Nam as well as some more recent examples. That said, while your statement omits a bunch of successes, it is broadly correct -- like all Armies, we've had more failures than successes. Thus OfTheTroops comment; no one wins -- and even the Swiss lost a few, not least Bicocca...Quote:
Furthermore I wouldn't place so much trust in the core competence of winning battles. The American way of warfare works well against near-defenceless opposition (at least superficially) and it works well with overwhelming resources. Competence is yet to be demonstrated in battle, and especially so in crisis. The 101st in Bastogne was probably the only U.S. Army ground forces formation that prevailed in a crisis with inferior resources - ever!
Me too. Doubts that is; we are far too technology, mass and firepower reliant. That's mostly due simply to the fact that we can provide those things (currently, anyway...) and accordingly have been unwilling to properly invest in, train and educate our forces. Dumb way to do business but Congress likes it. :rolleyes:Quote:
The current doctrine and near-total radio comm dependency of the entire army still needs to be proved to be an effective system in a conflict against a great power. I've got my doubts about the viability of the entire concept in such a scenario.
As most things it is mostly a grey affair but I think is always important to show the links between the society and the ressources it provides and it's military forces. There is nothing deterministic in those links but there is certainly a strong tendency in them.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
The great nomadic societies of the vast Eurasian steps tended of course to field highly mobile forces almost all horsed. But the degree of skill and capability as well as the mix between armored and light, lancers and archers or combined differed greatly. To a similar degree it was natural that the famous Swiss had little heavily armored knights and little artillery but were mostly lightly armored infantry. But it was not at all given that they would become often very competent at a tactical and operational level. (There would be a lot of interesting details to add but I will leave it there)
So it is quite logical that the US military enjoys a great endowment of capital (ressources) and technology per capita combined with a specific human capital pool. Obviously this was and is just the starting point and usually the US stepped up in other departments when there was a dire need.
Wait, so when the U.S.military trumps over say, the miniscule Panamanian Forces, it's the greatest military on earth.
Yet when if fails this can be excused with 'others fail as well', completely ignoring that budget-wise it's almost the sum of all 'others'?!?
I don't know if this is directed at my post. Anyway is the question about the 'greatest' bit about absolute capability - or efficiency with the relationship between in- and output in mind?Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
The type of conflict is of course also of great importance because industrial might might be more easily recruited and applied or 'converted' into military effectivness at one end of the scale.
I don’t know if this question can be addressed in short answer form, and I realize that the answer entails also addressing the question, “What are they expected to be able to do?”, but here it is just in case: what would forces adequately invested in, trained, and educated look like as compared to those currently in existence?Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
One of the more popular posts on the Small War Council asks, "What can we do to keep the SWJ relevant?" Maybe the answer for the SWJ council is, "Quit insulting each other."
I stopped posting on here because people like Bill Moore and "Of the Troops" immediately descend to calling me an idiot or the author of "highly naive articles and this is just another one to add to the compost pile." As a result, I only check the council side when someone links to my article. As usual, most of the "discussion" chooses to personally attack me and avoid the argument.
You gentlemen stay classy.
I don't think the argument has much substance, and I've never been in the military or involved with it in any way.Quote:
Originally Posted by Michael C
To use your own athletic metaphor, sending an army to "do state-building" is like sending an ice hockey team into a basketball game... and then of course blaming them for committing fouls.
This is not just a question of failure to prepare for irregular war or post cold war conflict. The military is perfectly correct to point out that it should not be used for "state building". That's simply not a military function from the start. If you order an engineer to perform surgery, don't blame the engineer if the patient dies.
"Pop-centric COIN" is an abortion of an idea that's based on unsustainable assumptions and programmed to fail from the start. Blaming failure to achieve the goals on inability to execute the strategy is like ordering someone to ride a unicycle up K2 and blaming the rider for the consequent failure.
I wouldn't say the military is completely devoid of responsibility (the world "blame" is really to infantile to be in the discussion at all), and I don't think anyone here would make that claim: certainly there's been an enormous amount of discussion of military shortcomings here. I don't see any point, though, in focusing on that degree of responsibility to an extent that ignores the massive shortcomings on the policy level.
Winning is achieving your objectives. The first step toward winning is selecting a clear, practical, achievable set of objectives and defending them against mission creep. This is not a military function, and if this step gets botched the job of everyone down the line, from the strategic level down to the tactical, gets infinitely more complex.
All the talk we hear of increased complexity stems to me less from any inherent complexity of the situations than from the complexity we impose by adopting vague, ephemeral, impractical goals and pursuing those goals using inappropriate tools and methods.
I've NEVER said or written that the US Military was very good, much less great -- or even far less, the greatest on Earth. I have frequently written that both the German Army and the Commonwealth Armies train to a better standard than do we. I've also harped on our poor state of training for years.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
As an aside, the Panama operation won by sheer mass; the number of screw ups there and the flaky actions by too many senior people would have been diastrous had that mass not been present. No trump or triumph there, just heavyweight steamrolling. :rolleyes:I did not and am not excusing anything -- I am pointing out that military failure is universal simply because warfare is unpredictable. All forces win some and lose some -- and again, we've lost more than we should have.Quote:
Yet when if fails this can be excused with 'others fail as well', completely ignoring that budget-wise it's almost the sum of all 'others'?!?
I also pointed out indirectly that a big part of our problem is just what you mention in your last sentence here. We have too much money and that encourages waste -- and inefficiency; that leads to poor performance.
I'm not a Tom Ricks fan but he's got it right on mediocre generals -- and they are a reflection of our personnel policies, many of which are dictated by the Congress (particularly with respect to Officers...). That is not an excuse, it is a complaint.
""""They'd have less money. The American solution of throwing money at a problem instead of fixing it has not worked with Education, Medical care -- or the Armed Forces.Quote:
Originally Posted by ganulv
For the active forces, there would be fewer people, they'd be a bit older (and thus, hopefully, a bit more mature) and would spend a bout one and half to twice as much time in institutional training staffed by selected Trainers with demonstrated expertise in subject matter and instructing. They would stay in the same units for years and their equipment fit would be a little different -- much of it to allow sea and land basing but rapid reaction to crisis area movement (we pay lip service to that but do not really want to do it -- too much uncertainty and careers might be damaged...). All would have spent some time in Reserve Units before being ALLOWED to enter the active force.
The Reserve Forces OTOH would very much resemble those of today but would be about 50% larger -- they would provide the mass and base for expansion if needed for a major war.
Movement between the two forces, active and reserve would be simplified. Personnel policies that over emphasize 'fairness' and 'objectivity' in selection criteria; 'everyone a generalist * ,' and the very mistaken idea that all persons of like education and experience are equally capable and can perform any job for that rank -- a structure, process and system that needs a MAJOR overhaul so we stop promoting based on 'potential' and being forced to reward decent performance with a promotion until the Peter Principle takes hold -- would disappear...""""
Then the Bwaa-ha-ha-ha-ha-hah from the Capitol and Five Sided Funny Farm in DC woke me up and I fell on my Lance. Sancho laughed and laughed.. :D
* That 'generalist' stuff and excessive rotation of personnel exist not to better train the force but to make assignments and finding square pegs to put in round holes easy for the Personnel bureaucracy. The unnecessary costs of that approach adversely impact the expansion of needed training; that lack of comprehensive training leads to mistrust of subordinates and reluctance to undertake any complex operations. The training process needs to ditch the Tasks, Conditions and Standards approach that limit abilities to aggregate and combine tasks to accomplish a mission; we need Outcome Based Training and Eduction.
Posted by Fuchs
AgreedQuote:
personally don't agree with his idea to about the direction to go (pop-centric COIN) and would if at all rather treat this as a political fight (=deal with those who have influence, don't try to influence millions of people directly).
I differ with you here, because the author attempted without providing any supporting evidence to conflate military competence with losing strategies/policies. Sen McCain is absolutely correct when he said we have the world's best military, but that doesn't mean it will achieve national objectives if the objectives and policies are based on fantasy, or conditions exist that are well beyond a military solution. From a strictly military capability stand point we currently have the best the military in the world. There may smaller militaries that are more tactically proficient, but they are too small to overcome our mass and technological advantages in a battle (a war is different if they can survive long enough to counter our strategy). Ken is absolutely right that we could be much better if we revamped our training programs, but despite our numerous shortfalls we are still quite capable. On the other hand, our ability to develop a winning strategy is another matter altogether.Quote:
I do believe he's more right about the "losing" thing, and consider your and dayuhan's position as rather reflexive partisan - especially in the case of Iraq, where the troubles were started more by occupation mistakes than in Afghanistan.
As for losing, the only one we lost is Vietnam and even calling that one a loss is debatable. We debated that enough in other forums, so we may just have to agree to disagree, but more importantly if we listened to our military experts who were familiar with the situation we wouldn't have gotten involved in the first place.
I take issue with the assertion that great armies can't be defeated. Other great armies have been defeated, the British were the best Army in the world when our colonalists defeated them, and after they were defeated they were still the best military in the world. If the British felt it was worth it and if they were willing to employ their full might against our citizens they would have won (opinion obviously), but fortunately they weren't, much like we weren't prepared to do what was necessary to win militarily in Vietnam. The Germans probably had the world's best army when WWII started, but they over extended themselves and made a few other strategic errors, but that doesn't take away from their military competence. I'm not trying to be defensive, but I think it is important to point out there is a difference between having a great military and having a great strategy. Great armies/militaries can be defeated by lesser foes if they have a better strategy, or in some cases if the better military is following such a flawed strategy it ends up defeating itself.
Actually quite the opposite, we're very good at defeating miliaries that have capable defenses. They provide us targets that we well suited to destroy. I agree with the second part of your sentence, we do rely on overwhelming resources, and that may be one reason we're so bad at strategy? We don't think we need to out think our adversary if we can out muscle him. Unfortunately we do rely on industrial age strategy to mass firepower on alleged centers of gravity with large forces that are enabled with information technology. I agree we have a lot of room to increase our sophistication when it comes to strategy, yet it seems the desire for ever larger forces instead of new ways of fighting still dominates our discussion despite guidance to do otherwise. It is important to note that the Pop Centric approach requires excessively large ground forces to implement.Quote:
Furthermore I wouldn't place so much trust in the core competence of winning battles. The American way of warfare works well against near-defenceless opposition (at least superficially) and it works well with overwhelming resources.
"No competent and motivated opposition" did certainly kind of help.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
I've got a standard example which I use to disrupt others' confidence in their nation's military - including my countries':
The Italians wiped the floor with the Abbessinians in 1936.
The British and ANZACs wiped the floor with said Italians in 1940.
The Germans wiped the floor with said British in 1941.
The invasion of Panama says about as much about the U.S. military's competence as the invasion of Denmark, and if you look very much at logistics, of Norway in 1940. The real test of competence for the German army was France, though. The U.S. military had no such test. Its major victories came to being with vastly superior, not about equal, resources.
For this reason I withhold final judgement of the U.S.ground forces' actual (relative) competence even for what's called conventional warfare. Their way of war and especially their love for gold plating and radio comms is dubious.
Bill; show me American ground troops fighting against well-armed opposition and we'll see whether this ability to destroy isn't overcompensated by an inability to survive in face of such an opposition.
I understand American army troops pride themselves in their supposedly unique quality at shattering formations, but this self-image appears to found almost entirely on fighting demoralised and 1970's monkey-model-equipped Iraqis.
Fuchs wrote,
If you're talking post Korea it is difficult, but I think an argument can be made that the US Army proved its ability to endure against a potentially superior force during the Battle of Ia Drang in 1965. Some may have some valid arguments to counter argue this.Quote:
The real test of competence for the German army was France, though. The U.S. military had no such test. Its major victories came to being with vastly superior, not about equal, resources.
For this reason I withhold final judgement of the U.S.ground forces' actual (relative) competence even for what's called conventional warfare. Their way of war and especially their love for gold plating and radio comms is dubious.
Bill; show me American ground troops fighting against well-armed opposition and we'll see whether this ability to destroy isn't overcompensated by an inability to survive in face of such an opposition.
I understand American army troops pride themselves in their supposedly unique quality at shattering formations, but this self-image appears to found almost entirely on fighting demoralised and 1970's monkey-model-equipped Iraqis.
It seems the fact of the matter is we simply haven't had a hard test in the past few decades, but I'm not sure what nation could test us in a conventional battle based on our current technological dominance? Obviously irregular warfare is a different animal altogether.
"Best in the world" isn't a measure of absolute capability or competence, it's a measure of relative capability and competence. What military would anyone say is better, and on what basis?
Certainly there's room for improvement, as there always is, but I'm not sure we should be pursuing improvement in pop-centric COIN or state-building, tasks that are likely to degrade competence at core military functions. If we really want to run about building states - and I can't see why we should - it's time to develop a specific non-military state building capacity, in which the military's only functions would be providing security and training corresponding military forces.
Yes, the American force in Desert Storm outclassed the Iraqi's. Still, I think the American forces did a lot better than most expected. The fact that more American troops were killed in accidents than in combat losses (115 total US combat KIA compared to ~25,000 Iraqis) tells me that one can't simply write off the success of that campaign as merely the product of superior resources and an incompetent enemy.Quote:
show me American ground troops fighting against well-armed opposition and we'll see whether this ability to destroy isn't overcompensated by an inability to survive in face of such an opposition.
I understand American army troops pride themselves in their supposedly unique quality at shattering formations, but this self-image appears to found almost entirely on fighting demoralised and 1970's monkey-model-equipped Iraqis.
You're right, though, that the US hasn't fought a peer force for a long time. I, for one, hope that is a"test" we never have to take. Also, I suspect that any "peer force" we'd fight would love their radio comms as much as we do.
Been there done that... and yes I agree.Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
Not sure who expected a lesser result? The smart people knew it was going to be a walk over (especially because of US control if the seas allowing safe and secure LoC).
That is the way the US knows how to fight... by applying overwhelming force to a lesser (in all respects) force. The key here is that at division and maybe brigade level is where the US operates best. Below that all bets are off - as seen by outsiders. US special forces are obviously world class and that offers a ray of hope. But the competence gap between small teams of SF and a convention bde or div is just too great in any form of insurgency war.
Fuchs, historically the German military machine was indeed quite outstanding. Better you leave it there than to cherry pick examples to try to make your point. The end result of arrogant national politics and military strategy led to a crushing military defeat in the field of an increasingly outnumbered and logistically deprived army. German humiliation did not stop at the destruction of their once fine military but extended to the national humiliation of the rape of their women on an industrial scale (reminiscent of the middle ages).Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
This constant harping on about the lack or peer level opponents - meaning Germans - no longer has any meaning. The German military record is merely historical and will never be repeated. There are many valuable lessons that can be (and should be) learned from the German military history but this continuing innuendo about German military prowess - which is now long gone - serves no purpose today especially with the reported poor performance of German troops in Afghanistan.
The US remains vulnerable in terms of 'mass' coming from potentially China and to a lesser extent Russia. Other than that who could threaten a US force in conventional terms?
The US and all western armies remain vulnerable to insurgencies where the self imposed restrictions provide a level playing field for semi-trained insurgents armed with AK-47s and a few RPGs.
How to win against an insurgency? Read Edward Luttwak.
There's always the possibility that one country comes close to a perfect storm and gets very much right in the art of war for some time.
Look at the early 18th century and the French will impress, 2nd half of the same century and the Prussians will impress, early 19th century French, late 19th century Prussians, early 20 century Germans, late 20th century supposedly Americans.
Now the question is about who's going to be next and why should we pay attention to who got it right in a paradigm long gone?
It's a professional obligation of military leaders to strive for being "the next". I doubt that the NATO powers got what it takes to excel beyond what you'd expect of them due to their budgets.
People are way too content, and disappointments in small wars merely push them to the edge where they reaffirm their belief that they'd get it right if it was only about a great war.
Too bad, history tells me that many people have been wrong in such a belief already. Take Prussia after Valmy, for example.
How might things have looked had the U.S. been allowed five weeks rather than five months for the buildup?Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
Yes, I agree the smart people knew we would soundly defeat the Iraqis (I was in college at the time and ignorant on military topics, so I certainly wasn't one of the smart ones). My point is one of degree - I don't think many of those smart people thought the defeat would be as decisive as it turned out to be. I think this is reflected in the casualty numbers. The degree to which we bested the Iraqis says something about our competence at that time (I think a lot of that competence is gone thanks to ten years of fighting insurgents).Quote:
Not sure who expected a lesser result? The smart people knew it was going to be a walk over (especially because of US control if the seas allowing safe and secure LoC).
I'm sure we could come up with a multitude of "what-ifs" and counter-factuals, but in this case I wonder where a five-week limitation would come from?Quote:
How might things have looked had the U.S. been allowed five weeks rather than five months for the buildup?
There certainly was a danger that Iraqi forces could have pressed into Saudi when there were only the Saudis and (if I remember correctly), the 82nd and some aircraft there to stop them.
While you are absolutely correct in the main, that isn't totally true; there are varied and changing units (due to the vagaries of personnel rotations) that operate competently. There are just far too few of them and the pattern of change and competence is essentially unpredictable.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
While that variance has always been true to an extent -- and will always be -- the percentage of less competent units is now several orders of magnitude larger than it has historically been. That is due almost totally to the terribly flawed BTMS -- Task, condition and Standard -- individual training model. The troops learn to do some tasks quite well but other important tasks are not well taught (many due to having a low initial pass rate, thus making the trainers look bad) and the troops do not learn how to integrate and combine those tasks for combat. A flawed and excessive rotation of individuals dependent personnel system does not help -- though it does provide jobs for a lot of personnel folks...:rolleyes:
There are Officer and NCO competence problems as well but they mostly result from the same training process flaw with an added unintended consequence of a personnel system that for them significantly over emphasizes 'fairness' and 'objectivity' in selection criteria and that seems to believe all people of like rank are equally competent. That is not true, never has been and never will be. :mad:
It should also be noted that until the early 1980s, movement of Officers and and NCOs between conventional and SOF units was quite common. As the 'new' training system took hold, the SOF guys very quickly insulated (isolated ? ) themselves in order to achieve and maintain a little 'purity.' Equally noteworthy is that they are not forced to use that flawed training model and that attempts to export elements of their training process to the broader Army in the past few years have been stoutly resisted -- by both communities... :eek:
We have major systemic flaws; little will change until the entire 'system' is revamped. Tom Ricks is right for a change, the Generals are a big part of the problem, no question -- but they are far from solely responsible; who, after all, approves their selection...
The Rolling Stones -- Doom And Gloom (Lyric Video), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPFGWVKXxm0
...the mechanics of the global kill chain continues to evolve and although Mars may take a breather or change weapons from time to time, he isn't going anywhere...
SAC, ICBM, Trident , and...
http://itmakessenseblog.com/files/2012/07/Drones.jpg
Contrary to some assertions here, we have a history of doing just that -- the Pols and the Generals screw it up and the Kids pull their fat out of the fire. That was true in times past, that was true in WWI and WW II, in Korea, in Viet Nam, in DS/DS and in Afghanistan and Iraq. We ain't great; we are adequate.True dat...Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
As one thoroughly involved at the time, admittedly personally all stateside, DS/DS would've been a bit more difficult, we would've had a few more casualties and it would have taken a bit longer but the result would've been pretty much the same.Quote:
I'm sure we could come up with a multitude of "what-ifs" and counter-factuals, but in this case I wonder where a five-week limitation would come from?
There certainly was a danger that Iraqi forces could have pressed into Saudi when there were only the Saudis and (if I remember correctly), the 82nd and some aircraft there to stop them.
As is and has often been the case, we're far from perfect -- but our opponents historically and over 200 plus years -- have always been either militarily or politically even less competent. It is no particular accident that our own Civil War was one of our longer wars and produced more casualties and losses than any others. ;)
America is a nation with many competitors. In fact, arguably everything not American, be it state or non-state, is in competition with the US. That is as it should be. Competing with powerful states possessed with a sense of "right" and "righteousness" to rule or dominate wide areas beyond their borders is how America herself rose to power. When our competitors stubbornly clung to obsolete positions and expended their waning strength in the process it served to accelerate our rise.
Today it is America clinging to obsolete positions, and it is America that expends its waning (relative) strength in the process. We have grown so used to the idea that competitors can be "contained" or simply directed (backed by the force of our wealth and military power) to act in the manner we deem appropriate that we appear to find it beneath us to simply roll up our sleeves once again and compete.
To blame the military for "losing" wars that are not truly wars (we easily won the war parts, it was the subsequent policy aspects of clinging to old policies and refusal to recognize change, while employing the military to somehow enforce such inappropriate positions to work that challenged our forces. The largest failing of the military was their dog-like loyalty to continue to play, to continue to chase that ball, until they collapsed in exhaustion. Good dogs don't tell their masters to stop throwing the ball, and good masters don't need to be told.
What are the existential threats to the US today and into the foreseeable future?? By and large, these are not military problems. We need to reframe how we see ourselves and how we see the world. We need to stop resisting the resistance, and decide once again to compete.
But first we must tone down the ideological mantra that shapes our current policies and that hinders the ability of US citizens, companies, as well as our official policies, to compete effectively in the current environment. This not all that hard, after all, it is primarily a return to what got us where we are, and an abandonment of what we have adopted to stay there. The ideas and motivations that fueled our rise are far superior to those that we have applied to stifle the competition of others to stay on top.
The principle of the right of self-determination of governance for all is far superior to the belief that all should embrace some form of US-like democracy.
Appreciate that values are rooted in history and culture, and that while the US history an culture is not evil, to push the values born of it too aggressively onto others certainly is.
Look hard at corruption laws that drive US business to either stay home or simply abandon the US altogether to avoid harsh rules and penalties that no other nation emposes upon their citizens that dare to go out and seek international opportunities. (Watch an episode of "Jungle Gold" about the raw world of gold mining in Ghana for a glimpse at just one aspect of this as armed Chinese operations dominate the scene)
We are in a confused place as a nation. Just listening to the rhetoric of the current Presidential contest gives clear evidence of that. One candidate calling for a doubling down on the perceived successful approaches of a past that no longer exists, while the other recognizes change must happen, but has yet to map out for anyone what our approach to that might actually look like. In the mean time we rely heavily on CT, sanctions and excessive military postures to attempt to slow the change until we figure things out.
To frame this as our military "losing two wars" is far too narrow and symptomatic of a viewpoint to help us truly fix what ails us.
...hang on....:wry:
Creative destruction, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_destruction
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Creative destruction, sometimes known as Schumpeter's gale, is a term in economics which has since the 1950s become most readily identified with the Austrian American economist Joseph Schumpeter,[1] who adapted it from the work of Karl Marx and popularized it as a theory of economic innovation and the business cycle. The term is derived from Marxist economic theory, where it refers to the linked processes of the accumulation and annihilation of wealth under capitalism. These processes were first described in The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels, 1848)[2] and were expanded in Marx's Grundrisse (1857)[3] and "Volume IV" (1863) of Das Kapital.[4]
At its most basic, "creative destruction" (German: schpferische Zerstrung) describes the way in which capitalist economic development arises out of the destruction of some prior economic order, and this is largely the sense implied by the German Marxist sociologist Werner Sombart who has been credited[1] with the first use of these terms in his work Krieg und Kapitalismus ("War and Capitalism", 1913).[5] In the earlier work of Marx, however, the idea of creative destruction or annihilation (German: Vernichtung) implies not only that capitalism destroys and reconfigures previous economic orders, but also that it must ceaselessly devalue existing wealth (whether through war, dereliction, or regular and periodic economic crises) in order to clear the ground for the creation of new wealth.[2][3][4]
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In philosophical terms, the concept of "creative destruction" is close to Hegels concept of sublation. In German economic discourse it was taken up from Marx's writings by Werner Sombart, particularly in his 1913 text Krieg und Kapitalismus:[14]
Again, however, from destruction a new spirit of creation arises; the scarcity of wood and the needs of everyday life... forced the discovery or invention of substitutes for wood, forced the use of coal for heating, forced the invention of coke for the production of iron.
It has been argued that Sombart's formulation of the concept was influenced by Eastern mysticism, specifically the image of the Hindu god Shiva, who is presented in the paradoxical aspect of simultaneous destroyer and creator.[1] Conceivably this influence passed from Johann Gottfried Herder, who brought Hindu thought to German philosophy in his Philosophy of Human History (Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit) (Herder 179092), specifically volume III, pp. 4164.[1] via Arthur Schopenhauer and the Orientalist Friedrich Maier through Friedrich Nietzsches writings. Nietzsche represented the creative destruction of modernity through the mythical figure of Dionysus, a figure whom he saw as at one and the same time "destructively creative" and "creatively destructive".[15]
I'll tell him once I meet the next farmer from Malawi.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Seriously, you added a lot to the more usual US-centric view here.
Your statement would be trivial if true, for it could then just as well be said that everything not Turkish is in competition with Turkey.
Fuchs,Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Somehow I doubt you spend much time chatting with farmers anywhere, yet alone in Malawi. But you miss my point. It is not that everyone is out the get the US, it is that everyone everywhere is in competition with each other. We are part of that competition.
The US didn't shed any tears for the UK when we nudged past them during WWII, nor would the UK shed any tears for the US if the situation were reversed. This is not about "allies" and "enemies," or "friends" and "threats." It is about competition. Those in power tend to set up systems to suppress the competition of others and to provide advantages to themselves. Spain did this, France did this, the UK did this, and the US has done this in its own way as well. Just as an example. Same applies to all nations. Increasingly their are major players who are not nations at all, and who have a flexibility of loyalty that is particularly frustrating to an American approach to foreign policy that is so emotional rather than pragmatic.
My point is that we need to stop whining and lashing out at those seeking their own best futures in ways that circumvent, by-pass or ignore our carefully crafted systems of obstacles that have been rendered as obsolete and irrelevant as the Maginot line by the emerging global geo-economic / political reality. Instead we need to put on our big boy pants and come up with a new understanding and new approaches for competing more effectively in the world as it is, not as we wish it was.
Posted by Bob's World
Some are, but it seems most of our national policy statements address the significant strategic level geopolitical changes taking place beneath our feet, but perhaps they fail in describing how we should adapt to them? The author of the article that starting this thread pushed for a U.S. military capability to conduct "population-centric" COIN, which in my view equates to your comment:Quote:
Today it is America clinging to obsolete positions, and it is America that expends its waning (relative) strength in the process.
Of course we can't see past ourselves so we don't understand why there are so many strong antibodies against us pushing our values. Yet when the communists, many of them sincere in their belief they had the best system, pushed and often imposed their system upon others we clearly saw that as an evil that needed to be fought.Quote:
Appreciate that values are rooted in history and culture, and that while the US history an culture is not evil, to push the values born of it too aggressively onto others certainly is.
There is some truth to this, and I think that is the way we're drifting towards. OEF-A and OIF were aberrations that took off this path (at least the way we conducted them), which is why I'm strongly opposed to transforming the military to fight these types of wars. The return on investment is negative to the extreme.Quote:
What are the existential threats to the US today and into the foreseeable future?? By and large, these are not military problems. We need to reframe how we see ourselves and how we see the world. We need to stop resisting the resistance, and decide once again to compete.
What ideological policies prevent us from competing at the business level? The only one I can think of is our outdated policy concerning Cuba. The ban on doing business with Iran is not ideological, but defensive in nature. There are a number of ideological policies that prevent us from competing effectively for influence at the government level.Quote:
But first we must tone down the ideological mantra that shapes our current policies and that hinders the ability of US citizens, companies, as well as our official policies, to compete effectively in the current environment.
Generally agree, but this also ties into Surferbeetle's comment on creative destruction. We are a strong and resilient nation, and in some ways that can be negative because most realize we need to change, but because we're so strong we don't have to change. It may come down to either a soft landing (if we effectively get in front of the needed change and direct it), or a hard landing if wait until the current system fails.Quote:
We are in a confused place as a nation. Just listening to the rhetoric of the current Presidential contest gives clear evidence of that. One candidate calling for a doubling down on the perceived successful approaches of a past that no longer exists, while the other recognizes change must happen, but has yet to map out for anyone what our approach to that might actually look like. In the mean time we rely heavily on CT, sanctions and excessive military postures to attempt to slow the change until we figure things out.
The example of a value-based law that absolutely cripples the ability of US business to compete overseas is the anti-corruption laws. The rules are incredibly vague and impossible to ensure compliance with, and the penalties are so severe as to risk a death penalty on a business found out of compliance.
State Department has a zero tolerance position on "corruption." Very well intended, but as a successful business owner pointed out in a discussion with State officials I attended last year "that in many places corruption is how many places do taxation where formal taxation does not exist." He also pointed out that "I don't see US business people when I go overseas. I see them from every other country, but by and large US capital is too fearful of being nailed for corruption to even participate at all." Unsaid, of course, was that to strike a deal in many places, what is seen as corruption under US law is simply seen as a standard business practice by many others.
When US entrepreneurs outmaneuvered the UK for rights to develop Saudi oil there were no such constraints in place. Today more pragmatic countries are cutting deals and moving forward, while US capital is either fleeing or to too scared to be employed.
We need to get off of our moral high-horse and stop expecting everyone else to play by rules designed by us, for us. They are playing by their own rules now, and the only ones being truly hurt by our rules now are ourselves.
Yes, these losing wars claims are quite provocative hence my comment to the author that he should not run to mommy if he gets an aggressive response when he posts this sort of nonsense.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
So where in your opinion does moral courage or the lack thereof play a part in all this?
Come on Bob this is silly.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
The US had its chance force moral conditions on the world when the Soviet Union collapsed but failed.
The rapacious greed of US corporations needed to be tamed and to the credit of the US it has done well in that regard. But leaving the back door open for the scum of the earth to enter was not smart. You had your chance and you blew it.
Moral Courage is a hard thing to define, but we all know it when we see it.
Have many senior leaders opted to "go along to get along"? Absolutely. Actually that is prevalent across the ranks. But one has to temper that with the realization that as an institution our military really just does not understand the nature of this type of conflict. We are far too blinded by the inertia of what the force was actually trained, organized and equipped to do; an inability to adapt the lessons learned from historic conflicts that were similar in nature to the realities of our own current mission, interests and the world we live in today; and the complete subjugation of military leadership to civil authorities (there are a great number of brilliant civilians working in the Pentagon, but few have a foundation as trained, experienced military professionals).
When I listen to smart, successful military leaders justify the "success" of heavy CT approaches, or "Clear-Hold-Build," or Nation Building, etc: I don't think they are being dishonest, I think they are in large part truly baffled by why these programs are not producing the promised results. They can look at their tactical metrics and see success piled upon success, but they can look out their window and see that reality is anything but success. We focus on the wrong things. As a wise man once said, "things that count most cannot be counted, and the things one can count do not count." We love things we can count. The same wise man said "people love chopping wood, as the results are immediately evident." The military in particular loves chopping wood, and our promotion system loves wood choppers.
Bottom line is that many factors contribute to why powerful nations stumble in this way. If it is any consolation, history books are full of very similar tales.
Let's return to first principles and seek some clarity?Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
When we truly observe, it is done by focusing on deeds, not rhetoric. Einstein was not swayed by empty rhetoric, nor Charles Darwin, etc. These folks and other observers understand that nature is ruthless, efficient, and red in tooth and claw...
Afghanistan - I can read a map, but you should be able to do a better job on this one than I can...
Iraq - Saddam, his sons, and many of his gang no longer walk the earth....blood has been spilled to atone for what was taken from us. Oil production is back up to what it was before Saddam took power ~ 3 million bbl/day. Internet penetration has gone from something close to zero to what appeared to be more than 50% in urban areas by my observation.
Iran - The economy is in shambles. The Syrian connection/pass thru supply route is fractured. Velayat-e faqih has a viable competitor in Najaf. Saudi Arabia & GCC, Turkey and Israel circle, scheme, and smell weakness...
Arab Spring - The world's largest youth bulge has a better chance to find employment and apply it's energy to productive efforts than previously.
US Army - Many of the weak remaining from the '92 purge have been run off. The SOF model is validated and has earned resourcing...GPF will be cut; unless the 2 trillion mentioned in the campaign is needed to bring a proud and headstrong country to heel (the 12th Iman will not get his chance to come home for a while yet)...and if so GPF will gain a reprieve for a time.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - Continues to gain in strength, governments need money to pay bills. Banking will be brought to heel. Shadow banking will be brought to heel. Commodities trading will be brought to heel. Rule of Law will continue to spread...
As to the lost wars, lost way narrative...BS
I'm not sure the US has ever had an opportunity to "force moral conditions on the world", and that sounds like the kind of Quixotic quest that ends with inevitable exhaustion and failure. The world is a large place with a very low standard of morality and no particular inclination to follow American instructions. The fastest route to the collapse of American power would be to waste it in a futile effort to police the world.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
Some would say the rapacious greed of American corporations was simply redirected to domestic financial dealings. Of course American corporations are as greedy and as profitable as they ever were. They've just found ways to make money under changing conditions.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
The reluctance of American companies to make long-term deals in politically unstable areas has as much to do with risk tolerance as with corruption regulations. In objective terms the Chinese (for example) are doing the oil-consuming world a favor by pumping oil in places where other companies won't go. If they didn't pump it that oil would probably not come to market at all.
It will be interesting to see what happens when a government that has made long-term deals with the Chinese is faced by an insurgency that wants to change those deals. Will they write it off, or will they jump in and try to "do COIN"?
But back to the original question...
I don't see any inconsistency there. The US by any objective standard does have "the strongest military" in the world and in the history of the world. That doesn't mean it will always succeed, especially if it's used in pursuit of objectives that cannot be achieved through the use of military strength. Driving a screw with a hammer is likely to fail, but that doesn't mean you have a lousy hammer.Quote:
(...) President Obama has described our military as “the strongest military the world has ever known.”
There’s just one problem with this...
That military just lost two wars in a row.(...)
If our military is so great, why have the last fifty years been so disastrous? (...)
Fuchs' point that the US military hasn't been proven in equal contest against a peer opponent is true, but irrelevant, since "strongest in the world" is a relative measure, not an absolute measure, and the potential peer competitors have even less experience of peer conflict and far less evidence of capacity.
In theory Russia or China could threaten the US with mass, but does either have the capacity (or, really, the incentive) to deploy and support that kind of mass outside their borders in a situation where the US would be forced into a full military confrontation?
American air and artillery support available may militate against that being a good example.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
The main point of the article is that military boosterism (We're number 1! We're number 1!) blinds one to the obvious military deficiencies exhibited by the American military establishment. And if those flaws are not seen they cannot be corrected. This statement of Sen. McCain "We have the highest trained, most professional, best military in history.” is a fine example of unthinking boosterism. It is the kind of thing that gets in the way of fixing the things, many things, that are broke. The C brothers expand upon this general theme in this post
http://www.onviolence.com/?e=641
about how generals aren't held responsible. And in this post
http://www.onviolence.com/?e=634
about politically correct views of the military.
There is nothing at all objectionable or controversial about the main point of the article. It is simple common sense that if you continually hear that you are the best of best ever that you won't be very inclined to change.
The second big point in the article is that the military establishment (the author uses the word culture) can't adapt. This also seems obvious given the events of recent history. The guys lower down can and have, quite a lot in some cases. But the establishment, all of it, political and military can't. They just go blindly along doing what hasn't worked for the past 10 or 20 years whether it be knowing the F-35 is going to make it or knowing with even more certainty that this is the year the Pak Aarmy/ISI is going to come around.
We have been getting away with this but the lower ranks may not have time to make up for the incompetence of the suits and multi-stars the next time. Which it why it is important that we remove the stars from our eyes. (Get it? Stars in our eyes, a dual reference to removing the baleful influence of the generals and the blindness that We're number 1! afflicts us with. I just now thought of it.)
Posted by Surferbeetle,
Some of your comments had no context, so I didn't understand what you were implying, but comments on a couple.
Saddam and his sons are dead, and good on us, but killing them did not require a major occupation, an excessive de-bathification program, and a largely failed nation building effort. Once Saddam was dead and the sanctions lifted I believe the Iraqis would have gotten their oil production back up to pre-Saddam years on their own (Western corporations would be allowed to provide technical expertise). The 50% internet penetration in itself is not a positive if 50% of them are using it to inform their views from disinformation on radical websites promoting ethnic hatred. That probably isn't happening, but still referring to internet penetration as a positive without understanding its impact seems a bit of reach. However, despite our win and we did win, we pushed Iraq into, or much closer to, Iran's sphere of influence, and ethnic violence is still very active, and the risk of civil war has not been erased. We won, but what the results of that win is too early to assess.Quote:
Iraq - Saddam, his sons, and many of his gang no longer walk the earth....blood has been spilled to atone for what was taken from us. Oil production is back up to what it was before Saddam took power ~ 3 million bbl/day. Internet penetration has gone from something close to zero to what appeared to be more than 50% in urban areas by my observation.
Is an Iranian economy in shambles really in our long term interest? We did the same to Iraq, and when we removed Saddam we had to deal with that economic shamble in addition to an insurgency, a civil war, and transnational terrorism. It was assessed by some experts that weaker economy actually made Saddam more powerful. It seems feasible that a country with a strong and diversified economy would be more difficult for the government to control, because government handouts would be less valuable as a tool to control the masses.Quote:
Iran - The economy is in shambles. The Syrian connection/pass thru supply route is fractured. Velayat-e faqih has a viable competitor in Najaf. Saudi Arabia & GCC, Turkey and Israel circle, scheme, and smell weakness...
This will be true only if they liberalize and allow their human capital to increase. If the result of Arab Spring is Sharia law and more oppression then I think we and they will all be greatly disappointed.Quote:
Arab Spring - The world's largest youth bulge has a better chance to find employment and apply it's energy to productive efforts than previously.
In your opinion what is the SOF model? I think the GPF still has many weak senior leaders who are failing to adapt, and can't think beyond the bounds of outdated doctrine (to include our COIN doctrine). As for the SOF model, we have "a" CT model, but is it the best model possible? We also have a Cold War UW/FID model that we try to apply to every security problem. My point is I hope we don't have a SOF model, but rather an adaptive SOF that constantly evolves and unlike GPF isn't constrained by doctrine.Quote:
US Army - Many of the weak remaining from the '92 purge have been run off. The SOF model is validated and has earned resourcing...GPF will be cut; unless the 2 trillion mentioned in the campaign is needed to bring a proud and headstrong country to heel (the 12th Iman will not get his chance to come home for a while yet)...and if so GPF will gain a reprieve for a time.
Posted by Carl
I hate the excessive self-promotion and the everyone in uniform is a hero crap also. It puts the lowest performer on par with the highest performer. Heroes are exceptional individuals, most of us are not heroes and claiming that everyone is weakens the value of the term to mean almost nothing. Most in uniform make sacrifices (deployments, injuries, varying levels of extended discomfort, and of course the ultimate sacrifice), and that deserves some level of respect in my view, but not on the same level as true heroes. Maybe our vocabulary is too limited and we don't have another term that equates to a person to deserves respect, but falls short of a hero.Quote:
There is nothing at all objectionable or controversial about the main point of the article. It is simple common sense that if you continually hear that you are the best of best ever that you won't be very inclined to change.
Claiming that we're the best on the other hand does not prevent us from adapting, and actually it may force us to work harder to retain our position as the best. This seems to apply to corporations who want to retain the reputation of their brand, to athletes, and to special operations. Even Bruce Lee said a little bragging was useful because it forced you to train harder to back up your boasts. There are factors that limit our ability to adapt, but it isn't because we recognize ourselves as the world's best military.
The author comes from the conventional military, and their ability to adapt is slower than the Special Operations community, but to state we continue to go on blindly doing what hasn't worked for 10 years is a gross exaggeration. The system that holds us back more than any other is Congress and the money associated with military spending. The military is frequently stopped from adapting by our civilian leadership, and in our country we accept that because we believe the military should be subordinate to our civilian leaders, but that comes with a cost also. Additionally, investing in high tech weapons is wise for a number of reasons the author doesn't have the experience to understand yet. We will have enemies in the future that don't look like the enemies we're fighting today, and it takes time to develop and field higher end capabilities. We also have to retain this industrial base as unpleasant as that may sound.Quote:
The second big point in the article is that the military establishment (the author uses the word culture) can't adapt. This also seems obvious given the events of recent history. The guys lower down can and have, quite a lot in some cases. But the establishment, all of it, political and military can't. They just go blindly along doing what hasn't worked for the past 10 or 20 years whether it be knowing the F-35 is going to make it or knowing with even more certainty that this is the year the Pak Aarmy/ISI is going to come around.
Many, if not most, of our Generals and Admirals are very competent. The fact that three in the Army are recently called out for character failures (not necessarily competence failures) is news only because it is NOT the norm. As for your shot at humor, it is best if you keep your day job :DQuote:
We have been getting away with this but the lower ranks may not have time to make up for the incompetence of the suits and multi-stars the next time. Which it why it is important that we remove the stars from our eyes. (Get it? Stars in our eyes, a dual reference to removing the baleful influence of the generals and the blindness that We're number 1! afflicts us with. I just now thought of it.)
Bruce Lee bragging in order to spur himself to greater efforts to back up the brag was a great stratagem, for Bruce Lee. Anything will work for an individual who is driven from within as he was; elite athletes and spec ops types too for that matter. I am not so sure that works for large organizations. Given the frailties of human nature, I think it much more likely that continually crowing about being the best makes such organizations complacent and keeps them in the same old groove. Why change what has made them the "best"? There is more than one factor that keeps us from adapting, but I think that firmly believing we are the "best" is one of the factors.
Blaming the politicians is something the military establishment has done for years. I'll bet it is something they teach at the secret multi-star school that exists in the basement of the MGM Grand in Las Vegas. It is true to an extent, but only to an extent. To give two examples of things the military does to itself, flip ones but they do go to the point, the politicians haven't created and inflicted the cult of powerpoint nor that of the reflective belt upon the military. The politicians don't much care if the military is FOBed up or not. They have proved that. The politicians are only partially responsible for constructing the temple of the night raid. The military doesn't adapt at military things they way we would hope. That is partially the fault of the military.
We have gone on doing the same thing for ten years, or one year at a time 10 ten times. That is the sense I get from bits of reading. Are we still road bound? I get the sense that we mostly are. Have we lightened the soldiers load in the 10 years we've been walking those sere hills and mountains? Have we cut down on the night raids? Do very high ranking military officers still go along with the fantasy that the Pak Army/ISI is useful? Is the date when the F-35 will be combat ready still unknown? Do we have a new tanker in the sky yet? Does the LCS have anything but a 57mm gun to fight with yet?
Reading On Violence I believe the authors well understand the value of high tech weapons. What they mostly object to is high tech that isn't worth the cost and weapons that don't seem to work. The F-35 example is mine, the little light bomber that can't-be all things to all men at least not until the year 2035. I can't speak for them on the need to maintain an industrial base but I understand the need for it. And I also see that we are very close to having only one, count it, one fighter mfg.
Competent is as competent does. It doesn't matter if most of the multi-stars know what they are doing if the corps of general officers produces inferior results, which it can be argued, they do.
You don't mean I have to give up selling material to Leno do you?
clearly the US military (not just the political leadership, the military) did not have a clear notion of what an occupation/liberation of Afghanistan would mean and how best to do it if it was needed. I have no doubt that when it comes to an actual tactical maneuver (capturing position X, securing position Y or patrolling down track Z) the US army is one of the best in the world. And without a doubt when it comes to big firepower high tech stuff, its simply in a class of its own; but generals have to be able to think beyond that and the US army does not do a great job of that. It wasnt just the job of some hack in the state department to plan for "the day after" in Iraq, it was General Frank's job and he didnt do it. Same thing in Afghanistan.
And in both cases a reasonably successful outcome (by current standards, a very satisfactory outcome, but of course, not by "ideal" standards, i.e. the standards that are the norm in the liberal imagination) was possible with less treasure and blood then was spent on sub-optimal outcomes.
Of course Cofer Black’s narrative is that the unseating of the Taliban (not to argue that they’re the good guys, but getting rid of them was not exactly a liberation now, was it?) was the CIA’s baby.Quote:
Originally Posted by omarali50
My comments and list are what I see as GWOT* deeds/deliverables and secondary & tertiary effects resulting from our involvement in the region. I mean to contrast this with the lost war/lost way narrative which I disagree with.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
I agree that we as a coalition overpaid for the results we see at this time.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Can't say regarding the counterfactual you lay out here, however I followed the bidding for various oil and gas fields....western corporations seemed to predominate in Kurdistan while a very interesting variety of corporations won blocks in the rest of the country. Think I posted some newslinks on SWJ regarding this...will look and get back to you.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
My first year (03-04) was spent out and about most everyday working with my Iraqi counterparts in utilities and infrastructure. My observations were primarily of engineers, accountants, admin staff, technicians, and blue collar workers...a subset of the population to be sure but I viewed them as a representative slice of the middle class. During my time there I witnessed an 'info wave' as goods and ideas flooded into a 'lacking' northern Iraq. It was a mostly positive experience, and I noted that the engineers in Kurdistan (who had access to these things prior to '03) were well ahead of those where I was at.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Admittedly these are limited and empirical observations, however bottom line, I see internet penetration as a force for good. I fully understand the other side/security concerns and am not attempting to discount the harm resulting from 'misuse' (as I see it) of this technology.
Broadly true, and I agree that it is too early to fully assess things.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
This article would be an example of the current dynamic at work.
Iraq suffers from its chaotic foreign policy, Ranj Alaaldin, guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 16 October 2012 04.46 EDT, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...ional-interest
You raise some solid points regarding a strong and diversified economy's ability to empower its citizens. I wonder however about the ability of trouble makers, for lack of a more detailed breakout, to siphon off of a vibrant economy and thus pursue problematic/regionally destabilizing courses of action. I also wonder about the opportunity costs of a war with Iran, the obvious point being a stronger economy would allow things to drag on resulting in greater opportunity costsQuote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
I would argue that another war, or a bungled western economic recovery would result in the opportunity cost of failing to appropriately steady those who would welcome western efforts to do so.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
The SOF business model, as I see it, is a product of GWOT.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Broadly it provides our nation with an expanded and consistent/industrial security spectrum/adjustable yield...massive retaliation to individual retaliation...24/7, anywhere. Nukes, GPF/USAF/USN, USMC, and SOF are that spectrum.
The SOF model appears to use drones to coordinate and enable a number of efforts that were not linked previously or linked in time previously.
It appears to be very heavy on direct action and very light on 'SF' as I was taught/observed it as a youngster.
Yes...but the why is interesting to consider.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
I believe that the COIN model is a militarized, autocratic, frankenstein version of what happens in everyday western democratic and chaotic/mostly rank-less civilian life which is closer to a 'policing and development' model.
With respect, many active military have lost touch with civilian life and this is part of the difficulty in translating 'COIN' to the military so that they are able to implement it. JRTC, NTC, and Hohenfels are some of the places where I was taught and attempted to teach this military model before being sent out to implement it...so I also admit that I am part of this problem.
The US military is amazing...but...not everybody is a banker, mayor, city manager, city attorney, city accountant, city engineer, etc...
Again, I would suggest that MAD is our coldwar business model (conceived and born during that time) and that a new post-coldwar business model is the GWOT SOF model that I have attempted to describe.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
This is not to say that there was not a SOF model prior to GWOT, but what I see today appears to be different from yesterday and institutionally blessed as opposed to the arguably red-headed stepchild of yesterday...(again, not deliberately attempting to be needlessly provocative)
*GWOT is no longer 'official' but it's my shorthand for our efforts post 9/11
Congress dictates how those who like Powerpoint and Reflective Belts, those who order night raids will be selected, 'educated' and promoted. It approves those who get to Flag rank. Note the words dictate and approve...Quote:
Originally Posted by carl
Again, speak to your Congress. The Armed forces are risk averse; all those things you cite would entail risk of more casualties and lost careers. It's not a 'risk averse' calling, so why are they so risk averse?Quote:
We have gone on doing the same thing for ten years, or one year at a time 10 ten times. That is the sense I get from bits of reading. Are we still road bound? I get the sense that we mostly are...
Yes. Almost everything but the Armor; the heaviest item. That enforced risk aversion again.Quote:
Have we lightened the soldiers load in the 10 years we've been walking those sere hills and mountains?
I'm not sure any ever did believe that though they were told by their civilian masters to be nice for several reasons. They do what they're told...Quote:
Do very high ranking military officers still go along with the fantasy that the Pak Army/ISI is useful?
Nope Ken, don't buy it to the extent you imply it is. There are just too many things done that Congress can't affect. It may approve those who attain flag rank but it doesn't have much to do with selections from O-1 to O-2 to O-3 and on and on. That is the military establishment. Congress didn't promote the "kill team" platoon leader after the crime was known about. And Congress didn't put the female O-6 at the door of the PX to make sure that everybody had or bought a reflective belt. Congress doesn't write the field manuals or supervise and approve the curriculum at the various schools. They may grandstand from time to time about something but they don't maintain the hive. Nope, don't buy it. To easy to blame somebody else instead of looking at the military establishment, which is what the original article said must be done.
Nor do I buy that Congress and by extension the Americans are especially risk averse. We stay at the war for over a decade now despite the casualties. Congress went for the various surges knowing full well that increased casualties would result. What Congress doesn't like is foolish casualties and they look into that. But, again aside from occasional grandstanding, they, and we, are willing to accept losses if they seem to make sense.
You are right that the military is not a risk averse calling. But it seems quite evident that the star wearing is a risk averse calling. It being my opinion that that is not to be laid at the feet of Congress, that leaves something else. My forever a civilian uniformed opinion is that military culture changes radically at the very high levels. Maybe their risk aversion at that level has something to do with it being easier to count and make judgments than actually think hard. At those levels Congress can only approve what they are presented with. And I remember that officer McMaster was not originally going to be selected for promotion beyond COL.
With the Pak Army/ISI they do what they are told to an extent. But nobody told GEN Barno to share info with the ISI despite advice from his intel people (as related in Operation Dark Heart). He did that on his own. And ADM Mullen gushed entirely too much about how he and Kayani were good buddies for that to be an ordered act. And Omar is entirely too convincing when he speaks about how easy the Pak Army can charm the brains out of high ranking heads.
The point of the article is that we have to start looking at the military failures of the military. We do.