Insurgents vs Terrorists -- Is there a difference?
Sir,
Thank you for your patients with my rambling on this topic. I believe based on what I have learned from the war and in my studies that there are fundamental and significant differences between insurgents and terrorists.
Not only in their motives and their Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs) but in our military response to each--how we fight. However, some experts will quickly say that insurgency and terrorism are inextricably linked. In doing so however, they would fail to recognize the consequence of this association. In my studies, the two are only loosely connected but often each gains tremendous momentum when the two are used interchangeably. I also believe that when we misrepresent one as the other, we do damage to our effort. It is, in our terms "a combat multiplyier" for the enemy in its most synergistic form. For example, when I associate what is happening in Iraq to a religious Jihad or a struggle against demoracracy, it gives the appearance of unification of one large group against another, and of a large scale almost global struggle. The risk is that we incite globally--“Beware the zealous leader who bangs the drums of war in order to whip the citizenry into a fervor, for this is indeed a double-edged sword. It both emboldens the blood, just as it narrows the mind. And when the drums of war have reached a fever pitch and the blood boils with hate and the mind has closed, the leader will have no need in seizing the rights of the citizenry. Rather, the citizenry, infused with fear and blinded by hatred, will offer up all of their rights unto the leader, and gladly so. How do I know? For this is what I have done. And I am, Caesar.” Quote from Julius Caesar.
I think a new thread would be helpful to me too. We should define the two.
Here are some of the things that I believe are the salient differences between the two:
Insurgencies are conditions in which the insurgents spawn within a population because the government will not, or simply cannot provide the appropriate governance for life (law, order, security, water, electricity, sanitation, etc. This population can be likened to the criminal gang and organized crime elements more then freedom fighters or terrorists. Their cause is never an ideology or idealistic dogma, (it is more primal and basic) and therefore they will have the propensity to ebb and flow based on the need of the day and the targets of opportunity. In other words, their cause can change based on the situation. Today insurgents might attack American fighters in response to the surge, tomorrow they might strike a Mosque in a form of sectarian retaliation, the next day it is the Iraq security forces. Their targets are most often tactical. Their goal has nothing to do with winning although they don't mind the enemies (plural) failing--they will fight anyone who tries to bring order. They win if the struggle is protracted because it is from the pure chaos that they get their Utility. Insurgencies are not religiously motivated; in as much as “they” want to present the appearance that they are religious in nature. This is in direct conflict with the traditional paradigm that the war fighter is accustomed. It is important to recognize that religion is ideological; an insurgency is not. This is not to say that religion and religious rhetoric is not important--it is to the insurgents because it gives the appearance of broad support, and it quickly organizes society for them into “us against them.” They gain if they breed hatred and distrust among other religious groups: Sunni, Shiites, Muslims and Christians. However, because they are not driven by a single ideology, members can quickly apostatize. This can be used as a COIN tool, and their members can be reformed.
The insurgents in Iraq are decentralized in their operations, are local within a small territorial range (kilometers from their home) and recruit their fighters from local talent. Here is an equation that predicts the probable distance from an IED strike to the insurgents' home base. P(b) = A * e**-Bx Where A and B are empirical constants determined from the enemy data sets. It is an exponential decay function. As the distance X from the insurgent’s base increases, the less probable that a single group committed it. It is believed that 90% of all insurgent attacks will occur within 15 km of their base.
The Terrorists on the other hand, have very much centralized command and control (decentralized in their execution) and will operate hundred up to thousands of kilometers from their command and control base of operations.
Their struggle is based on the terrorist’s commitment to violence as a small group (usually ranging in group size from few to less than one-hundred- fifty "card carrying" members) in order to intimidate a population or government to cause their perceived fundamental change. The group size is limited by command, control and confidentiality capabilities. Their cause is always ideological and political, based on group-actualization rather than self-serving. In other words, their belief is that what they do is for the "Public good"--acting on behalf of "all." It is aimed at the establishment, not decapitated states. Terrorism however enjoys the freedom to organize and operate unabated in failed states. Finally, rarely will anyone ever develop a counter-terrorist strategy to change this group’s apostasy--it is analogous to trying to change Rush Limbaugh from the right to the left--it simply cannot be done. Their beliefs are so deeply held that they appear to the world as radical and extreme. Terrorists may or may not be highly trained and their operations are top driven and centralized from the command and control elements. Their targets are always strategic. Because the terrorists act on behalf of all, they will never engage in grass roots fighting unless cornered into it. As a result, in my "Opinion," we have very few terrorist cells living in Iraq. Although the insurgents hope that we think differently.
I think a new string would be very helpful.
Agree ... with some caveats
Hi Folks,
In general, I agree with Tom and Bruz, but I do have a few cavils or caveats on that agreement (hey, I'm an academic, what did you expect? :rolleyes: ).
First off, how be if we drop the personal forms and look at the group forms: "insurgency" and "terrorism". This makes it easier to examine since individuals may be affiliated with more than one group form.
Wikipedia defines an insurgency as "An insurgency, or insurrection, is an armed uprising, or revolt against an established civil or political authority." The OED defines insurgency as "The quality or state of being insurgent; the tendency to rise in revolt", an insurgent as "One who rises in revolt against constituted authority; a rebel who is not recognized as a belligerent." and an "insurgence" as "The action of rising against authority; a rising, revolt." (personally, I always preferred the OED).
So, the core relational meanings of the term are:
- a "rise", "uprising", "revolt", "rebellion"
- against "authority"; defined as "an established civil or political authority" in Wikipedia and as "constituted authority" or just "authority" in the OED.
- with the implication of conflict; defined as armed revolt in wikepedia, undefined in the OED.
The relationship is between two groups, #s 1 & 2 and takes the form of 3.
Let's look at the groups in this little social drama. A "rise", "uprising", "revolt", "rebellion" against "authority" (of some type). The implication of this is fairly obvious, group 1 lacks "authority" that is held by group 2. As such, an "insurgency" implies a redefinition of "authority" between the two groups.
Let's look at the relationship (#3) next. In its broadest form, the OED definitions, it does not state the type of authority other than "constituted". This means that the authority relationship is, in all probability, housed in some type of institution: political, military, religious, academic, familial, etc.
As to the specific tactics of such an insurgency, the OED only uses the phrase "a rebel who is not recognized as a belligerent". Now, the definition of "belligerent" is crucial to this - "A nation, party, or person waging regular war (recognized by the law of nations)" [n] and "Waging or carrying on regular recognized war; actually engaged in hostilities" [adj]. Now this certainly implies armed revolt, but I would also point out that conflictual metaphors are common in many non-kinetic conflicts. More importantly, note the use of terms such as "regular war" and "regular recognized war". This implies the existence of rules of combat, and these rules can exist only within institutions. For example,our current "Rules of Warfare" derive from the Treaty of Westphalia. Notice, however, that all institutions have specific rules of "conflict" (broadly construed), and hat all the OED definitions really say is that an insurgency is characterized by tactics that stand outside of the "accepted" (socially contracted) rules of conflict within the institution.
Okay, let's shift to "Terrorism":
- from Wikipedia - "Terrorism is a term used to describe violence or other harmful acts committed (or threatened) against civilians by groups or persons for political or other ideological goals."
- from the OED - "A system of terror", "Government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the Revolution of 1789-94; the system of the ‘Terror’ (1793-4)", "A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized".
Terrorism is a specific "social contract" or system. The term was originally coined in France - "terrorisme (1798 in Dict. Acad., Suppl.)" - and referred to the system put into place by Robespierre. It is systemic and aimed by one group against another - originally by a government against its citizens, later by any group advocating political or ideological goals and choosing to use these tactics. Originally, this tactic took place within a social contract, but that seems to have dropped from the definition fairly quickly.
So, back to definitions: an "insurgency" is an attempt to redefine power / authority relationships within an institution, while "terrorism" is a specific tactic or system employed by one group against another to achieve specificf ends.
Marc
Insurgents and Terrorists
Quote:
I would also add a geographic component to the discussion.
I can better relate to Steve's recent posting, but Bruz, Marc, and Tom hit home equally well.
I can comment on insurgents from an African and later Estonian point of view.
Where Tom would end up for his last tour in paradise, there were basically two factions, and the outcome was fairly clear. But in Zaire, there were more than 400 tribes. Even though only a handful were more powerful, they still were unable to convice the rest to go along. Intimidation or religious belief was not nearly enough. The money was worthless, so that's out. Exactly what's left ?
In Estonia the insurgents are all now deep into politics. Much like Zaire, the parties and beliefs vary to the point, that it makes the whole process to complicated and only a civil war would break the tie.
Perhaps I'm wrong, but if you have 400 factions that all have a different view on things, how then would say one of the 400 create an effective uprising (insurgency), if the other 399 didn't care ?
It is geography as Steve put so well. Perhaps the Arab insurgents use the Americans to gain momentum and create a stir. That won't work where I am now as well as in Sub-Sahara. The Africans hated the Belg and French, but you still could not get all 400 tribes to agree.
Regards, Stan
Slightly more organized...
There are, in my view, some basic differences between a terrorist and an insurgent. As mentioned before, to my way of thinking the first of these is geography. I also view both terms as neutral in the great scheme of things. There can, from some perspectives, be “good” terrorists and “bad” insurgents, as well as the reverse.
I don't deny the impact of “global community” thought with this, but the relationship between “struggle with authority” (however that may be defined) and a group based on a particular tribe or local issue is to me at the heart of an insurgency. Once it begins leaving local borders, and takes on the trappings of the “global community,” it may well cross into a trans-national insurgency or terrorism. To be more precise, it may become a trans-national insurgent group or terrorist group. I make a distinction between terrorist tactics and methods (terrorism) and groups that practice terrorism.
The base of a typical insurgency remains geographic. While they may solicit outside support and assistance, their goals remain reasonably local (nationalized land holdings, revoking nationalized land holdings, correction of perceived or real social wrongs, and so on). If outsiders can help attain those goals, or distract the local “powers that be,” an insurgent group will use them. I would also argue that while some insurgent groups may have a loose command and control network (although this is not always the case), they still feel responsible to a fixed goal or vision. This is also something that can be easily measured (like the goals mentioned before). Tribal insurgencies, as Stan points out, may have issues getting off the ground, but each tribe remains fairly fixed in its goals and objectives. By this measure, groups like ETA may actually straddle the fence between terrorists and insurgents.
This geographic focus also places, to my view, some limits on the methods an insurgency can employ. These limits are determined more by their base constituency or recruiting pool, and not so much by outside considerations. For example, an insurgency would lose momentum if it continually committed atrocities against its own core population (this is, of course, assuming that the insurgency is not being controlled by others and used for their own ends...my thought here is the Viet Cong by about 1965, although the transition could have taken place earlier). Once they take that step, they become more committed to terrorist methods and the basic profile changes.
Terrorists, on the other hand, have goals and objectives that cannot be easily measured or attained (bringing Ireland under a Socialist/Marxist/whatever government, for example). For them geography is a consideration but not a focus. Also, these groups tend to spin out of control over time, becoming much more hazy in their goals and more violent in their methods. They become, in short, addicted to the killing (their own methods) and less focused on what those methods are supposed to achieve. Some insurgencies (like the ETA, the Khmer Rouge, and others) transition into terrorist groups as their goals become less clear and their methods more violent and less focused.
To me, a trans-national insurgency runs the very real risk of becoming a terrorist group because they lose that geographic focus. One of the first signs of a terrorist group spinning out of control is the conversion to a more hazy political or socio-political goal. “Global Community”-type insurgencies would be especially vulnerable to this, as their leadership would be dispersed and more open to influence by more radical (or extremist) elements. And once they start shedding their self-imposed limits, they run the real risk of falling into the classic terrorist spiral of violence.
Just some slightly more organized thoughts...