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http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66B0A220100712Quote:
"Over the last eight to nine years there has been a dynamic change in the age of fighters. Most fighters now are between 14 and 18 years-old," said Lieutenant Colonel Guy Jones, commander of 2-508th Parachute Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, based in Arghandab.
"In 2002, fighters were 22 to 30-years-old and commanders were between 32 and 40," said Jones who is on his fourth tour in Afghanistan.
This happened to British forces in Sierra Leone with the West Side Boys, too. Once. They got over it.
the leaders of the TTP and Haqqani network are both 30 years old. i guess part of the reason is that when it comes to the tribes the sons take over.
From Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State (The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 28, CSI Press 2008) pp. 77-78 pdf:
and, when all was said and done, with rescue effected (p. 83 pdf):Quote:
On Friday, 25 August 2000, British Major Alan Marshall, stationed at Benguema Training Camp decided to make a visit to one of UNAMSIL’s battalions near the town of Masiaka, about 65-kilometers east of Freetown. Marshall and his men were part of the stay-behind British training contingent. Accompanying him on this visit was an SLA liaison officer and 11 soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment. After visiting with Colonel Jehad al-Widyan, commander of the UNAMSIL battalion, he decided to take his patrol to the WSB base in nearby Magbeni. Marshall received an intelligence report that only a few rebels were present at the base and he wanted to check out the situation. His three Land Rovers were armed with .50-caliber heavy machine guns and the soldiers with SA80 rifles. As the patrol approached Magbeni, located 50 miles east of the capital in Freetown, the WSB blocked the road and denied them movement. Major Marshall tried to reason with them, but they insisted that he wait until their leader, 24-year old “Brigadier” Foday Kallay arrived.
As they waited, Major Marshall carried on a conversation with the boys and offered them cigarettes. Communication with the base at Benguema Training Camp was established via radio and the base camp was informed that the patrol was being detained. Once Kallay arrived, the situation turned tense. Kallay began issuing orders to his armed soldiers, became angry with Marshall for entering an unauthorized area without coordination, and surrounded the patrol with soldiers and a captured SLA truck mounted with a 14.5-mm heavy machine gun. As Marshall made attempts to reason with the WSB, he was physically beaten. Within 5 minutes, the rest of the Royal Irish soldiers were overwhelmed, disarmed, stripped, and taken by canoes upstream, across Rokel River, to Gberi Bana, Kallay’s headquarters.
What if the WSB in the initial encounter were treated as the armed combatants that they were ?Quote:
British forces killed 25 and captured 18 WSB members.
No statements are OTR. :D
Regards
Mike
The ROE were drastically revised after that incident and child soldiers were treated as real ones by western militaries operating in Africa, even if they wore dresses, wigs and makeup and fought drunk out of their minds. If not for the existence of Lord's Army Resistance and their untouchable record of sad weirdness, these guys would be the most whackjob insurgent force in modern times.
Interesting takeaway from that and other such conflicts is that without the AK, we wouldn't have child soldiers at all, or at least far fewer of them.
They'd better treat them all as real ones. A twelve year old can kill you just as dead as can his Father. Lot of foolish angst over 'child soldiers' for no good reason. A ten year old who throws a grenade in your lap as has happened here and there for a great many years may not be a Soldier in many senses but he's a fighter, he's your enemy even if he doesn't fully understand why, he's dangerous and deserves a shot as quickly as an adult.Quote:
Originally Posted by 40below
Before the AK there were far fewer people in the world, so the second clause is correct. The first, not so much...Quote:
Interesting takeaway from that and other such conflicts is that without the AK, we wouldn't have child soldiers at all, or at least far fewer of them.
History shows that fighting children is far from a modern phenomena, there are just more kids and better communication. Nor are or were they all in Africa or 'third world' nations. The third pic is Polish, WW II, the second Russian, the White Army. Note the webbing on the WW I trench cleaning kid in the first one...:wry:
My point was not that there have never been child soldiers, only that a malnourished 14-year-old can handle the recoil of a bullet hose like an AK (and with eight moving part on some models and not real picky about maintenance in the field) far better than from a western rifle where aim and upkeep counts, let alone the kick from a WWI Lee-Enfield or a similar battle rifle. I fired the latter in the Arctic when I was on presence patrols with the Canadian Rangers (they still use our WWI stock from stores because unlike plastic guns they don't shatter when you drop them at 50C below), and the average child soldier would get about one shot in his active military career before seeking treatment for a broken collarbone and a dislocated shoulder, maybe a broken jaw too.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
but as a big bore (.30-06, slightly more potent than the .303 and not to mention that %$&* 12 gauge...:D) shooter at age 11, I do not agree. Not at all.Quote:
Originally Posted by 40below
The Australian, British or Canadian Soldier in the third picture above may not be malnourished. he has the pre-war British pattern ammunition pouches for the .303.SMLE (the WW I Mk III, not your Ranger's WW II era No.4). The Poles and the Russians are probably malnourished. Note the Russian all have Nagants and the 7.62x54 is a contemporary of the .303. I posted two pictures showing .303 category weapons in the hands or likely so of 'child soldiers' and you come back and impute that weapon recoil would be a determining factor. :confused: Not a good argument, kids were padding their shoulders with rags a long time ago-- in the era of muzzle loaders... :wry:
While it is fact the AK enabled a proliferation of 'child soldiers,' for the reasons you cite in your response, my initial comment was not aimed primarily at refuting your perhaps unintentional overstatement. You said'None' initially then added the caveat 'or not as many.' I agreed on the not as many, just as a minor aside, really, disagreed on the none. ;)Quote:
"...without the AK, we wouldn't have child soldiers at all, or at least far fewer of them." (emphasis added /kw)
The comment by me -- and the pictures -- really was intended to make two important points. Thanks for allowing me to reiterate them:
(1) Armed kids are not an African or third world only problem.
(2) Whenever and wherever armed kids exist and attack, they are as dangerous as adults. Perhaps more so because many through a false sense of concern will not react as quickly to kill a child and they deserve no special consideration. None.
Me too, though it was SMLE No.4 and I was 13, but whole generations of British School Boys from 13-18 learnt to shoot on .303 until very recently.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
In Vegetius' essay on reforming the Legions, he discusses beginning the training of young men in the military arts as soon as they reach puberty. The concept of "child soldier" is a late 20th century invention. For most of human history, across all cultures, when humans entered puberty they were considered adults. For females, this meant marriage and children. For males, it meant farming, hunting and warfare.
Nonetheless, the issue here is first, reluctance on the part of Western troops to kill combatants the perceive as children, and second, the psychological problems resulting from the engagement (i.e. either killing them, or suffering casualties from reluctance or hesitation to kill them.).
This highlights one of the major problems with the tactical directives in Afghanistan: They placed illogical emphasis on Age and Gender over situational factors such as time, manner, place, activity.
A Coalition member engaging a young man such as described by Guy is likely to face challenges from higher HQ regardless of the activity engaged in.
One of my goals was to shift the focus from "CIVCAS" to criteria more practical. (All insurgents are, afterall, civilians) I actually got MG Carter, COM RC-South where LTC Guy Jones operates, to agree and he publicly took the position that his command would no longer use the term CIVCAS and instead use "Combatant" and "Non-Combatant." His LEGAD had a cow. Because the phrase civcas is what is written into the law, regardless of how illogical and wrongheaded it is on the ground, we had to use it. The lawyers won, and we went back to CIVCAS.
I tried to have a conversation with LEGAD on the topic and all she could do was stare at me like I had a horn growing out of my head and bluster about the terminology in various articles of international law, the terms they use, that must be adheared to.
Add this to my list:
If you don't understand insurgency, you can't do COIN;
If you don't understand insurgency, you can't legally advise a commander doing COIN either.
(Oh, and I suspect a rather large portion of those who fought in the American Civil War were in this 14-18 age range, and handled their .58 caliber rifles with ease and deadly skill; rode their cavalry mounts with the same agility and lack of fear they ride skateboards today; and generally were tremendously resilient and effective)
Doesn't Infantry literally mean, Boy Soldier?!
Just one quick google:
http://www.civilwarhome.com/boysinwar.htm
(only 46,000 out of a sample of 1,000,000 over the age of 24)
Napoleon is quoted as holding that Generals over the age of 40 were over the hill. (though I suspect strongly that this is a misquote from him saying as he rode away from Waterloo, "I'm too old for this Sh#%")
This situation would probably be beyond my capacity to survive without going postal:
You have to have a strong stomach or a large ulcer.Quote:
One of my goals was to shift the focus from "CIVCAS" to criteria more practical. (All insurgents are, afterall, civilians) I actually got MG Carter, COM RC-South where LTC Guy Jones operates, to agree and he publicly took the position that his command would no longer use the term CIVCAS and instead use "Combatant" and "Non-Combatant." His LEGAD had a cow. Because the phrase civcas is what is written into the law, regardless of how illogical and wrongheaded it is on the ground, we had to use it. The lawyers won, and we went back to CIVCAS.
I tried to have a conversation with LEGAD on the topic and all she could do was stare at me like I had a horn growing out of my head and bluster about the terminology in various articles of international law, the terms they use, that must be adheared to.
My initial reaction was that the LEGAD was bad and that all would be well if a "good lawyer" had been on call - in short, blame it on the lawyer (a variation of pile on the wabbit). If that were the problem, the solution would be solved by employing SJAs like COL Hays Parks, who wrote in 2003 re: Astan, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms:
While there is truth to that solution (or to the alternative, "get rid of all the lawyers") in many situations, the problem you faced is part of a greater problem in Astan.Quote:
At the US Special Operations Command (“USSOCOM”) annual Legal Conference, May 13–17, 2002, the judge advocate debate became intense. While some attendees raised questions of “illegality” and the right or obligation of special operations forces to refuse an “illegal order” to wear “civilian clothing,” others urged caution. [3] The discussion was unclassified, and many in the room were not privy to information regarding Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Special Forces, its special mission units, or the missions assigned them.
[3] In the debate that ensued over the next year, it was my observation that those most strident in their criticism were most distant from Special Forces ground operations or were judge advocates not serving with or familiar with the missions of Special Forces units.
COL Parks bio (from same) - Law of War Chair, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense; Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to The Judge Advocate General of the Army, 1979–2003; Stockton Chair of International Law, Naval War College, 1984–1985; Colonel, US Marine Corps Reserve (Retired); Adjunct Professor of International Law, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC.
That problem (also directly involving the ROEs, RUFs and EOFs) has been the conscious election by the political and military masters (of ISAF, including the US; and of the Astan national government) to adopt "bad law" even though (at least for the US and Astan) that would not be required. That "bad law" hinges on the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, Direct Participation in Hostilities and Customary International Humitarian Law as endorsed by the ICRC - many in the ISAF would see that "bad law" as "good law" (as apparently does Nick Carter's LEGAD).
It has to be frustrating to deal with nonsense like CIVCAS, restrictive ROEs, etc. (and please note, while I'd prefer a broad hunting license, I do not believe that everything in the woods needs to be shot).
Regards
Mike
The argument that child soldiers are not only a third world problem cannot be made by showing pictures of European children from a century ago. Those european kids also lived in "third world" conditions without economic alternatives. I guess it depends on what your definition of "third world" is.
When it comes to afghanistan, demographics plays a huge role. With an average life expectency around 40, they start an adult life at an early age. Not only in terms of fighting, but also working, farming, getting married early and having kids etc. 18-21 is a very arbitrary line to define adults anyways.
I have not verified the statistics from this Quote from this WSJ article but:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...461719008.htmlQuote:
In 1979, the Russian army faced 2.5 million Afghan males at the traditional fighting ages of 15 to 29. Some 1.7 million of those Afghan males were second, third or fourth sons. They were surely loved by their parents but the family's property was inherited only by the oldest son. Younger sons had to struggle hard to find their places in society and—with decent jobs hard to find—could be easily recruited by militant groups. In 1979, 3.5 million Afghan boys still younger than 15 when the Soviet Union attacked were getting ready for just such a fight.
This endless supply of angry, ambitious young Afghan men never appeared on Russian radar. Yet it eventually forced them to give up the war and go home. Afghanistan was down to 13 million inhabitants.
In 2009, the situation is even more volatile. Today there are 4.2 million Afghan males aged 15 to 29 out of a total population of 33 million. Two and half million may conclude that violence offers their only chance for a successful future. Are these men on the radar screen of the 65.000 soldiers of NATO and the International Security Assistance Force? Is NATO/ISAF aware that 6.7 million Afghan boys under 15 are getting ready for battle? In Afghanistan, 45% of all males are younger than 15 versus 21% in the U.S., 18% in the U.K. and 14% in Germany.
Another thing to consider is that the wise Afghan family diviersifies its investments just as the wise American family does.
So, while the American may have a percentage of his money in Stocks, and a percentage in Bonds; it is not uncommon to find an Afghan father who has one son in the Afghan National Police and another in the Taliban. This is a survival strategy, as one never knows who will prevail, and by having a son in both camps the family will likely weather the storm. If age requirements to be in the ANP require my oldest son go there, then I will by necessity send my younger son to the other program.
This is a country where one is either on the winning side, or one is totally and completely F'd. This is why I see Afghanistan as the easiest country in the world to conduct UW in; there is always about half the country totally excluded from participation in economic and political opportunity that is ready, willing and able to assist you in swinging the balance the other way.
The key to true stability in Afghanistan is to break down (slowly over time) this all or nothing dynamic. A bit off topic, but I suspect it feeds into the youth of some of those who are fighting the current regime.
I cannot resist weighing in here. I think it is time for Commander’s to start pushing back on their lawyers regarding ROEs and the Laws of War. They need to push back based on the individual Soldier and Marine’s right to self-defense. They also need to push back on the fact that the Laws of War state that military necessity is determined by the “field commander”. Another process that might teach lawyers about the Laws of War is to have them start charging for violations of the Laws of War instead of the Rules of Law.
I can’t wait for the responses on this one…it’s one of those spider fly thingys.
One has to give the Taliban ten out of ten for seeing and exploiting the weaknesses in the ROE caused by the sensitivities towards negative media exposure. Don't blame the lawyers, blame the idiot generals that allowed them in in the first place.Quote:
Originally Posted by Polarbear1605
hear, hear!Quote:
Originally Posted by jma
thought you'd find it hard to resist this topic.
I'd say look not only to generals, but to a confluence of politicians and generals who set the legal policy. The SJAs can influence it to some extent, but are still instruments of the national command policy.
Realistically, what could you and I do in Astan given the policies in place ? But, if the policy was to go back to FM 27-10 and implement its doctrines as written, I'd expect we could do more than just gnaw at ankles.
Best,
Mike