Printable View
General Ali Reza Asgari was Mughniyah's primary Iranian contact in the 80's, and its been reported they had good relationship. I imagine Mughniyah has had to change some of the ways he operates after Asgari's defection. So maybe its a counter intelligence move by Mughniyah to test new support networks, a canary trap or something.
Ron,Quote:
Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey
Just my 0.02 worth... no doubt about it... virtually every category of I&W (and even harmonics of them) seem to be screaming that a conflagration from Gaza, to WB to the Lebanon-Syrian frontier is getting ready to kick off.
Israel has not fought a war on three fronts simultaneously in a very long time. Previous wars saw the IDF secure one front before moing to the next, and then the next. All three at the same time is what the IDF has been training up for this go 'round.
A result more spectacular for the IDF than '67 may surprise a lot of folks -- that's the gist of what some current and former IDF soldiers are hinting at lately.
bourbon,
The link you note between Gen Ali Reza Asghari and Imad Mughniyeh is an overlooked item at the minimum. It is much appreciated that you brought it up. Can't help but wonder if Ashghari's defection (if real and not an Iranian red herring) is really the intelligence coup some portary it to be. One might think a significant part of the Hezbollah-Iranian-Syrian C2 would be quite compromised as a result.
I am unwilling to believe that, Sean. (For one thing, if they could, WHY would Israel have bothered with Annapolis?)
Be careful to decouple wishes from probabilities.
Penta,Quote:
Originally Posted by Penta
Just relating what has been collected from several current and former IDF soldiers, some of whom are 'Hayal Boded' (Lone Soldiers). This info is as close to real HUMINT as I'm capable of collecting.
The IDF has been mobilizing by all accounts since at least early November. Some of that mobilization was in prep for possible terrorist action prior to the Annapolis Summit. Since then the units have not stood down. Israeli DM Barak has been hinting strongly that a major IDF operation against HAMAS in Gaza is possible to very likely. Circumstances will dictate. Several individuals have stated to me that a major IDF action in Gaza would not commence until after a mass-casualty rocket attack on the civilian population in places like Sderot or elsewhere in the western Negev. (Related to this is that terrorists have increased the lethality of rocket-borne warheads and appear to be attempting to strike an elementary school. Such an attack nearly succeeded today in Sderot.) It would seem that provoking such an IDF operation may be what HAMAS and its allies are attempting to do.
The IDF may be reluctant to lauch a full-scale operation in Gaza due to political considerations. Once the IDF takes all of Gaza from HAMAS to whom do they then give it to? Fatah? Not likely. The IDF has to have their post action planning done first and by all acounts this aspect is unresolved. Still, there is the toleration threshold that may make this point moot.
Remember the pattern from summer 2006 - HAMAS operations in the Gaza front were duplicated by Hezbollah on the Lebanese front and that led to a short but furious war which the IDF had not planned or prepared for. That mistake will not be repeated this time.
Nobody but the terrorist enemy appears to desire another major war. Attempting to murder school children enmasse makes this a fact. Therefore decoupling of the info I collect from the probabilities of another significant conflict in the Levant is not something which needs to be addressed. To the contrary, the dots require connecting.Quote:
Originally Posted by Penta
I would disagree:
1. If Hamas and friends want the IDF to attack Gaza, there's a reason.
That reason? If the IDF goes back in to Gaza, they are not going to leave again. Not in a few weeks, not in a few months, not in a few years.
Especially if there's a mass-casaulty attack, doubly so if it's against an elementary school or preschool.
You're endowing the Israeli Gov't with far too much control over the situation, I think, then they do now or ever have had.
Last I checked, Ohlmert's approval ratings were rather tiny, and the final release of the Winograd report on the Lebanon affair of 2006 is supposed to come out -after- Bush's visit to the region; it'll probably aim directly at Olmert.
So, add all this up: Why do you think it wouldn't just lead to the resignation of the current government?
With what part? All, some, or something specific? What exactly is the basis of your disagreement? What is the source of information that guides your disagreement; would you care to cite the source(s)?Quote:
Originally Posted by Penta
No doubt about it there's a reason. And no doubt that Israel has not yet identified an exit strategy after the war with HAMAS - I made this same point ("post action planning") above.Quote:
1. If Hamas and friends want the IDF to attack Gaza, there's a reason. That reason? If the IDF goes back in to Gaza, they are not going to leave again. Not in a few weeks, not in a few months, not in a few years.
Aside from the (potentially moot) political consideration mentioned in my post, it is a given that Israel will totally annihilate HAMAS and its allied terrorist proxies military capabilities during any coming operation in Gaza. HAMAS et al will cease to exist as a fighting force. Gaza will be pacified and demilitarized.
The purpose of the Gazan terrorists provoking an IDF incursion/invasion of Gaza is guided by an ill-conceived Iranian/IRGC/Qods Froce stratagem - to inflict similar damage upon the IDF in Gaza as was effected against US/Coalition troops in Iraq by Iranian-supplied insurgents and Qods Force terrorists. The Iranian's would like nothing more than for their proxies to make Gaza a military quagmire for the IDF, to tie down and hold engaged a sizeable chuck of the IDF combat power in attrition warfare.
This stratagem is doomed to failure.
On the contrary, you are reading my assessment incorrectly. The regard I hold for the Olmert-led Kadima Party appeasers is rock-bottom. The implementation/execution of Sharon's unilateral disengagement in Gaza has yielded exactly the same net result as the withdrawal from southern Lebanon - a haven for Iranian proxy terrorists and never-ending war.Quote:
You're endowing the Israeli Gov't with far too much control over the situation, I think, then they do now or ever have had.
This is why the IDF has done the work necessary to execute the "7-Ps" :
Proper Planning & Preparation Preempt Psss Poor Performance in the anticipated Gaza operation.
No doubt about this either irregardless of when the check was done. I was saying the same thing in the wake of the Hezbollah war in August 2006. The Olmert government is finished and the sooner they are forced from power the better.Quote:
Last I checked, Ohlmert's approval ratings were rather tiny, and the final release of the Winograd report on the Lebanon affair of 2006 is supposed to come out -after- Bush's visit to the region; it'll probably aim directly at Olmert.
A few quick observations.
No, Hamas is not trying to provoke an IDF entry into Gaza. PIJ and the PRC might be, in a limited way, but Hamas is trying to play a game of strategic deterrence (which is why they and the Israelis are simultaneously discussing, albeit indirectly, conditions for a ceasefire). This isn't to say Hamas is playing it well, but this is certainly what they hope for.
Rocket fire across the border was an anticipated (but not hoped for) outcome of Israel's disengagement from Gaza. If Sharon were in a condition to talk, he would argue that the net outcome has still been positive: lower Israeli casualties, blame shifted to the Palestinians, consolidation of control over the main settlement blocks in the West Bank. He wouldn't be very happy about Annapolis, but I doubt he would regard it as having very bright prospects.
The IDF was spectacularly unsuccessful in preventing the growth of Hamas in Gaza the last time it was occupied. There's no reason to think they would be much better at it a second time around. A much more likely response is short-duration ground operations and more sustained air operations--what some in the IDF term a "Lebanon-style retaliatory policy."
Hamas enjoys good relations with Syria and Iran. Neither outside actor has much influence over their behaviour (indeed, even the Damascus-based leadership has lost influence since the Gaza takeover).
Rex,Quote:
Originally Posted by Rex Brynen
Is this your considered opinion or do you have supporting information in the form of HUMINT or otherwise?
Targeting elementary school children in an attempt at cold-blooded mass murder is not limited anything - it is in fact Unrestricted Warfare by definition.Quote:
PIJ and the PRC might be, in a limited way...
Trust me, the IDF response to a mass casualty attack of this sort will be anything but a limited response pointed out above.
I doubt very seriously that Israel and HAMAS are involved in negotiations- third-party good offices notwithstanding. Only people like Shlomo Ben-Ami advocated such abject nonsense and that was before HAMAS violent takeover of Gaza from Fatah. Moreover, there is nothing for Israel to gain in negotiating what would be nothing more than a 10-year hudna with HAMAS when Israel has the power to annihilate them lock, stock and AK-47 barrel.Quote:
Hamas is trying to play a game of strategic deterrence (which is why they and the Israelis are simultaneously discussing, albeit indirectly, conditions for a ceasefire).
99.9% of HAMAS currently military prowess in GAZA has been achieved since the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza - most of it smuggled in via tunnels from Egyptian Sinai.Quote:
The IDF was spectacularly unsuccessful in preventing the growth of Hamas in Gaza the last time it was occupied.
Of course. Next time HAMAS will cease to exist as a viable military force along with all the other terrorists in Gaza.Quote:
There's no reason to think they would be much better at it a second time around.
Good relations? They are de facto allies. Iran has bought HAMAS loyalty and strategic warfighting capability with tens of millions of dollars.Quote:
Hamas enjoys good relations with Syria and Iran. Neither outside actor has much influence over their behaviour (indeed, even the Damascus-based leadership has lost influence since the Gaza takeover).
Most of the crude, home-made rockets that they are firing are lucky if they have a CEP of a km. They are certainly targeting civilian towns (itself a grave breach of IHL), but they are not particularly aiming at schools.Quote:
Originally Posted by Sean Osborne
On the issue of negotiations, I deliberately refrained from using that word. However, the IDF has made it clear (as recently as today) that they will modify their military posture if Hamas will stop the rocket fire. Whether that happens is another issue--it is not at all clear that everyone in Hamas, let alone PIJ et al, would agree.
I'm interested in hearing how you believe that Israel will accomplish this feat. Are you anticipating a nuclear attack?Quote:
Originally Posted by Sean Osborne
Have you seen what has happened to Al Qaeda in Iraq before, during and after 'the Surge'?Quote:
Originally Posted by JeffC
I leave to your imagination what will happen to terrorist warfighting capabilities confined to an easily isolatable box approximately one-third the size of the entire city of Baghdad. HAMAS has no where to hide, their tunnels will be their graves.
http://www.worldpress.org/feed.cfm?h...ubContrassID=1Quote:
Defense Minister Ehud Barak is scheduled to meet Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Sharm el-Sheikh on Wednesday to discuss efforts to reach a temporary truce between Israel and Hamas.
On his one-day visit, Barak will also meet with intelligence chief Omar Suleiman and Defense Minister Mohammed Tantawi.
The two sides will also discuss the problem of arms smuggling from Egypt into the Gaza Strip and the negotiations to secure the release of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who is being held in Gaza.
On the possibility of a limited cease-fire with Hamas, Barak has told defense officials in the past few days that currently "there is nothing to talk about" with Hamas.
But Barak said that if Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas leader in Gaza, can achieve a a suspension of Qassam rocket fire at Israel, and if Hamas is prepared to accept the terms posed by the international Quartet, there may be room to reexamine Israel's position. The Quartet's conditions include a disavowal of terror and a recognition of the Oslo Accords.
This will be Barak's first visit to Egypt since taking office last June. Several attempts were made over the past few months to arrange such a visit, which was repeatedly delayed. Israeli defense officials said that a time has not been confirmed for the meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh.