Combat Power, Conflict Resolution, and US Economy

The recent conversation about the utility (and impact) of conscription in the United States has led me to consider the relationship between the US economy, combat power, and conflict resolution. The downward spiraling relationship between US military expenditures and declining US combat power is already well-established. For you visual folks, here is a visual depiction:

http://s7.postimage.org/kljs1mod7/Untitled.png
The graph is a quick overview of US combat power from 1973 to 2009.

So, I ask, what is the future of US military readiness and security given that the JCC believes we live in an unprecedented dangerous world? My questions are:

- Is there a relationship between any economic indicators (wealth concentration, unemployment, tax revenue) and US military expenditures and/or combat power?

- Is there a relationship between US combat power or US military expenditures and conflict resolution (conflict propensity, conflict intensity, and conflict termination)?

- Of the terminated conflicts, is there a relationship between US combat power and definitive and favorable terminations?

I don't think 10000 aircraft in 1973 have greater combat capability than 4000 in 2009.i thought there were way more sm 1991 than what's reflected I could be wrong
. The answer I think is a false reasoning cycle ie we always draw down after war

Hi OTT,

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Originally Posted by OTT

I don't think 10000 aircraft in 1973 have greater combat capability than 4000 in 2009.

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You are right, according to the DoD/NATO definition of combat power: "The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time." During a speech at Harvard University this month, General Dempsey stated:

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Originally Posted by Martin Dempsey

What truly concerns me as chairman is that these lethal and destructive technologies are proliferating in two directions. They’re proliferating horizontally across advanced militaries in the world, and they’re proliferating vertically, down to nonstate actors, especially insurgents, terrorist groups and even transnational organized crime. As a result, more people have the ability to harm us or deny us the ability to act than at any point in my life [my note: Dempsey was born in 1952]. And that’s the security paradox.

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His assessment about the proliferation of threats is shared by the intelligence community:

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Originally Posted by James Clapper

Although I believe that counter-terrorism, counterproliferation, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence are at the immediate forefront of our security concerns, it is virtually impossible to rank - in terms of long-term importance - the numerous, potential threats to US national security... Rather, it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats 0 and the actors behind them- that constitute our biggest challenge.

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Clapper's testimony continues with listing every conceivable threat to US national security, from Al-Qaeda and Afghan instability to China and Iran. Realism is the dominant frame of thinking US policy circles, and one of its core assumptions is that "relations between states are determined by their levels of power derived primarily from their military and economic capabilities." In other words, power is relative; therefore, the absolute number of aircraft in the US inventory is not as important as how many aircraft we have relative to our adversaries (it is also important to note that studies indicate that operator efficiency is a better predictor of combat performance than technological advantage). As noted by both Dempsey and Martin, the amount of threats are proliferating.This will be examined later on when I look into US combat power and conflict resolution.

An problem underlying this trend is the congressional testimony I cited in the first post that identifies drastically slowing US procurement vis-a-vis military expenditures. In sum, military equipment is taking longer and more cash to develop and are procured in fewer numbers with higher maintenance cost per unit; in other words, inventories are shrinking and aging and this trend is not a function of decreased spending.

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Originally Posted by OTT

i thought there were way more sm 1991 than what's reflected I could be wrong

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My numbers were from the Office of Personnel and Management's federal employment statistics, which says there were 2,040,000 uniformed military personnel in 1991.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

So, I ask, what is the future of US military readiness and security given that the JCC believes we live in an unprecedented dangerous world?

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By JCC I presume you mean the CJCS. ;)

I wouldn't put too much stock in that "unprecedented dangerous world." It's been far worse several times. !942 was not a good year. Even 1962 was fearful to many. There have been others in the last 70 years or so. The system requires danger or an approximation thereof to keep the budget up to the maximum possible extent. DoD and the JCS are not above hyping the 'threat' to do that. Way the game is played in Washington...

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Is there a relationship between any economic indicators (wealth concentration, unemployment, tax revenue) and US military expenditures and/or combat power?

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There's a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures. Precisely what that relationship happens to be varies from time to time depending on Administration and perceived threat levels. There's an indirect relationship between wealth concentration and the other economic factors but it also can vary considerably over time due to many things. The relationship between any of those -- including military expenditures -- and combat power is tenuous and infinitely variable. As you have correctly stated, recent large expenditures have not produced more effectiveness. Indeed, some say the opposite has occurred, a surfeit of money has enable and enforced mediocrity...

Most of that variability is produced by humans; they after all are the one who start wars and who fight in them and that's why the metrication of warfare and attempts to produce empirical norms, rules or 'doctrine' are rarely successful

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Is there a relationship between US combat power or US military expenditures and conflict resolution (conflict propensity, conflict intensity, and conflict termination)?

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Not consistently because propensity and termination are under political control; intensity is not solely under US military control, the opponent gets a vote as to an extent do politicians from both sides. Heh -- even the weather can interfere... :wry:

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Of the terminated conflicts, is there a relationship between US combat power and definitive and favorable terminations?

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Not since World War II other than for Grenada, Panama and Desert Storm -- all of which were aberrations. In most of the others, certainly the three largest, US combat Power was held on a very short leash; much was not used due to some military and a great many political factors. In any counterinsurgency or similar operations, a definitive conclusion is generally not achievable, a compromise of varying satisfaction is most likely. Subutai would not understand. :D

Napoleon Bonaparte had some problems but he won a bunch before he lost the one that counted -- he's alleged to have said "...morale is to the physical as three is to one." If he didn't, many others certainly did over the centuries because it is an absolute truth. Combat power comes from capability, capability is in part dependent upon expenditures but actual capability ultimately relies on people. World War II was an exercise in expenditure but it was brought to a successful conclusion by many people from many nations, all of whom suffered under far more pervasive and discriminatory wealth concentration and unemployment problems due to a major depression than many today can comprehend. Tax intake was higher on a percentage basis due to the value of money but net revenues were lower due to that same factor.

That said, Of the Troops has a point. Ship, Aircraft, all Equipment -- and soldier -- capability (not performance allowed...) today is far greater than was the case in 1973 so straight line comparisons can be very misleading. To use one factor I've mentioned elsewhere, the average infantryman in Viet Nam walked around with about $2,500 (inflation adjusted) worth of gear on his body; his counterpart today has about ten times that and near concomitant capability. There is a difference between the two other than that -- the earlier guy was allowed to take his even more mediocre training than today's Troop and put it to use; he had fewer constraints. Combat power is comprised of many factors and the economic aspect may be only a third or so, Political and Military will are important while training and experience are also a variable that can have salutary effect.

Before we look at the relationship between combat power, conflict resolution, and the US economy, I want to look at each service separately; first land power, then air power, and then sea power.

http://s15.postimage.org/7j402teaz/Untitled.png

This graph compares the Army's budget with the number of its uniformed and civilian personnel. I have not been able to find numbers for the Army's vehicle inventory as I have for both the Air Force and Navy, so I admit this picture as of now is incomplete. However, I would like to point out that the 2001 sharp increase in funding did not produce a notable increase in personnel. This is because the majority of new spending was operational expenses. This should be compared to the number of soldiers that actually served in combat zones by year between 2001 and 2009 instead of overall end-strength. Since only a small percentage of personnel were actually ever in theater at any one time, it calls into question the sustainability of the force in prolonged conflict. The Army's budget more than doubled to maintain a tiny fraction of its forces in the field.

What does this imply in regards to US ability to engage and defeat the proliferating, disparate global threats identified by both Dempsey and Clapper?

All the way back to Colonel Warden's first book 1990 ( The Air Campaign) he was warning that the US should be thinking about and preparing for the fact that we may have to fight a future war where we are NOT the economically superior power. That will require a very differnat force and very differant way of thinking than we now have. Very interesting thread American Pride!

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In other words, power is relative; therefore, the absolute number of aircraft in the US inventory is not as important as how many aircraft we have relative to our adversaries (it is also important to note that studies indicate that operator efficiency is a better predictor of combat performance than technological advantage).

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It's not really possible to compare numbers - even relative numbers - and reach a valid conclusion. There are too many factors involved and # of platforms is highly deceiving.

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The downward spiraling relationship between US military expenditures and declining US combat power is already well-established.

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Well, the defense numbers in your chart include the costs of actually fighting wars. Fighting a war does tend to use up combat power and, at the same time, cost a lot of money. You'll notice there is an uptick in 1991 which was the First Gulf War and another in 1999 for Kosovo, then it exploded after 9/11. Therefore I don't think it shows a death-spiral but the financial reality of fighting two large land wars in Asia. Peacetime and wartime defense costs are apples and oranges IMO.

Also, Spinney's opinion is always worth noting, but a lot of equally smart people disagree with him.

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- Is there a relationship between any economic indicators (wealth concentration, unemployment, tax revenue) and US military expenditures and/or combat power?

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Yes, it's call GDP. The more you have, the more military you can afford.

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- Is there a relationship between US combat power or US military expenditures and conflict resolution (conflict propensity, conflict intensity, and conflict termination)?

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Pretty much agree with Ken on this one.

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- Of the terminated conflicts, is there a relationship between US combat power and definitive and favorable terminations?

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Combat power is only one factor and it's relative importance is situational.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

So, I ask, what is the future of US military readiness and security given that the JCC believes we live in an unprecedented dangerous world? My questions are:

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Agree with Ken, this is way overstated. Exactly what are these "unprecedented" dangers?

Te extent to which military spending is proportional to our ability to avert or preempt danger would depend on the nature of the probable threats. A large inventory of ships or aircraft is not going to do much to control the threat of a terrorist group with WMD.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

- Of the terminated conflicts, is there a relationship between US combat power and definitive and favorable terminations?

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I'd think "favorable terminations" have more to do with wise selection of goals than with the amount of military power available. More military power would not have turned Afghanistan into a democracy; that was never a reasonable goal to begin with. Sometimes what you choose to do with what you've got has more to do with success than what you've got.

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Originally Posted by Ken

I wouldn't put too much stock in that "unprecedented dangerous world." It's been far worse several times. !942 was not a good year. Even 1962 was fearful to many. There have been others in the last 70 years or so. The system requires danger or an approximation thereof to keep the budget up to the maximum possible extent. DoD and the JCS are not above hyping the 'threat' to do that. Way the game is played in Washington...

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I agree in principle, but I also must finding a starting point in measuring security threats, and the testimony of the highest ranking military officer and the highest ranking intelligence official seems like a good place to start. Later on, I will look more specifically into the claim of threat proliferation to test whether or not America's combat power is in decline from that perspective. Right now, I am focusing on combat power and military expenditures.

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Originally Posted by Ken

There's a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures. Precisely what that relationship happens to be varies from time to time depending on Administration and perceived threat levels. There's an indirect relationship between wealth concentration and the other economic factors but it also can vary considerably over time due to many things. The relationship between any of those -- including military expenditures -- and combat power is tenuous and infinitely variable.

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I am withholding my opinion on this subject until I lay out the data. It would seem, at least superficially, that there is a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures, but the last ten years of a simultaneous increase in military expenditures and decrease in tax revenues calls into question the nature of that relationship.

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Originally Posted by Ken

That said, Of the Troops has a point. Ship, Aircraft, all Equipment -- and soldier -- capability (not performance allowed...) today is far greater than was the case in 1973 so straight line comparisons can be very misleading. To use one factor I've mentioned elsewhere, the average infantryman in Viet Nam walked around with about $2,500 (inflation adjusted) worth of gear on his body; his counterpart today has about ten times that and near concomitant capability.

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This is a problem of space, which the DoD/NATO definition of combat power does not acknowledge. Whatever the firepower capability of a soldier, aircraft, or warship, it can only be applied in one geographic space at any one time; so, the number of soldiers, etc must be compared to the number of geographically disparate threats. So how we measure relative combat power between, say, the 1973 aircraft and the 2012 aircraft is to find their ratio of cost-per-unit to how many units are active. The F-35 costs between 197 and 237 million dollars. One of the aircraft it will replace is the F-16, which cost 14 - 18 million dollars per unit. If we assume that the amount of combat power that a dollar can buy is fixed, then in order for the F-35 to be "worth it", it must provide at least 1,316% more combat power than the F-16. By anyone's definition of combat power, does it? The US has 2,230 F-16s, 335 A-10s, and 409 F/A-18s (the other two aircraft the F-35 will replace), for a total of 2,974 aircraft. The official plan is to buy around 2,400 aircraft. If we assume that to be the case (even though procurement has been both delayed and reduced because of cost of growth), and use the DoD/NATO definition of combat power, then even though the US intends to buy 20% less aircraft than current inventory, for now it is purchasing an equal or greater amount of combat power. For the US to replace F-16 combat power 1:1 (assuming the F-35 can provide 1,316% more combat power), the US must purchase at least 1,600 new F-35s. These are numbers that I will look at in the near future.

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Originally Posted by Entropy

Well, the defense numbers in your chart include the costs of actually fighting wars. Fighting a war does tend to use up combat power and, at the same time, cost a lot of money. You'll notice there is an uptick in 1991 which was the First Gulf War and another in 1999 for Kosovo, then it exploded after 9/11. Therefore I don't think it shows a death-spiral but the financial reality of fighting two large land wars in Asia. Peacetime and wartime defense costs are apples and oranges IMO.

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Operational expenses and the base budget are calculated separately, so we can see clearly in the documentation that the increase in spending is related to the cost of maintaining the forces in the field after they have already been trained and equipped. Yes, war is expensive, and for the US Army at least (I have not looked at USAF and USN numbers yet), it is become more expensive to actually use combat power. The data so far strongly suggests that the cost to maintain forces in the field has far outpaced military appropriations and US economic capacity to finance it. This means, if trends continue, the amount of combat power that the US can deploy or the amount of time such forces can be sustained will diminish. This is a major economic and security problem if true.

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Originally Posted by Entropy

Yes, it's call GDP. The more you have, the more military you can afford.

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This is true if we assume that the growth in cost-per-unit is lower than than the growth in US GDP. If that assumption is false, then with every budget cycle, the US will actually be purchasing less combat power per dollar.

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Exactly what are these "unprecedented" dangers?

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Read the document.

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Originally Posted by Dayhuan

Te extent to which military spending is proportional to our ability to avert or preempt danger would depend on the nature of the probable threats. A large inventory of ships or aircraft is not going to do much to control the threat of a terrorist group with WMD.

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This is not necessarily true. How many soldiers, aircraft, and ships has the US used in combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban? There are X amount of soldiers on the ground, Y amount of aircraft providing tactical, logistical, intelligence, etc support, and Z amount of ships moving to and fro (at times with escort) moving supplies, combat aircraft, etc. Then there are overhead assets that enable communication, etc, with their operators also. Whether or not all of this is necessary for defeating a terrorist group (with or without WMD) is besides the point; it can and is being used for that purpose. Your objection is one of military effectiveness, which will be looked at when I investigate conflict resolution.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

I agree in principle, but I also must finding a starting point in measuring security threats, and the testimony of the highest ranking military officer and the highest ranking intelligence official seems like a good place to start.

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Mmm. Be careful. My observation over many years is that is a flawed assumption. My two pet, if minor, examples of the error of that approach are the testimonies before Congress of then General Louis Wagner as CG AMC that the Sergeant York DivAD was the finest air defense weapon in the world (shortly before it shot up a Latrine on the Range at Fort Bliss at its Press introduction (and shortly before it was cancelled)... :D) and then General Robert RisCassi, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army that the Dragon (LINK)was the greatest anti tank missile in the world just before we canned it and started buying Javs. :rolleyes:

Omitted from the Wiki article is the disconcerting tendency of some Dragons to go a few feet out of the launcher and plop on the ground -- and the fact that the gunner had to be unusually well trained and experience in firing the missile to obtain an even marginal hit.

Generals, like all humans, have agendas so be careful...

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Right now, I am focusing on combat power and military expenditures.

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You're probably aware that there are numerous hookers in the defense budget and several blind alleys. There's also a lot of Congressional vote buying concealed therein...

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It would seem, at least superficially, that there is a direct relationship between tax revenue and military expenditures, but the last ten years of a simultaneous increase in military expenditures and decrease in tax revenues calls into question the nature of that relationship.

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True and you'll also find other incongruous periods -- the overall trend for a multi decade period, five or more, will I believe give you more accurate data.

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The F-35 costs between 197 and 237 million dollars. One of the aircraft it will replace is the F-16, which cost 14 - 18 million dollars per unit.

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Check the new costs for the F-16 when it appeared in the 1970s and adjust for inflation. Using only current publicly available prices can badly skew your data.

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If we assume that the amount of combat power that a dollar can buy is fixed, then in order for the F-35 to be "worth it", it must provide at least 1,316% more combat power than the F-16. By anyone's definition of combat power, does it?

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I think that is a bad assumption; that the costs must be very accurately assessed and compared; and that the mechanically derived variance factor all must be approached with great caution. Combat power is a function of both capability and of application not only of the equipment but of its operators and support systems. How much, if any, better trained are today's pilots and how much more capable are all the mission systems? A Sidewinder is a Sidewinder but the AIM-9X is a vastly different creature than an AIM-9B. Mission planning capability? Sortie generation? Maintenance man hours versus flight hours? Sensors? How much is the 'Stealth' feature of the F-35 worth...

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Operational expenses and the base budget are calculated separately, so we can see clearly in the documentation that the increase in spending is related to the cost of maintaining the forces in the field after they have already been trained and equipped.

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As I'm sure you're aware, many items in the O&M budgets of all the services are spent on things other than supporting elements deployed or in the field -- much of it goes to maintain the massive (and unduly expensive...) garrison and base operation in CONUS. Much also is spent on Exercises and add-on training, on TDY and travel to esoteric meeting in CONUS and around the world. Lot of fluff in there... :wry:

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The data so far strongly suggests that the cost to maintain forces in the field has far outpaced military appropriations and US economic capacity to finance it. This means, if trends continue, the amount of combat power that the US can deploy or the amount of time such forces can be sustained will diminish. This is a major economic and security problem if true.

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I suspect you will discover that (a) it is quite true and (b) little is being done about it. :mad:

OK, so now let's look at air power.

USAF Budget, Inventory, and End-Strength
http://s10.postimage.org/o80ra3495/Untitled.png

This trend should come as no surprise to anyone. However, as I mentioned in my post with Ken, at least in regards to the F-35 replacement of the F-16, the US is actually purchasing per dollar less combat power with each new procurement cycle. If this is true, we will continue to see the number of tactical fighters decline at an increasingly higher rate compared to appropriations in the budget.

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Originally Posted by Ken

Generals, like all humans, have agendas so be careful...

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I agree. As I stated, I will be looking at conflict resolution after looking at combat power.

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Originally Posted by Ken

I think that is a bad assumption; that the costs must be very accurately assessed and compared; and that the mechanically derived variance factor all must be approached with great caution. Combat power is a function of both capability and of application not only of the equipment but of its operators and support systems. How much, if any, better trained are today's pilots and how much more capable are all the mission systems? A Sidewinder is a Sidewinder but the AIM-9X is a vastly different creature than an AIM-9B. Mission planning capability? Sortie generation? Maintenance man hours versus flight hours? Sensors? How much is the 'Stealth' feature of the F-35 worth...

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It doesn't matter how we calculate or determine "combat power", or what other factors we include under its umbrella, as long as we apply both to the F-16 and the F-35 (or any other compared platforms). If all these factors are the same, but one aircraft costs X amount more than another aircraft, then in order to be cost effective that aircraft must also see a proportional increase in its combat power. I very much doubt that the F-35 has two or three times more combat power than the F-16, much less 11 times. As a side note, if we continue to see a decline in aircraft numbers combined with greater maintenance requirements and higher operational costs, then I suspect at some point we will also see a decline in flight hours. This could be off-set temporarily by increased simulator time and larger outlays for operations, but neither are sustainable to maintain combat power.

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Originally Posted by Ken

As I'm sure you're aware, many items in the O&M budgets of all the services are spent on things other than supporting elements deployed or in the field -- much of it goes to maintain the massive (and unduly expensive...) garrison and base operation in CONUS. Much also is spent on Exercises and add-on training, on TDY and travel to esoteric meeting in CONUS and around the world. Lot of fluff in there...

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This budget document (slide 5) illustrates that the majority of new funding came from the operational budget, starting in 2002. Whether or not they used it for expenses elsewhere doesn't matter, since that money paid for overseas combat expenses in totality.

AmericanPride,

You really need to define "Combat Power." You seem to be using the term in multiple way and in multiple contexts.

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It doesn't matter how we calculate or determine "combat power", or what other factors we include under its umbrella, as long as we apply both to the F-16 and the F-35 (or any other compared platforms). If all these factors are the same, but one aircraft costs X amount more than another aircraft, then in order to be cost effective that aircraft must also see a proportional increase in its combat power.

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The problem is, all those factors are not the same. Comparing numbers of platforms is going to lead to bad analysis. Comparing platforms in a vacuum also leads to bad analysis. Just look at the various debates over the years as to what is better - The F-16 or the Mig-29? The answer is, it depends.

Platforms function as parts of a system where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts (which is the essence of combined arms). Just to give a quick example, the fact that we have AEW aircraft makes our air-to-air fighters much more effective than they otherwise would be.

As far as the F-35 goes, I think it's way too expensive. As I noted a couple years ago, it's too big to fail at this point.

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Originally Posted by Entropy

You really need to define "Combat Power." You seem to be using the term in multiple way and in multiple contexts.

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There are three modes of analysis occurring simultaneously. First, there is the absolute measurement of combat power (as defined by DoD/NATO) of a platform's capabilities; this is more accurately described as "combat capability" for our purposes. The second mode of analysis is based on the first and is really just relative combat capability between different platforms of the same class. Lastly, there is relative combat power, which I described in my response to OTT, as a comparison between the US and its adversaries and threats. This is probably best described as "combat capacity"; the potential combat capability that can be leveraged by the US. Hopefully that clears it up some.

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Originally Posted by Entropy

The problem is, all those factors are not the same. Comparing numbers of platforms is going to lead to bad analysis. Comparing platforms in a vacuum also leads to bad analysis. Just look at the various debates over the years as to what is better - The F-16 or the Mig-29? The answer is, it depends.

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I agree, which is why I selected the cost-per-unit as the base measurement. I am certain that the F-35A, for example, has greater absolute combat capability than the F-16. But when we're discussing whether or not the US is actually purchasing more combat capacity when replacing the F-16 with the F-35A, we also must factor in how many platforms are being purchased. So, if the ratio of cost-per-unit:total inventory is different between the platforms, not only do we know that the aircraft have different combat capabilities, but that the US is also purchasing a different level of combat capacity. In the final tally, the US is purchasing an aircraft with greater combat capability but is simultaneously reducing its own combat capacity because it cannot procure as the necessary aircraft to replace the F-16's combat capability one-for-one. For this reason, I agree with you that the F-35 is too expensive. And I suspect that you are also right about it being too big to fail.

Before continuing on to seapower, I am going to look out USAF outlays; so hopefully that information will help guide our conversation some more.

USAF Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, and Procurement Outlays
http://s15.postimage.org/p4iabggff/Untitled.png

Here are some key events in USAF procurement:

1976: F-1t enters operational service
1976: A-10 enters operational service
1980: F-16 enters operational service
1983: F-117 enters operational service
1986: B-1 enters operational service
1993: C-17 enters operational service
1997: B-2 enters operational service
2008: F-117 retired from service

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

If all these factors are the same, but one aircraft costs X amount more than another aircraft, then in order to be cost effective that aircraft must also see a proportional increase in its combat power.

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I doubt many blue suiters would agree. I'm a retired and retarded no suit wearer and I sure don''t. Your problem in that statement is the "if"...

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Whether or not they used it for expenses elsewhere doesn't matter, since that money paid for overseas combat expenses in totality.

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That implies that you do not believe money spent elsewhere has any or much application to combat power...

I advised caution on your assumptions. This response adds to my belief that your study will likely not do what you wish it to do. Howsomeever, the best of Irish luck to ye... ;)

USAF Maintenance and Procurement Outlays, and Combat Inventory
http://s9.postimage.org/4p40tn52n/Untitled.png

Now, just a quick note, the outlay figures are different from the last graph because in this one I am using the total obligation authority (TOA), which contains all budget authority (the numbers used in the previous graph), and authorized credits and transfers from other accounts. I think this provides a more accurate picture of USAF sustainability (the ratio between number of aircraft and costs). The inventory is shrinking while its sustainability cost is increasing. I suspect that this will become more profound when the F-35 enters service. In this aircraft's particular case, the USAF intends to purchase between 1,000 and 1,300 aircraft, well below the 1,600 platforms necessary to not diminish America's air power. And, already, the procurement process is facing cost overruns, delays in acquisition, and diminishing orders, which will only push the outlays and inventory size further apart.

At what point does this trend become a national security risk? What is the future of air power threats (not only peer competitors, but also the development and proliferation of air defense systems)? How long can the USAF (and the US economy) sustain a prolonged conflict with intense air power competitiveness?

I'll never get why Americans are so much focused on national military power while being allied or befriended with the majority of foreign military power.


Well, if you really want to look at the economical underpinnings of U.S. military power, look first at the U.S. shipbuilding industry. It's going to be a tough search for a needle in a haystack.

The U.S. produces
* few overpriced warships, none of them are competitive export produces
* Great Lakes ships that will never see an ocean
* leisure yachts
* a couple oil rig servicing boats and ships
* not much else

Its shipbuilding industry is rated lower than the one of such great historical naval power as Poland or Croatia. In fact, almost all (about 80%) of global shipbuilding is concentrated in East Asia.
Don't bring up the supposed special skills of military shipyards versus civilian ones; getting cables wrong, do poor welding, deliver late and over priced are not desirable special skills. Besides; 20 semi-mil spec hulls beat one mil spec hull.


edit: I may have been too subtle.

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Yes, it's call GDP. The more you have, the more military you can afford.

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A look at the GDP is useless in this topic. What counts are
* economic sustainability (at the very least balanced trade and an appropriate net capital investment; the U.S. has neither)
as the background of military spending
* the size and composition of the share of the economy that can convert to a wartime economy
(electronics, machine building, chemicals, metal industries, resource production, automotive industries, shipbuilding, aerospace industries)

The GDP includes -especially in partially de-industrialised countries such as the U.S., France or the UK- a far too great share of irrelevant economic output. You're not going to win a war with the economic output of investment bankers, car washers, lawyers, fast food servants, mobile phone services, website designers or coiffeurs.

USN Strength and Budget
http://s7.postimage.org/cj7z59wmj/Untitled.png

Here is a quick look at USN strength. I think the glance at the USA, USAF, and USN trends suggests that the post-Cold War cuts did in fact significantly hollow out America's military power. Problems in cost growth, combined with the start of the GWoT, has had an upward pressure on the budget without producing any notable increase in military power. In other words, over time the US is purchasing less military power per dollar. Additionally, the capacity for the US to actually sustain its military forces in combat operations is also shrinking.

I don't think we need to go into detail of the decline of the US manufacturing sector, since this is probably generally accepted. Given increasing US reliance on advanced technologies for much of its military inventory, there is a question of how much and quickly the relevant parts of the economy can be converted for war-time production. Is there enough capacity to replace attrition and increase inventory in a conflict? Can that be accomplished before the termination of a conflict?

The next graph I produce will compare the growth of US GDP with the growth of the defense budget. Also, on a side note, I would be interested in seeing data comparing US, Chinese, Russian, Indian, and UK military flight hours and accident rates for this time period (1973 - 2009). So, if anyone has that data or knows where to find it, please let me know.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

I'll never get why Americans are so much focused on national military power while being allied or befriended with the majority of foreign military power.

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There is no guarantee that allied military power will be available for any conflict in the future, for whatever reason allies decide not to participate. There is also the problem that US military power is decreasing relative to the amount of money needed to sustain it.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

There is no guarantee

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The other stuff was superfluous. Understand this quote and you'll probably get my view on military spending.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

I think the glance at the USA, USAF, and USN trends suggests that the post-Cold War cuts did in fact significantly hollow out America's military power.

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Entirely wrong metric. Watch the difference between "to hollow out" and "to shrink".

For a change, I will refer not to my blog but to another useful one, "Ink Spots":
http://tachesdhuile.blogspot.de/2011...-and-isnt.html

A "hollow force" is a force that supposes to be more than it is. It's not a small force. Insufficient training and repair budgets lead to a hollow force, a budget cut does not need to do the same at all.
A hollow force is a failure of high-level leadership to adjust properly to a budget, it's about "not all is gold that shines" problem.

US Yearly GDP and TOA to Services Growth
http://s9.postimage.org/9mvu3czun/Untitled.png

This is a comparison between US GDP growth and growth of TOA appropriations to each military service by year. US GDP growth has averaged about 3% since 1973, while the growth of the budget has averaged about 1%. So, what this tells me is that the US economy is actually expanding its capacity to support military power over time. But it is important to note that this only remains true to the extent that US per dollar purchasing power remains fixed relative to the combat power purchased. If one US dollar purchased X amount of combat power in 1973, what difference from X does one US dollar in 2012 purchase?

As discussed in a previous post, in the case of the F-35 replacement of the F-16, this problem is evident. The F-35 is 11 - 13 times more expensive than the F-16 but does not provide 11 - 13 times more combat capability; the US intends to purchase far less than the approximately 1,600 F-35s necessary to replace the combat capabilities of the F-16 inventory. In this situation, one US dollar is purchasing a smaller rate of combat capability. When aggregated for the whole defense establishment, if this reduction in purchasing power is greater than 3%, then US economic capacity to purchase military power is shrinking. If the reduction is greater than 1%, then the ability of the defense budget to sustain US military power is also shrinking.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

Watch the difference between "to hollow out" and "to shrink".

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See above to see why both are occurring.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

Read the document.

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I did. I see nothing providing real support to the assertion of unprecedented danger.

I'm not sure anyone's speeches, and in particular speeches made by those representing institutions whose budget allocations depend on the perceptions of danger, are a good place to start assessing levels of threat.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

This is not necessarily true. How many soldiers, aircraft, and ships has the US used in combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban? There are X amount of soldiers on the ground, Y amount of aircraft providing tactical, logistical, intelligence, etc support, and Z amount of ships moving to and fro (at times with escort) moving supplies, combat aircraft, etc. Then there are overhead assets that enable communication, etc, with their operators also. Whether or not all of this is necessary for defeating a terrorist group (with or without WMD) is besides the point; it can and is being used for that purpose. Your objection is one of military effectiveness, which will be looked at when I investigate conflict resolution.

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To what extent are these assets being used top combat AQ - the terrorist group in the picture - and to what extent are they being used to try to establish a government in Afghanistan that will be acceptable to the US? These are two entirely different goals.

If we assume that in order to avert these "unprecedented dangers" we need to run around deposing governments and installing new ones, then we might be pardoned for assuming that large expensive conventional forces are needed for the task. Those assumptions seems to me highly questionable. Again, the key to achieving goals is not only the amount of force you can apply, but the goals you select and the means you choose to try to achieve them. If we can't succeed in transforming Afghanistan into a Western-style liberal democracy it won't be because we couldn't apply enough force, it will be because we selected a goal we can't achieve and tried to pursue it by inappropriate means. If your hammer won't drive a screw, you don't need a bigger hammer.

The question remains: what exactly are the threats that produce these "unprecedented dangers", and what exactly is needed to combat these threats? If we're talking about the threat of non-state actors, transnational criminals, terror groups, etc, I see no rational point in assessing our capacity by the number of ships and aircraft we can deploy. The number of F-35s or F-22s or carriers we buy may be proportional to our economic means, but I'm not convinced that it has any great impact on our capacity to counter these threats.

Military spending in general is not only related to GDP and government revenue, but also to perceived levels of threat and the nature of perceived threats. If we're at war or faced with imminent threat, we're willing to spend a higher percentage of GDP on the military. If the perceived threat appears to be from conventional force, we'll be willing to spend more on conventional force. The threat of WMD-armed terrorists makes a poor justification for spending more on F-22s, for obvious reasons.

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

I did. I see nothing providing real support to the assertion of unprecedented danger.

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Dempsey did not claim any new emergent threat existed. He claims that the "unprecedented danger" is the simultaneous diffusion of threats horizontally and the proliferation of threat capabilities vertically. The testimony of DNI Clapper agrees with Dempsey's assertion.

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

I'm not sure anyone's speeches, and in particular speeches made by those representing institutions whose budget allocations depend on the perceptions of danger, are a good place to start assessing levels of threat.

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This criticism would be more relevant and substantial if it also recommended a better metric.

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

The number of F-35s or F-22s or carriers we buy may be proportional to our economic means, but I'm not convinced that it has any great impact on our capacity to counter these threats.

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As I've stated before, I will look at conflict resolution after looking at economic capacity and military expenditures. The information I have gathered so far indicates that US military power is shrinking as is US capacity to support said military power. Though GDP growth outpaces defense appropriations growth, US purchasing power relative combat power is reducing. In order to maintain the same level of combat power over time, the US must spend an increasing amount of dollars. Without reform, we will either reduce our military capacity or catch up and surpass GDP growth with military expenditures (so far, my assessment is that we are reducing military power in order to (1) profit private defense interests and (2) protect other government programs from defense appropriations). Regardless of what threats we face and the most effective means in defeating them, this is the real problem.

EDIT: Further, this problem exists before the costs incurred by the GWoT, which highlights the inefficiencies of the defense establishment. IMO, the GWoT should be a shot over the bow to the defense establishment and American public about the true costs of maintaining the status quo. In the US case, the armed forces have the double cost of maintaining, and then the operational costs of actually using it, which happen to exceed the costs of maintaining, even though we employed only a tiny fraction of combat power at any one time. This is the primary reason why we have abandoned the "two simultaneous major theater wars" idea; we can't afford the costs of maintaining our current force at levels necessary to fight them, and the current force levels cannot sustain two major regional wars. Activating the reserves is not a solution (even though that's historically the US strategy) because that only adds to the final cost. That's a major security dilemma which we avoided by simply abandoning the policy. I'm not confident that the Air-Sea Battle concept will provide any outlet for this problem if the failure of the "revolution of military affairs" (FCS, for example) is any indication.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

As discussed in a previous post, in the case of the F-35 replacement of the F-16, this problem is evident. The F-35 is 11 - 13 times more expensive than the F-16 but does not provide 11 - 13 times more combat capability...

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You're comparing two aircraft of vastly different age, production status, capabilities and design parameters and for the older one you're using the cost of a stripped variant after years of production.

A far more apt comparison would of the the F-16IN recently offered to India (but beat out thus far by the Dassault Rafale). That variant of the F-16 is perhaps the most capable and it still won't quite match the F-35 in many respects. Flyaway costs run about $111M for the F-16IN versus $197M for the F35A. That's a factor of only 1:1.7 -- call it two times more cost and then ask the question on combat capability...

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

Dempsey did not claim any new emergent threat existed. He claims that the "unprecedented danger" is the simultaneous diffusion of threats horizontally and the proliferation of threat capabilities vertically. The testimony of DNI Clapper agrees with Dempsey's assertion.

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"The simultaneous diffusion of threats horizontally and the proliferation of threat capabilities vertically" seems almost intentionally vague.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

This criticism would be more relevant and substantial if it also recommended a better metric.

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What about simply describing and assessing the specific perceived threats... who exactly are we afraid of, and what exactly are we afraid they will do? Would any such process support a claim that we live in a period of "unprecedented danger"?

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

The information I have gathered so far indicates that US military power is shrinking as is US capacity to support said military power. Though GDP growth outpaces defense appropriations growth, US purchasing power relative combat power is reducing.

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Do we need to look at the military power we have relative to what we had at any time in the past, or at what we have relative to what we need to deal with today's perceived threats and the threats that are expected to emerge? Maybe we no longer have the power to stop Soviet tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap, but is that a power we still need?

The challenge is not necessarily to maintain the same level and type of military power, but to maintain a level and type of military power suited to realistic assessments of the threat environment that we face. I expect that trying to quantify that and illustrate it with charts would be a frustrating process, but luckily I don't need to do it!

IIRC inflation is being measured by assuming that predecessor and successor are the same thing. Technological progress is a different thing, measured differently. Comparing both properly is usually beyond the capabilities of the methods known to mankind so far.

The only real military #1 status challenge is the PRC (and so far only regionally). This challenge is founded on industrial capabilities; the production during the last years prior to war can easily be much more important than legacy equipment. Think of China as an equivalent of the '1933' Soviet Union. Ships, aircraft, tanks and even guns produced during the 1920's were largely irrelevant by '41.

Thus I'd compare

* economical sustainability of the economy (excluding ecological and resource sustainability)
* industrial capacity that's suitable for a war industry
* dependence on unsecured resource imports
* secured finished product or resource export capacity, currency and gold reserves, secured military goods import capacity (ability to import arms)
* qualified personnel base beyond that (mechanical and electrical engineers mostly)
* size and quality of the officer corps
* size and quality of the senior noncommissioned officer corps
* quantity of able-bodied personnel with basic (para)military training age group about 18-30 yrs old
* political stability (ability to sustain war; remember Austria-Hungary and Russia in WW1)
* quantity of able-bodied personnel without basic (para)military training about 18-30 yrs old
* allied power of the same sorts

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

The only real military #1 status challenge is the PRC (and so far only regionally). This challenge is founded on industrial capabilities; the production during the last years prior to war can easily be much more important than legacy equipment. Think of China as an equivalent of the '1933' Soviet Union. Ships, aircraft, tanks and even guns produced during the 1920's were largely irrelevant by '41.

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I appreciate your analysis and I would argue that long-term security trends are currently in favor of PRC, not the US. While I am interested in your proposed metrics, I don't think there is much in the way of disagreement about current conditions. My primary interest is investigating if structural problems in the US economy is having a detrimental impact on US military power. I think the data so far illustrates that military power is declining; first, in a reduction of military capacity, and second, in a reduction of purchasing power of military capacity. My question is if this trend is at all related to the downward structural trends in the US economy?

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

"The simultaneous diffusion of threats horizontally and the proliferation of threat capabilities vertically" seems almost intentionally vague.

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Quote:

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

What about simply describing and assessing the specific perceived threats... who exactly are we afraid of, and what exactly are we afraid they will do? Would any such process support a claim that we live in a period of "unprecedented danger"?

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Do we need to look at the military power we have relative to what we had at any time in the past, or at what we have relative to what we need to deal with today's perceived threats and the threats that are expected to emerge? Maybe we no longer have the power to stop Soviet tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap, but is that a power we still need?

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As I stated before, I am first looking at the economy and military capacity. Conflict resolution will be later. In the meantime, I recommend reading the Congressional testimony of DNI Clapper that I cited earlier if you are interested in a review of current and emerging threats. So far, the data suggests that independent of which threats exist, US military capacity now is less than in 1973, and the purchasing power for military capacity is also reduced. Again, this is the real security problem.

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Originally Posted by Ken

A far more apt comparison would of the the F-16IN recently offered to India (but beat out thus far by the Dassault Rafale). That variant of the F-16 is perhaps the most capable and it still won't quite match the F-35 in many respects. Flyaway costs run about $111M for the F-16IN versus $197M for the F35A. That's a factor of only 1:1.7 -- call it two times more cost and then ask the question on combat capability...

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The US does not operate the F-16IN so it is not useful in measuring US combat power. But I would like to note that this is an excellent example of inflating prices far along in the platform's history. William Hartung's book provides an excellent overview of Lockheed Martin's practices in this regard; and I think it's a fair representation of the acquisition process as a whole.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

So far, the data suggests that independent of which threats exist, US military capacity now is less than in 1973, and the purchasing power for military capacity is also reduced. Again, this is the real security problem.

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I don't see how you can determine "the real security problem" without assessing current capacity relative to current threat. Current capacity relative to 1973 capacity is irrelevant, the Cold War is over and the threat environment has changed. Once you decide that the analysis must be "independent of which threats exist" the analysis begins to float off on thin air, because any analysis of security is fundamentally dependent on which threats exist.

I don't think anyone doubts that military power ultimately stems from economic power, and that as the US loses absolute economic superiority (that doesn't necessarily mean US decline, as others can also rise) it will necessarily lose absolute military superiority. That doesn't necessarily have unmanageable security implications, it just means we have to learn to manage the new security environment. Is absolute superiority to everyone, everywhere, all the time essential to our security?

I don't think anyone doubts that reforms in US military procurement would be desirable; that's close to being self-evident. It would be interesting to know if any concrete, practical changes have been proposed...

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

The US does not operate the F-16IN so it is not useful in measuring US combat power.

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Nowhere did I imply that it was operated by us; that isn't the issue; combat capability or your combat 'power' are nominal owner independent issues, as is price. The issue at hand is your use of inappropriate and thus potentially invalid costs in comparing the costs of an F-16 of Block 30/32 or below with an F-35. Machts nichts to me, really, it's your study and I was simply pointing out a potential pitfall... :wry:

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But I would like to note that this is an excellent example of inflating prices far along in the platform's history...

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Is it price fixing or is it much added -- and more expensive -- capability? The F-16IN AN/APG 80 AESA Radar for example offers many improvements in capability and thus combat power (and some USAF F-15s C/Es are being retrofitted with a similar set as likely will be some F-16s) but it is an order of magnitude more expensive than the older mechanically scanned sets. Built in IRST (which the USAF used to foolishly reject), Current EW systems and helmet mounted cueing all available in the F-16IN are not only items designed into the F-35 but also far more expensive than the Boyd / Spinney / Wheeler beloved f-16A. Those gentlemen not withstanding, the USAF and most other purchasers of the F-16 have opted for far more capability than the A-model possessed. You get what you pay for. And one must pay for what one gets...

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William Hartung's book provides an excellent overview of Lockheed Martin's practices in this regard; and I think it's a fair representation of the acquisition process as a whole.

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We can disagree on that last item and I'll again point out that the Congress really like things the way they are; i.e. LM couldn't do what they're rightly or wrongly accused of without the assent -- even encouragement -- of Congress. Allow me to say that your choice of 'believable' sources is, er, interesting and they certainly generally are supportive of your views :rolleyes:

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

I don't see how you can determine "the real security problem" without assessing current capacity relative to current threat... Is absolute superiority to everyone, everywhere, all the time essential to our security...I don't think anyone doubts that reforms in US military procurement would be desirable; that's close to being self-evident...

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Quite accurate, as well.

Two countries in today's world have a problem with the classic line that goes approx. like this:

One countries' perfect security is all other countries' insecurity.

One country seeks perfect security for itself only in its own region, the other has completely lost its mind.

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

I don't see how you can determine "the real security problem" without assessing current capacity relative to current threat. Current capacity relative to 1973 capacity is irrelevant, the Cold War is over and the threat environment has changed. Once you decide that the analysis must be "independent of which threats exist" the analysis begins to float off on thin air, because any analysis of security is fundamentally dependent on which threats exist.

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As I have repeatedly stated, this has nothing to do with the first part of my analysis which, I stress again, is about measuring US military capacity. Yes, it is a major issue if US purchasing power is decreasing. In order to maintain the same level of military power, the US must increasingly spend more money. This decline is not related to the existence of other security threats or the development of other national military forces. The fact that other national powers may represent future threats only highlights the underlying economic problems that are reducing US military capacity. In other words, it is possible that US military is reducing relative both to US economic capacity and to foreign national threats (the former is what I have been discussing, the latter I have not looked at).

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

I don't think anyone doubts that military power ultimately stems from economic power, and that as the US loses absolute economic superiority (that doesn't necessarily mean US decline, as others can also rise) it will necessarily lose absolute military superiority. That doesn't necessarily have unmanageable security implications, it just means we have to learn to manage the new security environment. Is absolute superiority to everyone, everywhere, all the time essential to our security?

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You mean relative "economic superiority" since US GDP growth is outpacing the growth of the DoD budget. Nor has my analysis even addressed this problem yet, which, again, I said I would investigate when I explore conflict resolution. Right now, the data indicates that US purchasing power is decreasing. This decrease is not dependent on the existence of any threat.

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Originally Posted by Ken

Allow me to say that your choice of 'believable' sources is, er, interesting and they certainly generally are supportive of your views

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My sources in this thread have been:
- General Dempsey's speech
- DNI Clapper's congressional testimony
- Frank Spinney's congressional testimony
- OPM's federal employment statistics
- Naval History and Heritage Command (USN inventory)
- Arsenal of Airpower: USAF Inventory
- FY2010 DoD Green Book on national defense estimates
- World Bank

These are all primary sources so I doubt the substance of your objections about my sources. My conclusions are based on the numbers provided by these sources.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

You mean relative "economic superiority" since US GDP growth is outpacing the growth of the DoD budget.

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That is a very, very recent development.
The spending craze of the Bush Jr administration when the U.S. applied its classic strategy (of throwing resources at a problem till it drowns) looked very different.

http://blogs.cfr.org/geographics/fil....drawdown1.jpg
http://blogs.cfr.org/geographics/201...ense-spending/

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

These are all primary sources so I doubt the substance of your objections about my sources. My conclusions are based on the numbers provided by these sources.

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I'm sure you do doubt, no surprise there. However, after listening to, reading and watching all those you cite and / or their predecessors, cohorts, sycophants and fellow travelers as a highly interested and even involved party for a great many years, I'm far more comfortable with my assessment of their questionable overall credibility on the matters at hand.

Even OPM. As a former DAC and Civil Service retiree as well as a military retiree, they. IMO, are probably the most credible source you cite and they are far from being error or bias free. They, like most of the others, have to agree (or strongly disagree, individually and incumbent administration political party dependent) with each current administration no matter what they believe or think

Question everything, not just things that annoy you. Agendas abound... :wry:

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

As I have repeatedly stated, this has nothing to do with the first part of my analysis which, I stress again, is about measuring US military capacity.

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And as I have repeatedly stated, I see no point in measuring military capacity in ways that do not measure capacity against actual or realistically expected threats. The point is to have as much as you need, not as much as you once had. Maintaining or buying more capacity than needed is in itself an economic threat.

To be frank, it looks a bit like you've selected study parameters that make the outcome a foregone conclusion: the desired end point seems to be that US capacity to purchase military power is declining, that this represents a great threat to our security, and that the economy, the military procurement system, and possibly a few other things are broken and need to be fixed.

I'll be interested to see what repairs you recommend.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Question everything, not just things that annoy you. Agendas abound... :wry:

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Amen.

I thought I'd address some recent developments, given the inclusion of the 1% reduction in military pensions in the FY14 budget. SECDEF Hagel claims that reform of the military pay system is necessary because of runaway growth. Let's examine that claim.

http://s29.postimg.org/yj4aje1iv/Do_D_TOA.jpg

Here is the DoD TOA from FY48 to FY18. The budget categories are operations and maintenance (O&M), military personnel (milper), procurement (pro), and research and development (RDT&E). The other category includes retirement, military construction, and other miscellaneous expenditures. The two most evident trends: (1) the growth of O&M as a proportion of the DoD budget from 34% to 40% from FY48 to FY14; and (2) the shrinking of milper as a proportion from 45% in FY48 to 26% in FY14.

As seen in previous posts, the number of active duty uniformed personnel has declined dramatically from a peak of over 3.5 million to a little over 1.5 million. Simultaneously, the dollars spent on military personnel, when adjusted for inflation, has remained relatively steady when controlled for the Vietnam War, Reagan’s military buildup, and the War on Terrorism. The DoD budget, when adjusted for inflation, up until several years ago was higher than at any time during the Cold War. As the TOA increased, must of the gains were captured by O&M while personnel costs remained relatively stable.

Here is the O&M budget as a proportion of DoD TOA since FY48.

http://s15.postimg.org/idj4ad8ff/image.jpg

The end of Vietnam, the Cold War, and the Iraq War have done little to slow the growth of O&M as a proportion of the DoD budget; in fact, it probably encouraged it. With every drawdown, it's personnel, not operations and maintenance, that are cut. But the gains made by O&M in the budget when the US enters a new conflict are not restored to pay and benefits. This has been true since 1965. The comparison is more stark when we look at the 3 year averages of O&M and military personnel expenditures.

http://s9.postimg.org/q8i9jsknj/Averages.jpg

Nine of the last ten years have seen the lowest military personnel spending 3-year averages since FY48. In contrast nine of ten years of highest O&M expenditures were between FY02 and FY14. Are benefits being cut to protect the O&M budget? I think it's pretty clear, given that the other budget categories are relatively untouched. But is this necessarily a bad thing?

I think in light of the data in the previous posts highlighting the increased service costs but decreased combat capacity, the answer is an unqualified "yes". It seems to me that before long we won't have anyone to operate or maintain the latest generations of warships, aircraft, and armored fighting vehicles because it's becoming increasingly expensive to actually operate and maintain them. And the equipment that is fielded won't be in sufficient number to address the wide array of threats that the services say we need them for.

Just a quick comment from my point of view.

1. Military power is a somewhat sketchy concept and depends on many variables, which have been already mentioned in this thread. It is of great importance to distinguish military power in the short term and the long term potential as well as it quality. For example the US had relative low military power in the years of the Great Depression but it's military potential was huge - in the long run. History gives us plenty of examples in which in the end the greater potential won, but also a great deal of cases in which it could not be brought to bear as the war was already lost. :wry:


2. Economy, to pick up the area of greatest interest, is one of those variables it is interesting to take a look how it supports military power.

GDP, GNP and PPP are in aggregation and per capita highly useful metrics but is obviously not a one to one measure of economic capabilites nor potential for war. For example a relative higher share of manufacturing tends to be positive, but financial (and military) strength can enable a state to outsource parts of it's production and secure it's ressources by trade if the military situation allows it. An highly productive agriculture, a highly productive manufacture and perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree service industry , if sustainable, allow to shift a relative large amount of the population into the military and to equip them with a high amount of physical and human capital as well as technology.

The relative high investement into military power into the US and the dedicated industries should of course enable it in general to mobilize its long term potential if needed in a relative short time. It would be however highly interesting to analyse the overall ressources needed for it's war economy and to discover bottlenecks. Those could go from prime materials over specific industrial products to whole sectors. In our world of global supply chains it is no trivial task.

Some interesting stuff:

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/...c-popup-v3.jpg

I guess the metric of Value-added tends to underweight China war economy potential due to the particular nature of the global value chain, which is obviously countered by an unknown degree by the size of the military-industrial complex of the USA and it's advantage in technology. Other then that it is important to put it into the context of what I wrote before, especially the ability to secure the ressources for all that manufacturing capability and it's built-up.

A highly interesting graphic from a big US study on health care, via The Incidental Economist.

http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wo...th-500x279.jpg

I was about to muse about it's implications on the GDP per capita, but it might be a good example on how an American way of war (against illness and age) can turn out to be highly inefficient.

http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wo...DP-500x554.jpg

Just a reminder that ressources are very important but it matters also greatly how they are used. Throwing money at a problem does not always cut it.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...0-2004.svg.png

Regards

Mike

That's no Western monopoly.

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/...ty-custom1.jpg

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/...ty-custom3.jpg

http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/20...-world-is-fat/

Thanks for the graphs. Obesity has been a subject of concern for some time now. I don't know about the other services, but Army Recruiting Command estimates about a quarter (25%) of 17-29 year-olds are eligible or otherwise fit for military service. Given the large population of the US and the relatively small number of service members, at what point does public health become a priority national security concern?

It used to be normal that military bureaucracies took recruits and trained them, instead of expecting them to be fit in the first place. Only those without the potential for enough training progress were rejected, or simply sent into non-combat jobs.

There's no way how 75% of male young adults could be incapable of military service in any country, not even in Nauru.
Besides, we can nowadays add the female cohorts for the support jobs - and support is something around 80% of an army.


http://crossfitiota.files.wordpress....pg?w=293&h=300
It's also important what "overweight" means in such statistics. According to BMI, I'm on the upper limit of normal and I know nobody who would call me overweight.
At least nobody dared it so far. :D

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

It used to be normal that military bureaucracies took recruits and trained them, instead of expecting them to be fit in the first place. Only those without the potential for enough training progress were rejected, or simply sent into non-combat jobs.

There's no way how 75% of male young adults could be incapable of military service in any country, not even in Nauru.
Besides, we can nowadays add the female cohorts for the support jobs - and support is something around 80% of an army.


http://crossfitiota.files.wordpress....pg?w=293&h=300
It's also important what "overweight" means in such statistics. According to BMI, I'm on the upper limit of normal and I know nobody who would call me overweight.
At least nobody dared it so far. :D

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I hear you, I'm above the BMI and no one would refer to me as fat. The BMI doesn't account for muscle mass, nor is it is a measure of fitness by any stretch of the imagination. It is an outdated system that should be done away with, and fitness should be measured by capability, and if fat is concern measure the percentage of bodyweight that is fat.

As for training kids to get into combat shape I agree to a point, but for whatever reason they are unable to get these kids in enough shape to pass their service fitness tests at the minimum level during basic training. I suspect that is due to these kids being close to completely deconditioned from leading a very inactive life style for most, if not all their lives. If you knew how low the standards were to pass these tests at the minimal level I suspect you would be shocked that 8-9 weeks is insufficient time to get the kids to that level.

I agree with AmericanPride it should be considered a national security issue, and it is an issue that transcends national security to include the economic risk of overwhelming our healthcare system.

Obesity is not a security issue but an economic issue: the treatment of wide spread diabetes is very expensive and can wreck each health care system with ease.

OTOH, the preventive traetment, i.e. teaching people how to cook, eat and exercise is much much cheaper and has as byprodcut the larger man power pool for military recruitment.

Fuchs,

It's not that people are inherently "incapable" of military service, it's that given present standards, they are considered unfit. It's not just obesity; it's also legal and moral problems, education disqualification, immigration status, etc. It would be my expectation that in the event of a national emergency that required a surge in manpower, these standards (which in my view are relatively low anyway) would be loosened further. I don't know the extent of the problem of soldiers completing basic training unable to pass the physical fitness test but I know it exists. That said, as an aside, I was surprised at hearing the cost of what it takes to prospect, enlist, and train an individual soldier.

Anyway, in the news a couple weeks ago, a prototype exoskeleten was revealed for testing. What kind of impact will this have on military standards and expectations?

Exoskeletons have been disclosed for years, usually with a lag of 2-3 years.

If patterns hold, they're not going to be important, but the LS3 approach may.
related


Warfare is always relative; it's no one-party game.
The EU does even on its own vastly outnumber the combined Russian + Belorussian + Russians_in_Ukraine mobilization potential.
Even all of NATO couldn't compete with the 18-35 y.o. cohorts of India, much less China.

The influence of obesity rates on this picture is negligible.

Last week it made the news (again) about the extent of prospects in the general population ineligible for military service. None of the maintsream news I read actually discussed the structural problems in the U.S. education and health systems that lead to such poor outcomes in the first place. Eligibility for military service is a by-product (as opposed to a deliberate outcome) for both the education and health systems because of the decentralized structure of both. I think this has bearing on the professionalism in the military conversation going on in the other thread - as the eligible population continues to shrink (with clear demographic patterns), how does that affect the military as a warfighting institution, its values and beliefs, and behavior?