Soldier, Warrior, and Teacher
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Soldiers are not diplomats. Soldiers do fight and kill their way to operational success and/or gain that success by being capable or threatening to do so.
In Special Forces we strive to full fill the role of Warrior, diplomat and teacher as required to accomplish the mission. Part of the reason we did so poorly in Iraq initially is because many in the conventional Army failed to grasp that were in a diplomatic role where they had to negotiate with local leaders to gain situational awareness and to co-opt support.
Soldiers on point in this type of irregular warfare environment cannot define their role as strictly being a warrior unless we want to lose this fight. There is no one else to perform that role outside the capital. That American Soldier may be the only American that a local sees in a remote village, and the dialouge between them is as important as the shooting war in IW.
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Victory does not from building local institutions.
One of the criticisms directed at the U.S. military is that we confuse combat with strategy. Our entire Network Warfare concept is based on seeing first and acting first, which is great for combat, but it doesn't come close to looking like a strategy to win the war. We defeated both the Taliban/AQ and Saddam's conventional like forces in battle, but we're still far from a strategic victory. If a strategic victory is obtainable, it is going to be obtained through building viable host nation institutions, not institutions that parallel the American Government structure, but whatever works in the area we're fighting in.
William, I think you're doubling back on your previous argument where you stated we don't need irregular warfare doctrine, we just need to learn to fight wars better (loosely paraphrased). I agreed to some extent, but your argument in my opinion proves why we do an IW doctrine/concept whatever to provide some sort of organizing structure for winning these conflicts. Unlike many who swallow the indirect approach and peace corps with rifle b.s. to the extreme, I agree ultimately we have to kill/capture or co-opt the insurgents, but to that we have to engage the local population and win their support to some extent to find them.
"One people divided by a common language."
Wilf, as Churchill said. You and Bill and John (and me) are not all that far apart. Part of the problem is semantic - we mean different things when we use the same words. Some of that is driven by culture and historical experience - American, British, Israeli, etc. But there are structural differences as well. The US military is bigger and more instituionally diverse than any other military engaged in the wars we are fighting. The American military is not now as large as the Soviet military was when it was engged in Afghanistan but the US Army alone brings far more diverse elements to the Afghanistan fight than the Soviets ever did. It also brings far more diverse capabilities to that fight than any of its allies. This is not to say we are better - often they are - but we can do things that they can't. And, often, we must do them because no other institution in the American government can. The ongoing effort to increase STate Dept capacity that Secstate designate Clinton hope sto ramp up will help but it won't replace the capabilities of the US military in both its active and reserve components, eg Civil Affairs. Bottom line is that much of what John said was specifically targeted at an audience of junior American officers with all the baggage they carry. As some wag put it, "Context is everything."
Cheers
JohnT
Soldiers -- and Soldiers and Teachers...
John T. Fishel makes well the point that the US and the UK differ mightily on their employment of 'diplomats' in wartime. The UK does that very well, we are not so fortunate -- that means the US Armed forces have to fill the gap. That works.
The question though is -- is that a good solution?
I suggest the answer is a resounding 'no.'
State and the rest of the US government need to be brought up to adequate capability and the Army, all of DoD, should fight hard to insure that occurs -- it will be to the detriment of the Defense establishment if it does not occur...
Gian comes in with a good post. I frequently agree with him but often chide him and suggest he lower the level of his expressed discontent just a bit. Not this time. He and Wilf are right -- so is Bill Moore -- SF can do the diplomat / teacher / soldier bit and can provide the necessary interface with local populations (if the powers that be will stop sending them to kick in doors...); The Multi Purpose Forces that are the bulk of the US Armed Services are not diplomats and should not train or spend too much thought time on that aspect of their total competency.
They can be adequately mentored and guided by SF elements and by a revamped and empowered Department of State. Shifting from combat to COIN is not that difficult, if it seems to hard, then the training is inadequate because numerous Armies do it, have done it, we have done it -- it just isn't that difficult. So let SF do their job and let the MPF do theirs -- to include assisting SF at a reasonable level of capability as supplementaries, not replacements.
Be careful how we train -- too much training time spent on building other peoples Armies or nations will lead to a US Army that is not competent at its own primary mission. None of the services train new entrants, officer or enlisted well enough today; to fragment their training on COIN / FID as opposed to basic MOSC and military competence will lessen their overall capability. We need to be able to do COIN adequately (as opposed to superbly); we do not need to let it drive the train...
Couldn't have said it better myself...
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Originally Posted by
John T. Fishel
...who will do what is required? Soldiers and Marines - as they always have. Again, that is why we have FAOs, SF, CA and other specialties.
Yep.
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Finally, I would note that some of our Greatest Captains - Eisenhower, Marshall, and MacArthur, among others spring to mind - were more than just soldiers; they were diplomats as well.
Totally true -- and with no special training back in the day but a lot of common sense, more talking than was probably comfortable for all three and sound military judgment applied when required ... ;)
Wilf correctly notes:
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My actual point is you need better doctrine that does not make the error of looking at "IW" as something distinct and difficult, when it is the common currency of military operations.
. . .
Concur, and engaging the local population and wining their support is a normal military skill. It is not necessarily unique to COIN and it is not diplomacy! It's bog standard G2 bread and better. Calling it diplomacy is inaccurate, misleading, and unhelpful.
My suspicion is that the three gentlemen John T. named would agree with that description. Then, as Bill Moore points out:
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It isn't that hard, even an officer can figure it out if he has a patient NCO that doesn't mind mentoring him. Nor do we have to be that good at it, but we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.
True and as Gian reinforced, all we gotta do is be careful about
Can't. My mommy told me not to play with matches...
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
During my year in Iraq I was not engaged in combat operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week and I do not believe that the bulk of our forces during this entire war have been so engaged either...Things are not that black and white and all the wishing in the world will not make them so.
Those statements are true of all wars as nearly as I can ascertain. Certainly applies to all I've seen on three continents.
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...This war is focused upon 'the population'. Commanders (and by this I do not limit the word to Officers, but include NCO's and Agency folks) who fail to understand this, fail to understand the power of diplomacy, and in so doing fail to use all techniques available to them in order to win.
That is typical not only of COIN operations but, again to my knowledge, of all wars to a greater or lesser extent. I certainly agree with what you say is required with the exceptions of the fact that what you describe is not diplomacy and that you omit privates who also must be involved.
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Diplomacy works at a tactical level and it's past time to train on, and consistently use all means available to win. Other duties as assigned is not just a catch phrase...
Then I suggest you need to define diplomacy as you are using it a little better than you did before. Seems to me you are now talking somewhere between international discourse and tact. I don't disagree with the fact that frequently in any war and almost constantly in a COIN-like scenario, some effort along that line is needed by all ranks. No disagreement at all.
What I disagree with is twofold -- calling it diplomacy which it absolutely is not; and the implication that 'other duties as assigned' doesn't cover the problem. It does, it is indeed not a catch phrase -- it never has been that...
Other duties as assigned in this context mean that one has to apply experience and judgment in relations with opponents and civilians in a combat zone to achieve a balance of security and freedom of action. Should such capability be included in our training regimen? Certainly. It should have been from 1975 until 2005 but essentially was not for the bulk of the Armed Forces (in COIN or post conventional conflict / occupation / pacification operations). Hopefully that has been or is being rectified -- but that training is not diplomatic training and to use that word sends a bad message to many, not least Congress who might start thinking diplomacy was a military mission.
Such muddy thinking could lead to a map like this: LINK and a situation wherein the GeoCom CinCs actually were the lead agents in US foreign affairs in their AOs. Note that Schmedlap has said he sees that area allocation dichotomy as a good thing; may or may not be -- what is certain is that having Flag Officers serving as de facto Pro-Consuls around the world means that they are exercising diplomacy. While they need to be knowledgeable about all that, I submit it is not their job to actually do that and further believe that such muddying of waters is not good for the US. Diplomacy is the job of politicians and the foreign affairs crowd; military involvement in diplomacy has always had bad results -- ala your earlier comment about the trenches in WW I.
What you suggest as required training is IMO correct -- what it is not is diplomacy. Not in any way.
At the risk of being unduly pedantic
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
As Ken says there is a difference between diplomacy and Diplomacy and I am still working that one out...
which is difficult since I don't even own a pedant :D -- but to preclude further confusion I may have inadvertently sown; Ken doesn't say there is a difference between diplomacy and Diplomacy, large or small 'd' -- it is the intercourse between nations and / or the exercise of tact.
There is however, as Webster points out, a difference between diplomacy (or Diplomacy) and being diplomatic. The latter is a euphemism for being tactful... :wry:
Words, as they say, are important. ;)
Particularly when dealing with that crew of Lawyers that constitute our Congress...
"tactical diplomacy" ....
seems a logical extension from "exercise of tact" by soldiers, or anyone else.
I recognize the shorthand use of "that crew of Lawyers that constitute our Congress", so long as you keep in mind that "Lawyers" in the congressional context means "persons who happen to have law degrees". There is a notable lack of what I consider "Good Lawyers" in those hallowed halls.
;)
Agreed. My comment was aimed at
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
...There is a notable lack of what I consider "Good Lawyers" in those hallowed halls.
their parsing skills only, I presume the majority have no lawyerly skills or they wouldn't be in Congress. Hmmm, maybe skill is a bad word -- perhaps penchant for paralyzing parsing would be better... ;)
Agree with Steve. The SWM has to be taken in
context -- in particular context of the times. Things change. I did things in Korea that were not supposed to be done in Viet Nam. I'm sure we did things in VN that no one can legally do today. I suppose we're better off for that but I do have to wonder occasionally... :wry:
The SWM is like every other piece of military gospel I've read -- and that's a bunch, I'm old and it's my only hobby :D -- it has its uses and its suggestions (that's all they are) must be applied with caution and an appreciation (METT-TC like) for the specifics of the situation. Same thing applies to Orde Wingate, Clausewitz, Belisaurius, Sun Tzu, Khalid ibn Walid and all the nominal experts and savants of today. Even applies to my personal pet, Subatai... :cool:
Even doctrine must be regarded skeptically. One has to know it well, apply it usually but always be prepared to interpolate and modify.
Apply anyone else's solutions of the times to your tactical, operational -- or strategic -- problems of the moment without a great deal of thought and you'll be in trouble.
Heh. Funny you cite the 1976 edition of FM 100-5...
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Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
...as I see things is that nobody has the 1976 version of 100-5 (active defense) on reading lists and as "must reads" before deploying to Iraq or Astan...unlike other great works from the past the have an element of timelessness and ongoing relevance to them (eg., Thuycidies, Clausewitz, Callwell, Lawrence, to name a few)...
That was one of several items of 'doctrine' -- some much more current -- I had in mind just above. :D
I agree with all your named authors as having merit but would submit they too can lead one astray if not placed in context and modified IAW the actual situation of the moment. No one has yet come up with a golden bullet, many can provide a few silver bullets... ;)
Funny you should mention Callwell
Gian. I wrote a piece back in 95 - published in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (before I became its editor and it went out of business:rolleyes:) called "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." Near the beginning of the piece, I discussed Callwell and the SWM and argued that the authors of the SWM were very much acquainted with Callwell, Indeed, their discussion of what Small Wars are parallels his - with one major exception. The Marines who wroted the SWM rejected wars of imperial conquest in their manual - something Colonel Callwell applauded.
The SWM is mostly TTP. In that sense it resembles the new COIN manual FM 3-24, or rather 3-24 resembles the SWM. Some TTP has changed over the decades; some remains the same. If there is a need to use mounted troops and pack animals then the SWM is a good source (Afghanistan anyone?). Gospel it is not. But it is a fascinating look at a point in the evolution of Small Wars. Certainly, one can go back to classical times to look for examples of insurgencies and other small wars that look much like those of the present. It is interesting to read Josephus' account of the Jewish revolt in light of, say the FLN's revolution in Algeria and Kilcullen's enemy centric v. population centric strategies. Obviously, Callwell is another point on the timeline - closer to the Banana Wars that are the focus of the SWM than is Josephus - but the issues we are discussing here reflect those from past records, wars, and writers from antiquity to the present.
Cheers
JohnT
Sorry I’m a bit late for the dance…
But a death in the immediate family, and all the logistics that entails, and getting my youngest spawn off to Basra (who as a matter of fact just rung us up to let us know she was in Kuwait awaiting transport) has occupied a fair a mount of my time as of late. :cool:
On another thread here I pontificated:
“In many respects I agree with Gentile’s concerns and do not believe he is anti-COIN. The Army needs to have a robust capability to fight in both types of warfare. IMHO it is much easier for a Soldier who is highly trained in the complexities of employing the variety of weapons systems in conventional warfare to quickly adapt to a COIN/LIC/IW situation than it is for a Soldier who is trained predominantly in COIN to function at his optimum when thrust into the chaos of conventional war.
Soldiers, after all, are trained to obey orders, but to follow orders they need the skills. Conventional warfare requires solid skill sets, many of which that are also useful in COIN. COIN is more of an intellectual exercise requiring a common sense approach, an understanding of human behavior, and empathy with the local population, skills not necessarily taught or quantified in an FM.”
How we train is how we fight and at present training does seem to be slipping further towards being overly COIN centric, to the detriment of those hard skills Soldiers and Marines need. IMHO an “Advisor Corps” of the magnitude that Nagl recommends would strip away too many valuable troops from the main force. Better to develop an “Advisor Cadre,” place it within ARSOC or SOCOM, expand ARSOC to allow for sufficient personnel, make a fair amount of the strength Guard and Reserve, stop using SOF predominantly in DA, and tie them closer to State in some areas.
As to the SWM, it must be taken in the context and era for which it was written. The Marine Corps that fought in the “Banana Wars” of the 20s and 30s was not the Marine Corps that emerged from the Pacific Campaign. The genesis of that Marine Corps was Culebra and Quantico, not Haiti and Nicaragua. What I feel the “Banana Wars” contributed to the senior combat leaders in WW II was a taste of close quarters combat. At any level entering combat for the first time is a mind-boggling experience. There is great advantage to having combat vets in leadership positions when a unit enters combat for the first time, especially a green unit.
We do not need a COIN operated Army (or Marine Corps) we need a robust conventional Army and Marine Corps that is also capable of COIN and savvy in limited operations in conjunction with State in nation building/rebuilding.
To me that entails a greater fostering of professional inquisitiveness on the part of all ranks. I cracked open St Karl as a corporal, fortunately for me it was an abridged version but still, like Gian noted, it made little sense to me at the time and even made my head hurt a bit. :D But as I read more works by other theorists, delved into doctrine, and explored military history it made returning back to the old German dude easier and he started to make sense. To me John Boyd’s massive briefing “Patterns of Conflict” was less theoretical and more a revelation of how military history and theory all flowed together like a massive quilt writ large across the ages. That one should look at it all holistically and not try to cherry pick favorite strategies or theories. I am reminded of the introduction to the Encyclopedia Britannica’s series The Great Books. In it the editors posit that a “great conversation’ was occurring throughout the millennia between the Greek philosophers to those of the 20th Century. That each work of literature built on what came before. I see military theory and history entwined in a similar “conversation” across the ages. It’s tougher to see where you’re going if you don’t understand where you’ve been.
The Army we need is one well versed in conducting complex combat operations against a peer foe and can also decisively wage COIN.