The Ideology of Victory Through Airpower
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
I first noticed the trend when reading about Air Force involvement in Vietnam. I came across it again when reading about Korea. There was a constant "airpower could have won everything if we had been allowed to do it our way" thread, which usually translated into bombing everything that moved (and most things that didn't). There's often a disconnect between the theory and its application in a world where political constraints are ALWAYS a part of military operations.
In terms of the failing to fight consideration, I don't think it's a recruiting tool as much as it is an IO consideration in many areas and with some cultures. By failing to put people on the ground, you can appear to be afraid of the insurgents, giving them a sense of legitimacy they might not have otherwise. You also deprive yourself of invaluable COIN intelligence: being able to SEE and HEAR the people. Sensors are great, but they just don't substitute for the impressions that can be formed on the ground.
Intimidation has always been a part of insurgent operations, but most COIN attempts to "pay them back in their own coin" have been total failures. Part of successful COIN is being able to offer real alternatives to the insurgents, not a choice between who's going to shoot you in the back of the head.
The fundamental problem with the Air Force isn't so much its preoccupation with high-techology or its focus on the pilot's point of view, or numbers of systems, but its doctine, or rather ideology. The founding (and continually evolving) myth of the Air Force derives from the Doctrine of "Victory Through Air Power", but as anyone can read for themselves, from Douhet to Warden to Dunlap's piece (not that I'd necessarily rank Dunlap up with either of those two theorists), that "Doctrine" is really more of an Ideology masquerading as a doctine and is seeking its fulfillment in History (and like Marxists, they're going to be waiting forever).
This ideology, like any other, requires selective use (or abuse) of history to try to prove its truth and efficacy and ultimate, inevitable triumph. Just as Ken said about the Air Force, "It's a servive in search of a mission". I'm not totally convinced, but he may be right that creating an Air Force independent of the Army was a mistake. Both the Navy and the Marines have their own "Air Forces", and while not perfect, I don't hear very many people saying that the Air Force is better than either of them (except the Air Force themselves).
As long as the Air Force remains rooted in the "Ideology of Victory Through Air Power", and its fixation on "all or nothing" Total War, it can be a fairly blunt instrument for large-scale conventional war; for small wars (and unconventional warfare for that matter), it may be just a rampaging bull in a china shop. You can't make the local population feel safe with you and trust you when your flyboys just can't see why they shouldn't be turned loose to take out villages, houses, power plants, and water works with PGMs just because that's where the enemy is (and thus has to be "destroyed" with all the violence available at hand), while you're trying to move amongst the same people whose houses are getting it and who don't have safe water or electricity (if they're used to having it) because the Air Force bombed the utilities.
In its Heart of Hearts, the Air Force has not really changed.
Very much agreed Steve, and as far as AF ideology deriving from both pilots/aircraft and technology, I agree very much as well, it's just that with my political philosopher's schooling, I may be biased to look for the qualititative rather than the quantitative, and trip over the stone blocks as I search for the fortifications.
Both Culpeper and Slapout9 are correct to the extent that the Air Force is very a diverse organization, but how many Air Observers, CCT's, PJ's, SOF Crewmen, etc., make Chief of Staff? For that matter, how many rise to 3- or 4-star flag ranks; not too many. Most of the 3- and 4-stars are fighter, bomber, materiel, even intelligence types. A few strategic airlift transport types make their way to the upper levels on the stairway to the stars. By and large the guys who make it to the top (and in charge of doctrine) are those thinking in terms of the Big One, and those fighting small wars or unconventional ones amount to their (elite) cupbearers at most. This certainly doesn't detract from the vital and gutsy work that the PJ's, the CCT's, the SOF Aircrew, and the Air Observers do; but it very much testifies to their being marginalized at the top.
Culpeper (and Slapout too, being an ex-jumper himself about the time RDF was formed) are completely correct in that the Air Force was compelled to field a serious and reliable strategic airlift capability to take the Army's light divisions wherever they needed to go (especially if that destination was the Middle East) - no more Lebanon 1958's, where the Army's Airborne Divisions (STRAC) couldn't get there and tried to send front-line troops from Germany because the Air Force couldn't live up to its committments for adequate strategic airlift to get them there; that really burned the Army in general and the Airborne in particular, especially when Ike had to send in the Marines to do the job. But even now, the Air Force can't do much more than airlift a single light division (which is still more than anyone else) and keep it supplied for a month or so; the rest of XVIII Airborne Corps has to either cool their heels or board ships just like the Heavy Divisions.
But in its institutional heart of hearts, the Air Force remains essentially unchanged. Unrestricted, Total War theory remains the core of its doctrine. The Five Rings Theory remains unpurged from Air Force doctrine and teaching, and that theory is less than 20 years' old (well past WWII, Korea, and even surviving the Cold War). It's somewhat ironic that Fielded Military Forces is the outermost, and therefore the least essential, ring to be targeted by Air Power. Targetting the Population remains a tier above this, and targeting the Infrastructure (which we did in Iraq in 1991, Kosovo/Serbia in 1998, and Iraq again in 2003), and the destruction or damage which was inflicted on said in 2003 is dogging SSO ops in Iraq 4 years later - Iraqis are very ticked that their water and electricity is spotty at times, or even most of the time. Above that of course you get to Systems Essentials and finally the Leadership.
This is what the institutional Air Force still very much sees as how to fight war. That means air superiority and missiles/bombs on target, the bigger the better, and the more, the merrier, until the enemy utterly collapses under the full force of aerial bombardment. The reason that the Air Force doesn't deliberately target the civilian population (a la WWII and Korea) is that sort of thing just won't be tolerated morally by most of the public or politically by most of the political leadership. Yet the civilian population (and infrastructure even more so) remains a greater priority target in Air Force doctrine than enemy troops on the field (and no new-build CAS aircraft has been built for the AF since 1982, but F-16's designed for tactical air strikes are supposed to replace the A-10, hmmm...:()
This is not at all consistent with the proper conduct of small wars (or unconventional wars) where you're trying to protect the population against the enemy and rebuild their lives, infrastructure, and their trust in someone carrying a gun (or flying a fighter-bomber). Even when honest mistakes are made, and a fighter-bomber takes out someone's village or house or field in error, and killing civilians, all the progress that the troops on the ground may have made with these people is completely undone; in some areas, such incidents have made it impossible to even try to reach out to this people at all. And, for that matter, even General Wars must not be waged as Total Wars; the enemy population, and civilization must be preserved; good Armies instinctively understand this in their bones, as their true mission isn;t the extermination of the enemy, but the preservation of civilization. Total War is a descent into barbarism, or worse.
When the Five Rings Theory (and its ilk) are formally and finally ditched (or extensively revised to remove civilians and civilian infrastructure from targetting and destruction) and the Air Force is led once in a while by PJ's or SOF types, then I think that the Air Force will have really changed, in its institutional heart of hearts, and for the better.
Personally, I think that the Air Force should include the Airborne (I'm going to be shot dawn and hung at sunrise in some Airborne quarters after they read this - especially since I'm a leg), just as the Navy includes the Marines, and then the higher echelons of the Air Force might have more of an interest in, exposure to, and direct involvement with, land warfare in general and small wars in particular. I'd also give the CAS mission (except for the Air Force Airborne) and planes like the A-10 and its Air Observer variant, the excellent OA-10 to the Army; I'd also give (and this is what is just practice anyway) Strategic Air Defence to the Air Force (and let the Army concentrate on tactical and operational AD of Army ground forces).
Please, Please Forgive Me!
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Aside from the arch heresy of suggesting that Airborne forces should belong to the Air force, you have compounded the felony by suggesting -- nay, saying -- the Marine Corps is 'included' in the Navy. :mad:
Best advice I can give is avoid any patterns in your life style, have your land line telephone disconnected, change your cell phone, take different routes in all your travels... :D
I was under the influence; I didn't know what I was saying; These were statements made under duress; Please spare my life, I have so much to live for...!;)
As for the Marines, I meant that in terms that they are part of the Department of the Navy, not the US Navy proper; and if I may beg your pardon for continuing down this same path with regard to the Air Force and the Airborne, I would suggest (purely hypothetically of course, I'm thinking of Kurt Student and the Luftwaffe Paras here...) the same sort of relationship between the Department of the Air Force and the Airborne; there is no way even a leg like me would ever let the flyboys get their nice, soft, clean, pink hands on the tactical and day-to-day affairs of the Infantry (no 1st Allied Airborne Armies led by flyboys on my watch).
Returning to the matter at hand Ken...Please, PLEASE pardon me and spare my life... I am suffused with the inherent stupidity, arrogance, and inexperience that accompanies youth...I require the wisdom, correction, and firm guidance of my elders...Save me Obi Wan...!
Not me you have to worry about,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Norfolk
I was under the influence; I didn't know what I was saying; These were statements made under duress; Please spare my life, I have so much to live for...!;)
. . .
Returning to the matter at hand Ken...Please, PLEASE pardon me and spare my life... I am suffused with the inherent stupidity, arrogance, and inexperience that accompanies youth...I require the wisdom, correction, and firm guidance of my elders...Save me Obi Wan...!
I am indeed ancient, am long retarded and am almost excessively forgiving of youthful indiscretion such as thine. I long ago stopped trying to impart wisdom to anyone who does not seriously ask for such assistance -- even then, I'm rather careful; people tend to get dicey if your assistance is helpful because you knew something they didn't and if the assist wasn't helpful, they're even more irked. So, I'm not Obi and you're on your own. ;)
You also missed in suggesting I care, you really need to worry about those younger than yourself -- they're the ones who take that stuff really seriously... :D
I've got that part covered...I hope.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
I am indeed ancient, am long retarded and am almost excessively forgiving of youthful indiscretion such as thine. I long ago stopped trying to impart wisdom to anyone who does not seriously ask for such assistance -- even then, I'm rather careful; people tend to get dicey if your assistance is helpful because you knew something they didn't and if the assist wasn't helpful, they're even more irked. So, I'm not Obi and you're on your own. ;)
You also missed in suggesting I care, you really need to worry about those younger than yourself -- they're the ones who take that stuff really seriously... :D
I'm not so worried about some of them, if they're as young and dumb as me, it's the old and wise that scare me most. A GPMG and a Carl G laid on the driveway, some Claymores and Elsies out back (huh, Elsie mines are banned now - oops,) and a surprise inside waiting for those who make it to my door (two actually, I'll be hunkered down in the back of the beer store across the street when they arrive), and I just might get out of this alive...maybe.;)
Even if they do get to me, I'll still go down as the man who actually got the Air Force guys and the Airborne to come together and agree on something tactical. How often have you heard "Death From Above" and "Airborne!" shouted at the same time - in unison.:wry: