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I've always been curious how planners calculate redundancy (the structure and amount of a reserve force) afforded to small units, but I have no idea how they go about it. I know I need a better grasp on how some minimum unit is structured and why--for example, why X number of rifleman, Y number of LMGs, Z number of grenadiers and under what circumstances? Is this minimum unit treated atomically or do planners try to achieve redundancy at that fine grain?
If I understand your question correctly you're asking about planning to have more than enough troops to accomplish a given mission?
The only thing I ever heard was that we should have a 3 to 1 advantage in attacking a prepared defense. Beyond that, I really don't know.
As far as organizing small units with a built in redundancy.....it seems to me that the Army doesn't. Instead they try to get by with the bare minimum. And often in times past when the Army wanted to stand up additional big units, or was looking for manpower savings, the squad was the level that had to learn to make do with less.
This last go around the squad came out intact though. Instead, the brigade took the hit. The Army wanted more brigades so they got more brigades..... but now brigades have fewer maneuver battalions.
It seems to me that redundancy planning for the Army usually happens at higher levels. For example, many people think that Schwartzkopf didn't need as many divisions as he asked for to kick the Iraqis out of Kuwait. But he made sure that he had more than enough before starting an offensive.
In other words, what is the "basic infantry element?"Quote:
Originally Posted by Presley Cannady
Oh, boy. Go to the threads (and numerous links!:eek:) about the rife squad, fire team group platoon, etc.
Insightful (I thought) was Paul Melody's article: http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=...fier=ADA225438
That will keep you busy for a while. :wry:
I read the article, and thought the author made some good points about squads not likely to fire and maneuver in wartime. We did conduct training in which the squad would make contact, team A would lay a base of fire and team B would flank the enemy. We would also do the same with the two squads. First squad would be the base of fire and second squad would flank the enemy. When we would do force on force at NTC or JRTC, we would generally use both squads in this situation. Therefore, as the author pointed out, having two fire teams, may have been a waste of resources.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rifleman
However, that was the woods, or the desert. In an urban environment, having two teams seems to work out better. The team leaders' control the two teams and communicate with the squad leader who communicates with the Platoon Leader. While the two teams aren't necessarily "firing and maneuvering," they are operating apart from each other. Using the squad leader to control a team reduces his ability to communicate with the PL and increases his risk of becoming a casualty. Therefore, I conclude that the two team squad is better for the terrain the army finds itself in today.
Yes, I understand. Light infantry units do it that way also.
But the authors basic contention is that you need to start with big squads of 12 or 13 people for the fire team structure to hold up under attrition. Even if two teams in a smaller squad is better in theory the fire team structure will soon break down in smaller squads due to combat attrition.
Few Vietnam Army infantry vets remember their squads operating with fire teams very often, even though the two fire team structure was doctrine during that time. Ask them how many people they remember in a squad and you hear things like "five to seven," or "six to eight."
When that's reality does it matter if two teams are better in theory?
We've hashed this out pretty well on other threads.
I have been researching this for the past 5-6 years (which is no proof I'm right). Here's what I have concluded from studying the UK.Quote:
Originally Posted by Presley Cannady
I suspect the US is not much different, but I may be wrong.
@ It's all based on opinions. There is little actual evidence, but there is some which is usually dismissed as not giving the right answer. - and this I have written proof of.
@ There are no well articulated principles of organisation. Again, just an arbitrary collection of opinions.
@ Huge amounts of time and money have been wasted asking the wrong questions, EG:- How should the section be organised, not "How do we develop task organisation." - this is usually only done in respect to discrete activities like Patrols.
@ People believe that Section organisation is what enables Fire and Manoeuvre. - so major sections of doctrine, like Core Functions - have no impact on squad/section organisation!
@ The need to be able to sustain casualties, and continue the mission, is usually argued as an absolute statement of numbers and not a percentage of overall organisations. - EG: A company suffers 3 dead and 6 wounded. A Platoon suffers 3 dead and 6 wounded. A squad/section suffers 3 dead and 6 wounded. - so thus 9 casualties makes the 9 man Squad unsustainable, so you need bigger squads. What is a Platoon suffers a 100% loss of one APC/MICV?
@ Cost is the major driver. How much money a section/platoon takes to equip, train and sustain, is actually the base line for most decisions. Organisations beyond the platoon, EG: How the Company and Battalion is organised impacts disproportionately on the platoon.
@ The payload and equipping of APCs and MICVs is seen as being a driver in terms of manning and equipment costs, despite the fact that, logically, infantry should be organised to fight dismounted and not organised for transport. To support the MICV, the vehicle crew is established as part of the squad.
Mr. Owen, have you written any articles on your ideas for squad organization? If so, can you link it?
An interesting article written by Wilf proposing a "Fire Team Group Platoon."
http://www.geocities.com/drakonok/Or..._Infantry.html
I think this is what you're asking for.
It's being discussed here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4172
I tried this link but it said it was "not found."Quote:
Originally Posted by Rifleman
Not sure what happened. Go to the link I posted for the discussion thread, the second link, and you will see the first link in the first post on that thread.
I found it at the other thread. I'm starting to see the logic of the Marine 13 man squad. Three teams with a SL. Are they configured the same as an Army team? IOW, 1TL, 1SAW, 1Gren, 1 RM?Quote:
Originally Posted by Rifleman
The moderator's may want to merge this thread with the other, as this is basically the same discussion we're having over here:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4172
I have and they are linked in other threads. - or some that others may point you at.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ratzel
A.) A lot of the criticism of my ideas as outline in the "Fire team Group" is valid in the context that some state. So I am not dismissive of the critiques, nor are any of my insights necessarily greater than those who think I'm full of sh*t. but what sh*t I am full of, I know very well! :D
B.) My ideas have moved on a bit in the last 5 years. I think a Platoon has to be able to adjust its organisation based on Mission, Threat, Terrain etc. The article that is often cited was written to provoke debate.
C.) I believe that the Core Functions - Find, Fix, Strike, and Exploit are a very strong basis on which to train and organise. A Platoon that adheres to that is in, IMO, pretty good shape.
D.) Doctrine, training, education and leadership, matter far more important than precise Squad or Platoon Size.
E.) and I currently think a platoon should be about 30 men, organised into 3 x 10 man sections. Each Section contains a Recce Group and Weapons Group (6 & 4?).
1 Section is lead by the Platoon commander, and a L/Cpl.
2 Section is lead by the Platoon Segreant and a Corporal.
3 Section is lead by a Corporal and a L/Cpl.
If necessary,
The Platoon can form as two "Multiples". The Recce Multiple is the 4 x 5 man teams under the Platoon commander, two L/Cpls and a Corporal.
The Weapons Multiple is 2 x 5 Man teams under The Platoon sergeant and a Corporal.
OK, What weapons do these two "Groups" carry? Please lay out each man according to section and group. When labeling each mans' weapon, don't use m-4 or 240B use AR (Assult Rifle) or LMG (light machine gun). Make sure to have a different label for SAW-like, light machine guns as apposed to 240B GPMG. Sorry, if I'm being a pain in the a**, I just need to visualize this.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
It doesn't matter! Really. We can all train set up equipment, but that causes folks to focus on the wrong stuff! But...Quote:
Originally Posted by Ratzel
Recce groups focus on finding and manoeuvring, so short-barrelled ARs, and maybe some UGLs like M-203s.
Weapons groups focus on "attrition" so GPMG, (M240b) 84mm RCL or Javelin
The important stuff is ranks, radios and sensors, like Thermal Weapons Sights and Night Vision. Every man should have a PRR and Every ranks should have HHDR, like PRC-149, or 710MB.
Budget is vastly important so cut the cloth to fit the body.
No, it does matter. We were told before going down range in OIF I that a certain size building required a certain size force. The average Iraqi home was supposed to take a platoons worth of dismount infantry. Well, after we got there, it turned into a squad taking down a house and sometimes a team. The section you described, would have difficulty taking down a house. The 5-6 man recce group would have to do all the work while the weapons group would have to stay in the rear. You could line up the 3 recce groups to do the house clearing but then you'd have groups and sections split up all kinds of ways.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I'm not sure what you mean by sensors, but as far a night-vision and radio's, you're 100% correct. Each soldier should have a set of new night vision equipment. The best ones when I was in were called "NVG 14's." When we went down range, we had people still with NVG's that were 15 years old. Radio's, optics, NVG's, Body armour, web-gear, boots, first-aid, should all be top-notch, with everyone properly trained on how to use and maintain them.
I think your section/group idea is worth thinking about regarding the woods, or open terrain, but a MOUT environment is much different. The best people at MOUT in the world, don't bring 240B's along with them and surly don't form weapons groups, they do the exact opposite.
As you know, our wars for the next 30 years will be taking place in cities, caves, and probably even Jungles again. The regular forces need to become more SOF-like which, IMO, means smaller weapons, smaller teams, bigger brains.
If anything, which I think we can all agree on, there's a need for much more training, and much more time in rank before promotion. The average Infantryman should have at least six months of training before going to the line, and at least 4 years before becoming an NCO. We need better people. We need more college grads as well. The only way this is going to happen is buy $howing the MONEY! Its also time THE AMERICAN PEOPLE START PAYING MORE IN TAXES! The US defense budget is about 4.5% of GDP. There were times during the Cold-war where it was 8%. If this country is serious about "MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY" then they better start paying for it.
Sorry I got off track, but I do think its matters what weapons are carried by whom. That way we can visualize how it will work in combat. I'm starting to like the Marine Platoon, but want to learn more about it. That doesn't mean, by any means, that I won't listen to your ideas, I'm just pretty sure I don't like this one. I would like to read more of your work though.
@ Well if you think my opinion matters, I'm very flattered :wry: , now telling soldiers that X type of building requires X type of force is not quite the dumbest thing I have ever heard, but close. - see later.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ratzel
@ I don't know who are the best people in the world at MOUT. I see nothing wrong with an M-240, or GPMG. No you don't search and exploit into structures with it. You use it outside, as you would Javelin or an 84mm RCL. You have to be able to fight between structures, not just in them. Once you've secured the space, bring up the weapons teams to reduce suppress the next structure. 5.56mm won't go through too much as you know. Don't assume Iraq is the defining MOUT experience.
@ I don't know where the wars of the next 30 years will be taking place. Nor does anyone else. Should we be prepared to operate in all types of close terrain? Yes! - so we don't want to establish platoons on Iraqi dwelling take downs.
- I live in 36 storey apartment block, in central Bangkok. I estimate it would take 3 platoons about two hours or more to clear.
If you want to be more SOF like, just have 5 x 6 man teams. Each team has 2 x LMGs, 4 x M4/UGL - and accept the limitations of that weapons set. - Still 30 men, 6 ranks, 6 radios (one rank and radio spare - always useful)
@ If you want to be more Marine like, split the platoon in two. So you have two squads of 3 x 5 man teams. One Squad is commanded by the platoon commander and the other the platoon sergeant, each assisted by a Cpl and L/Cpl. Each 5 man team could be 2 LMG, 2 M4/UGL and one spare, with an M4 to carry the AT-4 or whatever. Still 30 men, 6 ranks, 6 radios.
Does this help any?
Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
There's no metric that calculates bodies per square footage, but yes, before taking down a structure, there is some sizing up. There is some general agreement about what size a unit should be, before it attempts to take down a structure. There was even an understanding that a unit should be ready to take about 30% casualties during urban combat.
While we're on the subject of second dumbest ideas, are you certain about this idea of Platoon leaders and Platoon Sergeants leading squad size units?
I guess arguing about why the squad should be this or that size is waste, until I understand your argument for why your squad size is best. If you can, tell me the advantages of the squad size you propose, and explain why its superior to the current size. Or, if you already did this, give me a link to where I can read it.
And No, your opinion doesn't matter, but I'm always open to new ideas and I appreciate your passion for these subjects.
@ Sure there is an understanding of troops to task, but no one should use the size of one possible type of dwelling to formulate infantry organisation.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ratzel
@ All this means is no Platoon HQ. It's about leader leading. Works well for the IDF. Works well in Patrolling. Works well in SF. Why do you need a Platoon HQ?
@. I am not saying my squad size is best. I want to be perfectly clear on this. All I am saying is that you need to apply principles of organisation. 30 men, and 6 ranks gives you 3-4 different ways to organise the Platoon (not squad) so as you can best accomplish your mission. It is merely an example of a set of principles in application.
Send me a PM if you want to keep discussing this - which I am more than happy to. It's just I am sure we must be boring everyone else to tears. :)
Thanks all for your remarks, especially Rifleman and Mr. Owen. I did read the "Abandon squad/section levels of organization" thread, but thought I should probably ask my basic questions in a separate line of discussion.
Rifleman: If I'm reading "The Infantry Rifle Squad" correctly, Melody's work is essentially a lit review and he arrives at his conclusions and recommendations deductively; the same can be said of his student Timothy Karcher in "Enhancing Combat Effectiveness."
Mr. Owen: Thanks for the heads up. I've spent some months mining what I lit I could find for empirical research on engineering small unit sustainability. I've unfortunately turned up nothing of the sort. Is there any research on the horizon that might shed some much needed light in this area?
Presley Cannady,
I am currently chipping away at Guide to Organisation Design by Naomi Stanford (ISBN 978-1-86197-802-8) and just finished Managing and Using Information Systems by Keri E. Pearlson & Carol S. Saunders (ISBN 978-0-471-71538-2). Both are interesting reads and discuss some the 'what do effective organizations look like?' questions that often pop up at work. Neither book, however, provides a definitive number of personnel for a team. Some of the organizational models mentioned include: Mckinsey 7-S Model, Gailbrath's Star Model, Weisbord Six Box Model, Nadler and Tushman Congruence Model, and Burke-Litwin Model.
My answer to 'how some minimum unit is structured and why?' is it depends upon the situation, the equipment (can one leverage MIS ?, etc) and the quality and experience of the personnel provided to accomplish the mission.
I have been in some 'kicking' two man CA Teams running around europe, latin america and the middle east. I have also been in some so-so six to eight man CA Teams in the middle east. Security issues drove the larger sized teams, while straight language and technical skills drove the two man teams. All of my teams accomplished their missions. The ROI, if it could be quantified, would be different for each team however. Relationships and are cultural/geopgraphical/operational experience are some the issues that should be added to mission accomplishment when calculating the ROI. It's 'squishy' and I don't know how to produce a 'hard' number thats reproduceable.
As a young soldier I was introduced to tables which predicted casualty counts for different MOS types and units based upon different offensive and defensive maneuvers. It was a bit much for a young guy with a short attention span, so I have no reference for you to refer to for these tables. Google?
Steve
1. Call me Wilf.Quote:
Originally Posted by Presley Cannady
2. That's because there is none, and none on the horizon. However there are things we know because people keep doing them. They get written into manuals and they are testable. It is my opinion that researching the ideal squad or platoon is useless. What you have to have is principles of organisation that allow you to adapt to changing missions and circumstances Thus discussion should focus on the testing and validity of the principle, not the search for absolutes
Thanks Steve, Wilf. I understand searching for an optimal squad organization for all seasons is most likely fruitless. What I'm looking for is literature on the small unit modeling process. I doubted it exists, and Wilf's pretty much confirmed my suspicions. What I do have is a lot lit on various time tested principles (Wilf calls them opinions), a set of three objective considerations for designing combat organizations (lethality, sustainability [I call this redundancy], flexibility [I call this mobility and modality]) and countless constraints imposed by targets, appropriate mixes of weapons, terrain, the available body of knowledge on manuever, etc. It's pretty overwhelming for uninitiated folk like myself and it'd be nice to if there were a family of model frameworks to handle all these inputs. Absent that, I lack the experience to understand why an 11-man squad is more optimal than one with 9 or 13 men (if that's true).
Also consider C2. Organisation is mostly about your ability to make things happen when people don't want to do stuff, cos they might get killed. Effective Span of control is actually pretty well understood. BUT remember the span of effective control, shrinks under stress and alters with task.Quote:
Originally Posted by Presley Cannady
You might consider looking at one or two things (the discussion of MIS got my attention).
Is you military organization an industrial entity or a knowledge entity? I know you will come back and say it is both but here is the thing. An industrial organization/entity responds very well to limited span of control and hiearchical arrangements. A knowledge organization/entity can be much flattter and based on information and training you have the reasonable expectation that loosely coupled entities will make the right decisions on their own. Flexibility in the face of decimation due to illness/injury/strike rapidly reduces the capability of a industrial organization. Whereas a knowledge based ogranization has a flatter more robust response to injury. I don't know if that helps the discussion much but there it is...
That's very interesting. I have looked at some stuff about the best size for software development teams, which would seem to span both industry and knowledge. That suggested that team over 6-7 took longer to get things done, which gells with information flow and oversight associated with larger organisations.Quote:
Originally Posted by selil
I just printed this out and read it in my lunch hour. To summarise,Quote:
Originally Posted by Presley Cannady
Karcher believes the 11-man squad is better because it can take more casualties, and has more firepower, compared to a 9-man squad. Thus More men is better, when it comes to redundancy and weight of fire.
Would 11 man squads mean an SBCT Platoon would need 5 vehicles to carry everyone, not 4?
...and this took 89 pages to explain in support of an MA Thesis? :rolleyes:
Am I missing something?
Seems to follow the same form as Col. Melody's argument for reshuffling the 9-man squad.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
This thread strangely reminds me of the "8 minute abs" routine from "There's Something About Mary". Now seven minute abs....Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
If 11 is better, then why not 12, 13, 14? ..... :wry:
Also reminds me of Nigel from Spinal Tap..."But this one goes to 11."
:-)
Until now I haven't posted on this thread; but now I will to say that a Squad or a Section requires a certain level of redundancy to (hopefully) last for a decent interval before being forced to extensively reorganize.
A single MG and a single UGL are sufficient to provide a base of fire for a Squad/Section. Likwise, a single RPG-type weapon is sufficient to deal with field fortifications and most armoured vehicles. And each of these weapons can be carried and fired by a single man. A second man for each of these weapons is best to have in order to carry extra ammo.
Most assault and clearing tasks require a pair of 2-man teams, or a single 4-man team. House-clearing can be done with a single 4-man team, but if something goes wrong, the rest of the Squad/Section may either be too far away to help in time, or may be tied up in their own fight. As such, for many house-clearing and similar tasks, a 4-man team may do the initial sweep, the rest of the Squad/Section needs to be on hand to maintain security and to be available for back-up if something does go wrong.
At it most basic, then, a Squad/Section requires 7 men. The Squad LDR/Section CDR can serve as the Grenadier (it's ideal for him to mark targets and lay smoke anyway) and he should be paired with the LMG Gunner so that he can direct its fires. Another man to carry extra ammo and provide security for the LMG Gunner is prudent; in short, 3 men for the Fire Element. A 4-man Assault Element is required, either to operate as 2 2-man teams, or a single 4-man team; they would carry the RGP and its ammo with them, as the RPG is best employed at the closest quarters practical.
Then there is the matter of battle losses. With an historical average loss rate of 20-30% as Melody and or Karcher report (based upon US Army studies), a 3-man Fire Element would require at least a fourth member to absorb battle losses, whereas a 4-man Assault Element would require at least 2 more men to have a practical chance of maintaining a 4-man assault element; given the added risks involved in assaulting and clearing, along with the added flexibility accorded to the Assault Element if it were habitually organized into a Leader and 2 3-man teams, a third addition to the strength of the assault element may also be prudent.
The result would be a Squad/Section of 11-men, with a Fire Element of 4 men including the Leader/Grenadier, LMG Gunner, and 2 Riflemen to carry ammo and provide an ability to absorb losses, and an Assault Element of 7 men including the Leader and 6 Riflemen, one of whom carries an RPG-like weapon, and another extra ammo. This organization can continue to perform its tasks at close to full efficiency before being forced to reorganize once it is depleted to 6 men. This is probably why both the Germans and the Commonwealth have traditionally favoured the 10-man Gruppe/Section (although the Canadian Army determined in the mid-1950's that 11 was actually required).
The balanced two-Fire Team Squad/Section throws everything into conflict. The US Army found in study after study that nothing less than a 12-13 man Squad, of two 6-man Fire Teams, could last in battle for any useful length of time before being forced to reorganize into a single-team Squad due to the taking of casualties. For a two-Fire Team Squad/Section to work, it still has to be able to produce a minimum 4-man Assault Element plus the necessary manpower for double the number of LMGs and UGLs as its counterpart with a single LMG and UGL; a minimum of 6 men is required for this, without taking casualties into account.
Taking casualties into account, the base 10 men required for the two-Fire Team Squad/Section requires no less than a minimum of 4 additional men, for a minimum 14-man Squad/Section. Once this organization is depleted by losses much below 10 men, then it requires extensive reorganization. Only the USMC Rifle Squad approaches this capacity.
8- and 9-man Squads/Sections have to be able to maintain 6-7 men out of their authorized strength to remain effective, using one LMG and UGL for fire support. Increasing that fire support with an additional LMG and UGL may allow for greater tactical flexibility, but it increases manpower requirements to a minimum of 10 men before casualties. When 20-30% casualties can be expected, 8- and 9-man Squads/Sections have no realistic chance of lasting long enough on the battlefield to make much meaningful use of their Fire Team organization, especially considering that the 11-man Squad could not retain its Fire Team structure in practice during Vietnam.
Another thing to bear in mind, of course, is the effect of Squad/Section organization on Platoon organization. The Germans found that 4 10-man Infanterie Gruppen (each with one LMG) were required to win the Zug/Platoon Firefight quickly, and transitioned to this structure in 1940 from 3 12-man Gruppen for the rest of WWII. When this kind of Platoon has most of its Squads/Sections with less than 6 or 7 men, then it has to break one of them up and reorganize the remainder. Ideally, the disbanded Squad/Section's LMG and UGL would be manned by the Platoon HQ.
Likewise, the Panzergrenadiere Gruppe with 2 LMGs, had 14 men each if Motorized, 12 if Armoured; each Platoon required only 3 such Gruppen. As manpower losses forced the Germans to reduce authorized establishments down to 8-9 men, the Panzer Grenadier Groups lost their offensive power. At such a point, with no prospect of immediate reinforcement, the Squad/Section's have to divest themselves of their second LMG and UGL and reorganize. Ideally, at least one LMG and UGL would be manned by the Platoon HQ.
Redundancy has to be built-in to Minor-Unit TO&E, and at two levels. The first level is simply to provide a certain amount of overstrength to each Squad, Section, and Platoon, etc., to absorb an anticipated level of battle losses; the 20-30% figure that the US Army identified is not exact, but it is based on past experience. The Canadian Army found the 10-man Section to typically consist of 5-6 men in practice, and not surprisingly sought an 11-man Section with one LMG to provide for the minimum 6-7 men necessary to carry out the Section's tasks.
The second level is reorganization, a sort of controlled self-cannibalization to simply make the most of what's left. The 10-11 man, 4-Section Platoon, with one LMG and UGL per Section, has the easiest time of this, being able to reorganize into 3 6-7 man Sections plus an LMG and an UGL at Platoon HQ, ideally. The two-Fire Team Squad/Section, has the worst of it, requiring at least 12-14 men to start with before casualties force reorganization. When it does reorganize, and if all 3 such Squads/Sections are in more or less similar circumstances, the Platoon must divest itself of nearly half its support weapons, or it will lose its offensive power almost completely.
Sorry, to go around on this but please explain to me how is there a difference between a 24 man platoon, organised between 3 x 8-man section, or 4 x 6-man section. How does section size make any real difference based on 6 KIA/WIA in a 24 man platoon?Quote:
Originally Posted by Norfolk
A 36 man platoon can be 4 x 9 or 3 x 12. It makes no difference.
30% casualties in a 10 man section is 3 men. 30% casualties in a 6 man section is 2 men. 30% of a 24 man platoon is 10 men. Combat is not iterative or deterministic. You can't determine where and at what rate casualties will occur.
An 11 man squad, loosing 30% has lost 3 men. If those 3 men are the LMG group, then the LMG group is down to 1 and F&M for the section. What if the section takes 30% casualties having taken 30%?
No one ever says fighting or recce patrols need to be able to sustain 30%.
Platoon organisation is about effectively controlling X number of men. Manpower is limited. The idea that 11 man is more effective than 9 is merely a function of absolute numbers. Why not have a 20 man section, composed of 4 x 5 man fireteams?
I'll disagree with that based on one simple thing. Your casualties will be a factor of enemy response and expectation of leatheality and effect. Your most effective or lethal elements will be attacked first (e.g. machine guns or mortars?). I'm NOT the great military strategist you all are, but take one of your examples, flip it on end, and attack it. Where would you attack each of these formations exposed to your withering fire? That is your likely if not perfect answer to how casualties would be received.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Based on a snap shot of current operations from Iraq and the Lebanon, section losses maybe 100%. You might loose an MRAP or APC full of guys to an IED, or a the house you are holed up in, get hit by 2-3 ATGMs. You cannot pre-determine, or plan, for casualty rates or effects. The ultimate sense of the argument if that 200 man Company can sustain 50% more casualties than a 100 man Company. Manpower is finite and resources are limited.Quote:
Originally Posted by selil
It makes a great deal of difference considering the amount of firepower, and thence, the ability to win the firefight, when considering the difference between 3x12-man Sections and 4x10-man Sections. The former has 3 LMGs and 3 UGLs between its 3 Sections, whereas the latter has four of each; and at the end of the Firefight, the enemy position still has to be assaulted. At the minimum, this means that one Section must perform the Assault while the other Sections continue to suppress the enemy position. With only 3 Sections, you suffer a much greater loss of firepower than with 4 Sections; while seemingly small, the Germans thought it so significant that they reorganized their Infantry Platoons into 4 Groups each with an LMG from 3 Groups after the Polish Campaign, and retained it through the rest of the war. And the Bundesheer retained it until just the past couple years for their non-Armoured Infantry.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
It's also pretty tough to reorganize your Sections and your Platoon in the midst of a Firefight or an Assault to make up for casualties sustained in the midst. Bulding a certain level of anticipated casualty-replacement into your Sections helps to mitigate, though not entirely eliminate, the potential for such inconvenient situations arising whilst under fire. Yes, you can certainly lose 3 out of 4 men in your Fire Element, and the Section will be in a right state after that, but you also may lose those 3 men across the Section as a whole; in any event, short of disaster (which happens), you may still have 3 other Sections in good fighting order to carry on.
If you don't have even this level of redundancy built in to your Sections and your Platoon, you'll be in a right state almost from the start, and certainly after having lost several men from a 24 or 30-man Platoon. Even taking 2 casualties in a 6-man Group means effectively that there are only 4 Riflemen available for CQB - not good odds when trying to Assault and Clear a Platoon objective. Even when reinforced by a second such 6-man Group, Assaulting, Breaking-In, and Fighting-Through the Objective, there are at most 12 Riflemen to clear a Platoon objective. Should they take 30% losses, they are down to 8 or 9 men.
Now, offhand this isn't as bad as some make it out to be; our own Doctrine says that a Platoon takes an enemy Section's position, but Kilcullen observed while he was attached to the Brit Army how a reinforced Section of 12 or so men could clear an enemy Platoon position (a Company objective). But that was with over 3/4s of said Company suppressing the enemy Platoon position. Granted, the 24 or 30-man Platoon of 4 or 5 6-man Groups would only be taking on an enemy Section, but it would only have a pair each of GPMGs, UGLs, and ATGM Lunchers to win the Firefight and then Suppress the enemy Section position. The enemy Section alone may possess at least one MG of its own, possibly two, as well as its own UGL (or two), its own rocket launcher or recoilless gun (or two), and as such would make winning the Firefight very difficult. There would be little possibility of achieving overwhelming Fire Superiority over the enemy Section, especially if it is entrenched. This is problematic to say the least.
The 20-30% casualty rates are not abstractions, they are based on wartime experience, and provide a guide as to how to anticipate what may happen casualty-rate wise. You may well suffer the 60% casualties in a day that we were told the expect in The RCR, or you may suffer light casualties such as in GW1 - or not so light such as in some battles in the Falklands. You may even suffer the loss of entire Companies or Battalions in a few days or even hours of ferocious fighting. But you don't know when and where that will happen; but you do know that the historical average has been on the order of 20-30%, so it makes sense to take heed of that, and plan accordingly. Like all plans, it is a basis for change; the wastage rates of North Africa in WWII proved quite inadequate for North-West Europe, but had even that much not existed and been taken heed of, the replacement situation would have been even worse than it was.
When an 11-man Section, having already suffered 30% losses, suffers an addditional 30% upon that, it is reorganized within its Platoon (ideally not under fire), and a 4-Section Platoon provides more of a margin for the effective loss of a Section than a 3-Section Platoon. But it is preferable to having to reorganize a 4 or 6 man Group or Section as soon as it takes its first or at most second man killed or wounded. The 11-man Section, in a 4-Section Platoon, is much less likely to be caught short in mid-stride than a Platoon of four or five 5 or 6 man Sections. And once the 24 or 30-man Platoon has taken heavy losses, it is effectively down to being a large Section, and can no longer perform Platoon tasks at all. In such an event, its parent Company must be reorganized or taken out of line, whilst the 50-man Platoon may simply reorganize into 3 Sections of around 30 or so men, and still available to perform Platoon missions. There is no point in fielding sub-units or units that have little to no chance of lasting beyond the first few minutes of shooting; a level of built-in redundancy is essential, even if it is not foolproof.
Wilf, I grasp, though perhaps not to the same extent that you do perhaps, the need for effective control and the ability to move under cover and concealment on the battlefield. I do not go for the open-order, neat battlefield formations advancing in full view of the enemy bit, whenever that can be avoided. I am very much about moving from fire position to fire position using cover and concealment as much as possible; sometimes, that is not available, but it must be taken when it is available. And I expect Sections to move in small teams to make best use of available cover and concelament as they move from fire position to fire position; the Section is not an indivisible monolith to be led by one man and one man only, though one man is ultimately in command.
I will say though, that Advance-to-Contact and the Attack, nor even the Defence and the Delay, are Patrol Operations. Although there are many common elements and procedures, they are not the same. Patrolling is about do,minating the ground between yourself and the enemy, and gaining information about him whilst denying the same about yourself to him. It is essential, but it is subordinate to the act of closing with and destroying him. What works for Patrolling does not necessarily and automatically apply in Battle.
You would not catch me doing a Recce with more than 4 other men, and preferably no more than 2 or 3; just too noisy and too hard to control in tight places except for very extraordinary reasons. I was in a 6-man Recce once, but that was to recce and secure an LZ for a Battalion-level Helo pick-up prior to an Air Assault - OPFOR was 3 Commando, CAR, and they weren't fighting nice that night. But I would not consider taking on a Platoon objective with 4 similar sized teams, even with 6 men apiece. 4 Sections of 10-11 men, sure, because I could take losses and probably still have a Reserve to Assault with after the Firefight, or to deal with a nasty piece of business that happens to unexpectedly occur. And each of the Sections has two NCOs (not the Brit Corporal and his Lance-jack) - and I go for the German System here, not ours - with the Section CDR in charge of the Fire Element, and the Section 2i/c in charge of the Assault Element (itself broken down into 2x3-man Teams to start with, plus the Section 2i/c controlling the two Team leaders). Battle has its own characteristics, different from Patrolling. The Section must be organized for Battle, and not just Patrolling.
But I would encourage greater consideration of your Section proposal of 4x5-man Teams, indeed I would go so far as to join jcustis in his consideration of James Webb's proposal for a 19-man Squad of 3x6-man Fire Teams; I think that your proposal is comparable. There may be a way of sidestepping the one-Team/two-Team Squad/Section controversy here by differentiating between the Squad and the Section (the former being sub-unit subordinate to the latter), and organizing the latter out of a few easily controlled Squads, so long as such a Section organization is not intended to supplant the Platoon.
Phew! That was a long one, even for me!
Yep that was long.
Couple of points that jump out.
A. You keep stating things as though they are well understood rules of thumb, like X number of men to assault, and 30% casualties, or even X has an LMG and a UGL. These are arbitary assumptions. They are not understood as absolutes, so I don't know where these come from. The OA from the Falklands disproves all these assumptions. The Final assualt on Darwin Hill was carried out by 22 men, mostly officers, NCOs and Radio Operators - and no fire support. The rest of A Company stayed put. This was a Paratrooper Company that had suffered IIRC, 3 dead and 12 wounded. A company was organised as 3 platoons of 32 men, with 6 GPMG per platoon, each operated by a 4 man fire team, in an 8 man section. Sections and platoons did re-organise in contact.
B. Kilcullen helped enginner the new Aussie Platoon orbat of 40 men, which is 10 x 4 man fireteams, to be organised anyway the platoon commander sees fit. There are fireteams and fire support teams. The platoon is the basis of organisation and not the squad or section. I had some long talks with him about this when he was in London and presenting to the School of Infantry. I think he's pretty on the nail. We both agreed that section defined concepts had very great limits.
C. Patrolling is nothing to do with dominating terrain. That's a Commonwealth Army's definition and it's provebaly wrong. How do you dominated ground between you and the enemy if you don't know where the enemy is? An advance to contact is reconnaissance. It may even be an advance to maintain contact against a moving enemy. Dismounted reconaissance is patrolling. Patrolling is dismounted or even mounted maneuver aimed at carrying out or supporting the core functions. It's like folks who fixate on AMBUSH instead of an attack on a moving enemy.
D. Fixating on the idea that the Ideal section is 11 or 9 men, or even X-men leads you down the same blind alley, because it is not based on the real world constraints and human factors that define how infantry operates. Redundancy is just a function of absolute numbers. Nothing more.
OK, so we go for a squad of 4 x 5 man fireteams - 20 men, so a Platoon is 60 or 80 men? :eek: - So why not have 6 x 5 man teams, 4 under the control the Platoon Commander and 2 under the platoon Sergeant?Quote:
Originally Posted by Norfolk
This is where squad based arguments unravel, because everyone is asking the wrong question. Instead I suggest,
a.) How do I best organised 100 men (arbitrary number, but one chosen as a function of limited resources) for combat operations?
b.) Once organised, how do we best equip them to fulfil a wide range of missions and within manning and equipment budgets?
These are not arbitrary assumptions, these are real tactics, based on real-world requirements, and have been used time and time again in battle; none of what I offered was abstract, but was instead grounded in both wartime experience and present Doctrine (such as the latter may be). I refer you to both the Melody and Karcher pieces presented on the threads in this forum, and to current Infantry Doctrinal manuals in the Commonwealth and the US.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
That a 22-man element of A Coy, 2Para carried out the decisive assault at Darwin does not in any way detract from what was proposed in my last post; following the same line of logic, we might be led to consider that all we need to take on an enemy Infantry Battalion, reinforced by AA Guns and with an Air Force Garrison taking up space too, is some two-dozen men. That obviously, does not follow. Yes, Sections and Platoons may have to reorganize in battle, but you want to avoid that if possible, not least because you do not want to lose momentum, which is what occurred at Darwin; a very near-run thing as Wellington said of Waterloo.
The whole point of Patrolling is to control the ground between yourself and to gain information on the location and disposition of the enemy, whilst denying same to the enemy. How is this provably wrong? And who said anything about limiting Fighting Patrols to fixed Ambushes? If you have to raid or occupy a fixed enemy position, then they may well be entrenched, which makes your job that much more difficult; if they are moving, then it's all gravy. A Meeting Engagement may be fluid, that the advantage more often than not goes to the boldest and most flexible side in such circrumstances. Good stuff.
An Advance-to-Contact is certainly about locating the enemy, but how do you carry out Patrol functions in the midst of a Battalion Attack, Deliberate of Hasty, with Tanks, Artillery, Engineers and the like, or even in the Pursuit? While I haven't heard what the latest diesel engines for MBTs sound like, I certainly know what the old ones sounded like, and I certainly knew that the enemy would likely hear us coming; gas-turbines on tanks like the M-1 are a different story, you hear their tracks long before you hear their engines. One of the problems with Mechanization is that you have to forgo stealth much of the time. That does not mean that you cannot practice Infiltration with MBTs and APCs, you certainly can, but your options are much more limited than with dismounted Infantry.
I do quite disagree that a given number of men per Section is pointless; I continue to argue that it is very much useful. You need to be able to have effective control while remaining dispersed and using cover and concealment to move from fire position to fire position; this is much facilitated by lightweight communications kit that we have now, and are much more liberally-supplied throughout the Platoon and Section than in the past, when a Section may have two or only one radio, and the Platoon usually only one, maybe two.
Take for example, the 11-man Section. The Section CDR deals with the Section 2i/c who leads the 7-man Assault Element, and his own 3-man Fire Element - no more than 4 men that he has to control in total. The Section 2i/c in turn, controls the two Team leaders (of 3-man teams) under him. Even in the old system of two radios per Section, the Section CDR and his 3-man Fire Element in the lead as per the German System and the 7-man Assault Element moving somewhere behind, provides for effective control whilst maintaining dispersion and using best available cover and concealment. With presently-issued small radios, the 7-man Assault Element can move in two separate 3-man Teams, controlled by the Section 2i/c (and he accompanies one of those teams).
But the same Section can come together very quickly for Battle. As per the German System, when Contact is made, the best available fire positions are taken, and until Effective Enemy Fire leads to the Firefight, the Section remains hidden. The Section Firefight is fought with the LMG and the UGL of the Fire Element, and possibly the RPG of the Assault Element; the Riflemen remain under cover unless ordered to join in the Firefight. After the Firefight is won, the Fire Element continues to Suppress, and the Assault Element infiltrates, if possible, to an assault position, and then carries out its work. Trench-clearing and the like is manpower-intensive, and heavy losses typical; that of course is why German Rifle Troops and Commonwealth Rifle Groups ideally numbered 6-8 men in a Group/Section.
As typical Section Battle in WWII strengths were 5-6 men out of an authorized 10 men, an 11-man Section with built-in redundancy does not seem so arbitrary, often allowing for the minimum 6-7 man strength that I described in a previous post. Replacements will be coming in periodically to replenish, at least partially, the strength of the Section, but persistent losses are likely to keep the Section down to said typical levels. This is not to say that there will not be 9 or 10-man Sections nor 3 or 4-man Sections, but redundancy does go some way to providing sufficient manpower in Sections, Platoons, and Companies to maintain effective fighting sub-units with the minimum required reorganization. And it is rather easier to do so than starting out with 5- or 6-man Groups trying to perform the same tasks as a Section.
Yes, I have followed Kilkullen's work now for a little while, and am intrigued by his Platoon organization for Oz. To be honest, while I remain unconvinced by it, I see so much potential in it that I am certainly open to see it further explained and developed. But I read recently that Oz may be abandoning this structure and moving back to 3 Sections of two Fire Teams plus a GPMG Team. Do you know more about this, or is it just a rumour? Superficially, it sounds simply like habitually associating each of the GPMG teams with a pair of Fire Teams, and in good hands, no Platoon CDR would hesitate to reorganize as he sees fit to meet whatever tactical demands are at hand; though I much prefer to avoid reorganization when and where possible.
Personally I have no objections to considering a Platoon of 60 or so men, provided that it is organized into say three Sections of about 20 men, each divided into say 3 Squads of maybe 6 men, each with an LMG. But, I want to make sure that it will provide substantial, not merely minor advantages over what we have now. If it turns out to be worth the cost, do it; if not, discard the notion entirely.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
When it comes to the limited resources bit, admittedly you're putting up a pretty stiff argument. I would say, however, that just as there are limits to resources, there are also tactical implications when cost and resources are the principle determining factor in force structure. The present 8/9-man Section/Squad is an example of this. It has no staying power, and losing its organic F&M capacity after taking just one or two casualties. And this despite not only having 10-11 man Sections/Squads previously (and the former not even intended for internal F&M), but there own studies, based on both wartime experience and peacetime tests, stated that not less than 11 men for the former and 12-13 men for the latter were required to carry out their tasks.
This the whole Bean-Counter problem, and certainly your propositions are the best that I've ever seen to deal with this. But I just don't see how, based upon what I've observed and done myself, and what I have learned from others and have read, how taking, for example, a more easily fundable figure of 100 men plus kit (rather than 150, let alone the monster Coys I lean towards) and then making a tactical organization out of it, necessarily leads to a viable tactical organization.
Take the Commandos for example. A common organization for a Commando in WWII, of course, was 5 or 6 60- or 70-man Troops, each of a pair of Sections in turn split into a pair of 11-man Subsections. It was light and agile, designed for hit-and-run raids, and not for sustained operations. As SF like the SAS came to demonstrate greater efficiency in the Raiding role, the Commandos were increasingly deprived of their intended Role. Towards the end of WWII, they came to be reorganized largely along the lines of conventional infantry, capable of sustained operations. The Commandos fought in Brigade formations in Amphibious and Airborne Operations in the Rhine battles.
And again, the Commandos fought organized much like their conventional kin in the Paras and the Guards in the Falklands. But there is no point to the Commandos returning to the WWII configuration, when the SAS/SBS, etc., can perform those tasks, organized on somewhat similar lines, far more efficiently in most cases. But the SF are not intended to slug it out on the ground in a sustained conventional campaign.
My point is, starting withthe principle planning assumption being that we must organize for maximum fiscal efficiency is starting off on the wrong foot. Yes, there is no option but to make the best of what resources are made available, but that does not mean stripping down sub-units and units down to the bare-bones from the start. What good is a unit or sub-unit of a given size when, for all its efficiency, it remains unable to perform its tasks, or it is only a one-shot deal because of its inability to sustain losses?
I think that your proposed 30-man Platoon is a very useful Raiding organization, but I retain doubts about its ability to go toe-to-toe with an entrenched enemy on the battlefield. It is small and quiet, easy to control, and can infiltrate in small teams to an RV close to an objective, and conduct said Raid in small teams or task-organized groupings. Very good stuff. For winning the Firefight against an entrenched enemy, though, it will need a good deal more firepower than a pair each of GPMGs, and ATGM launchers, especially when it may find itself approached or even matched in the same regard by an enemy Section. Kilcullen's Platoon organization (if I remember correctly), has each 4-man Rifle team with an LMG, in addition having a few 4-man GPMG teams. That organization can win the Firefight, and perform the Assault as well, even if its ability to sustain casualties is not quite what I would prefer. Perhaps Kilcullen's Platoon should be regarded as the minimum for an effective Platoon organization.
Sticking with the point I can usefully address, I have heard that the Aussies may reject the 1/39 platoon and go back to the old 32/36 man platoon because they don't have the manning and equipment numbers and the budget to support the 40 man 1/39 platoon. Same reason as the UK cut the fourth section in 1937! As we say here in the Far East, "same same everyday." :wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by Norfolk
Norfolk: I'll try to condense my thinking thus,
1. Manpower is limited. All resources are limited. Budget is everything. Accountants do not tell you how to fight but they do tell you how much you can have. We have to balance efficiency with effectiveness and so we have to have methods to measure this, or at least make useful comparisons.
2. There are huge flow down effects of just massing men and equipment to try and generate combat power, or address redundancy. These are mostly negative.
3. How you train, equip and organise has far more effect on combat power than pure numbers. You cannot argue that a 40 man platoon is more effective than a 30 man platoon, in terms other than numbers, for the same given training and equipment. The actual argument is whether to organise a 120 man company in 3 x 40 man platoons or 4 x 30 man platoons.
4. Task organisation works. We know this, so why fixate on fixed numbers for any other reason than budgets. I may have a 120 man platoon, but that does not stop me generating a 75 man fighting patrol under a skilled platoon commander.
5. As concerns "Patrols", I just refuse to get stuck in the 1915 phraseology that has held back infantry doctrine for nearly 80 years. We can do things better and also do better things. US/UK Infantry doctrine is till stuck in a WW2 set piece conventional battle mindset, that is retained for emotional and organisational reasons. If I were to subscribe to this mindset, I would be failing in my attempt to try and improve the wider understanding of infantry operations.
Particularly the last paragraph... ;)Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Quick question. Does the "denial of the same to the adversary" argument hold in an urban environment where the enemy patrols in plainclothes and you do not? If not, what's the solution or alternative?Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Sure as hell. If you can prove that someone is conducting unarmed or even armed reconnaissance, then you can detain or, if necessary, kill them.Quote:
Originally Posted by Presley Cannady
How someone dresses merely effects the how you detect them. It does not alter the need to detect them.
No argument there, but I'm asking how feasible it is to deny the enemy the ability to patrol under those conditions and what, if any, measures the force can take to mitigate the disadvantage.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
It sounds like you are a Marine. Don't know alot about Marines, except what I learned from my cousin, who was an E-6 at Pendleton. It sounds like you are talking about a recon platoon, because you have x 20 men dedicated to reconnaissance. You have another x 10 men dedicated to weapons, and I assume those weapons have to be along the lines of machine guns and anti-armor systems. This is x 30 men. O.K., so you have two 10-man recon elements and a 10-man weapons element. If you are using weapons during a recon mission, you're not going to last. That means the "eyes and ears" of the battalion commander are going to be put out of commission; that combat information off of which the S-2 can deduce "actionable intelligence" is going to be cut off; and that toes are going to be tagged. On the other hand, if you're talking about a x 30-man rifle platoon, there's no need for x 20 recon men. The Corps has a number of x 32-man platoons already, and for their force structure this is not bad because you need small units to fit everybody on amphib ships, AAV's, etc. Small, sufficiently mobile units with a very high degree of lethality are what I think the Army & Marines are looking for in the future. Marine squads have three fire teams totaling x 13-men, x 14 with a Navy Hosp Corpsman. Each team has a machine gun, SAW or newer M-27, TL, grenadier, and a rifleman. If you are thinking " x 30-man rifle platoon" you should take this into consideration to reorganize a x 41-man platoon into a x 30-man platoon. If you're thinking recon, they aren't fighters unless they get caught by the enemy. I'm not trying to be critical, just throwing a few thoughts your way. Maybe an x 8-man weapons section, (x 4 Bravo 240's) with three x 6-man teams having a TL, x 2 SAW/M-27 gunners, a grenadier, and x 2 riflemen for a total of x 26. Add a four man platoon HQ Group of the PL, PSG, Corpsman, and RTO and you have a x 30-man platoon with a very high degree of lethality. Hope you consider it, especially as far as part C) of your writing above goes.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Wilf, is a Brit - an ex NCO I believe - who no longer posts here.
With respect to him and a number of others who have indulged in speculative theory around here their lack of wartime experience undermines their contributions to such debates.
Quote:
Originally Posted by novelist
Well, I just came to this sight yesterday and lance corporal is a Marine rank. Please excuse my failure to recognize my mistake.
JMAQuote:
Originally Posted by JMA
Your first comment may be accurate but it was also mindless kidney punching. Your second comment was mostly valid and is a cautionary to me as a self-appointed commentator and incidentally an ex-reserve infantry NCO.
Overall and usefully demonstrating one hazard of self inflation the phrasing of your post revealed a Blimp with bile line showing. Don’t bother to respond because my future reading will exclude anything attributed to you.
Much of these discussions - about the organisation and structure of fire teams/sections/platoons etc - is a waste of time.
What trumps most arguments or motivations for change is the constraints of military budgets.
Thereafter all your planning and training can be undone minutes into the first battle.
Let me explain.
Take the 4th Battalion of the Somerset Light Infantry - as part of the 43rd Wessex Division - experience in the taking of Hill 112 for example.
Out of its original strength of 36 officers and nearly 700 other ranks, The 4th Battalion, The Somerset Light Infantry, received reinforcements of 15 officers and 541 other ranks, between the 5th and 18th July 1944 leaving it below its full strength. This is admittedly a radical case.
(source 18 Platoon by Sidney Jary)
So how long will all these theoretical organisations and structures survive after battle is joined?
The answer is how do the units taking casulaties adapt. The key lies in the abilities of the officers and NCOs - who survive - to show initiative and get on with what they have got. History provides those interested with many examples of how soldiers have risen to the challenge in the most dire situations.