Soft Power: a collection of writing & posts
Beacon, a blog by journalist Paul Kretkowski, which is devoted to the the concept of "Soft Power", is running a daily series on " the best episode in public diplomacy and the most important element of soft power".
Paul has assembled a distinguished list of contributors ( well, I'm not terribly distinguished... but the rest of them are ! ;) ) for his series, including Joseph Nye, who originated the soft power concept.
Moderator's Note
Seven small threads merged today, plus a new title; prompted by annarticle on Defence in Depth so now the most recent post (ends).
Hard vs. Soft Power in the Middle East
19 August Boston Globe commentary - In Mideast, the Goal is 'Smart Power' by Joseph Nye Jr.
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In traditional international conflicts, the side with the stronger military force tended to win. In today's information age, it is often the party with the stronger story that wins.
Thus in addition to their shooting and killing, Israel and Hezbollah are struggling to shape the narrative that will prevail as the fighting stops. They are locked in a struggle over soft power -- the ability to get what you want by attraction rather than coercion.
The ability to combine hard and soft power into a winning strategy is smart power and, thus far, Hezbollah seems ahead on that score. All that Hezbollah needs to win is not to lose, and to be able to tell the story that it was the only Muslim force brave enough to stand up to Israel.
Sadly, the struggle over soft power did not have to turn out this way. When Hezbollah kidnapped Israeli soldiers and launched rockets across the border, the actions were condemned by many Lebanese and criticized by Sunni Arab governments such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Today that public criticism has vanished, and Hezbollah is lauded for resisting Israel.
Israel used its hard military power in a manner that bolstered Hezbollah's soft power and legitimacy in Arab eyes, including many Sunnis who were originally skeptical of a Shi'ite organization with ties to non-Arab Iran...
Israel had to use force in response to Hezbollah's attack to reestablish the credibility of its deterrence, but it misjudged the scale and duration of its hard-power response. Sooner or later, continued large-scale aerial bombardment, even in an era of precision munitions, was bound to produce a disaster like Qana with dozens of dead children. And with dead Lebanese children continually displayed on television day after day, public outrage was bound to limit the leeway of moderate Arab leaders and enhance Hezbollah's narrative...
Lebanon provides larger lessons for the United States about how to conduct a war against jihadist terrorism. The current struggle is not a clash of Islam vs. the West, but a civil war within Islam between a minority of terrorists and a larger mainstream of more moderate believers. America cannot win unless the mainstream wins, and needs to use hard power against the hard core like Al Qaeda because soft power will never attract them. But soft power is essential to attract the mainstream and dry up support for the extremists...
Soft Power: More than Hearts and Minds
As an Army CA-Bubba (and AF-brat) I applaud LTG Seip for sharing his views on soft power here at SWJ. I do wish that he had included more footnotes/links so that we here at the board could follow at least part of the path, which he followed to arrive at some of his conclusions. IMHO the educational effects of SWJ with it’s free-wheeling discourse on variety of topics benefits from the presence of seasoned practitioners, those beginning the journey, and journeymen such as myself who are always looking for hints on how to do things better.
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Soft Power missions foster increased security and stability within partner nations, thereby increasing the conditions necessary for free peoples to prosper. Soft Power helps to emplace infrastructure, the rule of law, the internal ability to effectively respond to natural disasters and professional militaries to enable citizens to freely exercise rights and make responsible choices about their nation’s destiny. In addition Soft Power missions develop strong partnerships and open communication channels, allowing nations to collaborate in solving regional challenges. On the other end of the spectrum, instability and insecurity tend to breed dictatorships, offer safe havens to narcoterrorism and repress human rights.
IMHO AF SOUTHCOM missions are needed and the benefits of Jointness are on display here. However, as I wander from CTC to CTC, I note the presence of AF representation in terms of Air Support and note the absence of AF Civil Engineering Flights, AF Medical Units, and USN Seabees at these very valuable events. I have bumped into Marine CAG, and DOS folks at these same events. These observations may be the result of oversight on my part or scheduling issues, or perhaps it is a reflection of something else. My take on things is that all of us need to get together more often and practice on what it is that we want to do together, before we head downrange to do things.
I would like to share with the group some links that I have found on civil affairs and military government and how America has employed this cross-service, cross-agency capability. My list of sources is laughably incomplete and as usual I need help from the SWJ Council in fleshing things out.
Wikipedia provides the following entries on civil affairs.
Civil Affairs
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Definition: "UN Civil Affairs components work at the social, administrative and sub-national political levels to facilitate the countrywide implementation of peacekeeping mandates and to support the population and government in strengthening conditions and structures conducive to sustainable peace."
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According to the U.S. Army, "Civil Affairs units help military commanders by working with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander’s area of operations to lessen the impact of military operations on them during peace, contingency operations and declared war." With their expertise in civil matters, they are the principle unit in assisting a commander in the conduct of civil-military operations.
CA units act as a liaison between the civilian inhabitants of a warzone or disaster area and the military presence, both informing the local commander of the status of the civilian populace as well as effecting assistance to locals by either coordinating military operations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)and IGO's or distributing directly aid and supplies.
Comprised primarily of civilian experts such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, police, firemen, bankers, computer programmers, farmers, and others, CA special operators provide critical expertise to host-nation governments and are also able to assess need for critical infrastructure projects such as roads, clinics, schools, power plants, water treatment facilities, etc. Once a project has been decided on, a contract is put out at a civil-military operations center for local contractors to come and bid. CA teams will periodically check up on the status of the project to make sure the money is being well-spent.
CA provides the commander with cultural expertise, assesses the needs of the civilian populace, handles civilians on the battlefield, refugee operations, keeps the commander informed of protected targets such as schools, churches, hospitals, etc., and interfaces with local and international NGOs and private volunteer organizations, which provides the commander with a unique battlefield overlay of all civilian activity, ongoing infrastructure projects, and the presence and mission of NGOs in the area.
Some of my free-time reading (the easily downloadable kind) on this subject includes:
Rand Document CF 251 Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices
Rand Document MG 557, The Beginners Guide to Nation Building
Rand Document MG 304, The RAND History of Nation Building
Comprehensive Interoperability and the tools of soft power
Here's a note from a real-life CRCer in S/CRS. He used the term Comprehensive Interoperability (CINT) which I hadn't heard before and defines it as:
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the ability down the road to mount joint stability operations
In addition:
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CINT is critical to getting the civilian supply right, for no single government is building sufficient individual capacity to mount these operations on its own; nor politically would it be wise to try to do so. "Comprehensive" is a horizontal term, not a vertical term, that refers to foreign policy tools that range across the spectrum, including stability operations that employ the hard tools of military power and the soft tools of long term development. Improved coordination among actors can lead to better stability operations and better outcomes for the recipient nations.
He also states that he and S/CRS
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are helping our own government's principal policy makers become fully familiar with the new soft power tool they hold in their hands
He nails it right there. Isn't part of the problem that these policy makers are all sitting around holding their tools of soft power in their hands?
Call Them Sticks and Carrots, or Direct and Indirect, or Hard and Soft Power Approach
Call Them Sticks and Carrots, or Direct and Indirect, or Hard and Soft Power Approaches
Entry Excerpt:
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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
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U.S. Slowly But Surely Losing its Soft Power Capability?
U.S. Slowly But Surely Losing its Soft Power Capability?
Entry Excerpt:
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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
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The worrying talk about soft power
A short article on the British blog Defence in Depth (UK Staff College staffers) which starts with:
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One of the most troubling concepts to appear on the scene in recent years is Joseph Nye’s much-popularized notion of ‘soft power’.
Link:http://defenceindepth.co/2015/09/07/...ut-soft-power/
