Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Ken White

Highly disputable. Machiavelli and John of Islay among others plus the survival of Byzantium for Centuries would seem to be but three examples refuting your first assertion. Your case for it assumes a degree of selfishness that is not universal and is peculiarly western in large quantities. You also excluded third party interventions which are, as 'humanely' practiced in a 'limited' war, a western proclivity and which muddle your position...

As for your summation, I suspect the survivors of the conventional battles at Peleliu and the Hurtgen Forest might strongly disagree. In fact, given the overall history of US Arms for the past 264 years, it seems our net effectiveness at it is at best questionable. As Jon Custis once noted, we have been fortunate that our opponents have been more screwed up than we have...:wry:

---

My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own.


At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.

When tasked to help suppress an insurgency, the first thing the military commander should (who should be the resident expert on warfare in the room) say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

---

Who's perspective to we apply to figure out what sort of conflict we are in? The Afghan villages I've visited see their district as some sort of third-party and the province and national governments as some distant entity they hear about on Pashto BBC. For alot of these people, "the state" ends at the wadi dividing them with the next village or where the farthest field meets the desert. For them, I'd imagine going to settle a blood feud against the village down the way is the same as blowing up the passing infidels or soldiers from Jalalabad who may or may not speak the same language.

Is this an insurgency or just war?

Hi Bob,

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

---

I suspect that you are falling into the fundamental ontological error of assuming that such a "thing" as a "state" exists in and of itself. "States", whether modern or ancient, are, like all social institutions, constructed by humans as a result of various and sundry activities which may (broadly) be called "politics".

Where the "difference" comes between "convention" and "insurgency" is in the perception of a) causality of conflict and b) the development of cultural and social conventions to contain that conflict. Indeed, "democracy" is another form of "violent" political struggle with (assumed) non-kinetic cultural conventions.

The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.

This problem (technically a "breech" in our assumed reality), turns around and really highlights the problems with a lot of our doctrine and operational stance. For example, the entire concept of "poor governance" or "corruption" assumes particular socio-cultural standards of both, and the ascribes causality for an "insurgency" to them. Why? Probably because that is what caused a number of them in our own past political history. That, my friend, is the real definition of ethnocentrism - the ascription of a cultural assumption as a universal law.

So what happens if we through out the assumption that 'states" exist as anything other than socio-cultural constructs? Well, for one thing, it forces us to be a lot clearer on what our campaign intentions are. It also highlights the ways in which campaign planning would have to change, and that specifically includes what political institutions should be imposed / changed.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

When tasked to help suppress an insurgency, the first thing the military commander should (who should be the resident expert on warfare in the room) say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

---

One of the "insurgencies" that we never seem to discuss is the Liberal Revolts of 1847. I think that it would really help clarify some of our thinking in this boundary zone (i.e. the interface zone between politics, warfare, insurgency, policing, etc.) to take a look at how they were handled in the Austrian case from 1847-50. Very little "fighting", and the entire "revolt" (and separation) of Hungary ended when their own minorities "rose up" against them.

Part of the reason why this is a useful case is that it is primarily "political" (i.e. non-kinetic conflict) and that it happened at a time of fairly rapid technological change, which makes it a useful analogic case. As an added bonus, it is one of the few really good European instances where a "state" and a "people" are not the same which, BTW, tends to be another one of those nice little ethnocentric assumptions about "states" that we have.

Anyway, I need more coffee :D.

Cheers,

Marc

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Infanteer

Who's perspective to we apply to figure out what sort of conflict we are in? The Afghan villages I've visited see their district as some sort of third-party and the province and national governments as some distant entity they hear about on Pashto BBC. For alot of these people, "the state" ends at the wadi dividing them with the next village or where the farthest field meets the desert. For them, I'd imagine going to settle a blood feud against the village down the way is the same as blowing up the passing infidels or soldiers from Jalalabad who may or may not speak the same language.

Is this an insurgency or just war?

---

This question is the crux of the debate isn't it? In the formal model that BW suggest

Quote:

---

insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

---

we're assuming a state versus a counter-state. This model can be an insurgency or a civil war. In reality, there are multiple actors vying for power and control on the micro or local level. When we interdict as an external actor, we become a third player into the two-person game. We have to define a role. In Bosnia, we played a role as an arbitrator splitting the competing factions. In Iraq, at times we became a competitor, fighting for control. It's a slippery slope, and it can get messy. On the batallion and below level, we often don't get to choose our roles or our friends. We simply execute operations in support of higher's stated goals.

Here's an interesting example- Kurdistan. To some in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, Kurdistan is a terrorist safehaven that possesses a potential existential threat. To the US, the Kurds are our allies.

That drives back to BW's early point on conducting COIN versus being a counter-insurgent. On the ground level, it's a moot point. I'd submit that's an operational issue. When you're given a mission to clear a denied area, you gotta figure out how best to do it.

Best

Mike

My take is the that people who live within what is now called Afghanistan have an ancient and accepted system of local governance; a flegling and unproven attempt to apply centralized "state" governance; a Taliban led insurgent challenge to that central role; and a mix of competitors for regional influence in the midst of all.

At the local level I think the best you can hope to do is enforce the ancient local systems, and then work to help connect them effectively to the fledgling centralized systems to a degree and in a manner that is acceptable to that populace. There is nothing simple about that task; but I think the key is to see it as bringing the two together, vice imposing one upon the other. Some of those informal competitors, be they labled "warlord" or "taliban" etc may well be essential connectors in many areas.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

---

Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...

My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:

Quote:

---

When tasked to help suppress an insurgency...say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

---

You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...

Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:

Quote:

---

"Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own."

---

Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...

My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:

Quote:

---

At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.

---

that my initial statement was and is correct:

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support. ;)

I would like to emphasize some of the deep and subtle insights made so far on and compare them with a 'real-time' report regarding the interdependencies of the trinity of governance, economics, and security...

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Ken White

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support. ;)

---

...and from Dr. Marc Tyrrell

Quote:

---

The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.

---

From today's Washington Post by Blaine Harden: In N. Korea, a strong movement recoils at Kim Jong Il's attempt to limit wealth (H/T to Daniel Drezner)

Quote:

---

It was an unexplained decision -- the kind of command that for more than six decades has been obeyed without question in North Korea. But this time, in a highly unusual challenge to Kim's near-absolute authority, the markets and the people who depend on them pushed back.

Grass-roots anger and a reported riot in an eastern coastal city pressured the government to amend its confiscatory policy. Exchange limits have been eased, allowing individuals to possess more cash.

The currency episode reveals new constraints on Kim's power and may signal a fundamental change in the operation of what is often called the world's most repressive state. The change is driven by private markets that now feed and employ half the country's 23.5 million people, and appear to have grown too big and too important to be crushed, even by a leader who loathes them.

---

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Ken White

Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...

My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...

Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...

My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:that my initial statement was and is correct:

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support. ;)

---

Ken,

While I have tremendous respect for the SWJ community, and certainly there are many very keen insights posted here, I offer just this in response to your middle point of:

"the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception."

So, because you and a handful of others disagree with a theory it becomes a "dangerous misconception?" You may have taken the recent Ken White thread a bit too seriously. If I claimed that everything I either didn't understand or disagreed with "a dangerous misconception" I'd be a bit of a lunatic.

No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support. Where does popular support come from? The populace. When does a popualce support such movements? When it feels it is a better option than what they are getting from the current team, and when they also feel they have no way within the law to exercise that change.

If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this, that is a position I am quite comfortable with. I'm sure my thoughts will continue to evolve, and I suspect yours will as well.

Bob.

Hi Bob,

You and I have had a low level (decibels) discourse on your "good governance" and "self-determination" concepts from the gitgo. Some agreement; some disagreement.

I think you need to clarify this statement:

Quote:

---

from BW
No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support.

---

Now, my knowledge of the Malay "insurgency" in far southern Thailand is based only on what I've read from Kilcullen, from which I gleaned:

1. Viewed from an all-Thailand viewpoint, the Malays are a "small group with a distinct agenda" which is "taking on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance" as to the Malay issue.

2. Viewed from the Malay enclave, the Malays are a large group in that enclave with the "distinct agenda" of "self-determination", where the Malay populace is largely dissatisfied with the "goodness of governance" as to the Malay issue.

So, are the Thailand Malays an "insurgency" ? From whose viewpoint do you measure "good governance" ?

I've made it clear that I regard "governance" as an integral factor in the Political Struggle. But, as Bill Moore has made clear in a number of posts, governance is only one factor in that political effort (which BTW is not the Politik that drives both the political and military efforts to a common end goal).

Regards

Mike

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this...

---

I am closer to your position, kemosabe, than I am to the opposing view. But, I have two problems with the following excerpt.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support. Where does popular support come from? The populace. When does a popualce support such movements? When it feels it is a better option than what they are getting from the current team, and when they also feel they have no way within the law to exercise that change.

---

1. Popular support - how does one define this?

2. The notion of feeling a movement is "a better option than what they are getting from the current team" - is this to suggest that the populace thinks as one system or brain, rather than just a bunch of people reacting to short-term fears?

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

So, because you and a handful of others disagree with a theory it becomes a "dangerous misconception?" You may have taken the recent Ken White thread a bit too seriously. If I claimed that everything I either didn't understand or disagreed with "a dangerous misconception" I'd be a bit of a lunatic.

---

or because others do not agree with you, it is a dangerous misperception because as you say:

Quote:

---

No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure...

---

It is simply inaccurate and misrepresents history and if one is a strategic planner and one plans on what one admits is an even slightly flawed assumption, then I suggest it becomes potentially dangerous and if one admits it's a misrepresentation -- or a hyperbolic statement if you prefer -- then I suggest my tag is valid.

Quote:

---

If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this, that is a position I am quite comfortable with. I'm sure my thoughts will continue to evolve, and I suspect yours will as well.

---

I'm sure that is an accurate statement, our thinking will evolve. Nothing wrong with being a Lone Ranger but one does need Silver Bullets for that role. :D

We all use hyperbole to make points. Nothing wrong with that. I do believe, however, it is critical to not believe ones own hyperbolity. ;)

2 points, then I am signing off to focus on more pressing items.

1. Yes the movement in Thailand is an insurgency. The percentage of the populace is small, but the issues of poor governance that are perceived by the geographically concentrated Muslim populace are pervasive in that community. If 5% of a county's populace perceives it is not receiving good governance and they are dispersed across that country, you don't have much likelihood of insurgency. Note also that the Thai insurgency is what I would classify as a separatist insurgency. They don't want to change the entire country, they recognize that is unlikely and want to be released. If the Thai government wants to resolve it they need to either annex of that chunk of land and resident populace; or address the issues giving rise to the perceptions of poor governance.

Quirky little movements rise and fade, or persevere in their quirky little communities, but never burst into insurgency regardless of the strength of ideology or the dynamicism of leadership when embedded within a populace that is generally experiencing good governance. These things are ever present in all societies. It is only when governance fails that the medium is created within a populace for such sparks to ignite into a conflagration.

WWII was conceived in Versailles, not some Munich beer hall; and GWOT was conceived in the US policy decisions not to roll back Cold War controls in the Middle East at the end of the Cold War as it did in Europe; and not in some cave in Afghanistan. Conception isn't evil, often it is just ignorance or negligence; but those arguments won't relieve one from a judgment of a duty to deal with the consequences in the world court any more than they will in family court. Far easier to blame it on the bastard child that emerges for being born, but that won't truly solve the problem as it ignores the roots of it all.


Lastly, while I have fielded several "I don't agrees", a few "I don't think sos" and a couple of "what about's"; no one to my knowledge has put on the table a single example of a single insurgency that does not fit within my construct. I've been looking for such examples diligently myself, but to no avail. But I'm not here to argue, I have been here in the pursuit of thinking that will help preserve my nation and aid it in the pursuit of its interests in a manner that are not perceived as onerous to those around her.

My personal quest continues.

Before moving back to the topic, I will just want to bring an example in CvC's timeframe to show just how difficult it is to divide the phenomenon war into clearly defined elements.

During the Napoleonic wars the Austrian crownland Tyrol was ceded by Austria to the French ally Bavaria. It has been the ambition of many a Bavarian ruler and the largest part of it's population spoke a similar German dialect, a large part an Italian dialect and a relative small one Raetoroman (Ladin). All shared the same catholic faith, and the rural population had a similar way of life.

However liberal reforms and Austrian victories brought up the whole country and to a differing degrees the different communities against the French and their puppets which were the legitimate rulers of the land. Due to the strong will of the population, political organisation, widly dispersed and famous skill in markmanship, good armament and the mountains the insurgents were able to inflict very severe defeats on the forces of the government and their French allies. The Austrian Empire aided their former crownland little, but used of course their will to fight to their advantage. After new defeats the Austrians would cede Tyrol again which would rise up and drive the new rulers out again after having found the right occasion. This would repeat itself 4 times in a single year, until the fourth times only part of the leaders and the militias would meet head on with the main body of the enemy, as many felt betrayed by Austria. (The last three times an open battle against the main force had worked just fine).

So how can we define this wars? COIN, counter-counter-revolutionary wars, (multi)nationalist uprising, (defensive) people's war, a (small) war to support the main effort ?

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The link provided by Slapout provides some very interesting insights. The need of organisations skilled in the techniques employed by law enforcement and the secret services to operate effectively against the (more political) moves of the enemy is obvious. While the military has, due to the situation on the ground to shoulder most of the weight it is difficult to swallow that perhaps far more suited and experienced members and organisations have seemingly not been used in sufficiently intensive and skilled manner.

With the combat outposts and the efforts of their personnel under constant enemy watch there is a glaring need to have also more covert elements working to create a huge and yet fine net to recruit, observe, identify, filter, control, target, and so on. There are many ways and possibilities to aid this efforts, many of them are most likely already already in field, some not, but so far the effort to counter the infiltration and subversion seems to have been not strong enough. This is especially true when it comes to the cooperation between the coalition and the Afghan government/leaders/organisations.


Firn

P.S: It certainly surprised me how strictly the insurgents in the mentioned case study devided the military and political organisations and tasks.

Hi Bob,

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

2 points, then I am signing off to focus on more pressing items.

1. Yes the movement in Thailand is an insurgency. The percentage of the populace is small, but the issues of poor governance that are perceived by the geographically concentrated Muslim populace are pervasive in that community.

---

Personally, I think this is playing definition games. I have no problem with that, but it's always a good idea to be up front about it since I have a feeling that definitions, and how they are constructed and used, are at the heart of much of the apparent "disagreements" with your model.

Broadly speaking, there are three major types of definitions:

1. "Crisp" definitions of the either / or type. Usually based in some form of nomonological-deductive model, they are "certain" or "yes/no" types. As a note, people tend to us this form most often even if they have no idea if it is the correct form for when and where they are using it. Take a look at the accuracy of eyewitness testimony for an example of this :wry:.
2. "Fuzzy" or probabilistic definitions. These are usually presented either as probabilities - e.g. "I'm pretty sure it's an insurgency; say 80% - or, much less likely but more accurately, "it has certain characteristics in common with accepted definitions of insurgency, but several that are either not there or only in minimal form".
3. Plausible definitions. These tend to be used when people are trying to figure out concepts, constructs and just what they should be looking for. So, for example, if you were to look at the case of various and sundry national liberation movements in Quebec during the past 50 years, why didn't an open insurgency develop? All of the hallmarks were there: a distinct culture, poor governance, a different language and religion (on the whole), popular support for separation, etc.

Normally, all of these definitions tend to be used together but towards different ends so, for example, when you are talking about the Thai insurgency

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

If 5% of a county's populace perceives it is not receiving good governance and they are dispersed across that country, you don't have much likelihood of insurgency. Note also that the Thai insurgency is what I would classify as a separatist insurgency. They don't want to change the entire country, they recognize that is unlikely and want to be released. If the Thai government wants to resolve it they need to either annex of that chunk of land and resident populace; or address the issues giving rise to the perceptions of poor governance.

---

What this indicates to me is that you are dealing with a whole slew of different concepts. Pulling them apart, you've got

1. a rough model relating to the likelihood of an insurgency happening that draws on size of the group and dispersion of the group at a purely geographic level.
2. you switch levels between a nation state and a local community, and
3. you ascribe motivation back to perceptions of poor governance.

Now, the issue of governance is, as I think we would all agree, tricky. My suspicion is that the motivation is only partly related to the quality of the governance and much more related to the perception of the legitimacy of the governance. Key point here is that you appear to be conflating "good", which is qualitative and probabilistic, with "legitimate" which tends to be more "crisp".

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Quirky little movements rise and fade, or persevere in their quirky little communities, but never burst into insurgency regardless of the strength of ideology or the dynamicism of leadership when embedded within a populace that is generally experiencing good governance. These things are ever present in all societies. It is only when governance fails that the medium is created within a populace for such sparks to ignite into a conflagration. (emphasis added)

---

Now, that "never" is a crisp definition. Really? How about the American Revolution? What it comes down to again is definitions and you appear, to be using a tautology on "good" where if an insurgency happens then it must have been due to "not good" governance.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Lastly, while I have fielded several "I don't agrees", a few "I don't think sos" and a couple of "what about's"; no one to my knowledge has put on the table a single example of a single insurgency that does not fit within my construct. I've been looking for such examples diligently myself, but to no avail.

---

If you are looking for an example, try Algeria which had a very low initial support for the insurgency there. If you want another example, check out the various Jacobin revolts; the motivation has to do more with legitimacy than with effectiveness of governance structures. I would also strongly urge you to look at cases where they have crappy governance, and yet don't have a continuing situation of insurgency. Basically, what I am getting at is that you need a really good definition of "governance" that is probabilistic rather than crisp.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by Bob's World

But I'm not here to argue, I have been here in the pursuit of thinking that will help preserve my nation and aid it in the pursuit of its interests in a manner that are not perceived as onerous to those around her.

---

No worries, Bob :D. Some day, we need to get a bunch of us together in a convivial intellectual setting (aka a bar or brew pub), and really try to thrash out a decent "fuzzy" model of this - I'll buy the first round ;).

Cheers,

Marc

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by jcustis

There is certainly very little training for the battalion task force-level training audience (at the Marine Corps' Exercise MOJAVE VIPER) in integrating OGAs into the mix.

---

NTC is worth a visit, I enjoyed working with the USMC there. MOJAVE VIPER sounds interesting. :wry:

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by jcustis

We figure it out as we go along, but for the most part it's self-study and experiential learning that allows the green side to function best amidst these supporting elements.

---

Our resident spammer ugh boots brought this one to my attention the other day What Role for Germany in Iraq? by Dr. Christopher S. Chivvis. Not Afghanistan, however it is very interesting to look at Iraq through the SWP prism, and more importantly I find Dr. Chivvis' analytical method itself to be worth study.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by jcustis

Just as we are pushing civil affairs down to the battalion level, and pushing intel cells down even further to the company, there needs to be a component for CMOC training, even if it were just one or two modules for select personnel. We don't have that resource at this moment though, and yet COMISAF's campaign plan would lead most to believe that cracking that nut is the most important task we must master.

---

Mobile training teams are something to consider using as an ad hoc fix. I have been part of/learned from them both in and out of theater and have generally had good experiences with them.

Quote:

---

NTC is worth a visit, I enjoyed working with the USMC there. MOJAVE VIPER sounds interesting.

---

I've been part of two BLUFOR rotations there, the first in '96 and the second when my Bn was preparing to return in 2004. It was light years ahead of where the Corps was in terms of live simulation, but the margin has closed significantly since then.

I've just read through this thread and from an "armchair" faraway surely the local populace need to know what the message is? What is the minimum level of co-operation expected etc. As I recall in Malaya, not just in the protected villages, there was a very clear statement of principles / intent by the government and the resulting punishment for evasion (draconian by contemporary standards).

In the Afghan village context is this message clear? I do not mean 'fight with us', give us information how to fight and the rest.

Slap in particular has pointed at the lessons of gangs. We may not admit it, but most Western democracies have 'no go' areas or areas where neither the law nor state power are decisive - especially at night. Surveillance can help, for obvious reasons covert surveillance tends to be long range and the identification of individuals has a host of difficulties.

Tough question David. My experience in Iraq leads me to think that the answer lies in having the time to be present and watch/observe/judge what is going on around you in the village. We can engage them in dialog all we want, but if we are did so during a short 2-4 hour visit, we used to be told all sorts of tales of woe, which usually had a self-serving purpose most of the time.

It takes time and presence to make sure any message does "sink in."

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by marct

Hi Bob,



I suspect that you are falling into the fundamental ontological error of assuming that such a "thing" as a "state" exists in and of itself. "States", whether modern or ancient, are, like all social institutions, constructed by humans as a result of various and sundry activities which may (broadly) be called "politics".

Where the "difference" comes between "convention" and "insurgency" is in the perception of a) causality of conflict and b) the development of cultural and social conventions to contain that conflict. Indeed, "democracy" is another form of "violent" political struggle with (assumed) non-kinetic cultural conventions.

The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.


Cheers,

Marc

---

Was thinking about just this a couple days ago.

I've often wondered if in reality the "state" as we so often perceive it isn't one of the biggest examples of -

A solution in search of a problem.

Not dissing the institution but rather trying to recognize that just like most things states come into existence as a coordinated effort to solve various delimmas. As such once those are addressed effectively it should be fluid enough to adjust to new and more pressing issues yet quite often is too rigid to do so effectively.

The why and whats of that are fodder for all you polisci guys to work on.

Jon,

In post No.57 I said:

Quote:

---

(Taken from)..surely the local populace need to know what the message is? What is the minimum level of co-operation expected etc. ...In the Afghan village context is this message clear? I do not mean 'fight with us', give us information how to fight and the rest.

---

Jon Custis replied:

Quote:

---

(Taken from) Tough question David. My experience in Iraq leads me to think that the answer lies in having the time to be present and watch/observe/judge what is going on around you in the village... It takes time and presence to make sure any message does "sink in."

---

Hat tip to Zenpundit pointing at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/tribal-chief/ a series of interviews of a chief in Paktia Province (eleven) and for ease I cite the answers to five questions posed by Zenpundit:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3288

Quote:

---

(In part)Yes, the Afghans are great fighters, but that does not mean they wish for a war all their life. We needed to fight against the Russian invasion and I still strongly believe we have done the right thing defending our country and nation against Communism; as I said earlier, things went wrong when these so-called Mujahideen or Freedom fighters leaders started fighting one another. I believe every Afghan wishes for peace and stability in Afghanistan. Yes there are some who will continue fighting, but we all know they are small in numbers and are not significant. (My added emphasis)The reason many young men are part of the Taliban and other insurgents is the lack of employment , lack of better life conditions and of course lack of any positive attention from their government in Kabul. At this moment if you ask me, why are these young men are turning to Taliban and are fighting the US, NATO and the Afghan government? You will hear a simple answer from me and that is lack of employment opportunity for these youth who are mostly uneducated.

I believe the Afghan government and the US/NATO should provide training programmes to all those young Afghan men at around age of 16 and above who have lost the chance to go to school and get education. By learning skilled trades, I believe they will be in a position to earn a loaf of bread for themselves and their family and in this way we will prevent many young men from falling in the trap of believing being a suicide bomber means a life in the hereafter with the 72 virgins which will await them at the corridor of heaven.

---

I still think we, GoIRA and ISAF coalition need a 'message' to deliver. Hope this helps.