Is it time for psuedo operations in A-Stan?...

I shall leave LoW to JMM's able mind and remind readers that pseudo operations in the British and others experience can have unpleasant side-effects, some appear quickly and others take time.

Many years ago I read Frank Kitson's books and am mindful he served in the early years of 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland, where he is credited by some (mainly critics) with introducing such operations. See the Google links to MRF (Military Recconaisance Force) and the intelligence gathering 'Four Square Laundry' (not a puseudo op).

In those desperate years IMHO such operations were part of the UK Army standard response to insurgencies and met a political need for information and action. Later on such ops appear to have disappeared, for a variety of reasons, notably the long-term infiltration of the opposition i.e. para-militaries (itself fraught with problems).

The operations may have increased fear amidst opponents, but there is ample evidence that mainly innocents were murdered. Some argue that Republicans were aided in appearing as the community defenders and Loyalist collusion began.

What was the French experience in Algeria? IIRC psuedo ops featured there too, although cannot cite any sources. History shows that in the current conflict the Algerian state (military-led) probably used the option, with villages massacred to cast blame on the insurgents. I think a defecting officer's account appeared in a French paper.

On reflection and for once avoiding the Rhodesian experience, there are the lessons of such ops in SW Africa (now Namibia), Angola (cross-border) and in South Africa itself. Pseudo-gangs, notably the well-known Askaris, were a common feature of military and police operations. Somewhere I have a video on the subject from the 1980's. From faraway and with hindsight I doubt they actually strengthened governance i.e. apartheid or assisted in reaching a less violent future. I expect the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) reported on such activity and their impact (somewhere I have books on the subject read years ago).

I fully accept elsewhere and today fewer innocents maybe victims.

Yes, they can be an option - not specifically in Afghanistan. How desperate is the state to use them? What is their impact, particularly on the civilian population?

davidbfpo

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

I shall leave LoW to JMM's able mind and remind readers that pseudo operations in the British and others experience can have unpleasant side-effects, some appear quickly and others take time.

Many years ago I read Frank Kitson's books and am mindful he served in the early years of 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland, where he is credited by some (mainly critics) with introducing such operations. See the Google links to MRF (Military Recconaisance Force) and the intelligence gathering 'Four Square Laundry' (not a puseudo op).

In those desperate years IMHO such operations were part of the UK Army standard response to insurgencies and met a political need for information and action. Later on such ops appear to have disappeared, for a variety of reasons, notably the long-term infiltration of the opposition i.e. para-militaries (itself fraught with problems).

The operations may have increased fear amidst opponents, but there is ample evidence that mainly innocents were murdered. Some argue that Republicans were aided in appearing as the community defenders and Loyalist collusion began.

What was the French experience in Algeria? IIRC psuedo ops featured there too, although cannot cite any sources. History shows that in the current conflict the Algerian state (military-led) probably used the option, with villages massacred to cast blame on the insurgents. I think a defecting officer's account appeared in a French paper.

On reflection and for once avoiding the Rhodesian experience, there are the lessons of such ops in SW Africa (now Namibia), Angola (cross-border) and in South Africa itself. Pseudo-gangs, notably the well-known Askaris, were a common feature of military and police operations. Somewhere I have a video on the subject from the 1980's. From faraway and with hindsight I doubt they actually strengthened governance i.e. apartheid or assisted in reaching a less violent future. I expect the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) reported on such activity and their impact (somewhere I have books on the subject read years ago).

I fully accept elsewhere and today fewer innocents maybe victims.

Yes, they can be an option - not specifically in Afghanistan. How desperate is the state to use them? What is their impact, particularly on the civilian population?

davidbfpo

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David,

Let us be careful not to confuse using captured terrs (like occurred in SW Africa and Angola) and psuedo ops. There is a big difference between 'using' captured folk to track or fight compared to turning them to conducting pseudo ops. Read a bunch of Stiff's works about Koevet and the Buffalo Bn, then compare them to Ron Reid-Daly's book to see the immediate differences.

On a wider note, my sense is that the reason why psuedo ops worked well in places like Rhodesia was because of the fact that the terrs were not truly locals. This was based on the way that the insurgencts recruited and then re-inserted into country. I reckon in the case of anyone (white boys particularly) trying that stunt in Pashtunistan where everyone in the valley knows everyone else's geneology - Good luck, their balls are probably bigger than their smarts...

regards,

Mark

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.... We know that the Taliban are not one monolithic group, but several small groups each with their own goals and area of operations. That is a weakness that begs to be exploited. We know that they have village auxiliaries who support hard corps fighters who travel around in groups from 10 – 50. History also shows that from the 1940’s the Afghans were quite adept at infiltrating insurgents into the Pakistan’s FATA in order to instigate trouble. We know that part of COIN theory speaks of denying sanctuary to the insurgents. Afghan forces are more welcome and can operate more freely than Western troops. So, where are those Afghan Inglorious Bastards? Where are the small bands of Government of Afghanistan fighters operating on foot in Taliban safe havens, mixing with the people, getting intelligence, denying the Taliban that safe haven, ambushing Taliban groups, (with coalition backup) giving them no respite, taking away their feeling of invulnerability and exacerbating mistrust between Taliban groups? Where is the Afghan version of the “Les Commandos Tigres Noir,” (The Black Tigers), a group of former Viet-minh who under the leadership of Sergeant-Major Roger Vanenberghe in 1952 Indo China dressed in black uniforms and brought the fight to the insurgents and captured one of their command-posts?

We also know that the Taliban are very good at setting up roadblocks to collect taxes and control the population. Roadblocks, were used effectively to prevent voting materials getting distributed in the 20 Aug elections and also to prevent Afghans from voting. They are also quite effective at preventing IOs, NGOs and Afghan civil servants from getting out and working with the people. Where are the undercover Afghan Inglorious Bastards, who roll down the road in an old truck either armed to the teeth or armed with radios that talk to a trailing UAV or Attack Helicopter or follow-on truck full of undercover hard men? If a few of these check points were hit, the Taliban or local criminals might be less inclined to use them. This tactic was used quite effectively by Canadian troops in Somalia. Why aren’t we seeing it in Afghanistan? ....

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