Potentially correct. But...
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Originally Posted by
Abu Suleyman
100% Agreed. However, I take hope in the fact that there are actually many people outside of the establishment, that when the time comes, do have the appropriate skills. This wouldn't be the first time that the military turned to people who were not up to snuff in the "bureacratic" military, but who were just what was needed in war. (I am thinking specifically of U.S. Grant.)
I think you're right. I sure hope you are. However, I doubt those kinds of people will be available in the comparative numbers they were during WW II. We have had two more generations of added 'government' and 'safety and security.'
People that put bike helmets on kids aged four on tricycles, that have to buckle their seat belts under penalty of a fine if they get caught without one, that have a FEMA passing out checks to idiots who decide to live on a flood plain or a beach, that contend many benefits provided by big government are 'entitlements' simply aren't into risk taking. :(
Bill Donovan - conformist
I missed Mr Donovan by a decade, but his lawfirm, Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, was a "friendly" lawfirm to the firm where I worked. We think of him for his WWI and OSS activities, but Bill Donovan was a product of large firm litigation practice. In that context, he was a conformist.
What do I mean by that ? Here are a few points (not an ideal, because they are realized in practice by successful firms).
1. Correction by subordinates. As a young associate, you are expected to know your case and to correct errors made by those above you in the pecking order. Obviously, that includes substantive legal and factual errors, but also such things as grammar. Of course, if you expect to stay around, you had best be right most of the time. You are also expected to discuss (intelligently) the many judgment calls that have to be made. All good things have to come to an end. So, if you are a regular "counterformist", you will not last long.
2. Lines of Communication. You are expected to use horizontal lines of communication - with those roughly on your level; and to share knowledge. Selfish folks also did not last long. Vertical communications also had to be open - usually initiated from higher levels. Say, you have a four-person case team. The top dog wants input from all lower levels. So, it wouldn't be unusual for the bottom dog to be asked to give the top dog a complete brief (one on one) on the case. In that atmosphere, "yes men" also do not last long.
3. Consideration. The rule was simply "don't kiss ass upstairs; don't kick ass downstairs" - thank yous to the secretarial pool go a long way. And although vertical communications were open, never go behind someone's back. Positive input goes upstairs; negative input goes through the "chain of command". All of that is simply a matter of judgment and discretion.
In short, the normal world that Bill Donovan lived in for 50 years - after graduating Columbia Law in 1908 - was one where independent thinking, shared communications, exhaustive (but not exhausting) argument, judgment and discretion, were the norm. So, in that sense, Bill Donovan was a conformist. In WWII, half of the partners of the lawfirm where I later worked were "in uniform" (some in Donovan's organization).
I suspect LCol Malevich knows the answers to his questions
but I'll posit an answer anyway...
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Originally Posted by
Cavguy
I suggest:
The average Afghan is more afraid of the Talibs.They are not afraid of us because they know we're constrained by mores they think are dumb. Thus they'll pick on us as infidels and nice guys (who deserve to be fleeced in their view). As for revenge on the Talibs, they're willing to bide their time to get at them. What's a century or two...
We are not going to play a Viet Nam repeat because the rules have changed and 24 hour news cycles mitigate against such operations unless they are very low key; thus small and generally not terribly effective in the strategic sense.
There will be no -- or very, very few -- Afghan government inglorious basterds because the Afghan government does not necessarily want what the west thinks they ought to want. Far from it, I believe.
Consider also that if an Afghan soldier or police officer decides to beat a detained person to get information or just for the heck of it, he'll say something to the effect: "Please forgive me but I must beat you. It's my job, you understand." The beatee is likely to respond: "Please, go ahead. I understand. If God wills, I shall bear it manfully. I will bear no malice for this." Point there is that Pashtunwali is far more nuanced and complex than most westerners think. Also note that it is 'Pashtun...' Blood is thicker and so forth...
He states:
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We need to ask tough questions and stop making up the answers that please us.
Those are fair questions. I'm not sure whether the answers are pleasing or not but they really boil down to three rather immutable factors.
We may be nice guys but we are still outsiders and flatlanders in hill country. Hill people are rather comfortable fighting each other but they will unite to fight outsiders. No one not from a bunch of Hill folks is likely to understand that fully.
We are trying to fight a war nicely for western domestic political reasons and our opponents do not have that quite significant constraint.
While I know some US Sergeants Major who could and would lead some Tigres Noir, I know many more who could not and would not (the ratio used to be about 20:80, I suspect it is even more skewed today) and I strongly doubt the US Army for one would allow that to happen -- again more due to US domestic politics than to the fact that there are only a few commanders who countenance such operations -- fewer still would entrust it to an NCO. So the second factor is our bureaucracy and dictated conformity. The US Army is still, unfortunately, mentally geared to fighting a peer competitor on the north German plain.
Short version: Outsiders who try to be nice and are doctrinaire are very unlikely to win against tough, unconstrained, xenophobic hillmen. They can get a marginally acceptable conclusion...
Don't disagree. Good points all...
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Originally Posted by
omarali50
Somehow I doubt that they consider the US army as being too nice or too constrained. They ARE less afraid of you than they are of the taliban...
'Too nice' is shorthand for not as brutal (or as dedicated) as the opposition, no more.
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...because in the last year or two they have begun to think that the talibs are likely to win.
Or that we are more likely to leave sooner rather than later which is the same thing said a different way...
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Its true that they dont like infidels and outsiders in general. But, they are people and they see which side their bread is buttered.
They are pragmatic, no question. They are also xenophobic so they are conflicted -- that makes them prone to go with the flow -- and the meanest, most likely to affect them long term. :wry:
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If the infidels had set up a better regime AND appeared determined to win, they would go along with that.
Agreed. Problem is that said infidels want to to do western things that aren't always in tune with what's needed and are influenced by those who have personal ideas, not necessarily 'good of Afghans' ideas.
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Also, lets not generalize TOO much.
The population of primary concern is covered by those generalizations -- the others are more easily assuaged as you point out.
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Having said all that, I think if the US actually decides to stick around, the nutcases who are increasingly dominant on the Pakistani side of the border (the arabs and uzbeks and punjabi taliban) will prove to be their own worst enemies. They will kill mercilessly and almost randomly, provide no real service, butt into everyone's private life and generally make Karzai look slightly better by comparison....but only slightly better.
Agreed -- and that's the problem; the sticking around bit. To be determined, as they say... :(