Is an insurgent an insurgent?
I am working in northern Afghanistan and have encountered bit of a problem.
Describing the different actors on the ground has proven difficult using the term "insurgent". Is someone who is not seeking to overthrow the central government, but seeking to establish and consolidate a local powerbase that competes with local government structures an insurgent? Is he a "local insurgent"? Will the sum of all these local actors still qualify as an insurgency?
Any views on this?
You are asking the wrong question.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Saifullah
I am working in northern Afghanistan and have encountered bit of a problem.
Describing the different actors on the ground has proven difficult using the term "insurgent". Is someone who is not seeking to overthrow the central government, but seeking to establish and consolidate a local powerbase that competes with local government structures an insurgent? Is he a "local insurgent"? Will the sum of all these local actors still qualify as an insurgency?
Any views on this?
The right question in my opinion is not whether or not this actor is an insurgent, it is whether or not YOU are a Counterinsurgent.
Current definitions and policy not withstanding; there are arguably three types of insurgency; Revolutionary that seeks to change the overall governance; Separatist that seeks to break away from the existing state/governance; and Resistance that seeks to defeat an imposed foreign presence/influence over the governance.
COIN is what the existing governance does to address these problems and their underlying conditions.
If you are not a member of the Afghan populace; but are a foreigner helping the Afghans to resolve its insurgency challenges, in US doctrine, you are conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID). The biggest distiction being of course, not what is being down about what; but who is doing it. Always good to have a constant reminder of what your place is when inserting yourself into the middle of someone elses drama.
Mike and Wilf are both correct
The 'COIN' mantra folks may not like it -- but no war is as simple as they wish to make it, conversely, waging warfare against crooks, dissidents, gangbangers, guerrillas, insurgents, smugglers and battlefield strays is less complex than they seem to wish it to be.
There are always actors on any battlefield that are not doing what everyone else is doing. If you think everyone in opposition is the same and proceed to treat them that way, you are highly likely to create incidental insurgents -- or something. :D
Trying to apply a one-size fits all model to fighting a war is sort of like taking an Ibuprofen instead of Acetylsalicylic Acid. Both relieve swelling but other than that, they do very different things. I'm beginning to believe the COIN devotees object to reality. :wry:
In any event, it's FID, not COIN. Actually, it's FID, Mod 2 in that we are not aiding A government with development; we are attempting to install a Government modeled after our own in an area that is not like us and that has effectively been ungoverned for almost 30 years. Further, we are attempting to impose a strong central government ion an area that has never had such a thing. Not likely to work. This is not standard, base model FID and it certainly isn't COIN (Though some COIN TTP Are appropriate). It is FID to the second or third power -- and there is no rule book.
Is the object to aid the people form a government or or to impose a government the people do not want but that we do? You have to adapt to all the local nuances and aid development. It may well be that the western idea of a strong central government is not the right size. No sense in fashioning one that will only implode when we leave.
I became convinced some time ago that the Afghans were not confused or ignorant about what was happening there; we were. Several events and items over the last few weeks have really reinforced that. We need to figure out what we want. We are doing something not done before so there are no models, no guidebooks; we have to think about it. When you do not know what you really want to do, you're highly likely to do some wrong things...
Why must a COIN strategy be implemented?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Saifullah
The problem I am facing is that a COIN-strategy will not be implemented if the opposing force is not defined as an insurgent.
Then don't implement a 'COIN strategy' -- what ever that means.
Quote:
If the enemy is not an insurgent because he is not seeking to overthrow the state, what is he then when the result is the same?
He may not be your enemy but you'll likely make him one, thus Wilf's Accidental Guerrilla quip.
What State is he trying to overthrow? The Government of Afghansitan that we created without thinking it through? Will the result "be the same" or will it merely be something different than WE envision?
Serious questions: If they are successful, will the result really be the same? Are they trying to overthrow or do they just want more local autonomy? What is their likelihood of success? If it's better than 40% or so, is it possible that we need to relook our goals? What IS our goal?
Let me restate something I said above: "Then don't implement a 'COIN strategy'..." Turn that effort by said locals to assist your goals. Develop an alternative approach that avoids creating more hostiles and instead furthers your goals -- which you may have to modify from earlier designs. That's Plan A.
One should always have a Plan B. Plan B will probably entail fighting them whether you use a 'COIN strategy' or not.
If you have a 'political' problem
in describing a potential effort to some politicians who are nervous, then you could extrapolate your comment "If the enemy is not an insurgent because he is not seeking to overthrow the state, what is he then when the result is the same?" as a rationale. The result MAY be the same; whether it will be or not cannot be known but the potential effect is presumed disadvantageous so the result could be the same and therefor it is best resisted.
IMO, that is militarily specious and bad thinking but it's probably politically marginally supportable.
This is just one leg on what I believe is a 3-legged stool
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Why so? That makes every irregular military force an insurgent. That's just not true. Competing with or seeking to inoculate yourself against Government policies, or even the activities of another armed group, does not make that party an insurgent or their activity an insurgency. Insurgencies are "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."
Not all irregular armed groups are insurgents.
Certainly separatist movements like that executed by the American Colonies or the Iraqi Kurds had no intent or interest in "overthrowing a constituted government," they simply did not want to participate in it any longer.
Likewise resistance movements like that executed by the French against the German invaders; or the Iraqis against the American invaders of there respective countries were not "aimed at overthrowing a constituted government" either.
Yet both are categories of insurgencies in my book. It sounds like what he is dealing with is a subset of a separatist movement. Also, the insurgency is not the irregular military itself, irregular military is just what insurgencies tend to employ for their dirtier work toward achieving their political ends.