Nuclear/Radioactive Material Smuggling
Radioactive Material Lost At JFK
Quote:
You've all heard stories about airlines losing luggage, but how do you lose a 200-pound drum containing dangerous radioactive material?
"I'm still in awe I can't believe it happened," Phil Piccuirro, a plant safety specialist at the U.S. Postal facility in Jersey City, N.J., told CBS2.
It's a good thing Piccuirro works for the post office. And that he's not a terrorist.
Because what he found when he opened what was expected to be an empty air freight container could have wreaked havoc.
"It was prominently labeled," Piccuirro said. "It was labeled cesium 137 there was no mistaking what it was."
What it was, was a 20-gallon drum clearly labeled "radioactive" that had 200 pounds of lead encasing the cesium 137.
Dr. Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists explained that, "cesium 137 is a highly penetrating radioactive isotope, it can be used in medical and commercial applications but it could also be used for a dirty bomb."
Experts say the package contained enough cesium 137 to contaminate several city blocks, potentially causing cancer and radiation sickness.
This, just a couple of weeks after a good article that puts RDDs in context: 'Dirty Bomb' Tops Threat List, but May Need Suicide Technicians to Build
Then there is this excellent reference: Commercial Radiological Sources: Surveying the Security Risks
Georgian sting led to seizure of bomb-grade uranium
From CBC.ca
Quote:
Georgian sting led to seizure of bomb-grade uranium
Russia's refusal to co-operate in investigation of citizen shows gaps in regional security, Georgia's interior minister alleges
Last Updated: Wednesday, January 24, 2007 | 11:01 PM ET
The Associated Press
Authorities in the ex-Soviet republic of Georgia, aided by the CIA, set up a sting operation last summer that led to the arrest of a Russian man who tried to sell a small amount of nuclear-bomb grade uranium from a plastic bag in his jacket pocket, officials said.
The operation, which neither government has publicized, represents one of the most serious cases of smuggling of nuclear material in recent years, according to analysts and officials.
The arrest underscored concerns about the possibility of militants acquiring nuclear bomb-making material on the black market, although there was no suggestion that happened in this particular case.
More...
No More Surprises, Already in Unfriendly Hands
Marc,
Our Estonian DOE rep is about 65 and although he wants to retire, he feels there's no adequate replacement and stays on. His office is almost across the street from our bomb group.
Fortunately, we have an Andros F6A robot out of TN that permits via fiber optics, ADP-2000 and the Multi-ray detectors. We (actually HE) can stand off 300 feet and let the detectors tell the story.
If one of them beeps, we stand down and he dawns some freaky clothing.
Now that is spooky !
Stan
Arrests in Slovak 'nuclear plot'
Someone seem to have been trying to sell 1Kg of 'Radioactive Material' for $1m, but the rest is very vague. Has anyone seen anything firmer?
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7117758.stm
More details, names, amount, etc.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22022256/
Quote:
The three men, who were arrested Wednesday in eastern Slovakia and Hungary, were trying to sell about a pound of uranium in powder form, said First Police Vice President Michal Kopcik.
Quote:
He said the uranium had been stashed in unspecified containers, and that investigators determined it contained 98.6 percent uranium-235. Uranium is considered weapons-grade if it contains at least 85 percent uranium-235.
How Easy Is It To Smuggle?
Looks like this issue is getting tons of attention...
Quote:
Because uranium emits a form of radiation that cannot penetrate skin, and is much less radioactive than the polonium used to poison former Russian security agent Alexander Litvinenko in London last year, it can be stored and transported with little or no safety measures. Putting it in a lead-lined container would make it difficult or impossible to detect even with the most advanced equipment.
IS THE MATERIAL CONNECTED WITH THE SLOVAKIA ARRESTS DANGEROUS?
Police said they have found enough material to make a radiological "dirty bomb," but experts say highly enriched uranium is an unlikely candidate for such a weapon. Dirty bombs can be made from much more easily available radioactive materials found in hospitals, industrial plants or agricultural facilities, and uranium is not very toxic when dispersed in the air.
"Only idiots and scam artists think of selling highly enriched uranium as part of a dirty bomb," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C. "The net effect of dispersing half a kilo of uranium — who cares? Uranium is not very radiotoxic. Each person would get so little it would have no effect."
Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons Precursors
CNS, 10 Nov 08: Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons Precursors: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s
Quote:
......Until recently, little open-source information was available about illicit trafficking networks for CW precursors. In 2005, however, the trial in the Netherlands of Frans van Anraat, a Dutch businessman who had served as a middleman for Iraq’s procurement of precursors for mustard gas and nerve agents during the Iran-Iraq War, led to the public release of court documents revealing new details about chemical trafficking operations. Additional insights were provided by the related case of Peter Walaschek, a German middleman who arranged shipments of CW precursors to Iran. Th is study reconstructs the two cases by drawing on information from a variety of sources, including indictments, oral arguments, and exhibits from the United States and the Netherlands; interviews with the key individuals involved in the U.S. and Dutch investigations; and contemporaneous media reports.
Although the Van Anraat and Walaschek cases are more than two decades old, the insights they provide are still relevant today because methods of illicit traffi cking have not changed fundamentally in the intervening period. In addition to providing a detailed historical narrative of the cases, this paper describes the current U.S. system of dual-use export controls, indicates how it has changed since the 1980s, and identifies continuing gaps and weaknesses. Th e paper concludes with some recommendations to prevent the future trafficking of CW precursors.....