That's a useful analogy. Since U.S. military occupation failed to turn Virginia into a stable democracy, why do we think it can work in Iraq?
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But with this wonderful analogy you fail to consider that Virginia was not involved in a shooting war with, say, Lancaster County at the same time.
Perhaps a better parallel, if we're going for dysfunctional parallels, would be Missouri and Kansas. It's obvious that Unionist occupation failed horribly in both states, so we should pull our troops out immediately. Or pull all police out of downtown LA or Philly, since it has to be the presence of those bulls in blue that outrages all the gangs into violence. I'm sure if they leave, the gangs will turn in their guns and settle right back down to choreographed West Side Story dance-rumbles.....:wry:
Don't you mean aggression? :DQuote:
That's a useful analogy. Since U.S. military occupation failed to turn Virginia into a stable democracy,
Tom
Obviously anybody who doesn't follow this forum's Group-Think opinions fails miserably...
Taken from: "Heads We Win. The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN)" by David C. Gompert. RAND COIN Study Paper 1:
The jihad is able to perpetuate itself by relying on perceived Western injustice and aggression to turn disgruntled Muslims into radical Islamists and then using the story of the West’s assault on Islam to recruit radicalized individuals to violence and martyrdom. Understanding this cognitive process is the first step toward breaking it. Preventing Muslims from being radicalized, preventing radicals from choosing violence, and protecting society from violent radicals are different problems requiring different cognitive strategies.
Keeping Muslims from becoming radicals or radicals from becoming terrorists cannot be achieved through a U.S.-led propaganda assault on Islamic fundamentalism any more than it can by reliance on force.
[...] In COIN, force might weaken an insurgency, strengthen it, or both.
[...] the governing authority and its COIN can fail if the loss of the legitimacy of force puts it on the same level as the insurgents.
-End of quote-
I still ask the question about the legitimacy (not for the US soldier; I am aware that the president ordered it after cheating the congress on WMD in Iraq) of the whole OIF campaign in the perception of the Iraqi people
bruz
Bruz's last comment reminds of me of a Boyd story he liked to tell.
"You need to be the villager, instead of the one attacking the village, to really understand what's going on."
Perhaps you would fare better if you had actual opinions as opposed to drive-bys. Perhaps you should start by introducing yourself here.
Do a search of the forums. You'll discover that most of this stuff has been discussed before...and you may also discover that factional violence does exist in Iraq, and in many ways it's as big a problem (if not bigger, depending on the region) as the jihadi movements you like to discuss. The removal of US troops isn't going to end the factional violence. And ignoring it won't make it go away.
Your analogies are still flawed...and hauling random quotes from other sources isn't going to change that.
To "hijack" this thread back to it's original topic *ahem*:wry:
I have one question. This may be due to my lack of understanding btween tactical and strategical.
Are counterguerrilla operations/tactics used within the COIN strategy?
I guess I see very little difference in kinetic operations targeting insurgents and those targeting guerrillas. Where it would get fuzzy would be on the non-kinetic side but again one could and probably should try non-kinetic against guerrillas.
I believe what was said earlier in a counter guerrilla fight it's focus is the guerrillas whereas in COIN the tensions between insurgent-centric and population-centric play out (as they do on here).
best
Tom
PS
Keep hijacking.
Hi Bruz,
Given the reactions some of your posts have created, whether you intended them or not, you should realize that they may be seen as insulting by some members. Since the reactions are observable, this is not an accusation of intent but, rather, a notification of effect.
From Merriam-Webster online
Please note that the terms "arbitrate" and "preside" appear in these definitions. A large part of the role of a moderator is to teach and train participants in an ongoing discussion by setting the basic parameters of that discussion and the generally acceptable forms in which that discussion takes place. At the SWC, we call this the boards ROE.Quote:
1 : one who arbitrates : MEDIATOR
2 : one who presides over an assembly, meeting, or discussion: as a : the presiding officer of a Presbyterian governing body b : the nonpartisan presiding officer of a town meeting c : the chairman of a discussion group
Given the relative length on time on this board and the number of posts (BL: January 2007, 26 posts; Steve Blair: October 2005, 1232 posts) I will leave it, as you say, "for everybody to read and make up his own opinion" on who has a better grasp of the dynamics of this board.
Marc
<sound of mumbling voice: "I am NOT going to comment", "I am NOT going to comment", "I am NOT going to comment",...>
I remember the first time I got involved with an online community back in 1986 (yeah, I'm showin' my age :cool:). The main forum I was involved with was on Amateur Theology (AmTheo on PODSNET), and had so many different viewpoints in it that the potential for flames was insanely high. What struck me most was that while most of the posters completely disagreed with the other posters, there was an almost unanimous agreement on how to talk about things.
Shifting back to the insurgent-guerrilla discussion,
Tom, I think you are right about the focus on the "counter" part (counter-guerrilla and COIN), but I have to wonder about it from the other side. It strikes me that, at the operational level for he guerrillas / insurgents (I'll admit to preferring the term "Grand Tactical" but that's from doing too much gaming in the Napoleonic era), don't the differences disappear?Quote:
I guess I see very little difference in kinetic operations targeting insurgents and those targeting guerrillas. Where it would get fuzzy would be on the non-kinetic side but again one could and probably should try non-kinetic against guerrillas.
I believe what was said earlier in a counter guerrilla fight it's focus is the guerrillas whereas in COIN the tensions between insurgent-centric and population-centric play out (as they do on here).
Marc
Marc,Quote:
Tom, I think you are right about the focus on the "counter" part (counter-guerrilla and COIN), but I have to wonder about it from the other side. It strikes me that, at the operational level for he guerrillas / insurgents (I'll admit to preferring the term "Grand Tactical" but that's from doing too much gaming in the Napoleonic era), don't the differences disappear?
I am with you on that one, especially in the modern (post-WWII) sense. Guerrilla operations ala WWII were against German occupation and one really gets into counting angels on the head of a pin when you try and distinguish the difference guerrillas and insurgents. The best I can do is distinguish on the basis of who is actually tied to the local population. I guess if I had to point to a post-WWII "guerrilla" it would have to be Che Guevera and he failed everywhere he went. A second could be Holden Roberto whom we stupidly sponsored on his attempt to take Angola--since he was Uncle Mo's cousin and had the vaunted Farce Armees Zairiose backing.
Best
Tom
I still see a clear difference (as posted above): a guerrilla is always a fighter while an insurgent is a more overall term which can be a fighter or not (he may be a pure politician, a bomb-maker, a journalist who writes articles on the Internet, a webmaster, a photographer/cameraman, a computer expert, ...)
So in my opinion you're talking about a guerrilla and an insurgent fighter.
He obviously didn't fail in Cuba.
He failed later on in Africa and South America because he focussed on Guerrilla TTPs (in his book he also mainly writes about pure tactical stuff) while he failed to notice the absence of a political situation that favours an insurgency.
BRUZ