Bad habits are often induced by excessive wealth...
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Originally Posted by
Blah
Which brings us back to the US... What I've gleaned from the testimonies of soldiers returning from Iraq/Afghan is that many of the riflemen carry around 500-600 (some have claimed as many as 1000) rounds of 5.56 ammunition with them on patrols, not to mention all of the other munitions and equipment they have to carry. This seems awfully excessive to me, and I wonder if this is due to the nature of their approach to suppression. I wouldn't be surprised if "firing in the general direction of the enemy" works on the insurgents there, however I wonder if it would work if the US were to face a similarly capable military.
The significant overuse of automatic fire by Riflemen is one such habit. The US Forces 'learned' to do that in Viet Nam and it became embedded. It is, as you discern, a terrible waste of ammunition and -- probably really more importantly, load carrying and general logistic capability. Basically, I'm firmly convinced that your perception is quite accurate and that pun is intended. Volume of fire is not nearly as important as the accuracy of that fire. A nominal basic load of seven Mags, 210 rounds, per rifle is more than adequate for most things but the carrying of an additional 3-400 rounds started in Viet Nam and is still allowed. It should not be.
As Fuchs writes, accuracy can be overstated but not by much -- the real issue is location of the correct targets --as the Storr article linked by Fuchs states and as the anecdote on the river crossing illustrates. The issue is not pinpoint, one shot - one target accuracy, the issue is the amount of relatively accurate fire placed on or near the correct target area. As you note, well trained opponents will not be deterred for a second by poorly place fire, no matter the volume.
The US failure is to adequately train in two areas; fire discipline or control and target detection. The old target detection ranges, created as a result of hard won WW II experience, essentially fell into disuse after Korea and the availability of a full automatic individual weapon and tons of ammunition in Viet Nam effectively killed the knowledge of the importance of the skill. The Army's adoption of the terribly flawed Task, Condition and Standard 'training' system -- it is not training, it is instruction and a poor instructional methodology at that -- mean that we send folks off to war missing essential, life saving skills. Doctrine states that NCOs and Officers control fire -- reality states they cannot actually do that all too often, thus Joe has to know what to do -- and he has to be trained in order to do that. Unfortunately, it's easier to 'train' him to "Fire when and where your Squad Leader tells you..."
We should generally preclude full automatic fire unless the METT-TC factors call for it and in my experience that is relatively, even surprisingly, rarely. Correctly assessing the METT-TC factors is critically important, basic individual skills provide the ability to do that, every lowly Rifleman should be able to do that and we do not train them to do so -- they have to learn by doing in combat and that kills too many needlessly before they figure it out. We should better train both target detection AND marksmanship; the Troops are capable of doing more than we allow them to do...
We should also reduce the allowable amount of ammunition. :rolleyes:
Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team... :wry:
With a Spencer armed unit it may have happened -- but I doubt it...
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Originally Posted by
Pete
I haven't read about anything like marching fire in Civil War accounts...
Not with muzzle loaders, of course not. The broader point though is that the power of the even poorly dug in defense and the relative rapidity of reloading with the Minie Ball plus the few repeaters made frontal assaults bloody as all get out.
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...Patton in War As I Knew It is emphatic about having all weapons firing at the objective during an assault.
That's the issue isn't it -- assaults. They are a particularly poor way to do business and the Armed forces of the US use the and have used the 'techniques' entirely too often. Patton was almost as fond of them as Grant...
T.J.Jackson, John Buford, Walter Kreuger and James Gavin had more sense.
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Had he lived longer I'm pretty sure Patton was enough of a master of his craft to have seen when suppressive fire reaches the point of diminishing returns.
I wouldn't bet on that. He was a master at manipulating people. I'll give him that. Consider the fact that a good many Majors today have more combat experience than Patton had.
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This leads us back to the old FM 22-5 tactics drill tactics of the Civil War and First World War that nobody has ever been able to answer -- how do junior officers and NCOs re-establish fire control after the initial bursts of suppressive fire? What next after that? Find a flank? Call in artillery?
It hasn't been answered to your satisfaction you mean? Colud that be because it, as you state it, is a big open ended question lacking in any context and specificity and -- wait for it -- METT-TC applies. Always.
Our marginally trained troops may seem to need such NCO / Officer control and do in some units. Realistically in combat they have to know what to do at first contact and most figure it out after a couple of contacts. After that first rattle, they must know to look for and keep an eye on their leaders to watch for hand and arm signals -- the advent of individual troopies having radios will not totally change that aspect. Any good unit will develop that capability internally and since all leaders are different, most will do it in different ways. As for flank, call for fire, etc. -- all very much situation dependent.
The real constant is proper training and response to fire while keeping an eye on the leaders for cues. For the leaders, it should all be about what they need to have done to keep people alive and get on with the job. That can entail anything from a rapid departure from the area; to just going to ground; to trying to flank left or right (left or right are bad ju-ju, leaders should always use Compass directions, N,E,S,W, NW, etc. to preclude confusion which is generally around when under fire); to establish a base of fire; to a suicidal frontal assault supported by three DS and two GS Arty units -- and everything in between. It's really simple... ;)
The underlying Murphy problem
Suppressive fire doesn't.
The weapon isn't a problem.
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Originally Posted by
Infanteer
We've had the weapon for some 20 years and I've never had a problem with it.
It's employment as a Squad /Section weapon is the problem -- and if you've never had a problem, I'm happy for you. Personally, I've never seen any belt fed weapon that did not have problems with feeding, often belt problem caused, at least occasionally and with breakage of the feeding mechanism parts once in a while, much more so than with mag fed weapons. Anyway you couch it, belt fed weapons are more expensive, less mechanically reliable, often less accurate (a particular M249 problem) and require more training. Machine guns are necessary and important -- too important to allow proliferation to a level where high casualties in a more intense combat will eventually result in untrained machinegunners...
I won't even mention the logistics and ammunition expenditure for results gained. :D
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If a LMG Gunner is well trained in fire control (as all machinegunners should be) I don't see what advantage would be accrued by replacing the LMG with an AR - and yes I've read all of CWO Eby's stuff.
I have not read any of Eby's stuff, whoever he is. My comments are based on my own observations and experience. The advantages are simplicity, less weight, more reliability, less maintenance, no spare barrels (much less tripods) to carry at Squad / Section level, lessened ammunition consumption (waste???), hopefully and probably a more durable weapon and the ability to put your Machine Guns where they belong, in a dedicated MG Platoon (YMMV ;) ).
Every one does not take the time that Canada does to train folks. Perhaps they should but most do not and are unfortunately not likely to do so. Nor do most get the long service, multi skilled Corporals that Canada has. Hopefully that will continue for you because it has merit, however, the probability in high intensity conflict is more turnover, abbreviated training and less experienced leaders and gunners. Military weapons should be selected with that probability in mind, not peace time optimal conditions, training time and support.
I thought that was true of military leadership in all branches...
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Originally Posted by
Pete
Oh well, it seems that military leadership in the Infantry all boils down to bringing order out of chaos. It's almost as though because in combat they're all improvised solutions that are all unique, there are no larger lessons or solutions to be derived. Damn, all those Vu-Graph slides in '77-'78 in Infantry Hall were for nothing.
In reverse order, probably true on the Vu-graphs as is true for most of the foolishness that comes out of Bunker 4. :D
Not just the Infantry. Armor and Cavalry have exactly the same sorts and sets of problems -- as do Attack and Scout aircraft crews and the Engineers on occasion. The other combat and combat support arms can have the same sort of problems every now and then but those are rather rare and they seldom train for such efforts. Thus they tend to be more orderly and less chaotic. They tend to seek and use checklists, metrics and can actually apply larger lessons effectively and can also generally apply derived or patterned solutions
Maneuver combat OTOH is indeed a series of really unique situations and essentially undiffrentiated chaos requiring rapid assessments and intuitive responses and thinking. The problems of leadership and command in combat are many for all branches -- but those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic...:(
At about the time you were cruising the Snack Bar in Muskogee County, Georgia that is the meeting place of the Army, had you instead gone to Leavenworth the Tactics Department there would have informed you first thing something along this line: "What we are going to teach you will work in gently rolling open terrain on a mild June day against a peer competitor with approximately equal strength and equipment provided you have all your authorized personnel and equipment and they are trained and it is all operational. If any of those factors differ, you will have to adapt."
That means that if it is raining pitchforks, you've got a problem. If the opponent is a mess of Go-rillas instead of a generally like unit, you've got problems. If you are short 20% of your folks and have only a 70% OR, it's snowing and you have to fit those guerrillas AND a like sized and equipped opponent, you got bi-i-g-g-g problems. Like I said, it's simple... :wry:
Fuchs is totally correct. Formations are deadly, patterns are deadly.
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Originally Posted by
Pete
When we fought the First World War the old FM 22-5 way of doing things was how we deployed for combat ... Our doctrine during WW II is said to have been oversimplified so it could be taught in a hurry -- one element puts down a base of fire, the other finds a flank...
Yes and that started being questioned after Kasserine Pass and after the Bulge really fell by the wayside and had been totally discredited (at that time, not by the Bulge specifically). We in essence fought WW II with WW I tactical precepts until the tail end, by then we had so much mass employed that tactical nicety wasn't required.. Good thing because we did not know how to do that...
I'm not at all sure we can do it today -- I know there are units and people than can and do operate with excellent tactical acumen but I'm not at all sure the broader US Army does or can. Or even wants to, the tendency to rely on mass an firepower is strong -- because its easy. Unfortunatel, all the hard earned lessons of WW II were discarded and a return to 'real peacetime soldiering' took place. Our training and personnel system today are both flawed -- badly -- and both are relics of WW I and WW II -- just as tha dumbe 22-5 is. No parade ever won a war, no good haurcut ever killed a bad guy and unless someone has strangled one with it, neither has a stupid Reflective Safety Belt (NSN 8465-01-163-8835). :mad:
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Decades later, in a speech at Fort Benning Gen. DePuy said the main thing his company during WW II did was to transport his forward observer from one hill to another.
Rather than slam De Puy for ineptitude and say that was his fault if he was the Commander, since I wasn't there and do not know if that's correct, I can and will say that comment applied to him and his Company in one small area in one large Theater in an even larger global war. Having talked to and served under a number of people who commanded Companies in that war, my sensing is that most would not agree with him. I know those from the Pacific Theater would grin, mirthlessly, at the absolutely dangerous naivete of the comment.
That principle almost certainly did not apply to most Companies in that War -- yet, it got embedded in the mind of a young Captain and years later, he tried as a General to structure an Army based on his brief experience in one geographic area, in one command in one war. :rolleyes:
I do not think that was wise. Recent history proves it was far from helpful.
Thus my point earlier: ""...those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic..."" (emphasis added /kw).
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I've heard a lot about SOPs and battle drills.
That's a function of the Army in which you served. It trained to Tasks, Conditions and Standards and had a large quantity of less than stellar soldiers and few experienced NCOs to train those folks because way too many of the good and experienced got killed in Viet Nam. Those SOPs and Battle Drills were seen as a cheap and easy way for marginally competent trainers to train marginally competent individuals. Those days, fortunately, are gone --but too many are still trying to 'train' much smarter and more capable people the same way.
Drills are necessary but not the simplistic type that we picked up in the 80s. What's needed are complex, multi scenario drills that force the inclusion of multiple tasks and no pre-determined outcome.
"No pre determined out come" is what happens in combat...
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Given that 70 years ago what later became FM 22-5 was relegated to parades and change-of-command ceremonies, isn't it time to come up with a similar manual for infantry combat?
There's one out there. (LINK). It's only three years old and it's not too bad. Go to Chapter 3, Tactical Movement. It's fair. It's greatest problem as would be true with any doctrinal pub or technique is that it must be very generic in tone. For example, look at Figure 3-15. It suggests a 20m interval between Teams. That's okay for many places and times -- that "rolling open terrain on a mild June day" but it will not work in the jungle where less than five meters is necessary -- it is poor for place like much of Afghanistan where 60 to 100m would be better. METT-TC HAS to be considered by the guy fighting but the Book cannot do that, too many variables.
That's where the Task, condition and Standard of BTMS fails -- the conditions vary widely. Task: Clear a building. Conditions: Fragile mud hut in Viet Nam? Hardened, tough mud hut in Afghanistan? Frame house in Central America? Reinforced Concrete Police Staion in Iraq? Ten Story Apartment? The Tower of Dubai?...
You, as they said at Leavenworth in the old days, have to adapt. :wry:
The problem with manuals is they embed thoughts and images in minds and then when folks get in a scrap in places and ways the manual did not depict (or often could not predict...), they simply don't know what to do. Training -- repetitive conduct of combat like activities in different settings and against differing opponents is the answer, manuals are not. Tha training should be harder, more diifcult and more complex than is most combat, then combat will be easy. right now because the training is marginal, combat is more difficult than it should be.
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It's as though the old way to fight -- how to move around and fight -- was rescinded and replaced with oversimplified talking points.
I disagree. Strongly. That old way to fight got people killed and we've gotten a bit smarter, we should not regress, we should improve even more. 'METT-TC' and 'depends on the situation' are not talking points, they are very real concerns. An even greater concern is too rigid adherence to doctrine...
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We need a new way of doing it by the numbers. A new manual could be like DePuy's basic tactical formations in the old FM 100-5, but much more detailed.
Scary thought. You cannot fight by the numbers. Period.
That "by the numbers rationale" is predicated on the dumb enlisted swine model. It may be needed for mobilization but it is absolutely wrong for a supposed professional force.
Not to mention that100-5 was a very flawed document...
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Please forgive me -- I'm merely a broken-down old cannon-cocker.
No forgiveness required. As Brother Dave Gardner used to say, "Dear Hearts, you can't tell someone if they haven't never..." :D
Sadly, even some who have and should know better still produce flawed items. Witness DePuy who did a lot of good, really. He also did some harm...
As Fuchs said:
""Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.""