Been going on for years, Rokman
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ROKMAN
... If that is the case then why are some Marine squad leaders in Iraq are splitting their squads into two teams of 6 Marines each?
. . .
One of my best Marine Platoon Sergeants told me he did it on Okinawa because he had no faith in his youngest Team Leader. I saw people who had done that in Korea, generally for the same reason. I also saw those who refused to do it and either made the weak guy perform or made him a BAR man and put a sharp Private in as the Team Leader.
The latter would seem to me to be the better solution from the standpoint of accountability and leader selection and training. The former will work; the Squad Leader has -- or should have -- the flexibility to organize within reason the way he wishes.
I also saw a guy in Korea who had three fire teams; one with a really good shooter and one BAR; one with two BARs. Those two were his split base of fire. The third Fire Team was the assault element of five Riflemen (including one de jure Team Leader as a Snuffy) under his best Corporal. His rationale was that accurate and automatic fire kept the bad guys down and the BAR Men weren't as mobile and flexible as riflemen. He went where he thought he needed to be at the time.
Wouldn't have done it that way myself but whatever works.
I see where this is heading...
...and Norfolk and others are hitting it on the head. Regardless of a whether one has a 9-man, 11-man, or 13-man squad, the SL will have more in the way of plays (instead of up the middle) when he has good-caliber training.
Once you couple training with the appropriate number of exercises and scenarios, the SL can recognize the pattern of what he sees before him, or at least what he is about to face, then task organize appropriately before he crosses the line of departure.
This business of C2 over a large squad can be an easily managed tasked considering the current range of comm sets available to a SL and his TLs. I think we've satisfactorily moved out of the experimentation stage with sets like the Marconi Personal Role Radio and it is being employed with great effect on the battlefield. It takes comm discipline, no doubt, but I think on the whole a SL can control a patrol, attack, and defense with greater ease.
In my humble analysis, the A76 radio carried by Rhodesian teams went a long way towards reducing fratricide because the commander in the circling K-Car had contact with the moving parts on the ground below, and those parts could talk between themselves.
The Marine Corps just recently broke out of the hamstringing effect from having only 1 VHF radio at the platoon level around the 2002-2003 timeframe. Anyone remember the piece of #### PRC-68? Now I can watch a scout section leader (running four 3-4 man teams) maneuver from a movement to contact formation and transition into a hasty attack without raising his voice save to control the rate of fire of the SBF's weapons. We were relegated to the use of hand-held ground or aerial pyrotechnic signals, whistles, etc., back in the day, so yes, squad level fire and maneuver was a dangerous proposition.
Perhaps the best way to resolve the winner in this discussion would be to instrument a light infantry squad each from the Army and Marine Corps and run them through a series of experiments. After the first round, shake things up and have the Army squad run through in a 13-man configuration, and the Marine Corps shrinks down to the Army size. Are we going to get any empirical evidence out of it? Most likely not, but I suspect that comparably trained SLs will be able to achieve certain results based on a wide-range of variables that include a little bit training, a bit flexibility to task-organize on the fly, and a bit doctrine.
I need to sit down tonight and finish that second, more lengthy article.
Cannae's are more often due to the incompetence of the Cannae'd,
rather than purely the tactical genius of the Cannae'r. Both Ken and wm are right about this. The PLA Rifle Squad (3 "Cells", with 1 AR and 2 RPGs in the Squad) also tends to favour the double-envelopment (as well as some other similar East Asian Squads); the RPA Squad is very similar (minus one RPG, and with the Squad Leader integrated into one of the teams). But this is usually made possible by the close (often very close) terrain that tends to mask heavy automatic weapons fire from more than one element (much of East Asia is rather tight terrain). Otherwise, the double-envelopment is useful on a cut-off, rather incompetent enemy who has no place to go, and no reasonable prospect of relief.
Rifleman, I first read this article about ten years ago in the Infantry Journal, and this is where I first began to comprehend how a 3-team Squad could operate. The original article had nice illustrations, but the Infantry Journal (along with a whole lot else) was removed from public Internet access a few years ago. The author, B.P. Beardsley, went to NDHQ and then NATO HQ not long after this. Tom asked for this article on the "Who Are the Great Generals?" Thread a few weeks ago, given his Africa background. I find this to be, nevertheless, a fascinating article.
Anyone remembering carrying the PRC-25 (I prefer not to, myself)?
The WWII German Rifle Squad never used Fire Teams or Battle Drill; instead it cultivated the independence of mind and ability to learn of its troops (eveyone trained to think and to assume leadership two levels above their own). The Deutchesheer didn't have the minor-unit tactical problems (or controversies) that other Armies have had all along (barring the PLA and USMC and a couple of others). If we're going to look at the Rifle Squad/Section clearly, we have to start with the human factors, then move on to the organization and the shiny kit.
That does not mean that we will be giving up on a 3-team squad for example; just that it means we have to take a long hard look at the kind of man making up that squad, and what he's expected to do and what he's expected to face - then deal with the rest. Thinking about the "German Way" - amongst others - may be a good way to approach this.
Heh. He did that on purpose...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
wm
...
. . .
As Ken White noted, it is a question of METT-TC (even though Ken left off the C), with everything after Mission (including that pesky Civilian situation) being a very important factor in deciding how to achieve that mission.
. . .
(Sorry for dragging big battles into a discussion of squad tactics, but the principles are the same IMO)
Anyone who thinks a Squad Leader in combat is going to devote much attention to that newly added 'C' is perhaps an optimist... :(
(Aside from the fact that I thought the populace was a part of the 'terrain' ;) )
Remember I'm a Neanderthal. I am very firmly convinced that a lot of todays terminology and acronyms are short sighted, cheesy and unhelpful; unhelpful to the extent they're going to get people killed unnecessarily in rare cases and are going to send very bad messages in many cases.
I agree with you that the principles used in big battles equate to those at Squad (or Platoon) level but the practice is vastly different and one must be very careful not to try conflating the two. Been my observation that such conflation in discussion can lead some to believe that a minor Cannae is possible with a nine man squad... :wry:
You're correct in my view.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rifleman
Ken White,
A curiosity question: if you had to pick just one confict, between WWI and today, to study the rifle squad in combat for lessons learned which one would it be?
I was thinking Korea might provide the broadest range of examples.
Your thoughts, please?
Korea had it all. Full bore conventional war engaging in both defense and offense; in both cases with both very rapid long range attacking elements on both sides and with agonizingly slow frontal attack slogging and including night and day attacks by both forces. There were COIN ops, static warfare and extensive patrolling (both combat and reconnaissance, short and long range). It included raids and prisoner snatch missions, combat outposts, economy of force ops, trench clearing, urban warfare, phib landings, heliborne assualts; the full range of missions.
Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq and other operations all have some of those things but not at the extent, length and intensity that prevailed in Korea. There's also more specialization in VN and today, taking units out of some mission sets.
Far more importantly, there is a very significant difference then and now -- then sending a squad on a totally independent mission and trusting the Squad Leader to make decisions was the norm. I know that by the late 60s for a variety of reasons (mostly very flawed personnel policy) such independence was not acceptable to many in senior positions in the Army.
My perception today is that such independence is actively and strongly discouraged if not explicitly forbidden. That IMO is criminal malfeasance. I cannot in good conscience blame the Bn and below commanders, they grew up in a system that discourages that -- I can and do blame their Bosses who inherited that tendency but fail to see the errors in the approach. Before someone flames me for that and points out that Squads are patrolling in both theater (finally... :wry: ), ask the question; "Would I agree to sending a Squad on a three day mission in the other guys territory out of artillery range and with possibly spotty communication?" If the answer is 'no,' don't flame. :)
It is also tacit acknowledgment that our 'doctrine' is flawed and our training is not adequate. That is really criminal... :mad: