propensity to precariously stack several livestock, baskets of produce, and a family or two upon the most unlikely two wheeled conveyances has always been a sheer source of wonder to me. :D
Printable View
propensity to precariously stack several livestock, baskets of produce, and a family or two upon the most unlikely two wheeled conveyances has always been a sheer source of wonder to me. :D
The answer thus far is NO.
However, I lost patience waiting for my trip and decided to ask the Brits and Yanks involved with bomb data center research at both (locations withheld).
Of the 15 responses, 14 concluded and agreed with the following:
It should be noted (Ted pretty much made this clear already) that none of the respondents considered boats or bicycles as "vehicles" when utilizing the acronym VBIED :DQuote:
The earliest reference of a VBIED was the attempted assassination of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II by Armenian separatists on 21 JUL 1905! 80 keys of explosives were placed in a car and the explosives were timed to go off as the Sultan passed the vehicle during his regular visit to a mosque in Istanbul.
The first VBIED in the UK was on 22 FEB 72 at the Parachute Regiments Officers Mess at Aldershot Barracks. This device was attributed to the Official IRA (OIRA).
As something of an aside, you might also find examples from some of the Chicago gang wars in the 1920s. Not 100% sure on that, but I do have some recollection of such things taking place.
If you exclude fire ships and other such implements, I think you're more likely to find examples of VBIEDs in the terrorist and criminal sphere than you are the purely military one...at least prior to the 1960s.
Regarding the criminal sphere, the targeting tends to be different. A pipe bomb or some other type of explosive device emplaced in a vehicle with the intent to kill a specific occupant(s) is very different from a vehicle stuffed with explosives intended to inflict general death and destruction upon a proximity target, whether fixed, like an adjacent building (or the crowd in a marketplace, etc.) or mobile - i.e. remotely initiated to hit a passing convoy. Criminal emplacement of explosives in automobiles targeting a specific individual has been a tactic almost since the first days of automobile ownership - and continues to be common today. Just my personal bias, but I wouldn't count that as a true VBIED - Guido wasn't killed by a VBIED, he was killed by a pipe bomb placed under the seat of his car.
Bill,
You raise some interesting versions that now (with Ted's clarification) make me wonder how we could actually classify the VBIED or predate it while wondering just exactly when the acronym actually came to be :o
If the acronym came out in say 75, and what occurred before and after that date (just happens to) meet the current criteria for a VBIED, then, it must be a VBIED by definition ?
:D
Moderator's Note
Thread closed a sthere is new, main thread 'IEDs: the home-made bombs that changed modern war': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16303
TALIBAN MAKE UNDETECTABLE BOMBS OUT OF WOOD
By Andrew Johnson
Sunday, 10 January 2010
The Taliban's IEDs killed 48 British troops last year Taliban fighters have developed a deadly new generation of their most lethal weapon, the improvised explosive device, or IED, which is almost undetectable because it has no metal or electronic parts, military experts said last week.
IEDs have proved the Taliban's most deadly weapon: three out of five coalition troops killed last year in Afghanistan were victims of the bombs. At least 48 of the 108 British fatalities were caused by IEDs.
Chris Hunter, a former bomb disposal expert who served in Iraq and now runs his own consultancy said the new weapons were being manufactured from wood in Pakistan.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...d-1863353.html
Just to echo Ken's response, the means to clear ATs are the very same as they were in WWII.
Mechanical demining is nothing fast, but it is effective. It also turns a good 20 inches of top soil - great for agriculture ;)
I try to stay abreast of the operation tempo and tactics in afghanistan but its hard for a person out of the military loop to know exactly what empolyments troops use. It seems that so many of our troops are killed by IED, rolling around in humvees.
Is there a lack of heliborne resources in the stan to carry out our missions ? I realize COIN involves being among the people but Im wondering if more casualties could be avoided by more use of helo's. I read an article by a south african about defeating the land mine and the decision to forgo as much as possible the use of convoys and instead use helicopters.
Also as a tracking, blocking and kill factor , it seems that airborne warefare would provide a quicker reaction and safer transport into a contact. Perhaps, this has been discussed and the reasons why its not being done as much but I'd like some professional opinions on this.
It seems that one would be trading IED attacks for RPG and AA attacks, with the latter offering up juicier headlines (fewer incidents, but more killed per incident). It would also further remove Soldiers from the operating environment, as if sealing them off inside MRAPs had not done this already.
The focus on avoiding IED strikes seems similar to the debate over airport security. If the bomber is at the airport, then something is wrong, regardless of what he faces in the screening line. Likewise the focus on avoiding attacks during movement (whether IEDs against wheeled convoys, AA attacks against aircraft, or ambushes at LZs) should be shifted to stopping them from occurring.
Air Assault (or Airborne or Airmobile) isn't the solution to Iraq or Afghanistan. Vertical envelopment has its place, of course. But for all the tradeoffs of vulnerability, the decision isn't just about RPGs vs. IED. It has to come down to the purpose of the mission. To connect with IPs and win some old-fashioned hearts and minds, you need to really see people and come into contact with them, not just drop in and lift out of the neighborhood. Aircraft can't linger to form alliances...grunts have historically been the most successful at that, and IMHO, that is what we need to do to begin working with locals and gain their respect.
Close combat with clearly defined enemy forces demands and rewards speed, power and audacity. Unfortunately, our enemy today is like the VC two generations ago...extremely difficult to distinguish from the IPs.
This was precisely what we did during Operation KHANJAR in July of last year. So to answer your question, when you look at that operation, along with other ops like ANACONDA, we have the ability to project combat power through vertical envelopment, but the question comes up concerning why we would want to do so. The reasons are often very specific and attuned to the situation at hand.Quote:
I try to stay abreast of the operation tempo and tactics in afghanistan but its hard for a person out of the military loop to know exactly what empolyments troops use. It seems that so many of our troops are killed by IED, rolling around in humvees.
Is there a lack of heliborne resources in the stan to carry out our missions ? I realize COIN involves being among the people but Im wondering if more casualties could be avoided by more use of helo's. I read an article by a south african about defeating the land mine and the decision to forgo as much as possible the use of convoys and instead use helicopters.
This earlier thread highlights some details: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=strike+sword
Heliborne operations are difficult to sustain for a long duration, for a number of reasons. I wish I could post the photo of that mortarman carrying the baseplate and a load of other gear he shouldn't have. That highlights what happens when we try vertical envelopment but fail to fight light enough.
ETA: Just found it!
http://www.captainsjournal.com/wp-co...khanjar_ii.jpg
150 pounds, easily, on that kid's back. Feeling the pain.
Tankersteve
Very much so. And the heat. And the sweat. Light infantry indeed.
Most of the points have been already adressed. A well armored vehicle is a (very) important element but only the last line of defense against IEDs. The COIN operations in Rhodesia and current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that well designed armored vehicles play a very important part in troop survivability, but have also important drawbacks (greatly increased fuel consumption, reduced mobility, lesser situational awareness). Finding the right mix and balance as well as adjusting it in time and space is the great difficulty, as war is no science but art.
Firn
Other reasons why we travel on the ground:
We are, in fact, short of helicopters in Afghanistan. More are being sent, or so I glean from open sources, but we lack the resources to move many troops around by air. Moreover, any heliborne insertion results in a continuing committment of aircraft to logistically support the inserted force. Our allies are especially short of helicopters - I know it is something of a national scandal in the UK.
Also, the environment in Afghanistan makes employment of helicopters problematical in many areas due to climate and elevation.
Thanks for the input. I know that COIN requires sustained presence on the battlefield. I was really curious on the supply of helo's in the area. Its just so frustrating to see a good many men die without confronting the enemy and just get whacked by a roadside bomb.
It does make sense that in being on the ground and clearing, holding and building will yield intelligence on who and where the ambushes take place. Gary Schroen in his book, first in in 2005 decried our resource allocation to Iraq and pretty much predicted what would happen in afghanistan. Little resources people and machines and believing the terrs have departed the region only to come back in droves. Again, thanks for clarifying some issues. I aint been there so its hard to understand some methods and why.
If you review some possible lessons from Vietnam, you find that potential LZs are also quite susceptible to IED-type activities (the NV/NVA used to booby-trap LZs with unexploded bombs or shells, Chinese claymore copies in trees, and so on). So it doesn't necessarily get you around the issue, and in fact it can make it more complicated (downed birds and all that).
Anecdotal experience...
In 2005, we avoided and countered the IED threat by emplacing fire teams in covert positions throughout the AO. They were inserted usually at night, by way of dismounted patrols from our patrol base. Once curfew was lifted, the IED emplacers would come out. Anyone seen emplacing an IED was killed on sight. Suddenly, people were less enthusiastic about emplacing IEDs. The psychological impact was significant upon potential adversaries (most said, "screw that") and upon the populace (when lots of IED emplacers are shot in the chest from a single gunshot that comes out of nowhere - at least once per day - there is a sense that the Americans are now in control of security and the insurgents are dead men walking). Fewer IEDs improved our mobility, which made it easier to emplace fire teams in a wider variety of positions and continue to spread paranoia among our adversaries and reassurance among the populace.
And there's a parallel with the value of vertical envelopment. In Vietnam, the shock value of airmobile tactics was compromised by two factors: telegraphing the arrival sites and times, and essentially utilizing the Hueys as aerial taxis to bring troops in and then have them simply walk around on random search-and-destroy missions that were based on a feeling that the enemy would be where we land -- classic military projection of your wishful thinking onto an enemy's likely decisions -- and a plausible explanation for why we were less effective than we could have been. We took a lot of casualties on LZs to booby traps (that's how I got mine) and snipers.