Criminalizing Political Regimes
Just a few questions to perhaps get some discussion going:
I was reading through General van Riper's interview concerning Iraq (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/wartech/nature.html) where he stated that a contributing factor to the initiation of the insurgency was the absence of a former surrender. Then I considered why that occurred, whether it was an intentional decision or simply did not enter into the computation. Formal agreements of any kind grant rights to the opposing party and a recognition, at least in some part, to their legitimacy. Part of Israel's problem in making peace in the Palestinian territories, for example, has been the inability to find a counterpart it considers legitimate with which to make peace.
However, I think the difference with Iraq is its recognition as a formal state. Nevertheless, we failed in somehow producing an Iraqi leader from the previous regime with which to make peace. Did our criminalization of the Iraqi regime inhibit us from doing so? Did that failure, even in some small measure, contribute to the instability of Iraq? Are criminalized states less likely to make peace knowing the consequences for its leadership? Does the erosion of political sovereignty as a result of the pervasiveness Western norms (read: criminalization of non-Western regimes) contribute to the generation of small wars?
Two questions on your questions:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
...Part of Israel's problem in making peace in the Palestinian territories, for example, has been the inability to find a counterpart it considers legitimate with which to make peace.
One Israel considers legitimate or one that Israel is confident actually has effective control of the population and any agreement will thus be honored?
Quote:
...Does the erosion of political sovereignty as a result of the pervasiveness Western norms (read: criminalization of non-Western regimes) contribute to the generation of small wars?
I'm unsure why you say that political sovereignty erodes as a result of the pervasiveness of western norms? I'd also suggest that your "read: criminalization of non-Western regimes" linkage does not seem to apply universally.
As an aside, I disagree with Paul Van Riper and would suggest that in the case of Iraq, the contributing factor to the initiation of the insurgency was not the absence of a formal surrender but rather the fact that the Iraqis did not believe they had been defeated -- not the same thing at all.
Saddam told us up front what he was going to do; release all prisoners, arm the populace, set loose the Miliitias, the whole bit -- we totally ignored him and those problems. Iraq was a significant intel failure and a case of massive military overconfidence (and post operation / insurgency lack of training and preparedness) on our part. The insurgency was programmed, we blew it; the only effective preemption would have entailed a total, massive defeat of the Iraqis and much waste to the countryside -- not a good idea in this era.
As opposed to western norms, a formal document in the ME means little and I seriously doubt the existence of one would have changed anything.
At the risk of incurring rabbit rage, ...
I'd suggest that there is more agreement between Old Marine 1 and Old Marine 2 than Old Marine 2 seems to think:
Quote:
from Van Riper
If you have a war that doesn't come to a very definitive conclusion, there are people who don't believe they've been defeated. One thing that we saw in this war, there was no surrender. There was no point in time where someone in authority said, "The government of Iraq surrenders to the Coalition forces."
....
There were sufficient forces to capture Baghdad. But what we call follow-up forces—exploitation forces and reserves—were not available. Imagine on the day that we seized Baghdad, if we had follow-up armed forces, exploitation forces, continue up into what we now know as the Sunni Triangle, go into Tikrit, instead of having that long lag time. If there had been a lot of so-called boots on the ground at the beginning, you might have convinced a lot of people that the war was over at that time.
Quote:
from KW
As an aside, I disagree with Paul Van Riper and would suggest that in the case of Iraq, the contributing factor to the initiation of the insurgency was not the absence of a formal surrender but rather the fact that the Iraqis did not believe they had been defeated -- not the same thing at all
Grumpy Old Men without Ann-Margaret ?
The only reason I am getting into this is the I Law question of who gives a surrender when the recognized government has MIRVed in all directions, including spider holes. Have to look at Max Soreson's Manual and see if there is an answer.
The rest of this discussion (alternative military history) is outside my usual territory; except for the following learned maxim:
what coulda, shoulda happened = NOT necessarily = what woulda happened.
credit: White's Encyclopedia.
As long as the Rabbit doesn't die...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
I'd suggest that there is more agreement between Old Marine 1 and Old Marine 2 than Old Marine 2 seems to think:
Grumpy Old Men without Ann-Margaret ?
Don't know about Paul, who I knew in Viet Nam when he was a Captain advising the VNMC Battalion next door to the VN Abn Battalion I was an Advisor with but I have an Ann Margaret look alike... :D
I'll give it him on Rank but I was in the Corps before he was. :eek: and I respectfully agree with him on one point; as you say, we're in close to agreement on this: "If you have a war that doesn't come to a very definitive conclusion, there are people who don't believe they've been defeated." However, I still disagree with him on two points:
"One thing that we saw in this war, there was no surrender. There was no point in time where someone in authority said, "The government of Iraq surrenders to the Coalition forces."
Since the only guvmint, Saddam, had decreed a fight after the fight, that was never going to happen. Further:
"If there had been a lot of so-called boots on the ground at the beginning, you might have convinced a lot of people that the war was over at that time."
I strongly doubt greater numbers would have made much difference; more death and destruction might -- note the 'might,' even that would've been no guarantee -- have done so but no numbers we could have produced lacking a draft would have made much difference. LTG Van Riper has forgotten that over a million allied troops in Viet Nam couldn't control a nation a fourth the size and half population of Iraq... ;)
Quote:
The rest of this discussion (alternative military history) is outside my usual territory; except for the following learned maxim:
what coulda, shoulda happened = NOT necessarily = what woulda happened.
credit: White's Encyclopedia.
So let it be written, so let it be said... :wry:
(aka - reality bites)
The death and destruction works on will of the populace
as a whole; I'm not advocating it; as I said, can't do that nowadays (I think there's a policy-maker message in that...). Lacking that in future operations, the potential for an insurgency is exacerbated. In the case of Iraq, had we been harder going in it might have deterred some but since that insurgency was the plan, don't think it would've changed that much.
That said, I agree with you that not using the Iraqi Army and Police was dumb -- though it could've been mildly problematic as well. I think it would've done more good than harm.
Either way, OUR not stopping the looting was a really poor move on our part. In fairness to the Troops (from Wallace down), Armies that have not trained for things shouldn't be expected to do them. That's why I fault the Army's senior leadership from 1975-2001 for allowing that omission in doctrine and training despite numerous protests from within and many signs that occupation, FID and COIN would be needed skills.
