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As a field grade officer in Army ILE, we often have conversations about what the future budgets of DoD, and particularly the Army, will look like. With ongoing operations throughout the world, but a huge deficit at home, what should DoD's share of the cut be (if any)? Is it worthwhile to continue expensive development programs such as GCV and JLTV? Would now be the time to take an operational pause in these programs until we have a clearer requirement?
1st step: Remind people that the U.S. was not invaded by red, yellow or brown people in 2000 and that more military spending would not have averted 9/11.
Then you may be able to discuss an inflation-adjusted year 2000 DoD budget.
That would be about $ 400 bn for DoD.
Might even be able to cut it a bit. DoD is doing a lot of things that are really not it's business.
A part of that problem is caused by the arcane US budget process -- the more you 'do' and the more people you have, the more money you get. That's unwise and bigger is rarely better but it's gong to be extremely difficult to change. As I'm sure MattJ can recount, Congress does like its funding perks... :rolleyes:
That's because I already toned down, taking the audience into account.Quote:
That's a fair figure.
$ 400 billion is a figure that's realistic without a fundamental change in expectations (something that I would advice strongly).
How about their job? Demand a coherent defense policy that would get us out of other people's civil wars having nothing to do with our national interests, break the DoD's stranglehold on our foreign policy goals, and stop catering to lost Central Asian/Arab causes which are sinking our own economy.
But since that won't happen any time soon, how about just slashing DoD's budget and transferring it all to State and the Peace Corps? If they won't deal with the DoD's worldwide roles and missions like responsible adults, they should at least take the easy way out and stop writing the checks for irrelevant DoD missions and wars.
If you're talking about Congress, look bigger. Simply looking at cutting specific weapons programs while we waste upwards of $10B a year in AFG on ANSF funding is putting the cart before the horse. Get a strategy, know what your worldwide interests are, and pull out of all the unnecessary rest. That'll define what programs to fund and what to build to.
While I agree that we have to look at much more strategic issues to decide a grand funding scheme, I do wonder what issues big Army should take a hard look at in this fiscal environment - more on the programatic side than the strategic side. Despite the scrutiny that Congress gives our programs, it is very difficult to cancel anything due to the aggressive lobbying efforts of the defense industry. Many of our hardware development efforts have become 'jobs programs' for each state or district, and industry has been smart in linking each program with a number of jobs - also important in this economy.
Matt,Quote:
Originally Posted by MattJ
Members of Congress should do what they always do: keeping their constituents happy. Constituents express their happiness by (re-)electing the politicians they think will be most successful at that. Members of Congress express their willingness to keep their constituents happy by constantly adjusting their set of issue positions so as to benefit from "a daily majority" (see Dick Morris "The New Prince: Macchiavelli Updated for the Twenty First Century").
In the case of the DoD budget, this means cutting it without endangering soldiers in the field and jobs in their constituency. Combining both requirements is not always easy. Cutting the F22 program does not endanger any soldier, but it endangers 25000 jobs.
Therefore, the question is not what Members of Congress should do, but what the defence industry should do. The defence industry should make the politicians' job easy by focusing their production and their lobbying on weapon systems that matter for today's conflicts. In stead of putting their efforts in expensive development programs to win the fight on the (yet to materialize) near-peer competitor, they should focus on today's threats.
So, to answer your questions: NO, it is not worthwhile to continue expensive development programs such as GCV and JLTV. And YES, it would now be the time to take an operational pause in these programs until we have a clearer requirement. However, that initiative should not only come from Congress, but also from the lobbyists influencing its members.
I suspect that would be a more effective way to achieve U.S. national security interests. But as it entails Congressmen and Senators loosing defense contractor-related lobbyist contributions from their campaigns as well as defense contractor-related jobs from their districts I seriously doubt it will happen. Sadly.Quote:
Originally Posted by kotkinjs1
So where does the responsibility start, and who needs to start scaling back on this spending? Is it really a lobbyist's fault for for doing their job and representing industry? I don't really think it is. I think there is a shared blame on both the service that requested the budget and the Congress that approved (with earmarks added). While a Member of Congress does have a responsibility to represent their constituents, I think they also have a higher responsibility to ensure that their constituents' tax money is well spent and that their constituents in uniform have what they need. Almost every Urgent Operational Needs statement that gets submitted from theater (usually a valid request) turns into a team of Congress and Industry pushing the service to make that small program into a long term program of record. Once these programs get into the base budget, they are almost locked in forever.
I give great credit to GEN Chiarelli for taking a hard look at redundant programs and programs that aren't clearly lined up with requirements, but I think the effort needs to expand. It was good to see the Army stand firm (as of now) on their decision to not buy anymore HMMWVs - at least until they figure out the long term light tactical vehicle requirements. I think it would be helpful to see that scrutiny on a few more programs.
Isn’t that the Nuremberg Defense? :DQuote:
Is it really a lobbyist's fault for for doing their job and representing industry?
I agree completely. Unfortunately thinking like that makes it harder to get and keep an elected position in the federal government.*Quote:
While a Member of Congress does have a responsibility to represent their constituents, I think they also have a higher responsibility to ensure that their constituents' tax money is well spent and that their constituents in uniform have what they need.
*I don’t want to use that as an excuse to be cynical about the U.S. Government or democracy more broadly. I really do believe that politicians and voters could be better people and that aspects of the American political system could be tweaked.
Matt,Quote:
Originally Posted by MattJ
I think that hard look should become even harder. For a sharp analysis on the subject: see Mr Robert Gates:
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/spee...?speechid=1369Quote:
Of course, after September 11th, some things did change. The base defense budget – not counting spending for the wars – increased by some 70 percent over the next eight years. During this period there were important changes in the way U.S. forces were organized, based and deployed, and investments were made in new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles. However, when all was said and done, the way the Pentagon selected, evaluated, developed, and paid for major new weapons systems and equipment did not fundamentally change – even after September 11th.
Indeed, the kinds of equipment, programs, and capabilities needed to protect our troops and defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not the highest priority of much of the Defense Department, even after several years of war.
I learned about this lack of bureaucratic priority for the wars we are in the hard way – during my first few months on the job as the Iraq surge was getting underway. The challenges I faced in getting what our troops needed in the field stood in stark contrast to the support provided conventional modernization programs – weapons designed to fight other modern armies, navies, and air forces – that had been in the pipeline for many years and had acquired a loyal and enthusiastic following in the Pentagon, in the Congress, and in industry. The most pressing needs of today’s warfighter – on the battlefield, in the hospital, or at home – simply lacked place and power at the table when priorities were being set and long-term budget decisions were being made.
So the most important shift in President Obama’s first defense budget was to increase and institutionalize funding for programs that directly support those fighting America’s wars and their families. Those initiatives included more helicopter support, air lift, armored vehicles, personnel protection equipment, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, we also increased funding for programs that provide long-term support to military families and treatment for the signature wounds of this conflict – such as traumatic brain injury and post traumatic stress.
But, while the world of terrorists and other violent extremists – of insurgents and IEDs – is with us for the long haul, we also recognize that another world has emerged. Growing numbers of countries and groups are employing the latest and increasingly accessible technologies to put the United States at risk in disruptive and unpredictable ways.
Other large nations – known in Pentagon lingo as “near-peers” – are modernizing their militaries in ways that could, over time, pose a challenge to the United States. In some cases, their programs take the form of traditional weapons systems such as more advanced fighter aircraft, missiles, and submarines.
But other nations have learned from the experience of Saddam Hussein’s military in the first and second Gulf wars – that it is ill-advised, if not suicidal, to fight a conventional war head-to-head against the United States: fighter-to-fighter, ship-to-ship, tank-to-tank. They also learned from a bankrupted Soviet Union not to try to outspend us or match our overall capabilities. Instead, they are developing asymmetric means that take advantage of new technologies – and our vulnerabilities – to disrupt our lines of communication and our freedom of movement, to deny us access, and to narrow our military options and strategic choices.
At the same time, insurgents or militias are acquiring or seeking precision weapons, sophisticated communications, cyber capabilities, and even weapons of mass destruction. The Lebanese extremist group Hezbollah currently has more rockets and high-end munitions – many quite sophisticated and accurate – than all but a handful of countries.
In sum, the security challenges we now face, and will in the future, have changed, and our thinking must likewise change. The old paradigm of looking at potential conflict as either regular or irregular war, conventional or unconventional, high end or low – is no longer relevant. And as a result, the Defense Department needs to think about and prepare for war in a profoundly different way than what we have been accustomed to throughout the better part of the last century.
What is needed is a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. As a result, we must change the way we think and the way we plan – and fundamentally reform – the way the Pentagon does business and buys weapons. It simply will not do to base our strategy solely on continuing to design and buy – as we have for the last 60 years – only the most technologically advanced versions of weapons to keep up with or stay ahead of another superpower adversary – especially one that imploded nearly a generation ago.
To get there we must break the old habit of adding layer upon layer of cost, complexity, and delay to systems that are so expensive and so elaborate that only a small number can be built, and that are then usable only in a narrow range of low-probability scenarios.
We must also get control of what is called “requirements creep” – where more features and capabilities are added to a given piece of equipment, often to the point of absurdity. The most flamboyant example of this phenomenon is the new presidential helicopter – what President Obama referred to as defense procurement “run amok.” Once the analysis and requirements were done, we ended up with a helicopter that cost nearly half a billion dollars each and enabled the president to, among other things, cook dinner while in flight under nuclear attack.
We also had to take a hard look at a number of weapons programs that were grotesquely over budget, were having major performance problems, were reliant on unproven technology, or were becoming increasingly detached from real world scenarios – as if September 11th and the wars that followed had never happened.
Those of you with experience in the technology or manufacturing sectors have at some point probably faced some combination of these challenges in your own businesses. But in the defense arena, we faced an additional, usually insurmountable obstacle to bring rationality to budget and acquisition decisions. Major weapons programs, irrespective of their problems or performance, have a habit of continuing long after they are wanted or needed, recalling Ronald Reagan’s old joke that a government program represents the closest thing we’ll ever see to eternal life on this earth..
Here's an overview over the budget:
http://www.wallstats.com/deathandtaxes/
For starters, I consider most of the Navy big ticket programs a bad idea or at least partial failures.
It shouldn't be too hard to find waste in the DoD budget - it's certainly much harder to cut it. An old rule of thumb is that entering budget wars in Pentagon creates many enemies (either way), and that's just not good for those who want to develop their career further.
Unfortunately it often starts at the lowest level - the old end of fiscal year scramble to spend every last penny so that you can justify the budget request for next year - starting way down at the company level. I was always intrigued by the logic of that process, but will admit that I was always guilty of playing along. While I liked to think that I budgeted wisely for the year, I wasn't too proud to try and get a few extra pieces of equipment for my Soldiers - especially if it was going to be spent by someone else (faulty logic, but justification enough at the time to do it). I am cognizant of the faults of this process and am still guilty; the compounding effort all the way up the chain is obviously much worse. A million here, a million there - soon you're talking about real money...
As for big Army - I am hopeful (probably more than I should be) about the new effort to 'buy less, more often', as opposed to investing fully in the next greatest thing that is going to be able to do everything for every conflict (i.e. FCS). Spreading your eggs around to different baskets seems more logical during a time that you can't quite come to a consensus on what future conflicts will look like. Hopefully that will incentivize industry and the Pentagon to keep coming up with good ideas since there will be multiple chances to win contracts instead of having to put everything into the one huge program. I also hope that will reduce the amount of GAO protests that industry files. Small contracts awarded more often will incentivize industry to play nice and move on to the next chance to win some of the taxpayers' hard earned money.