I originally put this on the SWJ Blog under the debate about FM 3-0 - Revolution or Evolution - looks like a fit here under "theory" - Best Rob
Revolution vs. Evolution
We often try to classify events in military affairs across the DOTLMPF spectrum in terms of “evolution” or “revolution”, but the results are often disputed, why is that? It may be worth considering the two classifications as terms, the ways in which we normally employ them, and their historical uses in order facilitate discussions on the matter.
Evolution has a biological feel to it. For me, it immediately brings to mind Charles Darwin & the Origin of Species. Evolution also has the mark of change over time, a kind of gradual adaptation of something to the environment (or changes within the environment) which allows it to succeed where others may not. Its presence is probably not immediately felt, and the exact causal nature is often blurred by the non-linear nature of its change. Certainly we have some cases where a species makes an evolutionary leap in a great enough magnitude, and in a manner that seems absent from other causal relationships that we think we can attribute it to specific events, but I think this is the exception and not the rule. Most evolution would seem more “geologic” on its time scale to us with our linear framing of time, seasonal rotations and relatively short life (and professional and political life) spans.
Revolution has a political feel to it. It goes to the notion of “upset” by the group of the accepted status quo. It plays to the idea of abrupt change, “the new sheriff in town” to the concept of youthful values taking hold in a “cultural revolution”. It has also been used in a business sense, “this product will revolutionize “X” – which is often reduced – either when its introduction is tempered by other less malleable environmental factors, or over time as the environment adapts and the product is reduced to evolving in conjunction with its environment. It would seem that while an act or event may be seen as revolutionary, it must also be considered within the greater context of its environment.
Compare the verb forms of the two words: “to revolt” vs. “to evolve”. The former seems very active, while the latter seems more passive. Revolution raises images of abrupt and often violent change to something, while evolution seems far less risky, almost congruent with events. I think evolution gets to the concept of the golden mean – the idea that by maintaining balance and consistency, you don’t get it “too far” wrong so fast you can’t recover from it – or risk that you make change at such a pace that you inadvertently break things unknowingly that played an important but unpublicized role; but you also probably don’t get them too far right either – meaning the optimal solution would be reached in optimal time. There are advantages and disadvantages to both I think.
Consider the historical ideas of revolution and evolution where policy objectives have called for the use of military force to achieve them, its hard to make sense of them if isolated from the broader themes in History.
Would the “American Revolution” make sense divorced from the context of Neo-Classicism & the philosophy of Hume, Locke, Smith and others, the literature of Swift, or the science of Newton? What foundations did the Founding Fathers draw upon for the rationale for a new form of government? What is the political context of the use of military force by the American Colonies to achieve independence from England?
What about the Civil War, WWI, WWII and other “large” wars that have long standing significance on our historical self-image? What about the Small Wars: the Banana Wars, our involvement in the Philippines, Punitive expeditions – what is their legacy and why? What about the ones not so easy to classify such as Korea and Vietnam? How do these wars look divorced of their political context? How does the course of military affairs look different under the context of its use to achieve the respective political objectives? While our use of military force may be more broad along the “small wars” spectrum, how do you weigh it against the deeper channels of use of military force in “big wars”? Does the political objective (real or perceived) define the classification of the use of military force from small to big, or is it the size of the sacrifice? Do the two go hand in hand?
How about 9/11? How does 9/11 differ from say Pearl Harbor? What was it about the Japanese and Nazi Germany that galvanized the United States populace and made them largely unswerving in the war’s prosecution? We often point to the promotion of many a new WWII general and the dismissal of many others – what made that possible – there had to be a political context to it. While consideration of the inter-war period generally points toward an evolution (see Murray & Millet’s Military Innovation in the Inter-War Period) of military affairs – the political event of replacing a chunk of the General Officer corps could be seen as revolutionary.
Consider the Clausewitzian observation that War Is Never an Isolated Act (section 7, Ch. 1, Book 1 – Howard & Paret ed.), “War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread instantaneously. Each side can therefore gauge the other by large extent by what he is and does, instead of judging him by what he, strictly speaking, ought to be or do.” Later in Section 23, Clausewitz considers the evolutionary nature of the policy objective in relation to the means which are available to carry it through, “If we keep in mind that war springs from some political, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply the political objective is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means (Rob’s note- I think he means the use of war and the consequences and non-linear effects that accompany it as a chosen means to achieve the political objective), a process that can radically change it; yet the political aim must remain the first consideration.”
I chose these two pieces from “On War” because they offer some insight into how military affairs change. If you consider the political context of change – which some event creates a policy objective, or emphasizes it because enmity (political reason in a pragmatic sense – or interest) is overrun by passion (the domestic call for action due to fear, honor ref. Thucydides) it is still constrained by the lack of commensurate change in the realm of military affairs – the DOTMLPF arena. So while policy might call for strategic options, and may broaden the range of what is suitable the strategy itself must be feasible based on the means and ways available. In this model, military affairs must evolve to meet its new environment.
This takes you down the path of accepting risk in terms of understanding the changes in the environment – are they both broad and deep so as to be enduring and on a scale that requires large scale change, or does it only appear to be broad and is actually shallow so as to be temporary and potentially a diversion from the more pressing threats. Certainly, this is a question we see theorists, planners and leaders wrestling with – how many F-22s, CBGs, submarines or BCTs? How much GPF (General Purpose Forces) and how much specialization? How much do we turn the rest of our DOTMLPF gears to produce evolutionary change that matches our perception of the environment?
These last two questions are also subjective, because the answers are not so clear cut as they might seem – technology and a professional volunteer military have changed perceptions about the requirements for certain tasks, and how much additional investment is justified.
I think although the important ideas we’ve come upon may seem revolutionary in scope and potential, the actual implementation of these ideas will be evolutionary. First I’d say from a broad historical perspective, conditions, along with problems and solutions may have called for similar revolutions/evolutions not only in our own military past, but within the greater human military history. I’d add that what may be unique is the context of where we are along our own political development and the consequences (could be good, could be not so good) of the adaptation of these ideas in the long run – the only thing certain in my opinion is that where there is political interaction there are degrees of instability and there is change. Second, because of the nature of change – and the resistance to it (the fear of deviation fro the golden mean due to the real possibility of getting it too far wrong), change will evolutionary where we have the ability to make it so – meaning that divorced from irresistible outside stimuli- there is what the Prussian referred to a “natural tendency toward moderation”.
Best Regards, Rob
