This thread has been the most important one for me since joining the SWC, from a practical aspect. I am about to put my moderator and contributor effort on hiatus due to my immediate OEF deploy, but I'll try to circle back around to this thread and provide feedback if this analytical framework actually bears any fruit. Stay frosty guys...
Good luck and stay safe, SlapQuote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
First, JCustis- good luck downrange brother. As time allows from the day-to-day business of doing the good work, let us know what your thinking in terms of theory and practice.
Second, I meant to address this question a while ago. If I'm successfull, hopefully, I'll encompass it in my next series of essays, but for now, here's an attempt in this thread.
No. Shape is a separate phase. In reality, the collective "we" does a poor job of shaping. Remember, in a denied area of sanctuary, we do not know what is going on. Doctrinally, we have many terms to describe this process- IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield), Reconnaissance, and Survellaince.Quote:
Originally Posted by Infanteer
Ultimately, we're just trying to figure out what we know and what we don't know. Throughout this phase, which remains simultaneous in later efforts, we seek to answer:
What do we think we know? What is actually going on? Who is fighting whom? Who is the enemy? What does the enemy think they know? What does the enemy want? What do the people need? What is the enemy's weakness? What are we missing here?
One way of approaching these answers to define facts and assumptions for MDMP is the following:
SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT
1. Prepare a General Area Survey (HTTs, past opsums, past intsums, past data, current physical and human terrain).
2. Talk to the stakeholders past, present, and future.
3. Develop a Hypothesis on the problem definition.
4. Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance to test hypothesis.
5. Based on the collection of evidence (R&S), define your environment.
6. Develop your plan.
7. Conduct influence operations (propaganda, deception, and disruption operations) to set the conditions for clearance.
v/r
Mike
Maybe I'm just guilty of applying Occam's Razor too severely, but that just seems to fit into the "Clear" for me - you gotta know what you're clearing out first. I say this as I've seen "Define" added to the "COIN phase-orama-looks-real-good-on-a-slide" acronym as something you do before you "Shape" and "Clear".Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
I'm more of a KISS principle guy and all of this detracts from the simplicity of removing an overt insurgent presence from an area, protecting it against a relapse, and then building local capacity to deal with future threats and subversion. Clear, Hold and Build represents that to me; someone said on these forums that we get too stuck in phases and don't recognize these activities as "indicators of what my enemy is doing" but instead stick to them as some arbitrary milestone to victory(TM).
Defining and shaping are implied tasks of the whole fight - something you should be doing at all times of the small wars fight. The enemy is going to change, especially after you move forces into an area, attack his network, and start attacking his legitimacy in the eyes of the locals.
...as well, the natural way of fighting in Afghanistan makes the whole idea of phases very hard and borderline useless; perhaps a better model that addresses the ebb and flow of the summer fighting season would be more useful. You may be clearing in July what you held and built in February; one should never make assessments on where you're at in this country during the winter.
Infanteer,Quote:
Originally Posted by Infanteer
I believe it was Bob's World that made the comment
I distinctly remember that post and it stuck with me for a bit. I agree or at least can relate to much of what your saying so I don't think our views are too off. I'll attempt to readdress some of your points for clarity.Quote:
"that we get too stuck in phases and don't recognize these activities as "indicators of what my enemy is doing" but instead stick to them as some arbitrary milestone to victory."
Totally agree for an operations order. I've never giving an order that could not be dictacted through radio transmissions. In fact, probably 70% of all orders that I've ever given were on the radio. Clear and concise; however, IMO, design and the orders process is different. When we are intellectually lazy, then we come up with stupid soundbites like "speed kills" that minimize the greater challenges that we will face. During the problem solving phase, the questions are broad and complex, and we must tackle difficult courses of action IOT come up with a simple plan.Quote:
I'm more of a KISS principle guy.
I honestly don't care for cool slides that look good. I've been working with presentations that provide "Aha" moments to junior leaders. Things that work.Quote:
I say this as I've seen "Define" added to the "COIN phase-orama-looks-real-good-on-a-slide" acronym as something you do before you "Shape" and "Clear".
If that works for you, then great. From my experience, the US Army oftentimes does not take the time to do detailed and considerable reconnaissance. These implied task become assumed task, and we know what happens when you assume :D. I simply like to use "shape" first because it reminds one to attempt to define and understand the environment before jumping in.Quote:
Defining and shaping are implied tasks of the whole fight.
Agreed as I said in my previous post, "which remains simultaneous in later efforts." You're always doing recon and surveillance IOT to guage the enemy and populace reactions to your actions.Quote:
something you should be doing at all times of the small wars fight.
I hope this clarifies my position to some degree.
v/r
Mike
I totally agree but many -- perhaps too many -- seem to do so...:mad:Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
Change that to:Quote:
From my experience, the US Army oftentimes does not take the time to do detailed and considerable reconnaissance.
'The US Army rarely takes time to do sensible and adequate reconnaissance.'
and I'd agree...True dat. :eek:Quote:
These implied task become assumed task, and we know what happens when you assume :D.
Just a thought -- doing so can often lead one to forego the define portion and therefor try to 'shape' something one doesn't fully understand.Quote:
I simply like to use "shape" first because it reminds one to attempt to define and understand the environment before jumping in.
Simply put one should understand as much about a problem as is possible before one attempts to solve it. The Clausewitzian quote appropriate is "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking." That's macro. One could use the US invasion of Iraq as a prime if large example.
On a micro , tactical and operational, level, our impatience and unwillingness to do thorough reconnaissance does untold damage constantly. That is, regrettably, the US Army way.
Here's an example of how things could be a bit different if we better understood the environment (H/T Gulliver and the Inkspots crew).
In a WSJ letter to the editor, Major Tim Connors explains what he learned in Korengal.
The only way to determine the proper approach (direct or indirect) prior to intervention is through the art of reconnaissance and surveillance.Quote:
I was a member of the first U.S. patrol to enter the Korengal Valley in 2002, so I read Bing West's explanation for our retreat from there with some interest ("The Meaning of the Korengal Retreat," op-ed, April 23). Mr. West concludes that our efforts were thwarted by "Islamic extremism and tribal xenophobia."
The Korengalis I knew were not predisposed to join an extremist fight against Western outsiders. Nor were they naturally inclined to be our friends. Our aggressive tactics, focused exclusively on rooting out Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, drove them into the enemy's camp. A patient approach of relationship-building, relatively minor infrastructure improvements and a firm commitment not to interfere with the wood trade on which the Korengalis rely for their livelihood might have won a steadfast ally. In the long run, the Taliban and al Qaeda, outsiders themselves, have nothing to offer Korengalis but extremism and xenophobia. Perhaps after ending our permanent presence there, we will be better positioned to win that argument.
On an unrelated note, Maj Connors bio is here, and he has written and advised police forces on counterterrorism along the same lines as LAPD's John P. Sullivan and SWJ's own Slapout. He's I guy that I look forward to reading more about.
As usual, good points Ken. I guess that's what we're all trying to figure out- how do we describe "describe?" :DQuote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Best way I've found is rapidly, accurately and totally unemotionally.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
I just haven't figured out how to get all the non-sociopaths to that capability . Yet. ;)
I have already come to learn the validity of this point infanteer makes. Especially in my AO, the nexus of drug trafficking and insurgent activity is so closely knit that the success or failure of the poppy crop (an the fighter salaries involved) can have an effect on whether you are fighting the same knucklehead the next day.Quote:
...as well, the natural way of fighting in Afghanistan makes the whole idea of phases very hard and borderline useless; perhaps a better model that addresses the ebb and flow of the summer fighting season would be more useful. You may be clearing in July what you held and built in February; one should never make assessments on where you're at in this country during the winter.
I would already adjust the model to break the question down to a more individual level, and ask what the individuals on the insurgent side are fighting for, and attempt to define the nature of the problem by analyzing the ideological, financial, and cultural (like any issues of badal) aspects at the individual fighter level. Attacking the problem at the micro level can have some value as the effect accumulates.
Roger,Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
I guess my viewpoint is a bit of a reactionary stance against concepts which seemed to be added to thought models that don't really add much to the model itself but seem to be tacked on because they brief well. Not saying that was your intent and I agree with your points.
I just begin to wonder if concepts lose clarity when more things get stacked onto them like define, shape, enable, etc, etc.
To me, most of the defining and shaping is done during the "Hold" phase - you've sent the bad guys packing (or underground), locals are returning, and a "normal" pattern of life is beginning to occur. This is where you should be able to uncover the grievances of populations and the root causes of local insurgency movements. Little defining and shaping is done when you clear because most locals are keeping their heads down to avoid getting caught in the crossfire.
My 2 cents.
I understand your frustration. It seems like once words or concepts get routinized into a bureaucracy, then they become "talking points" that are overused or take away from the original meaning. For example, Malcolm Gladwell's Tipping Point. Gladwell's study was actually very technical in the phenomena of epidemics, and he chose to describe it in prose. Now, the term is used to describe anything.Quote:
Originally Posted by Infanteer
Moving on, JCustis gives us an interesting example that we can further analysis to find some understanding of what shape and recon are...
This is what I described to my scouts as recon in the human terrain. This transition was fairly simple for my guys when properly translated. I would suggest that this is the first step just to get out and talk to the people. Develop a dual personal and professional relationship, the former hopefully assisting with the latter. However, now one has a host of other considerations that they must learn discretion and discernment when determining whom to trust. Particularly in a denied area, trust and truth are often elusive.Quote:
I would already adjust the model to break the question down to a more individual level, and ask what the individuals on the insurgent side are fighting for, and attempt to define the nature of the problem by analyzing the ideological, financial, and cultural (like any issues of badal) aspects at the individual fighter level. Attacking the problem at the micro level can have some value as the effect accumulates.
-What is this individual's motive or incentive to tell me the truth?
-What does he want from this engagement?
-Why is he willing to talk to me?
When striking up conversation, we must remember or find out what the perception of the locals is of us and their relationships with each other. In my experience, a lot of the "intel" we received was merely rumor or disinformation designed to force our intervention on a competing family, tribe, or town. I'm not sure if this is something that can be taught or if it's just one of those things that you learn through practice and trial and error.
This is a very good point. I think that "clear" is merely a means to getting a foothold in the village. The real work and heavy lifting comes during the "hold" phase, but we have to have some mechanism to determine how or if we should go in at all.Quote:
To me, most of the defining and shaping is done during the "Hold" phase - you've sent the bad guys packing (or underground), locals are returning, and a "normal" pattern of life is beginning to occur. This is where you should be able to uncover the grievances of populations and the root causes of local insurgency movements. Little defining and shaping is done when you clear because most locals are keeping their heads down to avoid getting caught in the crossfire
As Ken White said,
That's why I think we need a definitive phase prior to clear. Through covert tactical reconnaissance (going in at night and observing) or discreet messengers and negotiations, we may find a better way to have access to the village other than driving there and establishing a patrol base. Shape may not be the precise term. Maybe it's simply investigate.Quote:
Just a thought -- doing so can often lead one to forego the define portion and therefor try to 'shape' something one doesn't fully understand.
Ted pushed a find over in the Marjah thread that bears cross-referencing. I'm only half-way through, but page 7 starts an interesting discussion of why young Afghan men are taking up arms. More at the link:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...5&postcount=78
Richard Florida on the topic of economic geography in the March 2009 Atlantic: How the Crash Will Reshape America
Quote:
The University of Chicago economist and Nobel laureate Robert Lucas declared that the spillovers in knowledge that result from talent-clustering are the main cause of economic growth. Well-educated professionals and creative workers who live together in dense ecosystems, interacting directly, generate ideas and turn them into products and services faster than talented people in other places can. There is no evidence that globalization or the Internet has changed that. Indeed, as globalization has increased the financial return on innovation by widening the consumer market, the pull of innovative places, already dense with highly talented workers, has only grown stronger, creating a snowball effect. Talent-rich ecosystems are not easy to replicate, and to realize their full economic value, talented and ambitious people increasingly need to live within them.
Big, talent-attracting places benefit from accelerated rates of “urban metabolism,” according to a pioneering theory of urban evolution developed by a multidisciplinary team of researchers affiliated with the SantaFe Institute. The rate at which living things convert food into energy—their metabolic rate—tends to slow as organisms increase in size. But when the Santa Fe team examined trends in innovation, patent activity, wages, and GDP, they found that successful cities, unlike biological organisms, actually get faster as they grow. In order to grow bigger and overcome diseconomies of scale like congestion and rising housing and business costs, cities must become more efficient, innovative, and productive. The researchers dubbed the extraordinarily rapid metabolic rate that successful cities are able to achieve “super-linear” scaling. “By almost any measure,” they wrote, “the larger a city’s population, the greater the innovation and wealth creation per person.” Places like New York with finance and media, Los Angeles with film and music, and Silicon Valley with hightech are all examples of high-metabolism places.
Walther Christaller's central place theoryQuote:
Every phase or epoch of capitalism has its own distinct geography, or what economic geographers call the “spatial fix” for the era. The physical character of the economy—the way land is used, the location of homes and businesses, the physical infrastructure that ties everything together—shapes consumption, production, and innovation. As the economy grows and evolves, so too must the landscape.
Demographic gravitationQuote:
Central place theory is a geographical theory that seeks to explain the number, size and location of human settlements in an urban system.[1] The theory was created by the German geographer Walter Christaller, who asserted that settlements simply functioned as 'central places' providing services to surrounding areas.[1]
Material Flow AnalysisQuote:
Demographic gravitation is a concept of "social physics"[1], introduced by Princeton University astrophysicist John Quincy Stewart[2] in 1947[3]. It is an attempt to use equations and notions of classical physics - such as gravity - to seek simplified insights and even laws of demographic behaviour for large numbers of human beings. A basic conception within it is that large numbers of people, in a city for example, actually behave as an attractive force for other people to migrate there, hence the notion of demographic gravitation. It has been related[4][5] to W. J. Reilly's law of retail gravitation[6][7], George Kingsley Zipf's Demographic Energy[8], and to the theory of Trip distribution through gravity models [5].
Quote:
Material flow analysis (MFA) (or substance flow analysis; SFA) is a method of analyzing the flows of a material in a well-defined system. MFA is an important tool of industrial ecology, and is used to produce better understanding of the flow of materials through an industry and connected ecosystems, to calculate indicators, and to develop strategies for improving the material flow systems.
The International Counsil on Security and Development commisioned that report. Their website is here. From what I can tell, they interviewed enough people to be statistically relevant, and the questions were good. It'll be interesting to see if the Marine Corps responds.Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
Good idea for "camps in a box," but I wonder how many displaced persons would relocate to them in the short-term? Lots to consider.Quote:
To strengthen humanitarian aid capacity, a series of fully resourced aid initiatives should be rolled out, starting with fully-equipped field hospitals and ambulance system. These measures should also include “camps in a box” to provide shelter, food, water and active engagement with displaced people to help them move to the camps or, when possible, to return to their homes. A surge of food aid capacity is needed. Aid agencies should be integrated into military planning processes, provided with the resources and capacity necessary to deal with the needs at hand, and if necessary, NATO forces should be integrated into relief and aid activities.
v/r
Mike
Mike:
I think the idea is that if and when operations push large volumes of refugees, you find out where the refugees are and deliver the "camps in a box" to where they end up.
Beetle:
Good recap. I ran into John Adams last April. We were discussing the disconnects between US mil/foreign reconstruction efforts and basic economic geography. Would make a big difference is things connected better.
Reality, as Paul Krugman became famous in the econ world for noting, is that geographic differences create their own limitations/ opportunities that define outcomes in particular places and in different way (duh!)
Funny how the more technically sophisticated we become as a society, the less our bureaucracies seem to remember the basics.
Steve
Steve,Quote:
Originally Posted by Steve the Planner
If you are up for it, I would appreciate any links to case studies and/or additional economic geography concepts which would be of assistance in examining business clustering.
The Army has some 'in-a-box' micro concepts which are useful and valuable however the deeper analysis which helps to predict sustainability needs additional work. Finding military case studies or doctrine for how to examine existing local economic systems or identifying/quantifying/modeling key nodes and linkages in order to start/restart such systems is not a high payoff activity. FM 3-07, FM 3-24, and the CA FM's have some info which facilitate a METL crosswalk (work breakdown structure and business mapping) but I am finding that I have to go to internet and physical clusters of like-minded individuals in order to find that which is needed.
I watched the concept of business clusters in Mosul with construction companies and thought more about it while working on a business plan for a (future) company in order to complete my MBA. My business plan included a recon (site & google earth photo's, equipment comparisions, price surveys, real-estate searches, vehicle title searches, traffic comparisons, weather pattern reviews, noting existing businesses and searching for future business openings in the area of interest) followed an analysis which included stating assumptions, crunching numbers (sensitivity analysis and monte carlo analysis) and comparing the results to standard financial ratios for the industry.
It's all interesting stuff with a real world payoff...
Assessing and Targeting Illicit Funding in Conflict Ecosystems: Irregular Warfare Correlations by David L. Grange and J.T. Patten
Quote:
In December 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a “Directive-Type Memorandum” whose subject was a DoD Counter-Threat Finance (CTF) Policy that included priority purposes to counter financing used by illicit trafficking networks in support of adversaries’ activities, which may negatively affect U.S. interests. Countering threat finance included memorandum policy to deny, disrupt, destroy, degrade, and defeat these adversarial networks with many “counters” relying on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that follow Irregular Warfare concepts. Targeting and assessing the greater illicit funding mechanism within conflict ecosystems demands the same below-the-waterline tacit knowledge, situational understanding, and intelligence creation that most complex and unconventional operations require while keeping local populations out of the fray.
Taken from MikeF's citation of the new Marjah report, which i will read when able to:Can I ask, no remind, readers that serious thought is given to the information aspects of 'camps in a box'. Do they really have to be delivered by the military? Are there not capable partners outside ISAF and GIRoA? Years ago the UK-based NGO Islamic Relief had a large support programme in place.Quote:
These measures should also include “camps in a box” to provide shelter, food, water and active engagement with displaced people to help them move to the camps or, when possible, to return to their homes.
I am very wary of the concept and practice of 'camps in a box' being easily labelled locally by the Taliban and other enemies as 'Protected Villages' etc.
Good catch David. This action could be viewed with shades of Briggs and Malaya. It can be one of those unitended consequences of trying to help but hurting. I've done a little bit of reading on the NGO and Int'l relief efforts in Kashmir and Haiti after earthquakes. It is interesting to see how good samaratan actions can be misconstrued.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Early on in my last deployment to Iraq, while the situation was deteriorating, probably early OCT 2006, we were enroute to an emergency Nahiya meeting to try and persuade the local governments to remain intact and ride out the storm. While on Blue Babe Highway, we noticed a truck headed east packed full like the Beverly Hillbillies. I had the convoy stop so that I could talk to the driver.
He was a father and farmer who had all of his family and possessions in the truck. I asked him where he was headed.
"Sadi, I'm leaving Zaganiyah and moving to Baghdad. It is far safer there."
That scene stuck with me for a long time as I tried to comprehend what perceived fears must persist to have one risk everything to attempt to move his family to safety.
Displaced persons is something we typically do not consider in planning and execution.
v/r
Mike