"... and Jagdkampf Forces." March 1983?

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03-10-2009
kaur

"... and Jagdkampf Forces." March 1983?

Fuchs gave me hint about this kind of forces. Most of the info that Google found, was in German. Does anyone know how I can obtain this paper? ... or electroni version of this paper :)

Quote:

Paper no. 13. "The Austrian Mountain Battalions and the Jagdkampf Forces." 1March 1983.

Austrian plans for the use of ultra-light infantry in a frontless defense against invading forces is unique among modern armies. The concept and plans for implementation are deemed unrealistic, although the organization of the light infantry has some enlightening aspects.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resour...ichael2.asp#17
03-10-2009
William F. Owen

treat with extreme caution

With the greatest respect to Fuchs, this is not a runner in the sense it was intended.

Unrealistic is the key word. Richard Simpkin, and some Germans, including Franz Uhle-Wettner came up with this idea based on some fairly spurious data. It's a nice idea, which briefs well, but it requires considerable planning, preparation and resources, which they were seemingly unaware of.

If you are looking to learn from their mistakes, you don't need to read the paper (which I have not, but I am very familiar with the ideas in general)
03-10-2009
kaur

Wilf,

Quote:

It's a nice idea, which briefs well, but it requires considerable planning, preparation and resources, which they were seemingly unaware of.

Planning, preparation and resources in what sense? Peacetime planning?

Quote:

If you are looking to learn from their mistakes, you don't need to read the paper (which I have not, but I am very familiar with the ideas in general)

Your suggestion is ...? Patrol-based infantry?

I'm chaseing light infantry concept, that has integral poor man's CAS in the sense of precision indirect fire. Chechen urban concept machine gunner (7,62PK), marksman (7,62 SVD) and AT guy (RPG), seems suicidal in rural conditions (if you consider Estonian geography with wide open areas around main approaches).
03-10-2009
William F. Owen

Quote:

Originally Posted by kaur

Planning, preparation and resources in what sense? Peacetime planning?

Both peace time training and operational planning. Large AT minefields need time to be laid, and deep gallery systems need to be built and packed with stores. Light infantry running around hiding in cellars is not really going to make much difference. They can make some sensible contribution, but it requires lots of engineer resources, and good C3I.

Quote:

Your suggestion is ...? Patrol-based infantry?

Patrol based infantry is a training concept. Not really an operational one, though there are cross-overs.

More to the point, I am working on this very stuff, right now, so PM me and I'll tell you where I think we stand in terms of current best practice.
05-22-2009
Distiller

The Austrian idea was quite similar to Werwolf/Gladio, just with regular light infantry. It was never executed on any larger scale, though, just a few locations in the eastern provinces and those safe houses and stores were probably betrayed to the Soviets the moment the plans were drawn up in the MoD. Austria was all leaky.

For such a concept to work one needs a lot of trust (political and personal) and resources, hiding MGs, ATGMS, MANPADS, mines, IED material, some com gear, &c all over the country. Techs/mechs are the primary target.

Plus do regular clandestine training for the folks. And beware of central data hording! Nothing above platoon level, maybe even squad level. Give the toys, but don't ask and don't tell. Don't bother about uniforms.

The Minutemen and the Swiss concept expanded into heavy infantry firepower. Put a Spike in your garden shack and the go-bag under your bed. Hamas showed in le sud de Liban that it's possible with guided missile technology. C2 is not an issue since everybody knows who the enemy is.

But in the case Bear vs the Baltics be prepared to take heavy non-combatant casualties as the Bear would without doubt retaliate against the civilian population. No need to tell you that, I guess. And then the problem with the 25 percent ...
05-22-2009
William F. Owen

Quote:

Originally Posted by Distiller

The Minutemen and the Swiss concept expanded into heavy infantry firepower. Put a Spike in your garden shack and the go-bag under your bed. Hamas showed in le sud de Liban that it's possible with guided missile technology. C2 is not an issue since everybody knows who the enemy is.

Hamas are not in the Southern Lebanon. That is Hezbollah, and the statistics clearly show they did not know how to use their ATGMs effectively. They managed to make a 90% effective weapon, 5% effective. C2 is critical. Nothing to with knowing who the enemy is.

Hezbollah tried to create an old style Soviet "Fortified Region," and failed to apply the training and C2 that is fundamental to making the idea work.
05-30-2009
kaur

Distiller said:

Quote:

Techs/mechs are the primary target.

In case NATO 5th article works I think the only target for local light forces should be those systems:

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Engag...mozTocId687041

Tanks, IFV's, ships, temporary bases etc should be left to NATO air force.

This is just my humble opinion.

Ps I hope that NLOS Netfires is still alive after US budget cuts :)
05-31-2009
Fuchs

Quote:

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

With the greatest respect to Fuchs, this is not a runner in the sense it was intended.

Jagdkampf has several psychological problems that require psychological conditioning in training.

One problem is that it's pretty close to soldiers becoming voluntarily encircled. That requires at least a partial guerrilla mindset (an great morale/confidence in general).

The other problem is that superiors would likely see it as a luxury, and drain on their resources. It's unlikely that a company commander tasked with defence of a sector would dispatch a reinforced platoon (then out of his control and under control of an even more junior officer he needs to trust a lot) to spell trouble ahead with Jagdkampf tactics if the company sector is already stretching the company beyond doctrinal limits.
This leaves Jagdkampf only as involuntary tactic for overrun light forces. A poor background if we keep the morale issue in mind.

I develop a concept that circumvents these issues (I call that light skirmishing).

I gave Jagdkampf as a keyword to Kaur because of the specific Estonian situation that does in my opinion not allow for a conventional defence on their own, not even temporarily.
Jagdkampf should be their starting point.
A conventional Estonian mini army would be broken immediately by any invader who unavoidably could prepare his invasion for years.
06-01-2009
kaur

Due to the fact that it is really hard to get exact description of Jagdkampf units tactics I just have to speculate that this is really close to Finnish sissi tactics. There is dispersed and united sissi tactics (I think it is approprioate use words swarming and wolf pack).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sissi_(Finnish_guerrilla)

Finns are thinking about evolution of this kind of tactics. I suggest this book.

http://www.mpkk.fi/fi/tutkimus-opetu...e%5Bprint%5D=1
06-01-2009
William F. Owen

Slow Down! Slow is smooth, smooth is fast

Fuchs has some very solid ideas and some I consider worth listening too. I would never dismiss any of his points out of hand, but...

What everyone seems to be missing is that this is not merely an issue of minor tactics. There is a lot of very small amounts of information about this type of thing, because no one views it as an Operational Concept.
This is not about Platoons, it is about Formations, Fronts and theatres.

It is not about gallant little teams bouncing about the woods with sacks full of RPGs. It is about a Formation and above defensive operation, that trades depth for attrition. It is the reverse of deep battle.

So if you want to do it in Estonia, the aim is not to stop the Russians, but to make sure only 1 serviceable Russian tank ever gets to see the Baltic Sea.
06-01-2009
Fuchs

Quote:

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Fuchs has some very solid ideas and some I consider worth listening too. I would never dismiss any of his points out of hand, but...

What everyone seems to be missing is that this is not merely an issue of minor tactics. There is a lot of very small amounts of information about this type of thing, because no one views it as an Operational Concept.
This is not about Platoons, it is about Formations, Fronts and theatres.

It is not about gallant little teams bouncing about the woods with sacks full of RPGs. It is about a Formation and above defensive operation, that trades depth for attrition. It is the reverse of deep battle.

So if you want to do it in Estonia, the aim is not to stop the Russians, but to make sure only 1 serviceable Russian tank ever gets to see the Baltic Sea.

"everyone"?
Wilf, how could you write that?

You saw a light skirmisher paper draft of mine that ranges up to the operational level with special emphasis on delay and (Counter)Recce.

I would even expect less from such actions on part of the Estonians. I'd say they should plan to fix one MRD for several days till Russian Interior Ministry forces arrive.

A large tactical success and persistence of Estonian resistance coupled with a strategic defeat could lead to just another major deportation to Siberia and again settling of enough Russians in Estonia to make sure Estonians will always be a minority in the future.
They could easily achieve a Pyrrhic victory if they're invaded again.
That's why I would suggest to strictly limit the expectations/performance.
06-01-2009
William F. Owen

Quote:

Originally Posted by Fuchs

"everyone"?
Wilf, how could you write that?

You saw a light skirmisher paper draft of mine that ranges up to the operational level with special emphasis on delay and (Counter)Recce.

Fuchs, I may be doing you an injustice.

1.) Let me amend everyone to "most people" - and very little has been written, on this subject.

2.) Checking my e-mail, I did get your skirmisher paper, and was unable to open it. We then drifted talking about C_RAM so it went under my radar. Re-send it as .doc and I will give it my full attention! :)
06-01-2009
Fuchs

Quote:

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Fuchs, I may be doing you an injustice.

1.) Let me amend everyone to "most people" - and very little has been written, on this subject.

2.) Checking my e-mail, I did get your skirmisher paper, and was unable to open it. We then drifted talking about C_RAM so it went under my radar. Re-send it as .doc and I will give it my full attention! :)

Naa, you checked too old e-mail. You got it later as .rtf and replied to it.
You got a 2nd version on 2008-07-21.

It looks as if you're losing the overview over your sources and contacts. ;)
06-07-2009
kaur

Maybe those light forces should forget mortars and heavier weapon systems and just stress FAC skills?

Quote:

Ten NATO and non-NATO nations will participate in the life firing exercise Loyal Arrow 09 in Sweden from 8 to 18 June 2009. Some 50 fast jets, which will be based at Norrbotten Wing, will participate in the exercise.

The aim of the exercise is to train units and selected parts of the NATO Response Force Joint Force Air Component Headquarters in the coordination and conduct of air operations.

Additionally, planes from NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System, better known as AWACS, as well as other transport aircraft and helicopters, will participate in the exercise. Some of the participating units will be flying in from bases in Norway and Finland.

Based on a fictions scenario
Command and control of the exercise will be executed by the Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) HQ from CC-Air Ramstein. Exercise Director will be Brigadier General Gianni Baron, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations CC-Air Ramstein.
Brigadier General Johan Svensson, Deputy Commander of the SWE Air Component Command, will be the exercise Co-Director.

The exercise is based upon a fictions scenario. Within this scenario, elements of the NATO Response Force (NRF), acting under a mandate by the United Nations Security Council, will be deployed to a theatre of operations.

http://www.mil.se/sv/About-the-Armed...al-Arrow-2009/

http://img229.imageshack.us/img229/6...edenestfin.gif
06-07-2009
William F. Owen

Quote:

Originally Posted by kaur

Maybe those light forces should forget mortars and heavier weapon systems and just stress FAC skills?

Aircraft have got to refuel, and pilots have to sleep. I'd get good with mortars, mines, digging, guided weapons, and pre-dumped logistic caching. ....based on what history tells us.
06-07-2009
jmm99

Finnish Sissi & Tiedustelijat

These units - "sissi" is more long-range assault; "tiedustelijat" is more long-range recon - are pretty well summed here in Wiki, during Winter and Continuation Wars, and as part of regular TOE.

Quote:

The Finnish "Sissi"-battalions

The Finnish Sissi-battalions had quite a lot differences when compared to an ordinary infantry battalion. The Sissi-battalions were intended to fight in a large area, possibly in the enemy rear area, as an more or less independent unit, making small attacks against the enemy supply columns, securing open flanks in the wilderness, mining roads in the enemy rear and severing cable lines. These attacks/actions were usually made with small detachments (1 platoon), but larger units were also used. (But even while this type of warfare proved successful, the shortage of troops forced the Finns to use some Sissi-battalions also in regular front-line duty).

Of course, the "Sissi" ("guerilla" or "special unit" is perhaps the most matching English word) warfare made the command and logistics (supply) very difficult. That's why the Sissi battalion's HQ was similar to a Finnish regimental HQ, including a command office ("komentotoimisto" in Finnish) and a logistics office ("huoltotoimisto" in Finnish). being larger in number of personnel than a HQ of an regular battalion.

A Sissi-battalion had 3 rifle companies (so it didn't have the mg-company, that the regular battalion had).

Each rifle company had 3 rifle platoons (each platoon having 3 rifle squads and 1 special sledge squad), a lmg-platoon, a signals platoon and a delivery platoon ("toimitusjoukkue" in Finnish), making the companies well capable of independent action. Each rifle platoon had 4 smg's instead of the 2 smg's in regular platoons, otherwise the armament of a Sissi company was quite similar to a regular company. Also, each Sissi-company had 10 sledges.

More akin to Rangers; and different from what is under discussion in this thread.
06-07-2009
kaur

Wilf said:

Quote:

Aircraft have got to refuel, and pilots have to sleep. I'd get good with mortars, mines, digging, guided weapons, and pre-dumped logistic caching. ....based on what history tells us.

I suspect that NATO/Allies attack against opposition in Baltic scenarion would remind very much Kosovo campaign. Russians just have S300/S400 weapons. How to get rid of those? Tomahawks? Jagkampf raids? Antiradiation missiles etc.

If NATO/Allies take this kind of mission seriosuly, the help of interior maneuver (units on the territory) to outside maneuver (invadeing forces) is comparable to the help of French resistance to Normandy landing. Interior maneuver can later just clean up the territory. If I remember correctly, the best military mission by KLA was to make Serbian units to move out from concealed positions.