A Case Against Battle Drill Six
Infantry, Nov-Dec 06 (AKO Log-in Required): A Case Against Battle Drill Six
Quote:
An overemphasis on training for close quarter combat (CQC), or close quarter battle (CQB), in recent years has resulted in its overuse in combat, often in situations where more appropriate options exist.
Platoon by platoon, the Army is learning the hard way how hazardous it is to fight room to room against a well prepared and often suicidal opponent. We can no longer afford to learn the lesson individually. It is time for a candid discussion on this subject, and to address the problem as a responsive, learning, and adaptive Army....
Stormtroop Tactics and Cordon and Knock
Great discussion. Couldn't agree more--we must be very careful training Marines/Soldiers for CQB using SWAT TTPs when the enemy is often hunkered down in what would have been considered pillboxes in WWII. Then 1stLt Elliot Ackerman, USMC, wrote a great Gazette article in the Sept 2006 issue titled "Relearning Stormtroop Tactics: The Battle for Fallujah" that provides insight into his experiences leading a rifle platoon in Fallujah. I tried to attach the PDF file but it's too big. Not sure if you've all had a chance to read it.
In the article Ackerman initially describes how he felt unprepared to attack a highly determined irregular foe in a fortified urban defense commenting that he didn't think we'd "cracked the code" just yet on urban combat. He proceeds to describe all Marine units at first relying too heavily on CQB tactics only to realize very quickly that doing so equates to suicide. He then demonstrates how infantry squads/platoons quickly learned to first identify enemy positions and then moved to isolate/overwatch while calling in tanks, air, D-9s, CAAT, LAR, Bradleys, etc. to reduce before Marines moved into clear. It's in the latter clearing process that CQB skills should be emphasized and employed. In sum: CQB TTPs are fine, but the conditions must be set to employ them before entering the objective.
Another and possibly even more important point brought on in the article is the importance of U.S. units using infiltration tactics when fighting irregular foes in Block III urban combat instead of strictly relying on on-line assaults that are currently recommended in our doctrine and the standard in most of our training exercises. Ackerman argues that using on-line tactics makes the enemy's job easy and falls right into his preferred strategy: attrit U.S. forces at range and then fall back through pre-made tunnels, jumping from roof-to-roof or over gates, etc as U.S. forces close and then to continue this pattern until you run out of room, at which point you execute your pre-determined E&E plan and live to fight another day. His argument in this respect is supported strongly by Poole's analysis in Phantom Soldier and Tactics of the Crescent Moon. Ackerman's experiences demonstrate the validity of urban night infiltration tactics as his platoon successfully infiltrated roughly 300 meters behind enemy lines and proceeded to wreak havoc on the enemy at first light when the enemy attempted to expolit what they perceived to be our predictable on-line attack preference shortly after the sun comes up in the morning.
All this said it's still extremely important for U.S. forces to train for urban ops at the other end of the spectrum of conflict as well. This afternoon I spent an hour conducting an AAR interview w/ an infantry Lt recently back from Ramadi. Many of his comments emphasized the importance of Marines toning down their actions and being much less aggressive when conducting cordon and search operations and even raids. As his company's primary raid force he found after a few months that his unit was much more successful when knocking and talking vs. explosive breaching/kicking down doors--even when conducting raids. He argued that even when we think we have solid intel, we're still wrong or too late in acting very often, therefore, our SWAT hard hit tactics only serve to increase the pool of POIs (pissed off Iraqis). Besides, he said he'd always isolate the objective area first and then move to enter the house with more Marines and firepower than the enemy had. Many interesting points were made throughout the discussion. His company's experience in Ramadi only goes to show that a unit can succeed when doing everything possible to de-escalate as much as possible.
Small Units Smaller Intelligence Operating Teams
I have written much on this subject, some of which has been discussed here.
Nothing happens until Joe puts his boot on the ground and that gets lost in the swirl of techie thinking whether you are talking close combat or intelligence operators out there looking.
I really liked Billl Meara's book. My review of it makes that clear. One thing that jumped off the pages at me was his practice of getting out and looking. Stan and I made that a practice and it served us and the greater intel community well. It can be a very lonely feeling...then again the first man through the door, stacked or not, is about as alone as one can get.
Best
Tom
the first man did not go through the door!
Good evening Folks !
Slapout, God I love the way you pen this Sierra :D
You could've been a grunt ! Errr, naw forget that one :wry:
I love the movies, cops and EOD. One low, the other high and guns a blazen.
Later, is it the white wire, or the blue one ? WHO CARES ?
We alway just blow the flippin thing with a water canon and go home.
Tom,
check out "Kaur's" link RE culture for the Army. Sierrra ! I think someone actually listened to you in the end. Don't let that go to your (bald) head :D
Regards, Stan
FM 7-8 Battle Drill Six or 6 and 6A?
Jimbo, I understand about training LE folks, they are hard headed aren't they?:) I don't have AKO access so I have not read the article, how ever I have seen FM 7-8 and under Battle Drill Six right after figure 4-10 is a note which states that if the room is occupied by civilians or non combatants than the normal ROE may change and normal combat power may not be available. Maybe there should be a battle drill 6 and 6a one for dealing with a known enemy and one for an unknown enemy. According to the manual the two situations are to be handled differently.
Not to mention that everyone doing the same thing
over and over sets up an easily exploited pattern. I always appreciated it when the evil enema displayed patterns in their futile attempts to shorten my days... :D
Second Guessing Our Decisions
I read the BD 6 article too late - and it cost me. When I was a CO CDR I decided to enter and clear a house, which resulted in one of my SSG's KIA. He later received the Silver Star, posthumously.
For the story, read this article from the March issue of ARMY magazine below, compiled by the CompanyCommand.mil Team at West Point.
I'm the B/2-37 AR vignette.
Quote:
In May 2006, elements of my company and Iraqi police were engaged in a conflict with an unknown number of gunmen located in a house on the outside of town.
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I arrived and dismounted on the ground with a squad-sized element of engineers and infantrymen. After receiving heavy small-arms fire, I authorized a section of M1 Abrams and an M2 Bradley to open fire on the house. They fired eight tank rounds and about 100 rounds of 25 mm into the structure, severely damaging it. The small-arms fire ceased, and I decided to lead my two teams to clear the single-story house. My battalion commander offered to let me employ Hellfire air-to-ground missiles from some AH-64s that were now on station to finish the job, but I waived off, trying to contain any collateral damage, and my troops were already inside the SDZ zone] of the weapon. So I continued with the plan to do room-by-room house clearing.
One of my squad leaders, SSG Legaspi, pulled me aside and asked me to let him lead the entry team and for me to follow in the second team. We also had about 10 Iraqi police with us. We advanced on the house and threw some grenades inside to prepare for entry. After they detonated, SSG Legaspi’s team began entering the house and clearing the first rooms. The IPs cowered and refused to enter, so I led the second team in, flanking around the side of the house. As SSG Legaspi led his men into the rear first floor room, shots rang out, and I watched in horror as SSG Legaspi collapsed on the floor about 10 feet in front of my position. The Soldier behind him was pinned by fire behind a pillar and screaming for help. I was stunned—one of my Soldiers just got hit, another was trapped, and the only way to get to either of them was to traverse the same open area that they just got shot in. Not a good set of options.
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A few weeks later, a partner commander was in a similar situation. Instead of charging in, he used police tactics and brought in the TPT [tactical psychological-operations team] truck to demand surrender, which the insurgents eventually did. I immediately began kicking myself. Why hadn’t I done that? Or, why hadn’t I dropped a bomb to begin with since my commander was willing? I kept doing my mental AAR, and each time I found myself wanting. Soon after, I read an article in Infantry Magazine arguing against the current training for house entry—that it was getting too many people killed because the extensive training for it makes it a first—rather than a last—option to many commanders.