FM 3-0 (Operations) Roll Out

It looks like the updated FM 3-0, Operations, will be released at the end of February 2008. Some of the areas in the manual with major changes include:

• Operational Concept
• Stability Operations Construct
• Information Operations Construct
• Warfighting Functions
• Spectrum of Conflict
• Defeat and Stability Mechanisms
• Joint Interdependence
• The Operational Environment
• Modular Forces

Chapter 3 of the new FM 3-0 describes the Operational Concept:

“The Army’s operational concept is the core of its doctrine. It must be uniformly known and understood within the Service...”

• Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent Joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.
• They employ synchronized action – lethal and nonlethal – proportional to the mission, and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment.
• Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.

The manual will have a combination of "evolutionary" and "revolutionary" concepts --

While this doctrine may be evolutionary, its impact on the force and the application of the doctrine will be revolutionary.

Some aspects are evolutionary (strategic context, operational environment, full spectrum operations, command and control, etc.).

Other aspects are revolutionary (stability operations co-equal with offense and defense, emphasis on information engagement, requirements for leaders to be competent with both lethal and non-lethal (soft power) applications of combat power).

It should be an interesting read...

To read it

I'm working on a news story about the new FM's creation. When it is published, I'll post a link to it.

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Originally Posted by Menning

I'm working on a news story about the new FM's creation. When it is published, I'll post a link to it.

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Do you imagine that it will receive the same level of attention as FM 3-24 did when it was released?

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Originally Posted by Menning

I'm working on a news story about the new FM's creation. When it is published, I'll post a link to it.

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Suggestion: Look at the development of FM 100-5 (FM 3-0 predecessor in the old numbering system) since 1976 (and especially through the 1980's with the introduction of AirLand Battle and how it positively impacted on ODS/DS) and compare it to the manual today and ask if it will do the same for the Army as did the 1982 and 1986 versions of 100-5.

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Originally Posted by Dr Jack

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• Operational Concept
• Stability Operations Construct
• Information Operations Construct
• Warfighting Functions
• Spectrum of Conflict
• Defeat and Stability Mechanisms
• Joint Interdependence
• The Operational Environment
• Modular Forces

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I'll confessed to being intrigued with how they will interrelate all these headings in a way that creates a coherent and useful doctrine. EG: What is the difference between a "Construct" and a "Mechanism". I understand the semantic difference, but am very curious to see how it pans out.

Sadly for my wife, I am quite excited about seeing this! :D

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I'll confessed to being intrigued with how they will interrelate all these headings in a way that creates a coherent and useful doctrine. EG: What is the difference between a "Construct" and a "Mechanism". I understand the semantic difference, but am very curious to see how it pans out.

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(and I mean a very dangerous in the true sense of the word) penchant for picking up jazzy and essentially meaningless terms from the MBA community -- to our lasting detriment. :D

We taught them most of what we knew and had learned from WW II and now we get to buy it back (literally through really expensive contracts and consultancies) from them. Embarrassing.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

(and I mean a very dangerous in the true sense of the word) penchant for picking up jazzy and essentially meaningless terms from the MBA community -- to our lasting detriment. :D

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How true! I wish a rule would be made stating that if Grant, Churchill or Eisenhower didn't use a word of phrase, nobody in the current military could use it either.

Not looking forward to the roll out. They have started to change the Information Operations construct from IO to IE... IE being Information Engagement. They want to take some of our toys away. We have been fighting with CAC on this issue, but it falls on deaf ears unfortunately.

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Originally Posted by Team Infidel

Not looking forward to the roll out. They have started to change the Information Operations construct from IO to IE... IE being Information Engagement. They want to take some of our toys away. We have been fighting with CAC on this issue, but it falls on deaf ears unfortunately.

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I believe that the construct is changing, but not with the intent of "taking toys away" from IO... Chapter 7 (Information Superiority) received (and continues to receive) the most attention of all of the chapters from all the "stakeholders" and senior leadership. The discussion of Information, as an element of combat power, emphasizes the commander's role in being personally involved in the integration of all of the information tasks:

Because of its pervasive nature, commanders at every level integrate and synchronize the information element of combat power...

Because the modern operational environment yields such a high and often decisive impact to the side which best leverages information, commanders must provide personal direction and attention to it, fully integrating information into their exercise of battle command. They insure these information tasks are integrated into all operations and that their staffs include them into the operations process from its inception...

There are six information tasks (including Information Engagement) listed in Chapter 7. The six tasks are: Information Engagement; Public Affairs; Command and Control Warfare; Information Protection; Operations Security; and Military Deception.

Of course, regardless of all of the discussions about IO, not everyone is going to be fully happy with the final outcome. Having the commander as the focal point in personally ensuring all of the information tasks are intergrated and synchronized is, in my opinion, a step in the right direction.

I don't believe FM 3-0 will see the same media frenzy that accompanied FM 3-24. I haven't heard much outside military circles about 3-0. However, I can't wait to hear what CADD says about the piece.

Suggestion: Look at the development of FM 100-5 (FM 3-0 predecessor in the old numbering system) since 1976 (and especially through the 1980's with the introduction of AirLand Battle and how it positively impacted on ODS/DS) and compare it to the manual today and ask if it will do the same for the Army as did the 1982 and 1986 versions of 100-5.

Thanks Col. Maxwell for the suggestions regarding looking at the evolution of concepts from the old 100 manuals. I hadn't heard that yet. I have come across complaints regarding the IO section.

One of the problems will be with Chpt 7 is that it will not synch with FM 3-13. It also doesn't allow us to be full spectrum IO Planners as previously taught. In fact, during the FA30 course, they teach both.

Just learned that Chpt 7 changed again this past week. A new drag is being sent to me today.

The Army will release FM 3-0 on 27 Feb at the Winter AUSA meeting.

There was a rewrite of chpt 7. The following description was sent to me on v. 9.

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Version 9 essentially relegates the G7 (FA 30) to message management focused on influencing local audiences (primarily
non-combatants). The primary focus of that being the "linking" of actions to messages, by means of COMCAM, DSPD and Strategic Communications themes, messages, products and activities in order to maintain consistency in both deeds and words. PSYOP, although an integrating responsibility of the G7 Information Engagement Section, is first and foremost focused on the enemy, adversary and other combatant forces in addition to foreign audiences and is conducted in order to "influence" select targets and audiences. The remainder of traditional IO is distributed across the staff with the majority of tasks assigned to the G-/S-3. Overall integration / synchronization responsibility remains the job of the chief of staff executed through the operations officer by means of other coordinating staff officers and functional cells. The processes and techniques that will be required to ensure IO is fully coordinated across the staff are in effect TBD as FM 3.0 defers the more detailed discussions as to exactly how IO is integrated, coordinated and executed to FM 3-13 to sort through.

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If you are interested and work in the Puzzle Palace, I can show you a copy.

Is the draft of FM 3.0 available, maybe through AKO? If so, could somebody post a link?

I may be able to upload the chapter to my ako account then send you the link to it. I will try tomorrow.

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Originally Posted by max161

Suggestion: Look at the development of FM 100-5 (FM 3-0 predecessor in the old numbering system) since 1976 (and especially through the 1980's with the introduction of AirLand Battle and how it positively impacted on ODS/DS) and compare it to the manual today and ask if it will do the same for the Army as did the 1982 and 1986 versions of 100-5.

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From the FM 3-0 overview briefing:

This version of Field Manual 3-0 represents the 15th edition of the Army’s capstone operations manual, a special commitment to America’s national security that traces its lineage to the first doctrine crafted for our forces, Baron von Steuben’s 1779 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. In 1905, Secretary of War Elihu Root published the Army’s first set of Field Service Regulations, institutionalizing the American way of war at a time in our history when the United States first expanded her influence beyond the borders of our nation. Those same field service regulations led our forces to the shores of France in 1918, and turned the tide of battle at a time when the entire world held it’s collective breath. They changed with America’s new role following the First World War, adapting to a remarkable new world order, and again in 1939 when new threats rose to challenge that order.

Under the guiding hand of Army Chief of Staff George Catlett Marshall, the Army’s capstone warfighting manual was revised three times during World War II, operationalizing the experiences and lessons drawn from the fields of battle in North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific Islands. It evolved again as a nuclear-capable Soviet Union raised the Iron Curtain between East and West. It captured the hard-earned lessons of conflict in Korea and Vietnam, and served as the seminal expression of American combat power during the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reshaping of world order reflected in the collapse of the Soviet Union. It carried American forces to victory in Panama in 1989 and again in Iraq in 1991. It evolved as the world entered a new era of peace operations, yet remained prescient enough to guide U.S. ground forces to decisive victory in the Thunder Run to Baghdad in 2003.

And, from the draft introduction:

This edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex period of prolonged conflicts and opportunities. The doctrine recognizes that current conflicts defy solution by military means alone and that landpower, while critical, is only part of each campaign. Success in future conflicts will require the protracted application of all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Because of this, Army doctrine now gives equal importance to tasks dealing with the population—stability or civil support—as to those related to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical; it recognizes that 21st Century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents. While defeating the enemy with offensive and defensive operations, Army forces simultaneously shape the broader situation through nonlethal actions to restore security and normalcy to the local populace.

I have it uploaded to AKO. Not sure how to have all you AKO/DKO users view it.

From the New York Times, 8 Feb:

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The Army has drafted a new operations manual that elevates the mission of stabilizing war-torn nations, making it equal in importance to defeating adversaries on the battlefield.

Military officials described the new document, the first new edition of the Army’s comprehensive doctrine since 2001, as a major development that draws on the hard-learned lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, where initial military successes gave way to long, grueling struggles to establish control.

It is also an illustration of how far the Pentagon has moved beyond the Bush administration’s initial reluctance to use the military to support “nation-building” efforts when it came into office.

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Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, the commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, began briefing lawmakers on the document on Thursday. In an interview, he called it a “blueprint to operate over the next 10 to 15 years.”

“Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the population — stability or civil support — with those related to offensive and defensive operations,” the manual states. “Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success.”

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is enmeshed in rebuilding local institutions, helping to restore essential services and safeguarding a vulnerable population. The new manual is an attempt to put these endeavors — along with counterinsurgency warfare — at the core of military training, planning and operations. That would require some important changes. “There is going to be some resistance,” General Caldwell said. “There will be people who will hear and understand what we are saying, but it is going to take some time to inculcate that into our culture.”

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Much more at the link:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/wa...html?ref=world

Interesting that FM 3-0 only uses the word "civilian" 7 times and in 4 of those cases refers to "civilian agencies."

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"General Caldwell said the manual would influence Army education and training by stressing the sort of skills that are needed to bring stability to conflict-ridden states with weak governments.

“There will be people who naturally will say, ‘If I can do high-end offense and defense, I can do any lesser kind of operations,’ ” he said. “What we have found through seven years is that is not the case.”

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Seems to me that that's an incorrect statement. What I think we've found through seven years are two things that make that statement wrong.

- People will do what they're trained to do and if you deliberately leave something out of the training, it won't get done or at least, won't get done correctly.

- The senior folks may be slow to adapt to an unfamiliar environment but the kids down the chain were not. In fairness, some senior leaders got it and did it right early on but they were a minority.

The US Army and most units in it are quite capable of doing a lot more than too many senior people will give them credit for. I've long had a suspicion that the fear of lacking General Officer personal involvement it will not be done correctly is a contributor to that. Bad attitude; there will never be enough Generals. Captains have to be trusted; the vast majority prove daily that they can be ...