St Carl on the Reading List
In regards to Gian's comment about taking Clausewitz off the reading list for this counterinsurgency manual...
Am I wrong, or isn't Clausewitz on the general reading list for officers in the officers manual? And, isn't he still taught at military academies? And on the reading lists given to officers through OCS?
I am not sure that his lack of inclusion is necessarily a lack of endorsement of his general theories. However, I might agree that he was not included on this list because the focus was on counterinsurgency and that it was meant to shape the ideas and tactics used by officers in that regard. Is that "browbeating" combat officers into changing their minds about the role of combat and politics in a counterinsurgency? I suppose you could call it that, but I am unsure why the attempt to reshape strategy and tactics for a given type of war is incorrect or reviled.
On Steve Metz, that is exactly what I was referring to. The question of whether politics or combat takes over all precedence in a counterinsurgency seems out of place when the entire process is to facilitate flexibility in responses to get a resolution.
It is a balancing of appropriate force to achieve the ends. Even Clausewitz makes reference to that as you point out.
So, I guess my question is: "why is it hard for the military to do both?"
Is this about inflexible meets flexible? And why doesn't the need to be flexible in conventional war and adjust to the circumstances translate to flexibility in application of force and politics in a counterinsurgency?
Defining "Politics" in counterinsurgency
Quote:
"Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other."
I think that is a pretty good general statement. If we did unpack it further I believe that "politics" encompasses the entire efforts that are not "combat" (ie, shooting, killing, arresting or disrupting the enemy; but would include intelligence gathering and other activities directly linked to carrying out "combat" operations). That would include building government infrastructure, negotiating power sharing, developing economy, reconstructing physical infrastructure and all the other variants of that which do not directly relate to actual "combat".
Separating the Insurgents IS Political.
Quote:
But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works.
I'll repeat the title there: separating the insurgents IS political in nature. Carrots and sticks are political. Negotiating power sharing, whether democratic or other, is political.
Further, I think there is a reason that we separate the "indigent insurgents" from the "global insurgents" and how we deal with them. We don't have to kill all or even a significant portion of the indigent insurgents in order to win the "war". That can still be handled through a mix of political and combat that may reduce casualties on all sides. In a previous thread, we discussed that "local" insurgents have their own agenda and is tied to their local goals and gains. The risk of losing that may result in more political resolutions.
"Global Insurgents", like Al Qaida and their recruits, are working towards a global construct that little cares about the local populations conditions beyond serving their global agenda. they are less likely to negotiate or accept "political" resolutions and are more likely to be or need to be killed off in great numbers in order to result in a secession of combat. Equally, the way we separate them from the "population" may have a different variation than what we do with the "locals".