Lessons from Iraq: An Infantry PL's Thoughts on OIF Ops
Infantry, Mar-Apr 08 (AKO Log-In Required):
Lessons from Iraq: An Infantry Platoon Leader’s Thoughts on OIF Operations
Quote:
Listed below are a number of observations based upon my 15 months service as an airborne infantry platoon leader in and around Samarra, Iraq. I have tried to organize my thoughts into specific areas which include small kill team (SKT) operations, mounted and dismounted patrolling, raids,interaction with local nationals, sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and miscellaneous topics. My observations are based on common sense … I think. During an assignment everyone forms his own opinions and develops his own techniques for doing things; these are the practices that have worked for my platoon and our particular way of conducting combat operations. Take what works for you and your area of operations (AO), or expand on my concepts to help prepare your platoon for deployment. Unfortunately, my company had a very bad relief in place and received almost no information or lessons learned from the previous unit. We spent the last year learning by trial and error what easily could have been passed on from our predecessors. This is my attempt to rectify those deficiencies and minimize the amount of practical knowledge lost between units.....
Egos and impatience, American watchwords...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jcustis
Why?
Again...why? Where is the failure point?
Once I finished writing, I'd be taking a trip through the AKO pages to find those "predecessors" and tell them thanks for nothing.
My kid left Iraq after two weeks of trying to pass on stuff to the new guys -- they discounted all of it and effectively said they'd do it their way. They did and it went downhill.
Friend of mine went in to another AO in Iraq and the unit relieved had no plan to effect the handoff after getting none coming in and thus had decided that a big effort was wasted.
Good units don't do that. Not all units are good units. Not excusing it, I'm really condemning it but I suggest a good part of it is a lack of coherent doctrine exacerbated by the Centcom penchant for putting units in odd places to build interoperability. That needs to happen but it should've been preceded by a firm outline on the handoffs.
There's also possibly the problem that the surge units -- some the 82d falls in that category -- went into places that crossed old boundaries and others where no one had really been operating and thus no one had any knowledge to pass on. Not enough info to tell, really.
That Division's been operating on about
a seven month turn around, sometimes less -- that's seven months CONUS and a year to fifteen months there. While they're in the states, they spend most of their training effort on big war stuff (by direction), not on the next tour. Not to mention they changed over the last three years from their old TOE to a totally new TOE which was a major reshuffle and stood up a new Brigade all that at the rate of a Bde every four or five months while still maintaining the deployment schedule. They average about 25% turnover.
As you say, he got back in August and he's talking about stuff he learned when he arrived, so yeah, you're talking about stuff that's over a year old. Then there's OPSEC to preclude publishing the really neat and most current stuff...
Since he's writing for Infantry, one can presume he reads it, I suspect.
Rotate Replacements, Not Units
I recognize that there is something real and valuable about unit integrity. At the start of every hostile conflict, the military is in the ideal position to deploy units whose officers and men have trained together and bonded together. As long as the campaign is short enough so that the same officers and men who started the job can finish it, then unit integrity will prove to be a valuable element contributing to success.
But we are involved in an interminable conlict. It involves fighting partisans, insurgents, saboteurs, and foreign-based guerilla forces in a long war of attrition. The Army and Marine Corps have made a huge mistake by rotating units into/out of the combat theaters, rather than rotating replacements. Even though many units are being deployed for the third time, personnel changes have been dramatic; and the units are not necessarily being rotated into the same AO into which they were deployed previously. Perhaps the Pentagon was in denial about the nature and duration of the operations; but the respective Chiefs of Staff for the Army and Marine Corps should have seen this coming.
I do not have access to AKO. So, I could not read the lieutenant's comments. I appreciate the quoted passages contained in the comments of members of the Small Wars Council, from which I gleaned the essence of the Platoon Leader's frustration.
Certain military units should have been permanently assigned responibility for stability and counter-insurgency operations within specified areas in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tactical organizations would have become almost permanent, while officers, NCOs and enlisted would have been replaced in small groups, so that situtational awareness, permanence of presence, singleness of purpose, and combat experience levels could be maintained.
Not as simple as you portray it.
First, on individual rotation which we employed during WW II, Korea and Viet Nam. It is probably noteworthy that two of the best divisions in Europe, the 3d ID and the 82d refused to accept any replacements above the grad of Private or 2LT; they promoted from within. In Korea, individual replacements were a detriment to full combat effectiveness as units effectively turned over 10% per month; Viet Nam was even worse because there was also the infusion program which meant an effective turnover of over 120% per year for most combat units.
Your suggestion of packet replacement has also been tried with the COHORT process -- that didn't work even in peace time.
Due to the above cited experiences, we have since gone to unit rotation and that needs to stay in place. Contrary to your assertion, the Army and Marines have not made a huge mistake in rotating units; they have improved combat effectiveness by an order of magnitude. Yes, there are personnel changes within units between rotations but the unit does get locked for its final trainup and, far more importantly, there is little personnel turbulence while committed. I'll acknowledge that not putting units back in the same AO is questionable but the rotation between AOs is designed to enhance flexibility in planning, assimilating and working with other units; it does that at only slight cost to combat capability. The enhanced capability it provides as a training vehicle for other wars in other places -- and there will be some -- is significant.
Having deployed to two wars, in each case once as an individual replacement and once with a unit; I have absolutely no doubt that individual replacements should be avoided at all costs.
Agree with all that. Last time the
son was in the 'Stan, they got replaced by the Canadians and not only did the Bde send an MTT to Canada, they had a two week RIP that worked out pretty good. Like Tom said, it's up to the commander how well it gets done.
Agree with you on the benefit of rotating conventional units and not rotating SF out of a given AO -- if they're doing ID, for the DA jobs it's mostly immaterial.
One would hope that anyone making a back scratching deal would get found out and jailed...
2 Blind Men And An Elephant
Regarding WW II, you could have added that there were instances when the newly-arrived troops were sent forward by veterans to draw fire. The veterans had bonded; and saw no purpose in risking their own lives that way, when unknowns could bear the brunt instead.
S.L.A.Marshall's vivid account of the late days of the Korean War exposed the problems of poor training and low morale within units just waiting for the truce talks to end the war.
Personally, I found great comfort in patrolling with men who had been moving through the AO for months, or sharing my experiences months later with the officer who would take my place and introducing him to men who had joined the unit during the interim. There was a continuity of operational effectiveness and situational awareness, which gave a sense of stability to the unit, and to the civilian and military leaders of the indigenous population. Unit integrity was not the problem, which proponents of unit rotation seem to fear. None of the problems, reported by the Lt. or others, concerning hand-offs of responsibilitry from one unit to another, occurred.
Perhaps, if the military would rotate individual battlions within the same brigade, to replace each other within the same AO, one could have the best of both methods.
One thing is certain: the current policy is to stay in Iraq and Afghanistan for decades. If the military is going to create a stable environment for the civilian populations of these two countries, it must stabilize the way its units operate in-country and treat the indigenous population.
Two elephants and a blind man?
I agree with you on one point -- it's a proven fact that if you do not rotate units, you do not have the problem of coordinating the rotation and relief in place process. Beyond that we'll have to agree to disagree though I will add that there are advantages and disadvantages to any method.
Yes, I could've added a slew of WW II and other war stories -- the one I did provide made two points germane to the discussion; to wit, (1) two of the acknowledged better units in the US Army during that war (2) tried to promote from within. Coincidence? I think not... ;)
And in a possible tangent...
It's also interesting to note that prior to the draft, any rotations were done on a unit basis (be it company or regiment...the Philippines was of course the main destination prior to 1945, but there were others) and not individual replacements. Even during the pre and post Civil War period replacements were sent out in as large a party as possible. Individual replacements came about as part of the industrial mindset and the desire to keep units in the line as long as possible (possibly due to lack of transport and/or space to refit during the early part of World War II). With the Vietnam example, SOME units did their best to train replacements up before sending them out on that first chopper, while others didn't. It was, in short, something of a crapshoot and certainly hurt unit ability and cohesion. I can't see any real value in going back to that system, especially with an AVF.
