How could there ever have been an insurgency?
Think of these terms – banditry, insurgency, civil war – as a diagnosis. The first diagnosis was fighting with a low level of political activity – by “dead enders.” As the disease progressed the threat assessment also escalated, and there was an “insurgency.” Now it has progressed to the point that the central government – for which we had such hope – appears non-viable. There is probably a specific word for the current condition, this specific type of civil war. (I wish I had thought of this when writing the text).
Continuing the medical metaphor, each diagnosis leads to a remedy. Now we are treating Iraq with counter-insurgency operations. If the disease has progressed, that might no longer be appropriate. A different form of treatment might be required.
As with 5GW, we cannot take this metaphor too far or it gets silly. (Do we ally with the cancers in each organ?) It's an illustration.
Insurgency, quasi-insurgency, or .......
I'll meet you part way, as you may recall I made other posts on the SWJ Council where I also expressed by doubts that we're dealing with an insurgency, at least in the traditional sense as described by our doctrine. We executed a regime change, and we don't have much, if any, doctrine on that topic, but we do have some history with it, such as Panama, Haiti (successes, at least Panama), and numerous CIA sponsored regime changes.
However, since we did stand up a government (however ineffective) in Iraq, and since some Iraqis who want nothing to do with it are fighting it (not necessarily to overthrow the government, but to push the government out of their lives), at least part of the trouble in Iraq by definition is an insurgency. As DK wrote (still the best thinker in my opinion on the subject) we have a whopper of a problem with three types of conflict: insurgency, civil war, and terrorists (in this case separate from the insurgents, who also use terrorism as a tactic). The strategy for one problem makes the other worse and so on.
The real question is will our COIN doctrine work? First it is a crime we haven't really applied COIN doctrine until now (with the exception of certain units at some locals such as Tal Afar, but strategically we haven't). We have to secure the population and hinder freedom of movement for the insurgents, terrorists, and warring ethnic groups, so the strategy we're trying to apply now seems to be best suited to accomplish this. Do we and the Iraqis have enough troops? Enough politcal will? etc. I don't know. I also don't what the political solution is after we attain an acceptable level of security. However, the only reason I would throw in the towel at this point, is so our fighters could wipe the sweat off their brow, then get back to fighting. It is too early to state make a prediction either way.
comments on several posts
As Jonslack and Bill note, insurgency is not an all or nothing thing. Rather, the "no insurgency" analysis suggests that the balance has changes such that we should adopt a new strategic direction.
The alterative to COIN -- perhaps the only alt other than load and leave -- is to attempt putting Iraq on the path that Jonslack describes in our history. America was not built as a top-down project, but from the bottom up. That is, it was built on a foundation of legitimate States and their governing elites. Only after the Civil War (aka the War between the States) was the national structure clearly stronger than the States.
That suggests, as Bill said, attempting to retain order. Except that in the “Federal” solution we would stop fighting the local militias. Instead work to cut deals with as many as possible. The political and security rails would run in parallel, not in series.
As usual, RTK asks some pointed but pertinent questions. Answers:
1. Do as described briefly above, and in more detail in my op-ed.
2. I do not comment on current ops. All that I’ll say is in the article, the Mao quote.
3. From the start I shared the opinion of the real experts, the A-team, in the 4GW community. Most were of this opinion before the war started that we can destroy a state but not build one. We’re in the era of “the decline of the state” as described by Martin van Creveld. Failed or wrecked states easily fragment into situations like the 30 years war, where many factions – divided among varying lines – fight one another.
This suggests another reason to stop fighting the local elites. If we do break them, that might not build the center. Rather it might initiate another round of disintegration. This is Lind’s worst case, where we have nobody to negotiate with.
Federated Iraq? Bah humbug
Seems like a magic pill solution to me. And too big a pill to swallow at this point.
JonSlack provides a nice summary of our own growing pains.
Iraq cultural experiences include the extremes of excessively concentrated central government power, and tribalism/localism with only loose and fleeting alliances based on specific issues or relationships. Compromise, a key to a federal system, is not in the vernacular.
For the metaphor crowd, I would say that this is NOT a case of just teaching an old dog a new trick, but one of not being able to make a horse drink.
The net of this cultural impasse, as I see it from my comfortable suburban living room at the moment, is that there is no feasible third way -- make Plan A work, or let there be civil war, but we can not realistically try to apply the political equivalent of the Triple Lindy just because we gooned up the early attempts at a strong central democracy.
Has anyone seen an outline for a federal solution, and path to get there, that they feel is workable? I.e. anything more than escapism and inventing a COA C, just becasue COAs A and B don't seem pat?
Four Phases of U.S. COIN Ops in Iraq
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fabius Maximus
... Off-topic: Professor Colin Kahl of the Political Science Dept at the U of Minnesota wrote a brief on the evolution of our COIN ops in Iraq.
Posted on "Informed Consent"
Blog of Juan Cole, Prof History, U Michigan
http://www.juancole.com/
Professor Kahl has been kind enough to grant the SWJ permission to post his e-mail, the following link also contains a link to the Andrew Krepinevich briefing that generated his e-mail - The Four Phases of the U.S. COIN Effort in Iraq.
