Where Are Our Priorities Focused…Lack of Knowledge of Basic Enemy Capabilites

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Originally Posted by Pete

I was both enlisted and commissioned, ...

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Good. Then may I ask your opinion on the matter of officer platoon commanders (lieutenants).

It has been said that there is nothing more dangerous than a second-lieutenant with a map and a compass. Sadly that is probably true in many cases.

The idea from the Brit tradition is that a good platoon sergeant (7-10 years experience) will carry the young officer for the first year or so until he finds his feet. I guess I could live with that if armies were at peace most of the time but increasingly newly commissioned officers are being thrust into war for better or worse with uncertain results.

I accept that platoon commanding is a necessary grounding for officers especially those who will advance over 30 odd year careers to general officer rank.

How are armies handling this matter and what if any ideas do you have to improve upon current systems?

I was field artillery, so my main things as a lieutenant were quadrants and deflections, not leading a platoon. At the time the Army general Don Starry made a big thing about how lieutenants should "Listen to their NCOs." Great advice, as far as it went, but the U.S. Army underwent a sea change in 1965 when the last of the WW II veterans retired. In spite of Don Starry's good intentions many of the NCOs circa 1978 were fairly half-assed minimum-effort type of guys as well. I wasn't that great an officer, but I was honest about my deficiencies, and I refused to throw up a facade of "excellence" to fool people into thinking how great I was.

Aside for Ken: I might not have been a great officer, but I truly love the Army. :D

I don't think the comeback of the Army during the 1980s can be neatly characterized as the restoration of high standards versus entrenched mediocrity. It was more complicated than that -- it was a sincere effort to improve things as well as a return to eyewash and covering things up. Up to a point that's okay, I always liked being spitshined and starched rather than the alternative. When 60 percent of the M16s in Jessica Lynch's Ordnance Company failed to function in 2003 it was something I might have predicted would happen in 1984. I guess the short answer, career-wise, is to keep your mouth shut, stay in your lane, and do your job to the best of your ability.

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Originally Posted by Pete

When 60 percent of the M16s in Jessica Lynch's Ordnance Company failed to function in 2003 it was something I might have predicted would happen in 1984.

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Why was that?

When the war began in 2003 many people in the combat service support branches probably regarded small arms as impedimentia they had to take with them when they went to the field, not things they'd actually have to use. Attitudes have probably changed since then.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Why was that?

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Little/no attention on the part of the indivisiual Soldier and lack off supervision on the part of the unit leadership, including the commander who clearly could not read a map at all.

As an aside, I seem to recall in the aftermath of TF Smith in Korea in 1950 that a significant number/% of their weapons malfunctioned also. Poor maintenace and incorrect assembly were two of the main causes as I recall.

So, garrison life in occupied Japan had the same impact on line units 60 years ago (only 5 years after the end of WWII!)

BTW, cannot speak for the other reserve forces, but the Army reserve has taken hugh steps since then to correct the situation.

Perhaps too far. There is a concern out there now that we have spent so much time/effort/resources on "Warrior Training" that these folks are no longer at the job/mission/tasks they were put their in the first place to do.

Does not do a Patriot Missle Maintenace Company like the 507th to survive the convoy in and then not know how to fix a Patriot Missle System.

Have to be able to find a balance point between force protection ability and technical proficiency.

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Originally Posted by TAH

Have to be able to find a balance point between force protection ability and technical proficiency.

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I guess that sums it up pretty well.

It wasn't only the retirement of the World War II NCOs circa 1965 that changed the Army as an institution -- more broadly it was the retirement of the 1940s-50s generation of NCOs that changed things. They could be compared to Blanton's Sour Mash, " ... aged in one barrel, and unlike most others, never blended with any other bourbon."

When I served in Germany in '78-'81 unit-level training was a big deal. One of the things that discouraged an enthusiastic attitude about presenting it was inspectors coming around with clipboards with checklists.

For example:

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Did the instructor have training aids?

Did the instructor present "Task-Condition-Standard" as presented in the manual?

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Well, the long and short of it is that our NCOs got stage fright about presenting instruction, after their good-faith efforts were criticized.

When I PCSed back to the States in 1981 I asked my Dad about common-task training in his 105mm battery during World War II -- he said the individual training ceased as soon as they were in the battery, that everything after that was unit training.

I guess that this unit-level training thing goes way back, before Ken was a corporal.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Never in the history of warfare have there been more intel analysts and other assorted odd bodies yet the ability to join the dots in a place such as Afghanistan appears to be unimproved from the distant past.

Ken, you seem to believe that if you set these guys free they will do the job that's expected of them? So where exactly is the blocking point in the system? Can you point your finger on it?

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I tend to agree with Ken; give them proper training and guidance and they will do the job, and many will do it well. They majority just need a sense of purpose.

In my experience, one blocking point is in how we train intelligence analysts. At Huachuca, we teach them tools and process, but I think we fail to teach them how to extract anything useful from the whole process. Some of the kids seem to get it, but they're usually from that part of the population I call "the naturals," inherently inclined and gifted for this kind of work. The majority need to be taught critical thinking skills and how to synthesize intelligence from information. During FTX briefings, I would constantly hammer students on the "so what" factor. I would ask them "Why is this important?" and I would get the deer-in-the-headlights look. This goes back to their civilian education (or lack thereof), but I'll refrain from that rant.

So why do we not train on this? My theory is that it is too difficult to teach and too difficult to evaluate. TRADOC likes clear cut answers and well-defined metrics for success and failure; analytical work is essentially nebulous and difficult to define as right or wrong becuase it's not necessarily the final answer, but the thought process (as opposed to the mechanical process we teach) that matters.

The second blocking point is how we (fail to) lead young analysts. MI NCOs are often deficient in leadership skills, especially when it comes to mentoring and developing young troops. Many are too preoccupied with their own ambitions and fail to see that Soldier development can fast track them to their personal goals. So they marginalize the youngsters and offer them nothing; no training, no encouragement, no motivation. And then we wonder why they misbehave and won't work.

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Originally Posted by TAH

Have to be able to find a balance point between force protection ability and technical proficiency.

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The irony is that the NCO Creed specifically states: "I will strive to remain technically and tactically proficient." Unfortunately, in the support branches we tend to overemphasize technical proficiency at the expense of tactical proficiency. This has a secondary effect in that it creates a cultural rift between combat arms and support. I like the Marine ethos of "Every Marine a rifleman."

In a larger sense, the Army must now find a way to achieve balance between Big War and Small War proficiency.

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Originally Posted by VileEvilDoer

Some of the kids seem to get it, but they're usually from that part of the population I call "the naturals," inherently inclined and gifted for this kind of work. The majority need to be taught critical thinking skills and how to synthesize intelligence from information.

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Here, I think, is the source of the problem.

Once upon a time, intel people were experienced other branch soldiers who happened to show a knack for it.

Then we screwed up and made Intelligence a branch.

Then we made it worse and made it verboten to put non-Intel rated people in Intel spots.

People that need to be taught critical thinking skills have no business being in Intel. In the tactical units I've served in, with few exceptions, Intel types were incredibly ill-suited for Intel work. How, exactly, does a competent personnel system allow that to happen?

120mm,

I agree, but I think the number of "naturals" is pretty small and the competition for those people is significant. I know when I went through intel school in the early 1990's at least 1/4 of my class had no business being there, but they were pushed through the system because intel is constantly undermanned.

It doesn't help that these schools (at least in the Navy and Air Force - I don't have experience with the Army schools) are run like mini-boot camps. It's hard to teach critical thinking and promote introspection when so much time is spent enforcing conformity. The courses themselves are overly focused on powerpoint, briefing, memorizing "facts," and are constantly 3-5 years behind in terms of curriculum. The system produces people who can create a relatively polished "threat" brief on some weapons system but are unable to answer fundamental "so what" questions and apply that knowledge in a real-world context.

Then there is the security clearance issue, which is a whole 'nother ball of wax.

In my previous job, I was in charge of unit intel training and it took a year to 18 months (this was a reserve unit) to fix most of the bad habits learned in intel school and get them to a rudimentary level of competence. This went for both the officers and enlisted.

Another problem is that intel is a dumping ground for personnel from other career fields who are unable to continue in that field for whatever reason (due again, to the fact that intel is constantly undermanned). Many aren't remotely interested in intel and are simply marking time. They got into intel because it was one of the "open" career fields and oh, there's also a five-figure bonus!

Additionally, intel is simply a huge and diverse field. In my career I've gone from supporting small tactical units all the way up to theater-level strategic warning. That kind of change feels like moving to a whole other career field. That diversity is one reason I like intel so much, but there are a lot of people who don't like it.

Finally, I think some responsibility needs to be spread around. Too many people seem to view intel as the one-stop-shop for any and all information. The 3 shop is especially bad. If I had a dollar for every time someone from the 3 shop asked me where some US unit was located, I'd be a rich man. We're often tasked with stuff the 3 shop is too lazy to do on their own.

In summary, there are a lot of problems in intel. Training problems, organizational problems, cultural problems, personnel problems. After 17 years including my own attempts at bashing by head through brick walls trying to improve things, I'm not confident at all any of those problems will be fixed anytime soon. Indeed, it's likely to get worse.