Collateral Damage and Counterinsurgency Doctrine
Collateral Damage and Counterinsurgency Doctrine by Major General Charles Dunlap at the SWJ Blog.
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One of the most controversial issues today is the role of kinetic military force, and especially airpower, in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. While no one advocates the use of force except when truly necessary, the history of COIN efforts reveal that it is essential to success. For example, Professor Daniel Moran points out in his book, Wars of National Liberation, that in Malaya, the COIN operation most admired by many contemporary COIN aficionados, “7,000 guerillas were killed” out of total number “which probably never exceeded 10,000.”
Nevertheless, accepted wisdom these days is that reflected in FM 3-24, that is, “killing insurgents…cannot itself defeat an insurgency.” This is complemented by a related listing of “paradoxes” which include such aphorisms as “sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.” (Of course, “sometimes” is a qualifier that renders it almost meaningless because virtually anything can happen “sometimes” – to include sometimes the more force is used, the more effective it is.)
The overall flavor of FM 3-24 is, however, most unambiguously reflected in its attitude toward airpower...
A couple of observations...
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Put another way, COIN forces rarely enjoy any “propaganda victory” with host-nation populations when the enemy kills innocent people.
I have to wonder why he is locked in an assumption that the target for propaganda is in the host nation? This, to my mind, is certainly belied by the extensive use of videos, etc. put out by AQ for consumption in non-host nations.
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Moreover, the broader topic of civilian casualties is also discussed. Specifically, has collateral damage from airstrikes caused more enemy “propaganda victories” than have, for example, the results of land force actions at such places as Abu Ghraib, Haditha, Hammadyia, and Mahmudiyah? Is there a difference between the impact of unintended civilian causalities from airstrikes and intended injury to civilians by rogue military members on the ground?
I think that this is an invalid comparison. How about rogue military members in the skies? The way this is phrased seems to imply that there aren't any. Given the friendly fire casualties caused by certain US air units on Canadian troops, I would beg to differ - if not "rogue" in intent, then rogue in activity. I would also like to point out that that particular action had an immense propaganda effect in Canada.
There is also the interesting point, that seems to be left out, that it is easier for host nationals to comprehend ground fire collateral damage (since it comes from all sides), that air strike damage, since it only comes from one side.
Domestic poltiical legitimacy
I can only concur with the discussion so far, including Merv Benson’s warning that we do need to be wary of our enemy inflating numbers and/or simply manufacturing from a whole cloth an incident of civilian casualties.
What Dunlap also seems to miss is the issue of broader perceptions of the use of force in Afghanistan (and Iraq) that such incidents create in the minds of our own publics and wider international community. Mark and Steve point to this with their observations about amicide. But it is broader than this. If one reflects back to the war over Kosovo, one of the more significant emerging political issues as the war wore on stemmed from the public’s knowledge of the directive that Allied aircraft fly no lower than 15,000 ft coupled with tragic collateral damage from aerial attacks (some of which were hyped up by the Serbian gov’t). Striking was that a commonly articulated public complaint in 1999 is exactly what wm noted; a growing perception that the Alliance was not willing to risk a single life to save innocent civilians. This public perception amongst our own populations started to present a political problem in 1999 and it is starting to create a real problem today.
Dunlap seemingly exposes his lack of understanding that our forces on the ground need to be seen as legitimate by the local population, but also that our use of force needs to be perceived as legitimate by our populations and allies. The apparent callous disregard of civilian casualties (however much this is a function of enemy info ops) does impact adversely on our publics. In the case of Afghanistan, that it seems to be the US that seemingly is so callous (ie, the recent request by the Brits for the Americans to go away) makes it very difficult for Euro gov’ts to sustain what limited commitments they have to Afghanistan, never mind increase their contributions and relax their ROEs as NATO, Washington, London, Ottawa and The Hague have been urging.
Arguments such as those put forth by Dunlap do not help the situation.