just a couple of more comments
Cavguy said:
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I strongly disagree here. I also argue with your use of "directly", which is pejorative...Why study history if we can't learn from it and use it to inform the present?
The word "directly" was not used in a pejorative sense (sorry if you took it that way) but in an argumentative way to make a point. So I use the word again, your essay (as I read it) does use the "lessons" from Vietnam as highlighted by Krepinevic (K) and "directly" applied them to Iraq in your second tour there. K says that the US failed in Vietnam because it didn’t focus on classic coin and population security, you say in Iraq the first three or so years (mostly) the US failed (or at a minimum performed very poorly) in Iraq because it did not do classic coin and did not focus on population security. How is that not applying the lessons directly?
How would it seem if some brigade or division commander right after the march up to Baghdad said that before the assault he had re-read his Jomini, realized that it had been overlooked in the American Army for the past 20 years, applied its Principles in the assault, and as a result of applying those principles the march up to Baghdad in Spring 2003 was a great success?
Qualitatively and with assuming a reasonable amount of context, how is this example of "using" history any different than yours?
Again, it is a different philosophy of history that you and I have. To quote one of your words, you see history as something that can be "used." I see the "using" of history as dangerous because it produces a mindset of the templating of the past into lessons and principles to be plucked at will for "use" in the present. But in so doing this you end becoming a-historical in the sense that by detaching these lessons from their historical moorings and plotting them in the present you remove them from their context. What is it about this period of history of the Vietnam War and counterinsurgency that we privilege it over other periods? As a matter of abstracted historical philosophy, why do we privilege the writings of Galula for lessons learned in Iraq say over the British imperial officer CE Callwell? The conventional answer to this question as given to me by one of the primary authors of FM 3-24 is that Galula's world of the early 1960s is simply closer to ours than Callwell's. Well back into the reality of the present, I don’t buy such arguments. But those that do have thus detached the early 1960s counterinsurgency theory and practice and have plotted in the present as a template and have elevated it to the absolute oracle of historical truth because they align in analog fashion to current experience in Iraq and say in a reductive, simplistic way that here are the lessons from Vietnam, we have learned them, have applied them in Iraq and because we have learned and adapted we are winning.
That is what, in barest form, is happening here.
Congrats Cavguy ... and a few comments
Niel, an excellent article. :D
Something worth reading: Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY FOR DECISIONMAKERS. Richard Neustadt, a political scientist - like me, was a staffer for President Truman and is best known for his book, PRESIDENTIAL POWER. Ernest May is a historian. Their point, briefly summarized, is that we all reason by historical analogy, Wheile there is no avoiding this, thinking rigorously can help us avoid historical interpretations that are too facile.
As a political scientist, I usaully have to take my disciplinary colleagues to task for their utter disregard of history. One cannot do good political analysis without knowing the history of the country, organization, or events that are the subject of research. That said, many of my historian colleagues are so convinced that every situation is unique and, therefore, no generalization is possible. For what it's worth, a plaque on both extremes!:eek:
Cheers
JohnT
If anyone takes anything away from this thread,
it should be this:
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Originally Posted by
Cavguy
...professional malpractice on the part of the Army, because in my opinion that failure prolonged our stay in Iraq and thus cost soldiers' lives.
as amplified by this:
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The Greek tragedy in all this is that the "learning" was mostly "re-learning" what was sitting on the shelves of our library. Men died because we failed to train or appreciate the lessons of past counterinsurgency warfare....
He's obviously not alone:
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Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
...It is a strong indictment from Niel's (and from mine) perspective given that many of the leaders who'd determined our DOTMLPF path...for whatever reasons, they left a hole where that knowledge should have been.(emphasis added /kw)
Because those are truths; they are not just a theory, they are a statement of fact and many of us know it all too well. We cannot know that had the failure not occurred, Iraq would have been different -- but we can speculate and I submit the possibility that it might have been only 10% better would have saved several hundred lives. It's not a Greek Tragedy -- it's an American tragedy. One that must not be repeated.
There is also this:
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Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
...Again, an indicator of a thoughtful article is its ability draw out debate. I am not being critical of Niel, but drawing on his fine article to apply criticism and thought to problems that I see in the US Army.
True on the first part.On the latter portion, no one can object to that and your opinions have merit and weight. However, I too can apply criticism after much extremely long and hard thought to problems that I see in the US Army today; there are three that are IMO quite critical:
Too many seniors are reluctant to trust their subordinates; This either causes or is caused by risk aversion -- I'm still trying to determine which but I do know inadequate training is at the root of it. Those are the first two items. Lastly but most importantly -- and in the vein of this thread -- I see a very worrisome and strong trend on the part of some senior people to return as quickly as possible to business as usual...
That is not a good idea.
Cautionary historical notes & a disagreement
Gian--
I agree with you that one should be very cautious about applying lessons from Iraq to operations in Afghanistan. Particularly, one needs to consider issues of small COPs in light of other historical experience there, such as the Brits in Kabul twice in the 19th century. That doen't mean that my friend John Nagl is necessarily wrong in his assessment but rather that it is both more complex and requires more in depth analysis before we decide on a strategy and operational plans and tactics. One fallacy is that we have a tendency to focus on a singular historical experience without comparing it to other similar and contrasting experiences. Another of our errors is that we prefer not to remember our own history at all (or rather remember it very selectively). I am thinking here of 300 years of American (both colonial and national) military experience fighting Indians and later the Philippine Insurrection that we did not wish to recall in the 30 years between the end of Vietnam and 9/11. Again, from my poly sci (and old soldier) perspective, the essence of using history to garner principles and lessons is to look for multiple cases that shed light on the subject.
In that context, I must disagree with your interpretation of the war in El Salvador. Our allies won! They won, largely because they learned from the lessons taught by the MILGP and 3 superb Ambassadors and their own pragmatism. I watched that fight up close and personal as the XO of the Combined ESAF Assessment Team in 87 and 88 and later at SSI and as a civilian prof at Leavenworth as the fight wound down and ended with the peace accords of 1992. Obviously, there is significant disagreement as to how much the Fall of the Wall in 89, the ending of Soviet aid to Cuba, and the fall of the USSR in 1991 contributed to the GOES victory. I believe it was important but not decisive although I am sure that many would disagree. But, my real point is that MILGP commanders like John Waghelstein and Ambassadors like Ed Corr and CINC's like Jack Galvin and Fred Woerner brought a much broader view of historical experience than merely that of COIN in Vietnam to the table.
Cheers
JohnT
Sodium Chloride to the rescue...
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Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
Ken:...although I have to tell you I often disagree with your interpretation of Vietnam and history, but naturally, this is OK...
Of course it is. I will again point out though that I don't so much disagree with your interpretation of what you read as I do with those sources and their reliance on the 'record.' I have a great deal of experience over many years with that record and know that it is often deliberately skewed to cover mistakes, blunders, accidents and bad decisions and to protect or embellish reputations; bureaucracies tend to do that... :wry:
As Steve Blair said earlier, both the written and oral histories need to be taken with quantities of NaCl... :eek:
We do agree that training and effort for MCO are imperatives and must take precedence over COIN issues; we only disagree on what else must -- and can -- be done.
Oh, re: Veet Nam. I'll also point out that this
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JMM: ... the fact that the American Army tried to do classic coin in El Salvador (by using the El Salvadoran army and government as its proxy) and it did not work in the ways planned.
selective use of history by you is not perhaps refuted by this:
...From John T. -- ""In that context, I must disagree with your interpretation of the war in El Salvador. Our allies won! They won, largely because they learned from the lessons taught by the MILGP and 3 superb Ambassadors and their own pragmatism. I watched that fight up close and personal as the XO of the Combined ESAF Assessment Team in 87 and 88..."
However, that rebuttal certainly does raise the question of the accuracy of observations of people on the ground at the time versus the 'record' written by others who were not there and who may or may not have a bias... ;)
Ken, it's even more complicated
since some of those who were there - including Waghelstein, whom I greatly respect and who is a good friend - have written that we didn't win...
Obviously, being on the ground, studying the situation academically, or a combination of both will not automatically produce Truth. Reasonable people can, and will, disagree. But discussions like this can help to clarify all our views of reality.
Cheers
JohnT
May I paraphrase and wholeheartedly agree...
Since some of those who were there - including a few whom I greatly respect and who are or were good friends - have written things that differ from my view... :o
(Albeit only slightly, he said, shyly... :D )
Don't even have to paraphrase this one.
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Obviously, being on the ground, studying the situation academically, or a combination of both will not automatically produce Truth. Reasonable people can, and will, disagree. But discussions like this can help to clarify all our views of reality.
Well said, as always, John.