I agreed with your article, Wilf
and thanks for posting it. I did not comment on it simply because it made sense and I had nothing to add. I do wish that, like Kaur, I'd explored and pulled up the Colonel Dr. Storr article. I agree with Storr's conclusion -- but I get there by a slightly different route.
Thanks for doing that and posting it, Kaur.
Storr says:
Quote:
A few studies are quite insightful. It appears that a soldier’s ability to hit a given target is typically reduced by a factor of ten or so when he is moved from a static rifle range to a field firing area where he has to select cover, move, shoot and so on. It is reduced by a further factor of ten or so if there is an enemy firing back at him. It is reduced by another factor of ten if the enemy has machine guns, or if he has tanks; and by a hundred if he has both.
I have not seen those studies but my experience corroborates the thrust of that paragraph. I think the factors he cites range from reasonably accurate for green troops to terribly high for experienced troops. In short, experience can better performance. No surprise there but I also strongly believe that better, more intense and more realistic training can significantly better the performance of new troops.
The issue then becomes one of cost. Marginal performance can be obtained as we now train weapons use; to improve that will take a lot of rounds and will cost a bit more. IMO, the money should be expended as doing less is morally suspect to say the least...
An added cost factor is the possibility of a slight increase in training casualties. Sensible practice can minimize that but the realism required will create the potential.
Then this:
Quote:
Another study reveals entirely different phenomena. It highlights that achieving surprise, or inflicting shock on the enemy are hugely effective. These are more effective than any likely force ratio, or the use of other weapon systems, and so on. Put very simply, if the attacker can find the enemy’s flanks and rear and attack him from there, or apply sudden concentrated violence to him and then exploit it, the enemy will typically give up quite quickly.
Exactly -- calling for better, more imaginative and realistic tactical training for junior leaders and potential Company / Battalion commanders (and better operational and strategic training for senior people but that's another thread).
With respect to suppression, he says:
Quote:
Get some fire down!’ is the wrong approach.
‘Suppress the enemy!’ is a better approach.
‘Suppress the enemy, to enable the platoon to attack him
from his rear’ is a better approach still.
Suppressive fire without purpose is just that: purposeless
I very much agree with that and believe the vast majority of such fire is totally wasted and the wasters don't even realize it...
As you and I have agreed previously, 'suppressive fire' as it is generally practiced is not at all effective against well trained and experienced troops -- accurate fire OTOH will stop or slow them.
He also added:
Quote:
The L110 (Minimi) Light Machine Gun (LMG) performs far worse in such trials. At best, only the first shot of a short burst passes close enough to suppress. However, subsequent shots in that burst go anything up to 6m wide of the mark at battlefield ranges. Since perhaps 3 to 5 rounds in 3 to 5 seconds are required to suppress, a typical LMG gunner will rarely achieve suppression. He would have to fire 3 to 5 bursts in as many seconds to do so. Furthermore, since only the first round typically passes near enough, he would have to fire a burst every 3 seconds or so to keep the target suppressed.
Confirming my long held position that belt fed weapons do NOT belong in the Rifle Platoon other than in the defense (which should be avoided but that too is another thread...).
I agree that suppressive fire is needed but contend it must be reasonably accurate and that aimed fire is far more effective than are rounds in the general direction. I also agree that in many situations, HE is the killer but do believe that far better small arms training than is now the norm in desirable, achievable and that improvements can significantly improve the kill ratio of small arms versus HE effects.