Not ready to concede just yet
Ken?
How “tactically” mobile were the HMMWV and FMTV trucks the infantry relied on before? Sure they “some” off-road capacity, but believe me, I have gotten many a HMMWV stuck. Any of the IMV’s that Wilf or I advocate have the same “tactical” mobility range as these vehicles and are simple enough to be left behind if specialty tracks (like the Australians and Brits have done in East Timor and Afghanistan) or helicopters or plan old forced marches are better suited. Also,
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In the old Airborne Battle Group and Battalion Recon Platoons with the M 151, a third of the strength was driving. My Sons Rifle Platoon in OIF II had a slew of unarmored HMMWVs with no turrets and ad hoc weapons mounts; they carried more people so he only lost a fifth of his strength to the vehicles. Later, in OEF IV (or V, can't recall) he had an Antitank Platoon, armored HMMWVs with turrets -- back to a third or fourth of the strength left with the vehicles.
as you point out, a signifigent amount of the force gets tied up in vehicles regardless. If an IMV holds as many troops or more then the PC HMMWVs, doesn't that increase the troops available?
Helicopters do provide potentially better mobility, however, unless you are advocating for decentralized helicopter distribution (which does not work very well either), they have problems as well. They are very expensive to operate, take a great deal of advance planning the way they are currently set up, and have vulnerabilities to MANPADS and planned ambushes. Like you say, METT-TC dictates. The core concept to the IMV is that it is NOT a “system of systems” and simply an affordable force multiplier if METT-TC dictates. Historically, since they have been shown to be the most likely to be utilized, the easiest and most affordable to operate, since they do not require a unique skill set as helicopters and IFVs do, why not make them organic? This means the operators will in-fact have infantry skills. Don’t need them, don’t use them. Need them, and if they are not available, that’s were situations like Somalia and the 2-5 CAV QRF rescue attempt in Sadr City occur.
One more question.. you state
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Track drivers were poorly trained, tactically speaking (Yes, they need to be trained -- and plain old riflemen training is a good base from which to start), the track commanders were similarly poorly trained and the crew just wanted to transport and not get involved in the fight. Doesn't work that way. So, yes, the training of the crew is very important -- and they should at least have a basic understanding of Infantry tactics. They will still suffer the fact that they have no loyalty to the unit being transported -- and that does make a difference; a big difference.
But then you state
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A Mech platoon at company level or a mech company at Bn level is, IMO, an invitation to trouble because, as many point out, Mech and Inf are two entirely different doctrines. Added complication at Bn and below is best avoided...
IFVs are aggressive fighting vehicles, so why is the first quote be relevant to them? They are designed to get in and mix it up with the enemy. If you do not want to lose the cohesion and training for infantry platoons, then you have to separate the IFVs (and the unique skill sets required to operate them well) and the Infantry squads. Even if they stay in the platoon, the manning can’t come out of the individual squads, or else you are never capable of dismounting an effective infantry squad/platoon, period. So the question is, what is your suggestion to reduce the infantry manpower and skill drain in the Mech units? Having the troops rotate between light and heavy outfits is a good start but it only addresses part of the issue. What else is there? You have been around for a variety of concepts, what works best in your eyes?
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Walking infantry is equally necessary and valuable
ALL infantry is walking infantry since they require essentially the same skill set and there job starts once they "dismount". All Infantry needs to be able to utilize IFVs, IMVs and aircraft if the TA-DA! METT-TC determines them to be valuable. The ability to dismount and fight effectivly are determined more by..TA-DA again! training, training and training.
Reed
P.S. Do I get my toaster yet?:wry:
Sigh. what's to concede. we have differing opinions.
That doesn't bother me...
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Originally Posted by
reed11b
Ken?
How “tactically” mobile were the HMMWV and FMTV trucks the infantry relied on before?
Before what? The HMMWV is a poor vehicle IMO, yet another example of the compromises the Army must make to achieve the 'GP' functionality it is unduly enamored of. The FMTV is more mobile than its predecessors and that's good; the HMMWV just has a little better ground clearnce and more power. It is a poor military vehicle. Neither is really a tactical vehicle, they are trucks, no more and no less.
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Sure they “some” off-road capacity, but believe me, I have gotten many a HMMWV stuck.
Proving that tactical driver training, including things not to try, is very, very important. :D
I've been stuck, too. learned how to avoid that and, more importantly, teach others how to avoid it. Tracks and wheels. A thrown track by hitting a dip in a a side slope traverse is as much a mobility kill as one blown off. You cannot just put anyone behind the wheel of a tactical vehicle and ever expect good results.
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Any of the IMV’s that Wilf or I advocate have the same “tactical” mobility range as these vehicles
That's not saying much, better solutions are available.
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and are simple enough to be left behind if specialty tracks (like the Australians and Brits have done in East Timor and Afghanistan) or helicopters or plan old forced marches are better suited.
Left behind where? In a tactical situation? In theater if you leave? ???
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...as you point out, a signifigent amount of the force gets tied up in vehicles regardless. If an IMV holds as many troops or more then the PC HMMWVs, doesn't that increase the troops available?
Obviously -- but you still have the security of the vehicles and the don't get too far away from them syndromes to worry about. I'm not saying never, merely that it's situation dependent and one is probably advised not to try to create an either / or rule.
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Helicopters do provide potentially better mobility, however, unless you are advocating for decentralized helicopter distribution (which does not work very well either)
Didn't say helicopters, said aircraft; MV22, C27, others. Oh it works very well, it just isn't terribly efficient -- the question is which is important, efficiency or effectiveness?
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they have problems as well. They are very expensive to operate, take a great deal of advance planning the way they are currently set up, and have vulnerabilities to MANPADS and planned ambushes. Like you say, METT-TC dictates.
Yep -- and anyone who contemplates their use should consider your negatives in their planning.
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The core concept to the IMV is that it is NOT a “system of systems” and simply an affordable force multiplier if METT-TC dictates.
I agree; IF. Big word, that...
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Historically, since they have been shown to be the most likely to be utilized, the easiest and most affordable to operate, since they do not require a unique skill set as helicopters and IFVs do, why not make them organic? This means the operators will in-fact have infantry skills. Don’t need them, don’t use them. Need them, and if they are not available, that’s were situations like Somalia and the 2-5 CAV QRF rescue attempt in Sadr City occur.
First, I'd say the 'historical' resord is brief and unclear. Second, depends on how much you want to pay for something you may not need. Or may not do all you think it will do. Can't comment on either Somalia or Sadr City, wasn't there. Found out a long time ago that expounding on actions one was not in was foolish -- commenting on actions one was in can even bring conflicting views from others who saw different things.
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One more question.. you state
""Track drivers were poorly trained, tactically speaking ... They will still suffer the fact that they have no loyalty to the unit being transported -- and that does make a difference; a big difference.""
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But then you state
""A Mech platoon at company level or a mech company at Bn level is, IMO, an invitation to trouble because, as many point out, Mech and Inf are two entirely different doctrines. Added complication at Bn and below is best avoided.""
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IFVs are aggressive fighting vehicles, so why is the first quote be relevant to them?
It isn't, the first quote was relevant only to the "put the infantry in carriers of some sort and operated by dedicated crews that are not a part of the transported unit" method. The second applied to Mech units with organic vehicles.
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They are designed to get in and mix it up with the enemy. If you do not want to lose the cohesion and training for infantry platoons, then you have to separate the IFVs (and the unique skill sets required to operate them well) and the Infantry squads.
Strongly disagree, the carrier of whatever type (and, if any, its weapons) and from where ever becomes part of the tactical operation; they and the dismounts have to train and, when possible, rehearse, together.
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Even if they stay in the platoon, the manning can’t come out of the individual squads, or else you are never capable of dismounting an effective infantry squad/platoon, period.
Yep.
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So the question is, what is your suggestion to reduce the infantry manpower and skill drain in the Mech units? Having the troops rotate between light and heavy outfits is a good start but it only addresses part of the issue. What else is there? You have been around for a variety of concepts, what works best in your eyes?
Dismounted and mounted infantry are two different animals and they have many interchangeable or transportable skills but different mindsets pertaining to operating techniques. Mech is mechanized and foot infantry isn't; three versus 30 clicks an hour; aggressively attacking versus letting the weapons do the work; bypass, regas and haul ass; lot of differences.
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ALL infantry is walking infantry since they require essentially the same skill set and there job starts once they "dismount".
Yes and no. Many skills do transfer but all do not. The mindset does not transfer. Quite simply, in my experience foot infantry is more aggressive and less risk averse than mech infantry. Mech Infantry is needed and has many advantages not least the mobility and the firepower and log support to troops supplied by the vehicles -- but those troops are tied to those vehicles. One can argue about the length of that tie but it is always and emphatically there. Size of the vehicle is usually going to limit the number of dismounts; five (the current norm, all things considered) per track gives you about 20-25 per mech platoon versus about 35-40 for a fairly full rifle platoon. That slight edge in strength give the foot guys more wiggle room and better ability to absorb casualties or other losses and still get a job done.
For a whole lot of reasons, I disagreed with the decision to do away with the 11M MOS. IMO that was done not because there was a recognition that there were not two discrete types of infantry in the US army but to make Infantry OSUT cheaper by single tracking and giving the Per Squirrels the ability to transfer square pegs to round holes at will. The mentality is, as I said, different...
As far as I'm concerned, Mech Infantry should be Armored Infantry and, while if I were King, I'd do away with Branches all together, if we have to have branches, the Heavy divisions ought to be Armor pure, including the foot combat dismounts.
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All Infantry needs to be able to utilize IFVs, IMVs and aircraft if the TA-DA! METT-TC determines them to be valuable. The ability to dismount and fight effectivly are determined more by..TA-DA again! training, training and training.
P.S. Do I get my toaster yet?:wry:
No -- but drop the IFVs out and that last paragraph got you closer... :D
Only a slight modification...
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
So does this mean the the medieval and ancient distinction of "heavy infantry" and "light infantry".
That would work but being a traditionalist (when it suits... ;) ) I'd go for Infantry (period) and Dragoons.
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If so, this does have considerable merit. We'd have
"light infantry" with effective protected mobility to enable their light infantry mission - IMVs. "heavy infantry" optimised to operate with armour formations.
Change to:
Infantry, primarily foot mobile but able to quickly adapt to air or vehicle (including IMV) operations as the mission requires. Dragoons, primarily mounted in vehicles but prepared to dismount to provide close in protection for Armored formations and to provide limited range dismounted action on infantry like missions (added: ) as a component of Armored forces. The Armored force may be mounted in wheeled or tracked vehicles; the defining factor being their training and equipment aimed at highly mobile and predominantly mounted combat.
Armor also needs mounted engineer / pioneer types, specifically trained for the mission. I'm still searching for a name. Neither Drappers nor Sagoons seems to work very well... :D
As a Sapper I can tell you
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Armor also needs mounted engineer / pioneer types, specifically trained for the mission. I'm still searching for a name. Neither Drappers nor Sagoons seems to work very well... :D
that you are spot on with that observation! Ken, please don't do us anymore favours with 'new' names, we are happy enough with the one we have.
Now you are just being silly .....really
I am not sure that changing the name would help the infantry or cavalry anyway - they are quite used to yelling out 'Follow the Sapper...." when things need to get moving.:p
Dragoons, Wilf, Dragoons...
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
That is doctrinally incorrect and illogical. Infantry are that component of the combined arms team that fights on foot. Protecting armour is not, and never should be their "primary mission."
Dragoons to the rescue!!! :D
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These are all things that any good infantry formation should be able to achieve. They are all issues merely associated with training, equipment and organisation. Again, fighting on foot is the key issue.
Agreed. The 'light Infantry' (US version, which isn't really that light) is a semantic construction created in the 1970s to justify the slicing of TOEs to the bone to produce 12 (lighter) US Army Divisions from 8 (heavier). The result was nine man vs. the earlier and far better 11 man Squads and a structure unable to sustain itself.
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I am fairly astounded by these pronouncements. Infantry are the most numerous, and most flexible element of the combined arms team. I am very much of the view that everyone exists to support the infantry as, only the infantry can deliver military capability in a spectrum of violence and across almost all terrain.
I agree with HDV that there may be three types, in some minds. However for that construct to be valid we have to do some pretty poor reasoning and this is not what the reality should reflect.
Wass de Czege was justifying in salable form, the retention of a more robust Infantry Division without treading on the toes of either the Infantry School (who had earlier justified the 'light' foolishness) or the Armor School (Clank, clank -- but without giving them Dragoons... ;) ).
Gotta solve the close in protection of Armor
I'm not sure armour is the problem
I think MBTs and infantry should be mutually supporting. Under most conditions neither has primacy. MICVs are a sort of chimera I am still trying to wrestle with. My first thought was "they work but they shouldn't". I know have a better of idea of how well they work, and what it actually costs the infantry to get there. MRAPs are actually the object lesson in this regard. They are APCs.
Where is sit right now, is that the man getting out of a M2 should not be an infantryman, and the M2 should be an M3. Same goes for UK Warrior but that's another can of worms.
Questions for Lyall/Wilson
Some issues with Dr. Lyall's/LTC Wilson's thesis:
Theory:
1) Given the changes in regime types, international order, information distribution, public goods, and international laws over the same time period (1918+), why do you think Mechanization is the causative factor of declining COIN performance?
2) What was the rationale of counting settlements as losses? If they are coded as wins, does the data result change? What was the criteria of defining a win/loss/draw?
3) Why would a foraging army, taking goods from the populace, gain cooperation from the same? If you steal my stuff, I'm certainly not giving you intel willingly, unless you suggest coercive methods are used. Why do foragers obtain better information, as you suggest? Or are you suggesting mechanization also reduces use of coercive intelligence gathering?
4) Are certain COIN tactics used in the 19th Century still usable today? The campaigns against the Native American tribes were extremely successful COIN, but certainly the methods used are taboo in the 20th century. Does this affect your argument?
5) Is a better determinant of mechanization's effect on a force the assessment of the opponent it will likely fight? If one has a largely mechanized force, he envisions fighting a similar enemy in decisive battle. Therefore doctrine and training align against the most dangerous threat, which is usually conventional. Therefore heavily mechanized armies are less likely to study/practice for COIN. This is far more plausible than foraging/logistics as an explanation for any declining COIN performance associated with vehicles.
Case Study:
1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?
2) Why are officers, identically educated and often assigned between light and heavy units during careers, allegedly worse at COIN when paired with vehicles in OIF?
3) How do you explain the major COIN success of 3d ACR in Tal Afar (2005), the most mechanized unit of its size in the Army? What about 1/1 AD in Ramadi (2006-2007)? There are more examples, but these are the most striking.
4) How does the performance of the light 82d Airborne in OIF 1 contrast with the 101st AA, and the performance of 4th ID with the similarly configured 1AD in 2003-2004? What about the performance of later mechanized formations?
5) Why did some units of the 101st turn in a mediocre to poor COIN performance during 2005/2006? What changed in 2004-2005 that so altered the COIN ability of this division? (Think COL Steele)
6) What are the policy implications of your paper? How should the Army configure its units for COIN? Should Armor be reduced or eliminated from the battlefield?
7) Are mechanized units more or less able to adapt to an insurgent environment than light units? Why? What recent performance data bears this out?
8) How does the counterguerrilla performance of 11ACR in Vietnam align with your argument?
Just a few of the issues raised in our response, which I can send PM to those interested but not publish yet.