Planning and the proverbial "Squirrel!"

First, if you don’t get the “Squirrel!” reference, watch this….

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaAxzIFgNso

I’m doing some research for a paper on the negative impact of technology on the art of planning. In particular, I’m focusing on how “current operations” centers embedded within various command posts have become bright, shiny objects that distract higher-level commanders and others from their roles in leading planning efforts.

I’ve noticed command posts (TOC, COC, JOC, AOC, etc.) have come to look the same over the last 10 years…just at different scales. Walk in any of them and you’ll find rows and rows of positions with multiple flat screen monitors at each…plasma screens on the front wall showing “Pred porn”…and some sort of “battle cab” in the back. The amount of information ingested into these operations centers is enormous….requiring not only dozens of personnel at each location to cope with it, but dozens more to feed them and keep them running.

The advent of blimps and other full motion video assets is compounding the problem…

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/20101003.aspx

To make matters worse, there are several programs that are coming down the road that could potentially exacerbate the bias for current over future ops (I won't mention them here). As distant commanders believe they have more influence on the real-time fight because of “enhanced situational awareness and decision making tools,” boundaries of behavior for those actually in the fight are likely to become more narrow. In other words, ROE will likely become even more restrictive. Decision cycles, as a result, are going to grow so that commanders can pursue perfect information in order to make perfect decisions…as if this were ever possible. Lower-level initiative is going to be stifled just at the time it’s needed the most.

Maybe the most troubling aspect of this phenomenon is that the organizational seam between current ops and planning results in bad decisions on the fly. The shift-working current ops crowd hasn’t invested the intellectual capital into the operational environment that the planners have…they are too busy chasing squirrels. So when it’s time to take action, lets say against a high-value target, those directing the action may not understand potential consequences as well as others who have been studying it for a longer period.

That said, to keep from making this more of a doom and gloom discussion, I’d like to look to the crowd for solutions. At the end of the day, technology is a good thing...if we put it in the right context. How do we take the goodness of technology without falling victim to the belief we can “control” the fight? Is there an example of a command post organizational construct where current and future ops (planners) live in harmony? How can technology assist in this regard? My gut tells me the answer may lie in collaborative planning…but there hasn’t been much thought placed into that concept from what I can tell…I could be wrong.

It's an issue I wrestled with for years. However, two initial items based on my observation of the phenomena you mention:

I've seen Planning Cells as a major problem for over 40 years. Three points on that:

- The information explosion of the last 20 plus years has provided headquarters at all levels with more 'data' than they can absorb or process and the Army has failed miserably at providing effective filters for that. Filters must insure information is sent where it is needed as opposed to where the capability allows it to be sent.

- As we got effectively over-Officered (with respect to the Leader:Led ratio) during Viet Nam when restrictions were lifted and then hung onto those extra spaces post VN and even post 1989 (as a mobilization hedge -- needed but there are better ways to do that), the Army had to find something for these not fully employed, smart, able and energetic folks to do -- so it increased the size of Staffs across the board, needed or not. Most combat echelons now have Staff numbers virtually double their WW II -pre 1975 numbers. I very strongly doubt efficiency or effectiveness have doubled.:rolleyes: Staff size should be reduced.

- Planning Cells may be worthwhile at Theater level but I doubt it. They can be worthwhile at Corps level, mission dependent. They are almost never beneficial at Div and lower levels. A far better process is to have two Operational Cells which rotate in a Planning / Preparation phase and an Execution phase. The guys and gals that plan Operation Wednesday take charge and execute it while the other crowd reverts to planning for the next opn or time period. I've seen that work in large and small Hq, in peace and in war. You planned, you know the ins and outs and you know you have to execute it -- so you planned sensibly and you know the Plan. There should be no plans cell, merely alternating operations teams or cells.

Then there's this:

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As distant commanders believe they have more influence on the real-time fight because of “enhanced situational awareness and decision making tools,” boundaries of behavior for those actually in the fight are likely to become more narrow. In other words, ROE will likely become even more restrictive. Decision cycles, as a result, are going to grow so that commanders can pursue perfect information in order to make perfect decisions…as if this were ever possible. Lower-level initiative is going to be stifled just at the time it’s needed the most.

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That too is a forty year old and increasingly bad problem. It is a chimera and one would think that the last few years would have shown senior folks that theory just does not work. In addition to removing decision makers from direct contact and thus adversely impacting their SA, it is a terribly bad impactor on the morale and attitude of the troops -- not to mention its adverse effects on retention. Unless the US Army adopts AND ENFORCES a 'one-two up, one-two down rule' wherein Commanders must talk to their immediate higher and lower headquarters only, with ability to go up or down one more echelon in an emergency, the problem will exacerbate, initiative at lower echelons will be stifled and the Army will continue to drive out really good people who see the terrible flaws in overly centralized control.

The trend developed after the lines stabilized in Korea when the Flag Officers found they had little to do so they developed the habit of interference as opposed to trust and delegation. Viet Nam, better radios and Helicopters only made that worse and thirty plus years of peace and generally poor training have elevated it to the point of, IMO, military embarrassment. The situation exists as a result of mediocre training and long peacetime service causing many commanders to have little faith in the ability or judgment of their subordinates. There are too many of them (that Leader:Led ratio again) and they're smart aggressive guys who have been trained to do something even if it's wrong. Only firm positive action, policies and enforcement from the top will preclude excessive centralization over control.

This is one of the situations where a legacy of the First World War still works, the old five-paragraph field order. Too many staff people and modern commo means that a paper version of a modern OPLAN or OPORD with all of their appendices and tabs would require two deuce-and-a-halfs to deliver them to subordinate HQs.

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Originally Posted by Jobu

I’m doing some research for a paper on the negative impact of technology on the art of planning. In particular, I’m focusing on how “current operations” centers embedded within various command posts have become bright, shiny objects that distract higher-level commanders and others from their roles in leading planning efforts.

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You need to read this. PM if you want to speak to the author and few other folks in this field, plus I have done some work on it as well.

Manstein wrote in his memoir "Verlorene Siege" about an army group commander (I think v. Rundstedt) that he did sometimes leave the HQ for a walk to distance himself from the daily activities there and to clear the mind. I assume that certain general's preference for physical workout serves a similar purpose.


The Reichswehr/Wehrmacht leadership style which included the presence of high-ranking officers at the scene of an anticipated Schwerpunkt battle certainly helped as well. There were sometimes army commander, corps commander, division commander and battalion commander at a forward battalion commander's observation post to observe a critical attack (such as a river crossing).
This did - unlike watching a drone footage in a theatre HQ - remove them from their own staffs. Their chief of staff would usually have full competence to run the army/corps/division in their absence, save for the units who were in the commander's reach.

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Most combat echelons now have Staff numbers virtually double their WW II -pre 1975 numbers. I very strongly doubt efficiency or effectiveness have doubled. Staff size should be reduced.

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No question in my mind. There are too many people wasting space at the larger bases. Many of them are there to feed the "battle rhythm" (a great oxymoronic term)...which turns out to be a series of briefings and meetings intended to cope with the vast amounts of information. There are tons of worker bees counting the beans...developing data-dependent processes that require subordinate units to feed the beast. The worker bees settle into a routine and turn their brains off for 6 months to a year. It quickly becomes ineffective and inefficient just like any other bureaucracy. Organizational seams increase in number and severity.

So maybe it's time to do what most organizations find useful in times like these...cut out middle management. That may force better collaboration between staff functions...and force the commanders to get their head out of the battle rhythm every now and then.

Regarding five-paragraph operations orders and the First World War -- Google books has a history of the 33rd U.S. Infantry Division during that war. The book has an appendix with division and corps field orders, many of which are written in the five-paragraph format. There is circumstantial evidence that the British taught us that format but I have't been able to nail that down yet.

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Originally Posted by Pete

Regarding five-paragraph operations orders and the First World War -- Google books has a history of the 33rd U.S. Infantry Division during that war. The book has an appendix with division and corps field orders, many of which are written in the five-paragraph format. There is circumstantial evidence that the British taught us that format but I have't been able to nail that down yet.

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Gold dust mate. Got a link?

The 33rd ID history is somewhere on Google books. You'll have to set up a Google account, which is free. Sign up for a free gmail email account, that's all it takes. Occasionally people outside of the U.S. have trouble viewing Google books -- it may be due to different countries' versions of copyright law.

The French taught us the G1, G2, G3 and G4 form of staff organization during WW I. Guys may recall that French army intelligence is called the Deuxieme Bureau.

but don't gnaw at the hand that feeds you - gnawing at little red riding hoods is OK.

Illinois in the World War: an illustrated history of the thirty ..., Volume 1 By States Publications Society (pp. i-396, 30mb pdf)

Illinois in the World War: an illustrated history of the thirty ..., Volume 2 By States Publications Society (pp. 397 et seq, 30mb pdf)

Illinois in the World War: This history of the 33rd division, A.E.F., by Frederick Louis Huidekoper (12mb pdf) (Appendices I-XVII).

The history of the 33rd division, A.E.F., by Frederick Louis Huidekoper (10mb pdf) (Appendices XIX-XLIII).

and a bonus (32 ID in WWI - our Mich-Wis division)

The 32nd Division in the World War, 1917-1919 By Wisconsin War History Commission, Michigan War History Commission (17mb pdf) (our local Upper Mich 107th Engineers, still active including our local sapper company, is rostered in the 32ID at p.30 pdf)

Co. C, 127th Infantry, in the World War: a story of the 32nd Division and a complete history of the part taken by Co. C., Paul W. Schmidt (12mb pdf)

Cheers

Mike

Cheers JMM

Thanks Mike. I had been racking my brain trying to find where I had seen this stuff on the net two years ago.

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This is one of the situations where a legacy of the First World War still works, the old five-paragraph field order. Too many staff people and modern commo means that a paper version of a modern OPLAN or OPORD with all of their appendices and tabs would require two deuce-and-a-halfs to deliver them to subordinate HQs.

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I think a mission type order (in a narrative format like the five-paragraph order) can create a lot of harmony and overcome a lot of seams...for a short period. The staffing process to keep it updated with FRAGOs or complete re-writes is not feasible these days to keep pace with the fight...or organizational entropy.

The planning happening at the lowest levels is more critical than what happens higher up. The lower-level unit's order has a limited scope...its authority won't cover all the assets/units they need they need for support.

C2 lines are messy (arguably they always are). There has to be a better way of getting commander's intent out. Maybe FRAGOs should be replaced by blogs and tweets :rolleyes:.

If it's more than a quarter of a page in total, it's too long. :eek:

Somewhere from the late 80s to mid 90s we became the Russians.

We went from a commander-centric execution/end-state focused organization to a staff-focused planning centric one.

We even publish it two FM now as oppoed to one.:eek:

Orders and the "Orders Process" grew. So staffs grew, so more annexes could be written/published etc.

Brigade level and below should be able to crank-out an robust FRAGO in 2 hours or less. Companies should be able to issue their orders within an hour of getting theirs from higher and it should never be longer then 30 munites. Oral only at company level.

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Originally Posted by TAH

Oral only at company level.

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...there may be a better way to say that! :eek:

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

...there may be a better way to say that! :eek:

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filthy beast...

Hmm, I read an article in Armor Magazine (or was it infantry?) from the 90's which was about how a U.S. division fought its way through France and Germany iirc almost entirely without written orders.

I do also recall a document about a U.S. Corps wargame from about 82' where the U.S. corps in Germany had invited iirc Balck and v.Mellenthin to participate. The two veterans stressed how decision-making had to be done in a few minutes, and both the two veterans and the American team were able to put together a mobile defence battle plan for the corps in a few minutes. The veteran's plan was more daring and radical, but both chose the same basic approach.

Officers up to army commander level (above corps) had issued 'spoken' orders without written backup regularly in WW2; in Wehrmacht, Waffen SS and Patton.


Now, could someone please tell me why only written orders should be used above Coy level? TAH?

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

Now, could someone please tell me why only written orders should be used above Coy level? TAH?

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Very simple, Fuchs. CYA.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cover_your_ass ?

So why exactly should a modern officer in a should-be command system have a need to cover his rear like that when officers who served under a murderous, micro-management-obsessed dictator didn't?


Isn't "CYA" an explanation for an interim solution instead of for a really good command system?

edit: Lest I forget; aren't spoken orders not actually preferable for "CYA" because their existence can be denied?

Because it's the business school mentality that's been drilled into the US forces since the middle 1950s, Fuchs. That's why. And no, I don't support it or believe in it. You would be sadly confused if you thought I believed that the current "system" was a good thing.

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Originally Posted by Jobu

I think a mission type order (in a narrative format like the five-paragraph order) can create a lot of harmony and overcome a lot of seams...for a short period. The staffing process to keep it updated with FRAGOs or complete re-writes is not feasible these days to keep pace with the fight...or organizational entropy.

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To keep pace with the fight, or the information overload that we have these days? When fax machines began showing up in the field in 1983 I could see that the floodgates were just starting to open up, information-wise.

So how much of the staff problem is a result of the growth of peace-time staffs to handle increased admin requirements? It seems to me that peace-time staffs have gotten bigger even since I first came on active duty in late '91. All those people on peace-time staffs don't go away in war time. Commanders would be used to using them and they themselves would want to insert themselves into the process. It seems only natural that as peace-time staffs get bigger, war-time staffs will increase also.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

Hmm, I read an article in Armor Magazine (or was it infantry?) from the 90's which was about how a U.S. division fought its way through France and Germany iirc almost entirely without written orders.

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It was by Don Vandergriff in ARMOR about a decade ago about MG Wood and 4th Armored Division. I have it in my files somewhere. Will try and find a link.

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To keep pace with the fight, or the information overload that we have these days? When fax machines began showing up in the field in 1983 I could see that the floodgates were just starting to open up, information-wise.

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That's a good question...and one that goes back to my original point. Are we in an age where it is expected to both digest and produce a large amount of info (for CYA and other reasons)? Does that explain the large staff sizes? Is there any turning back? I'm not sure using the excuse that there's too much info will hold water these days.

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Originally Posted by Jobu

Is there any turning back? I'm not sure using the excuse that there's too much info will hold water these days.

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Probably not, we simply haven't got enough info to make that case.:eek::p

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Originally Posted by Jobu

That's a good question...and one that goes back to my original point. Are we in an age where it is expected to both digest and produce a large amount of info (for CYA and other reasons)? Does that explain the large staff sizes? Is there any turning back? I'm not sure using the excuse that there's too much info will hold water these days.

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Staffs are large because commanders are asking them to do a lot. They are large because we have rank-inflation, with three-stars doing a one-star job and so forth. They are large because we are doing things jointly, which requires more liaison and coordination. They are large because it is much easier to start doing things than it is to stop doing things. They are large because the headquarters they service don't have to move.

They are large because commanders have the leisure to micromanage (see rank inflation, above). They are large because many of the functions that used to be performed by subordinate units are now performed by staffs. They are large because our current operations are labor-intensive when it comes to staff work; you can't do key leader engagement, for instance, with a computer program.

They are also large because a lot of information is coming into the headquarters, but any body who thinks that is the prime mover is mistaken. It is much more a result of American military culture meeting Parkinson's Law

edited away

True enough, Jobu, but some information is a lot more important than other information. "Glass cockpit synrome" is said to happen when a pilot becomes overloaded with information; it also happens to air traffic controllers or new lieutenants in FDCs. In the Army people are supposed to stay in their own lanes and do their jobs to the best of their ability, including staff officers working in their comparatively trivial niches. The net result is that we're overwhelming ourselves with our own staff processes.

When the COIN manual was being conceptualized I believe Gen. Mattis said that journalists made some of the best contributions, probably because they'e big-picture guys who don't stay in narrow little lanes.

http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa...00/5wood00.pdf

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After viewing his division’s first written order in combat, MG John S.
Wood, commander of the 4th Armored Division, told his G3 (operations officer)
not to issue any more. Wood believed the formatted, five-paragraph
order taught to U.S. Army officers at the Command and General Staff College
at Fort Leavenworth would only slow down his division’s decision cycle
in combat.
The fact that MG Wood could dispense with written orders while leading
his division across France highlights the level of training, cohesion, and education
that a unit would need to achieve in order to execute verbal mission orders.
The 4th Armored Division’s “daring, hard-riding, fast-shooting style” was
made possible through the execution of mission orders. But only by “throwing
away the book,” ironically, did the division accomplish the armored warfare
envisioned by the writers of FM 17-100, Armored Command Field Manual,
The Armored Division.2

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The war exposed Regular officers to responsibilities far beyond anything
they had experienced, and forced them to rely on subordinates who were
essentially commissioned amateurs.
Most division commanders and their regimental commanders, who were
largely pre-war regulars, turned toward authoritarian, top-down methods of
command. They issued detailed orders, insisted on unquestioned obedience,
and used their staff officers to check on compliance. Reposing trust and confidence
in a subordinate entailed the possibility that he might fail, and embarrass
his ambitious superiors with their eyes on one of the many commands
being formed.13
Wood was the exception to this trend, taking the pain of creating autonomy
that would allow his officers to learn from their mistakes. He won their loyalty,
and developed subordinate leaders not afraid to take risks in the face of
German actions.

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Wood speeded up decisions by using this ability to change task organizations
to solve a particular tactical problem. From the first day of his command,
Wood did his utmost to ensure that his commanders and their staffs were not
focused on processes or formulas. Wood understood that over time,
through constant training, officers memorized and verbalized a seemingly
complex decision-making process He was against these tidy methods of control
and written prescriptions for ensuring control.

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The division trained on how to task organize for a particular
mission, and then, on Wood’s orders, reform the task forces while on the
move to meet a new threat. Wood did this with no fancy briefings or lengthy
rehearsals. He used the radio, and face to-face oral instructions to train his
division to operate without written directives.
Speed was always on Wood’s mind as he trained, not just speed of
motion, but speed in everything the division executed. The training enabled
the division’s officers to do away with many standardized procedures that
would slow down their actions, such as abiding by strict radio procedures.
For example, Wood’s battalion commanders and the division command
learned to recognize each other by voice — authentication by familiarization.
This increased flexibility, and translated into the ability of commanders
to change directions more quickly, without worrying that the orders received
were false. Rapid decisionmaking increased with operating procedures
that eased the ability of commanders to make decisions. This translated
into fluid tactics.

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The article is probably a bit coloured by the fact that Vandergriff is a Maneuver Warfare mafia guy.

Keep in mind that Wood commanded the 4th Armored Division during Third Army's breakout from Normandy and the exploitation across France, a very fast-moving time when Third Army would literally advance right off the maps it had. Wood was removed from command during the more static campaign in Lorraine in the vicinity of Metz for arguing with his corps commander, a man who also was sent home a couple of months later for health reasons. Wood was upset by how his 4th Armored was being repeatedly used as a fire brigade to bail out less dynamic units. At the time the fuel and ammunition shortage and a reconstituted German line had slowed things to a crawl.

Quick question-

I have heard that the 5 paragraph order and the MDMP process were developed in case the Big One kicked off vs. the USSR. The story was that if the IRR/inactive reserves were activated the AD cadres could use MDMP as a simple way of leading the not as proficient callups.

Any truth to this? Thanks!

V/R,

Cliff

The five-paragraph field order dates from the First World War. It can also be found in the World War II version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations.

At times saying you need more data upon which to form an informed analysis is a kind of bureaucratic and CYA cop-out. In the DoD operations research and R&D communities it is a standard excuse for excusing oneself in advance for not having for not having been an omniscient genius. Take your ORSA and shove it, give me a good infantry battalion or brigade S-3 operations NCO with field experience.

In any event, most of the bottom lines of DA-level operations research analyses during the last 40 years have been rigged in advace to confirm what the powers-that-be had already decided they wanted them to be. It's a standard joke with the DA ORSA guys: "What answer do you want it to be?"

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Originally Posted by Pete

Take your ORSA and shove it...

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I love it! If I had a dollar every time I'd like to use that phrase...

How often do we see assessment teams (including modeling and sims) run amok...in cost/time/effort...all to turn out something that is tossed aside because intuitively it just isn't right?

Undoubtedly, that becomes a massive distraction here in the Beltway...how much is it so in the field these days? More so than current ops?

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Originally Posted by Tom Odom

filthy beast...

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especially if we allow females into the Combat Arms :D

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Originally Posted by Cliff

Quick question-

I have heard that the 5 paragraph order and the MDMP process were developed in case the Big One kicked off vs. the USSR. The story was that if the IRR/inactive reserves were activated the AD cadres could use MDMP as a simple way of leading the not as proficient callups.

Any truth to this? Thanks!

V/R,

Cliff

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MDMP is nothing ore then the classic scientific method of problem sovling with different names for the steps.

Two problems/issues with that.

They are both designed to provide the "Best" solution as opposed to a workable solution. Its efficency versus effectiveness. You can be effective and inefficent at the same time. What commanders need in most cases is a workable solution NOW not a better one in a couple of hours.

The other problem is the issue of time. MDMP doe not really account to time. The commander who employs a workable solution NOW will most likely be done and on to the next task/mission before the "Better" guy even gets he order published.

Read a guy named Gary Klein. He defines a much better decision making method he calls recogniztion primed. Much better but assumes a high level of subject matter expertise. Much higher then is commonly found in our Army and it staffs today. Too many people move or change jobs too often to make Klein's method work. :(

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Much better but assumes a high level of subject matter expertise. Much higher then is commonly found in our Army and it staffs today. Too many people move or change jobs too often to make Klein's method work.

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True indeed. MDMP is a patch to fix that through process; it fails in that it gets abbreviated to meet time constraints. Meanwhile the personnel system has institutionalized the duality of inexperience and ignorance to create stupidity. Inexperienced people take over new jobs as staff officers and commanders, essentially beginning with a base plate of ignorance that they overcome via experience learning. As soon as they have time to really understand their job, they move on to the next. That system defines stupidity. MDMP is merely a bandaid on a sucking chest wound.

Tom

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Originally Posted by Tom Odom

True indeed. MDMP is a patch to fix that through process; it fails in that it gets abbreviated to meet time constraints. Meanwhile the personnel system has institutionalized the duality of inexperience and ignorance to create stupidity. Inexperienced people take over new jobs as staff officers and commanders, essentially beginning with a base plate of ignorance that they overcome via experience learning. As soon as they have time to really understand their job, they move on to the next. That system defines stupidity. MDMP is merely a bandaid on a sucking chest wound.

Tom

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MDMP is a great way for a group of amateurs with alot of time on their hands to use a structured lock-step way to analze a situation and over look absolutely anything, even stuff that should be overlooked. :D

How is it that men who need something like the MDMP get to be officers?

In all fairness to people who work in the operations research field, they do challenging work and their analyses provide useful points of view for assessing processes. However, the executive summaries of their reports should not be regarded as the revealed truth or as tablets that came down from Mount Sinai, they're merely another way of looking at things.

Operations research is said to have begun when the German army developed its mobilization schedules for deploying units using its railroads prior to the First World War. During World War II in the U.S. the technique was useful for coordinating the delivery of weapons and equipment with personnel accessions and individual training so that units could be activated quickly without lots of "hurry up and wait." That's what I believe MacNamara did during World War II.

However, when operations research is taken outside of organizational and manufacturing processes, such as when it is used for assessing combat operations, it becomes more problematic -- how do you quantify and weight all the different variables? How do you factor in the element of contingency and random events, the "sh*t happens" factor? MacNamara and his Whiz Kids found that out during Vietnam.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

How is it that men who need something like the MDMP get to be officers?

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(I've been trying to figure that out for years... :D).

Don't pin all the blame on MDMP, it's a good process. Blame the CTCs for making the rigorous step-by-step application of MDMP the standard of success.

The problem is not that we codified a logical planning process, but rather that we made the full and rigorous application of it the measure of success over the results of actual operations on the ground. Guys with Patton like talent were deemed "lucky" if the skipped steps but kicked ass. Guys who methodically plodded thru the system but lacked any artistry in vision or execution began to move toward the top.

MDMP is good stuff. Our love of objective metrics, doctrine, and the classis win-lose senior rater profile are the real culprits here.

Right on the money...:cool:

I've been doing some research on a related topic. I believe the staff issue is part of a larger culture issue. I believe our root problem is that we collectively think of the Army as a mechanical or biological system, when it is not.

We use mental models to conceptualize complex systems. This allows us to mentally simulate actions in our minds in order to predict likely outcomes. Our collective mental model of the Army is that of a mechanism or an organism. We trend toward organism, but there are elements of mechanistic models within the Army system. I won't go into the history of why this is. Suffice it to say it is a combination of Jominian influence and 20th century management thinking.

This mental model is implicit - you won't find it written down anywhere, but the evidence is all around us. We use terms like "Esprit de Corps" (Spirit of the Body). Elements in our formations are "organic." Command and control happens at the "Head" Quarters. The Captain (from the latin caput or head) leads the company (from the latin corpus or body)

This is not just a matter of semantics - it explains a great deal about why we operate the way we do, including the large (and growing) size of our staffs. The headquarters is the "brain" of the operation. The brain is the only place in the body where decisions are made, therefore, it must have a constant flow of information. Mission command, or empowering subordinates to take initiative within the commander's intent without having to ask permission, is against our intuitive conceptualization of a biological model. The last thing we need is our right leg going off on its own, or our liver deciding that it needs to rapidly exploit an opportunity.

Biological systems work best when the parts respond with predictable regularity to every signal from the brain. Indeed, otherwise we say that the body is sick. Consider that a recently published study of students at the Army War College showed that Army leaders believed the Army culture should emphasize “flexibility, discretion, participation, human resource development, innovation, creativity, risk-taking, and a long-term emphasis on professional growth and the acquisition of new professional knowledge and skills.” However, it also found these same leaders believed that current Army culture emphasizes “an overarching desire for stability, control, formal rules and policies, coordination and efficiency, goal and results oriented, and hard-driving competitiveness. “

Current Army culture emphasizes these things because these things are desirable in a biological system.

In a biological system, the emphasis on information flow from and to the brain is the overriding factor in organizational structure. The ultimate goal is real-time omnipotence. This explains our never ending quest for the Corps Commander to have real-time predator video of your platoon operation.

What is the solution?

In a nutshell, we must recognize the Army for what it is: not an organism, but a socio-cultural system. There are three primary differences between a socio-cultural system and other systems.

1. Socio-cultural systems are composed of people who each have choices. Therefore, in order to move a socio-cultural system toward a collective purpose a leader cannot control, rather he/she must inspire in a way that subordinates choose to follow, or said another way, aligns the purposes of the agents within the system with the purpose of the system as whole.

2. Socio-cultural systems are bonded by information, versus physical and chemical bonding in biological systems. Therefore, leaders must communicate with subordinates. This does not mean sending emails or pushing out powerpoint slides. The relationship is similar to a horse and rider, who must communicate through a series of mutually understood signals. Communication means constantly seeking and ensuring common understanding.

3. Socio-cultural systems have a common culture. Culture figures a great deal into what people do and why they do it. Two people that share a common culture are likely the perceive the same information in the same way, and therefore act in a way that benefits the system, even if they aren't in direct communication. Current Army thinking focuses on controlling behavior and choices through an ever-expanding labyrinth of complex orders, SOPs, rules, regulations, doctrine, and so on. Leaders would get much more bang for the buck focusing on building common culture, which ensures that subordinates make good decisions when they (inevitably) find themselves out of contact without a order, SOP, rule, regulation, or doctrinal manual to tell them what to do.

Not only will moving toward a socio-cultural model alleviate many of our problems, it will also enhance effectiveness. Small unit leaders and even individual Soldiers who can make on-the-spot decisions based on common culture and understanding of commander's intent (without having to ask the brain permission) are not only more effective, but they exponentially increase the decision cycle speed of the unit through reduced friction.

Apologies for the length...had to fit 4000 words worth of stuff in the post...

Although I'm not positive of it and I admit I may be wrong, I think operations research had a role in designing our personnel system, in terms of input-throughput-output. At the entrance to the personnel pipeline there are accessions, which in turn feed the scoolhouses, and after that TOE units. Throw in all the mid-career schools for different specialties and so forth, then the planning gets complicated. The system works after a fashion, but it treats everyone of the same MOS and grade as though they're interchangeable and it doesn't always put the best qualified people in the best slots. Training is another ball of wax, but that's TRADOC, not personnel.